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Historically, both Belgium and the Netherlands are archetypes of ‘consociational democracies’. These are characterized by broad multi-party coalitions, numerous power-sharing devices, and fragile checks and balances in order to ensure due influence for all relevant parties and minority groups. Hence, the overarching logic of these consensus democracies seems to represent an obstacle to a process of presidentialization.

However, we argue that the need for strong leadership resulted in more prominent and powerful positions for the (parliamentary) party leaders and Prime Ministers. We present evidence of a process of presidentialization that gained momentum a decade earlier in the Netherlands (from the 1970s onwards) than it did in Belgium (from the 1980s).

It is interesting to note that the increased autonomy of Prime Ministers is not due to constitutional amendments, but tends to be linked to the increased decision-making role for the inner cabinet, the professionalization of the Prime Minister’s Office, and the growing attention the audiovisual media give to the Prime Minister.

Similarly, parliamentary party leaders in The Netherlands and extra-parliamentary party leaders in Belgium grew stronger through an accumulation of power and resources at the leader’s office, personalized campaigning and a centralization of control over inner party selection procedures, and party leadership selection.

This chapter asks a deceptively simple question: How do we understand the relationship between the prime minister, cabinet, and the rest of the Westminster system? It explores the dilemmas posed by the alleged centralization of power on prime ministers. It concludes the arguments for presidentialism are not persuasive. The chapter suggests that four factors shape and constrain both the capacity of prime ministers and the expectations about cabinet in Westminster systems: the contingent nature of ‘court politics’, traditions of leadership, competing notions of cabinet and its role as authoritative decision-maker, and territorial interdependence. There is recurring dilemmas running through the debate between Westminster and the governance tale with its stress on the prime minister as one actor embedded in, and dependent on, webs of organizations and governments. The inescapable fact for all governments, unitary or federal, is that they have to work in, with and through a complex of organizations, governments, and networks with power constrained by ever more pervasive and complex patterns of dependence.

In no parliamentary democracy has the presidentialization of politics achieved such magnitude as in Israel. In 1992, the Israeli parliament adopted a law that altered not only the electoral system but also Israel’s political framework. According to this law, Israel became the first parliamentary democracy in which the Prime Minister was directly and popularly elected. This development produced a unique political system in which a ‘presidentialized’ Prime Minister was grafted onto an essentially parliamentary democracy. This chapter addresses the following questions: First, did the political reform in the 1990s reflect a de facto change that had already taken place? In other words, is it appropriate to speak of a phenomenon of presidentialization occurring within Israel’s parliamentary democracy prior to the 1990s? Second, what were the causes and consequences of presidentialization? How did this unique system affect the political parties, electoral competition, political representation, legislative behaviour, legislative-executive relations, and other associated factors? Third, how does Israel’s experience of the presidentialization of politics compare with other modern democracies? Were the political and electoral attributes of leadership powers amplified by factors flowing from the formal change? Finally, how does Israel’s rather extreme experience of the presidentialization of parliamentary democracy contribute to the assessment of this phenomenon?

Analyses the extent to which Portuguese democracy has become presidentialized both politically and electorally. Several indicators are used to measure the growth of leadership autonomy within the party, namely, the election modes of leadership bodies; the control over candidate selection for the national parliament; the degree of autonomy to draw up the electoral programme; and the ability to decide on coalitions. Concerning the strengthening of leadership within government, the chapter explores data concerning the increase in Prime Minister’s resources. In this section, the enduring importance of senior party members within government is shown, which counters the presidentialization trend. Looking to the electoral face of presidentialization, evidence that points to the importance of leaders in the vote choice of the Portuguese electorate is presented.

Certain indicators point to greater autonomy and strength of the party leader/Prime Minister. The 1982 revision of the Constitution that circumscribed Presidential powers in ‘normal circumstances’ and the concentration of the vote in the two major parties, which has occurred since 1987, are important factors that explain the emergence of a stronger premier, and more candidate-centered electoral processes. Yet, the enduring semi-presidential nature of the regime, as well as the evidence of the importance of the party members within government, cautions against characterizing the Portuguese political system as having become fully presidentialized.

