Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic ...
More
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.Less
This chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.
Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199269679
- eISBN:
- 9780191604096
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926967X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter first shows what contribution a Public Service Bargain (PSB) perspective can make to the understanding of executive government. It claims that such a perspective can aid comparison, can ...
More
This chapter first shows what contribution a Public Service Bargain (PSB) perspective can make to the understanding of executive government. It claims that such a perspective can aid comparison, can be applied at various levels of aggregation, and can sharpen understanding of cheating and strategic behaviour. It then shows how the PSB perspective can add to existing analytical and comparative work on executive government. The future of PSBs is discussed and it is argued that rather than stasis, convergence, or divergence, the most likely future is one of further multiplication and, therefore, complication.Less
This chapter first shows what contribution a Public Service Bargain (PSB) perspective can make to the understanding of executive government. It claims that such a perspective can aid comparison, can be applied at various levels of aggregation, and can sharpen understanding of cheating and strategic behaviour. It then shows how the PSB perspective can add to existing analytical and comparative work on executive government. The future of PSBs is discussed and it is argued that rather than stasis, convergence, or divergence, the most likely future is one of further multiplication and, therefore, complication.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300796
- eISBN:
- 9780199783700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.003.0011
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Behavioural Economics
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, ...
More
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, oligopoly games with privately observed costs and hence adverse selection, risk sharing and insurance, and repeated principal-agent problems. The latter example also illustrates review strategies.Less
This chapter illustrates how the theory of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring can be used in economic applications. It examines collusion in oligopoly with imperfectly monitored demand, oligopoly games with privately observed costs and hence adverse selection, risk sharing and insurance, and repeated principal-agent problems. The latter example also illustrates review strategies.
Paolo Mauro, Nathan Sussman, and Yishay Yafeh
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272693
- eISBN:
- 9780191603488
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272697.003.0006
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Financial Economics
This chapter focuses on co-movement of spreads across different countries, and on the frequency of crises shared by more than one country — contagion. Overall, co-movement of spreads among emerging ...
More
This chapter focuses on co-movement of spreads across different countries, and on the frequency of crises shared by more than one country — contagion. Overall, co-movement of spreads among emerging markets was far higher in the 1990s than during the pre-World War I era. Sharp changes in spreads (or crises, defined in a number of ways) during the 1990s typically affected many countries at the same time, whereas global crises were virtually non-existent in the historical sample. An examination of whether co-movement was driven by common economic fundamentals showed that emerging markets in the past were more different from each other than their counterparts are today: they tended to specialize in a small number of export commodities. Differences in co-movement between the two periods were not driven solely by economic fundamentals, and may be accounted for by differences in investor behavior, particularly the presence of large investment funds today versus many individual investors in the past.Less
This chapter focuses on co-movement of spreads across different countries, and on the frequency of crises shared by more than one country — contagion. Overall, co-movement of spreads among emerging markets was far higher in the 1990s than during the pre-World War I era. Sharp changes in spreads (or crises, defined in a number of ways) during the 1990s typically affected many countries at the same time, whereas global crises were virtually non-existent in the historical sample. An examination of whether co-movement was driven by common economic fundamentals showed that emerging markets in the past were more different from each other than their counterparts are today: they tended to specialize in a small number of export commodities. Differences in co-movement between the two periods were not driven solely by economic fundamentals, and may be accounted for by differences in investor behavior, particularly the presence of large investment funds today versus many individual investors in the past.
Takanori Matsumoto
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198292746
- eISBN:
- 9780191603891
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292740.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
This chapter assesses the quantitative position of ‘traditional’ industries in the economy. Traditional industry — which accounted for the largest number of gainfully occupied workers — developed ...
More
This chapter assesses the quantitative position of ‘traditional’ industries in the economy. Traditional industry — which accounted for the largest number of gainfully occupied workers — developed steadily in the modern era and continued to provide opportunities to workers that were not absorbed by the modern industrial sector. The role of the traditional commerce and service industries is emphasized, which functioned as a ‘buffer’ for economic fluctuations. The regional diversity of these industries is also analyzed using the statistical method of principal component analysis.Less
This chapter assesses the quantitative position of ‘traditional’ industries in the economy. Traditional industry — which accounted for the largest number of gainfully occupied workers — developed steadily in the modern era and continued to provide opportunities to workers that were not absorbed by the modern industrial sector. The role of the traditional commerce and service industries is emphasized, which functioned as a ‘buffer’ for economic fluctuations. The regional diversity of these industries is also analyzed using the statistical method of principal component analysis.
Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245000
- eISBN:
- 9780191599996
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245002.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This book is about the complex and changing relationship between levels of governance in the US and the European Union. On the basis of a transatlantic dialogue between scholars concerned about modes ...
More
This book is about the complex and changing relationship between levels of governance in the US and the European Union. On the basis of a transatlantic dialogue between scholars concerned about modes of governance on both sides, it is a collective attempt at analysing the ramifications of the legitimacy crisis in these multi‐layered democracies, and possible remedies to this. Starting from a focus on the current policy debates over ‘devolution’ and ‘subsidiarity’, the book engages the reader into the broader tension of comparative federalism. Its authors believe that in spite of the fundamental differences between them, both the EU and the USA are in the process of re‐defining a federal vision for the twenty‐first century. The book is a contribution to the study of federalism and European integration, and seeks to bridge the divide between the two. It also bridges the traditional divide between technical, legal or regulatory discussions of federal governance and philosophical debates over questions of belonging and multiple identities. It is a multi‐disciplinary project, bringing together historians, political scientists and theorists, legal scholars, sociologists and political economists (more than 20 authors are involved), and includes both innovative analysis and prescriptions on how to reshape the federal contract in the USA and the EU. Included are introductions to the history of federalism in the USA and the EU, the current debates over devolution and subsidiarity, the legal framework of federalism and theories of regulatory federalism, as well as innovative approaches to the application of network analysis, principal‐agent models, institutionalist analysis, and political theories of citizenship to the federal context. The introduction and conclusion by the editors draws out cross‐cutting themes and lessons from the thinking together of the EU and USA experiences, and suggest how a ‘federal vision’ could be freed from the hierarchical paradigm of the ‘federal state’ and articulated around concepts of mutual tolerance and empowerment. The seventeen chapters are arranged in five sections: I. Articulating the Federal Vision (two chapters)—views of federalism in its USA and EU versions; II. Levels of Governance in the USA and the European Union: Facts and Diagnosis (four chapters)—an overview of the history and current state of federalism in the USA and EU; III. Legal and Regulatory Instruments of Federal Governance (three chapters); IV. Federalism, Legitimacy, and Governance: Models for Understanding (four chapters); V. Federalism, Legitimacy, and Identity (four chapters)—a discussion of the deeper roots of legitimacy in federal systems; there is also an appendix, which discusses the basic principles for the allocation of competence in the USA and EU.Less
This book is about the complex and changing relationship between levels of governance in the US and the European Union. On the basis of a transatlantic dialogue between scholars concerned about modes of governance on both sides, it is a collective attempt at analysing the ramifications of the legitimacy crisis in these multi‐layered democracies, and possible remedies to this. Starting from a focus on the current policy debates over ‘devolution’ and ‘subsidiarity’, the book engages the reader into the broader tension of comparative federalism. Its authors believe that in spite of the fundamental differences between them, both the EU and the USA are in the process of re‐defining a federal vision for the twenty‐first century. The book is a contribution to the study of federalism and European integration, and seeks to bridge the divide between the two. It also bridges the traditional divide between technical, legal or regulatory discussions of federal governance and philosophical debates over questions of belonging and multiple identities. It is a multi‐disciplinary project, bringing together historians, political scientists and theorists, legal scholars, sociologists and political economists (more than 20 authors are involved), and includes both innovative analysis and prescriptions on how to reshape the federal contract in the USA and the EU. Included are introductions to the history of federalism in the USA and the EU, the current debates over devolution and subsidiarity, the legal framework of federalism and theories of regulatory federalism, as well as innovative approaches to the application of network analysis, principal‐agent models, institutionalist analysis, and political theories of citizenship to the federal context. The introduction and conclusion by the editors draws out cross‐cutting themes and lessons from the thinking together of the EU and USA experiences, and suggest how a ‘federal vision’ could be freed from the hierarchical paradigm of the ‘federal state’ and articulated around concepts of mutual tolerance and empowerment. The seventeen chapters are arranged in five sections: I. Articulating the Federal Vision (two chapters)—views of federalism in its USA and EU versions; II. Levels of Governance in the USA and the European Union: Facts and Diagnosis (four chapters)—an overview of the history and current state of federalism in the USA and EU; III. Legal and Regulatory Instruments of Federal Governance (three chapters); IV. Federalism, Legitimacy, and Governance: Models for Understanding (four chapters); V. Federalism, Legitimacy, and Identity (four chapters)—a discussion of the deeper roots of legitimacy in federal systems; there is also an appendix, which discusses the basic principles for the allocation of competence in the USA and EU.
