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The author considers the modal, or ”consequence,” argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. He diagnoses the defects in van Inwagen's original formulation of the Beta principle before recasting and defending a variant of the argument in terms of two simpler closure principles governing unavoidability. After disputing Frankfurt's case against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, he argues that even if one rejects an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility, it would be implausible to conclude that responsibility is consistent with determinism.

This chapter develops the basic metaphysics of agent causation. The author analyzes causal notions generally in terms of the notion of ’causal power’ or ’causal capacity.’ The difference between event (or broadly mechanistic) causation and agent (or personal) causation concerns the way in which causal capacities are exercised. With event causation, the capacity to generate a particular effect (in some cases, from a range of possible effects) is exercised ’as a matter of course’: having the capacity in the right circumstances directly gives rise to what is either its unique characteristic effect or one of the effects within its characteristic range. By contrast, having the properties that subserve an agent‐causal capacity doesn’t produce an effect; rather, it enables the agent to freely determine an effect (within a circumscribed range).

This paper argues that to be omnipotent is to possess all the powers. This view accommodates the demands and insights of the literature on omnipotence quite well while overcoming difficulties faced by alternative accounts of omnipotence. At the same time, the account makes available equally attractive resolutions of two puzzles: one concerning the compatibility of omnipotence and perfect goodness and a second concerning the compatibility of perfect goodness and divine freedom. In the course of articulating solutions to these puzzles, novel suggestions are proposed about divine self-control and about how best to understand the principle of alternative possibilities, while engaging with relevant literature on topics such as the truth conditions of counterpossible conditionals, the neo-Aristotelian view of powers and dispositions, and the interpretation of so-called “Luther cases.”

Anselm of Canterbury holds that in order to be free and responsible, a created agent must be able to choose a se, from himself, and this requires that he confront genuinely open options such that it is entirely up to him which option he pursues. Katherin Rogers shows that the Anselmian theory subscribes to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In the recent literature, the main challenge to this principle originates with Harry Frankfurt, who challenges PAP by offering counterexamples in which a “controller” sees to it that an agent does not actually confront open options. Yet, as Frankfurt supposes, even a libertarian ought to judge that the agent is free and responsible. This challenge has evoked extensive debate in the last several decades. The Anselmian version of PAP is immune to these Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and his argument can be adapted by other species of libertarian.

This chapter surveys the various responses to hard determinism, all of which seek to salvage responsibility in the face of the thought that all of our actions and choices are caused by factors over which we have no control. Those responses are grouped into three large categories: libertarianisms, fictionalisms, and compatibilisms. Libertarians believe that we do possess contra-causal free will, at least some of the time. Fictionalists believe that we must fictionalize responsibility so that we can construct it so as to be compatible with the determination of human choice by factors themselves unchosen. Compatibilists believe that there is no contradiction between free and responsible action, on the one hand, and determination of human choice, on the other. Various subcategories of each of these groupings are explored, and a case is made to subscribe to one of the forms of compatibilism, classical compatibilism. Ten amendments are offered to classical compatibilism aimed at eliminating the many problems that have been raised for classical compatibilism these past sixty years.

This chapter presents a critical analysis of Michael Otsuka's “Principle of Avoidable Blame” (PAB). Otsuka argues that Frankfurt-type examples are indeed counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, they do not impugn PAB. The PAB states that one is blameworthy for performing an act of a given type only if one could instead have behaved in a manner for which one would have been entirely blameless. The chapter also discusses the key points of Otsuka's argument, especially the claim that PAB cannot be refuted by Harry Frankfurt's cases. It concludes that adding an alternative possibility, in which an agent “accidentally” avoids blame, cannot explain the agent's measure of blameworthiness.

The Frankfurt cases motivate the notion that we should adopt an “actual-sequence” approach to moral responsibility. On this sort of view, moral responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise; rather, it is a function of (possibly modal) characteristics of the actual sequence leading to the behavior in question. This chapter addresses a significant challenge to the actual-sequence approach; the challenge has it that we cannot extrapolate from classical Frankfurt-style cases to a conclusion about the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility, since the Frankfurt-style cases feature “counterfactual interveners,” whereas causal determination is a property of the way the actual sequence unfolds.

Chapter 9 explores the nature of the volitional excuses and whether such nature can be reconciled with the classical compatibilism explored in the last chapter. The volitional excuses are those excuses whereby the accused does not claim ignorance or mistake about the wrong-making characteristics of his actions; rather, the claim of excuse is founded on the difficulties some actors have in either choosing or doing what they know is the right thing to do. Classical compatibilism has the danger of eliminating all volitional excuses; the chapter aims to reformulate the counterfactual analysis of ability at the heart of classical compatibilism in ways that do not eliminate volitional excuses. The chapter also assays the extent to which contemporary neuroscience might aid in formulating and/or verifying the presence of, the volitional excuses.