Even though structural causes of presidentialization such as the growth of the state, the development of a modern mass media, the erosion of cleavages, and the Europeanization of politics, all exist in the Danish case, the logic and reality of consensus politics means that domestic politics is still not heavily presidentialized. Presidential trends within parties are limited to a discernible strengthening of party leaders in respect of the resources available to them and their potential to influence the candidate-nomination process. In regard to the electoral process, some presidentialization is seen especially in relation to media coverage. Perceiving the way in which the media seek to personalize their coverage of politics, the parties have sought to accommodate this in their campaign strategies. The presidentialization process seems stronger in the governmental arena with a growing longevity of Prime Ministers in executive office, increasing frequency with which the premiers reshuffle their cabinets, the growing use of cabinet committees as means of executive coordination, the gradual growth of the Prime Minister’s Office, a new system by which media relations are coordinated by the Prime Minister’s staff, and the Prime Minister’s larger role in international affairs due to Europeanization. On the other hand, the Prime Minister does not enjoy any formal rights of patronage and, most significantly, prime ministerial power in Denmark is still kept in check by consensus politics. The tradition of minority and multiparty government makes this a necessity, and consensus culture does not generally call for strong personalized leadership.

Normally, in a first past the post‐electoral system in which majority single‐party government is the rule, the sovereign has no choice as to who to call to the Palace. But, in cases of emergency—war or economic crisis, as in 1931—the sovereign may enjoy discretion. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to create a coalition government, as in 1915, 1916, 1931, or 1940, and the sovereign's role may then be crucial. The danger is that, in using his or her discretion, the sovereign's actions may appear partisan, and the sovereign's actions will then be labelled `unconstitutional’.

A parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model, Canada does not qualify formally as a presidential system: The prime minister and other members of the political executive are responsible to a popularly elected House of Commons. Nonetheless, the Canadian prime minister enjoys wide-ranging powers that in practice are far more extensive than those enjoyed by prime ministers in other Westminster systems. The nature of the leadership selection process, strict party discipline and a fragmented opposition, help ensure prime ministerial dominance over both parliament and cabinet. So too do strong central agencies. While personalization and popularization of prime ministerial leadership is not as pronounced in Canada as in the UK, it is nevertheless an important factor. Prime ministers are beholden to very few interests in their parties, which they dominate. In the Canadian system, one finds many of the characteristics of presidentialization without any of the formal attributes. Federalism and the strength of the provinces act as the major constraint on prime ministerial power. In important respects, Canadian prime ministers are more powerful than presidents in some presidential systems.

Despite Britain's first past the post‐electoral system, which generally produces single‐party majorities, Britain has become more politically fragmented in recent years. This makes a hung parliament—a parliament in which no single party has a majority—much more likely. Hung parliaments pose a dilemma for the sovereign. For, it will often not be obvious in such a situation who is the most appropriate Prime Minister; nor whether a dissolution requested by a Prime Minister should be granted—there may well be an alternative combination capable of governing within the existing legislature. These problems can be illuminated by analysis of past hung parliaments—1923–24, 1929–31, and 1974. The problems would be exacerbated with the introduction of proportional representation, for this would mean that nearly every parliament would then be a hung parliament.

This analyzes the consequences of the Israeli version of a mixed electoral system, in which a majoritarian method of electing the head of the executive branch was grafted onto an extremely proportional system of electing the legislature. Focuses on the first two elections in which this mixed system was implemented, 1996 and 1999, and in doing so, concentrates on two aspects of the elections: the election results, i.e., the decimation of the two main parties and the rise of sectarian parties (fragmentation of the parliamentary system); and the electoral dynamics, i.e., the convergence toward the center in both the executive and the legislative elections. The most significant ramifications of the implementation of the direct popular election of the prime minister have been a significant shift in the electoral strength of the parties and a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the Israeli party system. Neither result was expected by those who initiated and propelled the electoral reform, while many of the actual expectations of the reform were not met. Arranged in the following sections: The Israeli Version of a Mixed Electoral System and Resulting Hybrid Political System; and The Consequences of the Mixed Electoral System for (1) Electoral Competition, (2) Political Representation, and (3) Electoral Efficiency.