Matthew Flinders
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199271603
- eISBN:
- 9780191709241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199271603.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, UK Politics, Political Economy
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework used in this book. This consists of three complementary theoretical approaches — the Westminster Model, Historical Institutionalism, and ...
More
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework used in this book. This consists of three complementary theoretical approaches — the Westminster Model, Historical Institutionalism, and Principal-Agent Theory — which each in their own distinct way allows each chapter to dissect and tease apart the politics of delegation in Britain. Moreover, these approaches also operate at distinct levels, which again deepen our understanding of both the theory and practice of delegation.Less
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework used in this book. This consists of three complementary theoretical approaches — the Westminster Model, Historical Institutionalism, and Principal-Agent Theory — which each in their own distinct way allows each chapter to dissect and tease apart the politics of delegation in Britain. Moreover, these approaches also operate at distinct levels, which again deepen our understanding of both the theory and practice of delegation.
Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297840
- eISBN:
- 9780191602016
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829784X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often ...
More
Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. Taking principal-agent theory as its framework, the work illustrates how a variety of apparently unrelated representation issues can now be understood. This procedure allows scholarship to move well beyond what have previously been cloudy and confusing debates aimed at defining the virtues and perils of parliamentarism. This new empirical investigation includes all 17 West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and 17 country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments, which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints, such as courts, central banks, corporatism, and the European Union, which can impinge on national-level democratic delegation. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.Less
Parliamentary democracy is the most common way of organizing delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Yet knowledge of this type of regime has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. Taking principal-agent theory as its framework, the work illustrates how a variety of apparently unrelated representation issues can now be understood. This procedure allows scholarship to move well beyond what have previously been cloudy and confusing debates aimed at defining the virtues and perils of parliamentarism. This new empirical investigation includes all 17 West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and 17 country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments, which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints, such as courts, central banks, corporatism, and the European Union, which can impinge on national-level democratic delegation. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ...
More
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, as predicted by principal‐agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re‐regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue‐areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.Less
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, as predicted by principal‐agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re‐regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue‐areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the ...
More
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration.Less
The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to ...
More
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.Less
Principal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.
Mark A. Pollack
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251179
- eISBN:
- 9780191600111
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251177.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control ...
More
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.Less
European Union governments have delegated executive and agenda‐setting powers to the Commission primarily to reduce the transaction costs of policy‐making, and they have designed complex control mechanisms to limit the discretion of the Commission in the policy process. Examines the record of delegation to the Commission throughout the EU's history, measuring the extent of delegation and Commission discretion across 35 different issue‐areas. Almost without exception, member states delegate to the Commission precisely the functions hypothesized by principal‐agent models, including most notably monitoring compliance, setting the legislative agenda and laying down expert and credible market regulations. Similarly, however, the Commission is closely monitored by member governments, which have adopted a carefully designed and calibrated system of appointment and censure mechanisms, ‘comitology’ or oversight committees and administrative law and judicial review by the European Court of Justice.
Cary Coglianese and Kalypso Nicolaidis
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199245000
- eISBN:
- 9780191599996
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199245002.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
Adopts the conceptual tools of agency theory to rethink the challenge of federal governance under conditions of broad concurrency in the allocation of competences by examining the relations between ...
More
Adopts the conceptual tools of agency theory to rethink the challenge of federal governance under conditions of broad concurrency in the allocation of competences by examining the relations between states and the union as instances of principal–agent relationships, and considering the different kinds of ‘mechanisms of control’ available to the agents. After exploring the theoretical implications of principal–agent theory for issues of intergovernmental structures, an examination is made of the different tiered regimes of the USA and the EU for evidence of the mechanisms suggested by the theoretical analysis. It is argued that these tiered regimes feature several characteristic mechanisms that may help sustain the legitimacy of allocations of authority between different levels, and that the policy debate surrounding federalism should include attention to these mechanisms, along with the discussion of the appropriateness of centralization or decentralization. The different sections of the chapter are: Allocation and Legitimacy from a Principal–Agent Perspective; Mechanisms for Securing Allocational Legitimacy; and Federalism and Allocational Legitimacy.Less
Adopts the conceptual tools of agency theory to rethink the challenge of federal governance under conditions of broad concurrency in the allocation of competences by examining the relations between states and the union as instances of principal–agent relationships, and considering the different kinds of ‘mechanisms of control’ available to the agents. After exploring the theoretical implications of principal–agent theory for issues of intergovernmental structures, an examination is made of the different tiered regimes of the USA and the EU for evidence of the mechanisms suggested by the theoretical analysis. It is argued that these tiered regimes feature several characteristic mechanisms that may help sustain the legitimacy of allocations of authority between different levels, and that the policy debate surrounding federalism should include attention to these mechanisms, along with the discussion of the appropriateness of centralization or decentralization. The different sections of the chapter are: Allocation and Legitimacy from a Principal–Agent Perspective; Mechanisms for Securing Allocational Legitimacy; and Federalism and Allocational Legitimacy.
