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Agency‐Type Public Service Bargains

Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge

in The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199269679
eISBN:
9780191604096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019926967X.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic ... More


Delegation and its Peril s

Arthur Lupia

in Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
January 2005
ISBN:
9780198297840
eISBN:
9780191602016
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019829784X.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

Presents a formal theoretical framework that clarifies when principals can, and cannot, use delegation to accomplish desired ends. It shows the conditions (having to do with preferences and ... More


Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Union

Mark A. Pollack

in The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251179
eISBN:
9780191600111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251177.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, European Union

Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to ... More


 Applications

George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson

in Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2007
ISBN:
9780195300796
eISBN:
9780199783700
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0011
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics

This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, ... More


Securing Subsidiarity: The Institutional Design of Federalism in the United States and Europe

Cary Coglianese and Kalypso Nicolaidis

in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199245000
eISBN:
9780191599996
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199245002.003.0011
Subject:
Political Science, European Union

Adopts the conceptual tools of agency theory to rethink the challenge of federal governance under conditions of broad concurrency in the allocation of competences by examining the relations between ... More


Theory

Matthew Flinders

in Delegated Governance and the British State: Walking without Order

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199271603
eISBN:
9780191709241
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271603.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, UK Politics, Political Economy

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework used in this book. This consists of three complementary theoretical approaches — the Westminster Model, Historical Institutionalism, and ... More


Introduction

Mark A. Pollack

in The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251179
eISBN:
9780191600111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251177.003.0001
Subject:
Political Science, European Union

The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ... More


The Commission as an Agent: Delegation of Executive Power in the European Union

Mark A. Pollack

in The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251179
eISBN:
9780191600111
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251177.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, European Union

European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control ... More


The More Closely We Are Watched, the Better We Behave?

Andrea Prat

in Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
January 2012
ISBN:
9780197263839
eISBN:
9780191734915
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
British Academy
DOI:
10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0006
Subject:
Political Science, Political Theory

This chapter provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The conceptual tool used by economists is the principal-agent model, a game-theoretic setting in which transparency ... More


 Taking Charge

Ken Binmore

in Playing for Real: Game Theory

Published in print:
2007
Published Online:
May 2007
ISBN:
9780195300574
eISBN:
9780199783748
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300574.003.0020
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Microeconomics

This chapter introduces mechanism design, which is the subject wherein games are designed so that rational play results in socially desirable outcomes. The judgment of Solomon from the Bible is used ... More


Conclusion

Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge

in The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame

Published in print:
2006
Published Online:
September 2006
ISBN:
9780199269679
eISBN:
9780191604096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019926967X.003.0010
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

This chapter first shows what contribution a Public Service Bargain (PSB) perspective can make to the understanding of executive government. It claims that such a perspective can aid comparison, can ... More


Explaining National Behavior in Multilateral Interventions

David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman

in NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691159386
eISBN:
9781400848676
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691159386.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter draws on a variety of literatures to model the national determinants of military behavior during multilateral interventions. Theories of principal-agent relations point to the importance ... More


Principals and Agents: From the Convention’s Proposal to the Constitutional Treaty

Thomas König and Daniel Finke

in Reforming the European Union: Realizing the Impossible

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691153926
eISBN:
9781400842506
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691153926.003.0007
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter examines the transformation of the Convention's proposal on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe to the Lisbon Treaty in the aftermath of the two negative referendums from a ... More


Norms, Dispute Resolution, and Judicialization

Alec Stone Sweet

in Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780198297710
eISBN:
9780191601095
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198297718.003.0001
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

The regular and effective settlement of disputes by a third‐party dispute resolver leads to the evolution of a set of behavioural norms, which become authoritative in society. In turn, normative ... More


The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU

Mark A. Pollack

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199251179
eISBN:
9780191600111
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199251177.001.0001
Subject:
Political Science, European Union

The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ... More


Transnational Investment Arbitration: From Delegation to Constitutionalization?

Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel

in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration

Published in print:
2009
Published Online:
February 2010
ISBN:
9780199578184
eISBN:
9780191722561
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199578184.003.0007
Subject:
Law, Human Rights and Immigration, Public International Law

This chapter compares different ‘Principal-Agent’ (P-A) models of arbitration and adjudication, and then applies them as a means of focusing empirical attention on how investor-State arbitration is, ... More


The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union

Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds)

Published in print:
2001
Published Online:
November 2003
ISBN:
9780199245000
eISBN:
9780191599996
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199245002.001.0001
Subject:
Political Science, European Union

This book is about the complex and changing relationship between levels of governance in the US and the European Union. On the basis of a transatlantic dialogue between scholars concerned about modes ... More


Legislating

Alec Stone Sweet

in Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe

Published in print:
2000
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780198297710
eISBN:
9780191601095
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0198297718.003.0003
Subject:
Political Science, Comparative Politics

The growing interdependence between law‐making and constitutional judging is explored, proceeding from the view that constitutional courts ought to be conceptualized as specialized legislative ... More


Democracies Are Not Created Equal: A Theory of Democratic Constraint

Matthew A. Baum and Philip B. K. Potter

in War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy

Published in print:
2015
Published Online:
October 2017
ISBN:
9780691164984
eISBN:
9781400866472
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Princeton University Press
DOI:
10.23943/princeton/9780691164984.003.0002
Subject:
Political Science, International Relations and Politics

This chapter introduces a theory of democratic constraint and derives testable hypotheses. Drawing on literatures ranging from principal-agent theory to political communication and crisis bargaining, ... More


A Theory of Public Service Motivation

Julian Le Grand

in Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens

Published in print:
2003
Published Online:
April 2004
ISBN:
9780199266999
eISBN:
9780191600869
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199266999.003.0004
Subject:
Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare

Uses the material from the two previous chapters to develop a new theory of public service motivation. The theory allocates a key role to the sacrifice involved in performing altruistic acts, arguing ... More


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