Arthur Lupia
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780198297840
- eISBN:
- 9780191602016
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019829784X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Presents a formal theoretical framework that clarifies when principals can, and cannot, use delegation to accomplish desired ends. It shows the conditions (having to do with preferences and ...
More
Presents a formal theoretical framework that clarifies when principals can, and cannot, use delegation to accomplish desired ends. It shows the conditions (having to do with preferences and information) under which agents will act in their principals’ interests and how political institutions can alleviate the perils of delegation. Finally, it discusses the implications of its theoretical insights on chains of political delegation.Less
Presents a formal theoretical framework that clarifies when principals can, and cannot, use delegation to accomplish desired ends. It shows the conditions (having to do with preferences and information) under which agents will act in their principals’ interests and how political institutions can alleviate the perils of delegation. Finally, it discusses the implications of its theoretical insights on chains of political delegation.
Andrea Prat
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263839
- eISBN:
- 9780191734915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263839.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The conceptual tool used by economists is the principal-agent model, a game-theoretic setting in which transparency ...
More
This chapter provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The conceptual tool used by economists is the principal-agent model, a game-theoretic setting in which transparency corresponds to the ability of the principal to observe what the agent does. Holmström (1979) provides a powerful and general rationale for full transparency. One can argue that the increase in accountability is not sufficient to offset other drawbacks such as the violation of privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, or the revelation of sensitive information. Alternatively, one can attack the link between transparency and accountability: it is not necessarily true that more disclosure makes the agent behave better. Holmström showed that, in a world of complete contracts, the more the principal knows about the agent, the better the agent behaves. Some objections to Holmström – the right to privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, the risk that hostile parties learn sensitive information – are perfectly valid, but they find limited application in politics, corporate governance, and other important areas.Less
This chapter provides a brief survey of the economic literature on transparency. The conceptual tool used by economists is the principal-agent model, a game-theoretic setting in which transparency corresponds to the ability of the principal to observe what the agent does. Holmström (1979) provides a powerful and general rationale for full transparency. One can argue that the increase in accountability is not sufficient to offset other drawbacks such as the violation of privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, or the revelation of sensitive information. Alternatively, one can attack the link between transparency and accountability: it is not necessarily true that more disclosure makes the agent behave better. Holmström showed that, in a world of complete contracts, the more the principal knows about the agent, the better the agent behaves. Some objections to Holmström – the right to privacy, the direct cost of disclosure, the risk that hostile parties learn sensitive information – are perfectly valid, but they find limited application in politics, corporate governance, and other important areas.
Alec Stone Sweet
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198297710
- eISBN:
- 9780191601095
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297718.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The regular and effective settlement of disputes by a third‐party dispute resolver leads to the evolution of a set of behavioural norms, which become authoritative in society. In turn, normative ...
More
The regular and effective settlement of disputes by a third‐party dispute resolver leads to the evolution of a set of behavioural norms, which become authoritative in society. In turn, normative evolution shapes how interests are formed and power operates. In the context of constitutional law and politics, this system of reciprocal influence has led to the judicialization of European politics and the constitutionalization of European law. The final section of this chapter surveys a variety of perspectives on European constitutional politics, including a principal‐agent framework, the legislative politics approach, judicial decision‐making and conceptualizing legal normative autonomy.Less
The regular and effective settlement of disputes by a third‐party dispute resolver leads to the evolution of a set of behavioural norms, which become authoritative in society. In turn, normative evolution shapes how interests are formed and power operates. In the context of constitutional law and politics, this system of reciprocal influence has led to the judicialization of European politics and the constitutionalization of European law. The final section of this chapter surveys a variety of perspectives on European constitutional politics, including a principal‐agent framework, the legislative politics approach, judicial decision‐making and conceptualizing legal normative autonomy.
Alec Stone Sweet
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198297710
- eISBN:
- 9780191601095
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198297718.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The growing interdependence between law‐making and constitutional judging is explored, proceeding from the view that constitutional courts ought to be conceptualized as specialized legislative ...
More
The growing interdependence between law‐making and constitutional judging is explored, proceeding from the view that constitutional courts ought to be conceptualized as specialized legislative organs. Judicialization also engenders and institutionalizes new modes of legislative discourse and practice. The conclusion is drawn that constitutional adjudication transformed the nature of parliamentary governance unexpectedly and with significant effects.Less
The growing interdependence between law‐making and constitutional judging is explored, proceeding from the view that constitutional courts ought to be conceptualized as specialized legislative organs. Judicialization also engenders and institutionalizes new modes of legislative discourse and practice. The conclusion is drawn that constitutional adjudication transformed the nature of parliamentary governance unexpectedly and with significant effects.
Anna Grandori and Giuseppe Soda
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269761
- eISBN:
- 9780191710087
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269761.003.0004
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Corporate Governance and Accountability
This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It ...
More
This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.Less
This chapter broadens current agency approaches by exploring the possible consequences of optimizing CG structures with ‘multiple principals’ and multiple governance and organizational mechanisms. It uses an analytical framework and an empirical study conducted in Italy, which gathers empirically the actual preferences of two samples, representative of the providers of financial and human capital, over varying policies on a variety of governance and organizational mechanisms (e.g., low to high pay for performance; low to high teamwork; low to high managerial representation in boards etc.). Preferences are cluster-analyzed and compared with actually implemented policies. Results indicate that actors' preferences converge more than conventionally expected, while they differ sharply from actually implemented policies, thereby indicating opportunities for the Pareto-improvement of CG structures.
Kenneth Lipartito and David B. Sicilia
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199251902
- eISBN:
- 9780191719059
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251902.003.0001
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Business History
In an overview of the theory and historiography of the corporation, this chapter examines contributions to understanding offered by historians, neo-classical economists, evolutionary economists, and ...
More
In an overview of the theory and historiography of the corporation, this chapter examines contributions to understanding offered by historians, neo-classical economists, evolutionary economists, and organizational sociologists. It critiques existing theories of the corporation for neglecting power and culture and for failing to understand the mutual constitution of the corporation and its environment. This discussion paves the way for a new model that recognizes the ways in which corporations are embedded in their social environment and help to constitute their environment, and how this relationship has evolved over the past 150 years. An overview of the chapters that follow is presented.Less
In an overview of the theory and historiography of the corporation, this chapter examines contributions to understanding offered by historians, neo-classical economists, evolutionary economists, and organizational sociologists. It critiques existing theories of the corporation for neglecting power and culture and for failing to understand the mutual constitution of the corporation and its environment. This discussion paves the way for a new model that recognizes the ways in which corporations are embedded in their social environment and help to constitute their environment, and how this relationship has evolved over the past 150 years. An overview of the chapters that follow is presented.
Craig T. Borowiak
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199778256
- eISBN:
- 9780199919086
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199778256.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory, International Relations and Politics
This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent ...
More
This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent framework. Within this model, accountability is treated as involving citizen “principals” holding representative “agents” to account in order to compel the agent to uphold the principal’s interests. Accountability becomes equated with punishability. The model has the benefit of illuminating how conflicting interests and informational constraints can confound the effects of electoral accountability. Nonetheless, when it comes to gaining a full picture of what democratic accountability entails, this approach has several shortcomings. It is too bound to institutional hierarchies at the expense of horizontal forms of accountability. It is too focused on disciplining officials according to the principal’s preferences, at the expense of accountability’s role in generating preferences and new forms of solidarity. It also reflects a conservative bias that favors formal institutions and that discounts accountability initiatives coming from outside established institutional structures.Less
This chapter argues that contemporary social scientific discourse has become dominated by a narrow, disciplinary model of accountability typified by the widespread use of the principal–agent framework. Within this model, accountability is treated as involving citizen “principals” holding representative “agents” to account in order to compel the agent to uphold the principal’s interests. Accountability becomes equated with punishability. The model has the benefit of illuminating how conflicting interests and informational constraints can confound the effects of electoral accountability. Nonetheless, when it comes to gaining a full picture of what democratic accountability entails, this approach has several shortcomings. It is too bound to institutional hierarchies at the expense of horizontal forms of accountability. It is too focused on disciplining officials according to the principal’s preferences, at the expense of accountability’s role in generating preferences and new forms of solidarity. It also reflects a conservative bias that favors formal institutions and that discounts accountability initiatives coming from outside established institutional structures.