The sovereign's relationship with the Commonwealth derives from Britain's imperial history. For, nearly all of the members of the Commonwealth are formerly dependent territories of the Empire, which chose to cooperate voluntarily on a basis of full constitutional equality. Since 1953, the Crown has been divisible, and the Queen of Britain is now also Queen of 15 other Commonwealth monarchies, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Jamaica, etc. In those countries, the functions of the sovereign are, in practice, undertaken by a Governor‐General, appointed by the sovereign on the advice of the Prime Minister of the country concerned. But, since 1949, it has been possible for members of the Commonwealth to become republics, and the majority of the member states are now republics. They must, however, recognize the sovereign as `the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth’. But the position of Head of the Commonwealth is not an office but rather an expression of a symbolic character without any separate constitutional standing or capacity.

The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was adopted by referendum in September 1958, and this chapter explores the relationship between the president and the prime minister in that Fifth Republic. The first section of the chapter, Patterns of Political Leadership, provides an overview of presidential–prime ministerial relations. The second section, French Semi‐Presidentialism in Context, discusses the constitutional situation, the founding context of the 1962 reform, and the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority. The concluding section, The Contemporary Nature of French Semi‐Presidentialism, considers the wider context of presidential–prime ministerial relations, and discusses the changing parameters of executive leadership generally. In these ways, the contemporary nature of the Fifth Republic's semi‐presidential system is established.

Italy represents, in most respects, an ideal-type for the presidentialization of the political system: the role of individual leaders has been greatly enhanced vis-à-vis their parties, while they have simultaneously gained a stronger hold over the executive branch of the state through the growing autonomy of the Prime Minister’s office and the exercise of an increasingly monocratic form of rule. Presidentialization has also deeply affected the electoral process: campaign style, media focus, and voting behaviour have all come to reflect an increasingly personalized form of leadership.

Among the major causes of presidentialization, two—the internationalization of politics and the growth of the state—refer to general trends common to most industrial democracies. Thus, the presidentialization of the Italian political system must be seen, at least in part, as a response to the growing demands laid upon the political executive by the changing role of the state, both domestically and internationally. However, in order to account for the momentous and rapid nature of change in Italy, one needs to focus primarily upon the critical role played by the other two factors: the erosion of traditional social cleavage politics and the mediatization of politics.

Romania emerged from one of the darkest periods in its history in December 1989, when Ceauşsescu's regime was overthrown, leaving Romania with a traumatized population and a devastated economy, and the gradual establishment of a democratic system of government during the last seven years has been painful and not without setbacks. The new institutional system established in Romania is semi‐presidential in the sense of the definition used in this book: it has a directly elected fixed‐term president alongside a prime minister who is responsible to parliament. The semi‐presidential system of government was established gradually, initially on the basis of the Electoral Law of 14 Mar 1990 and the rules of procedure of parliament adopted after the May 1990 elections. The institutional provisions of the Electoral Law and the rules of procedure of parliament subsequently formed the basis of the semi‐presidential system of government established under the new constitution, which was approved in a referendum in December 1991. It is important to note that there is no historical precedent for the establishment of a semi‐presidential system of government in Romania, and the inheritance of the whole period between independence (in 1878) and the fall of the Ceauşescu regime generally provides an unsuitable basis for the development of a democratic system of government. The chapter is divided into three main parts, organised according to the three factors identified by Duverger as determining for the leadership style in semi‐presidential systems: the events surrounding the formation of the system; the constitutional powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament; and the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the president and the majority.

Chapter 7 examines the rationalities or technologies used by government, specifically the rationality associated with the new public management, or managerialism, with its emphasis on targets and performance measurement. It decentres the Blair government's putative reforms of a central feature of the British state as understood by Westminster elites, notably the civil service. It tells three stories about the civil service and public service delivery. First, there is the centralization story, which claims the changes sought to increase the power of the Prime Minister at the expense of Cabinet and the Departments. Second, there is the management story, which claims the reforms of the civil service foundered on Blair's lack of policy making and management skills. Finally, there is the governance story, which argues the Prime Minister is locked into webs of dependence that undermined his initiatives.

The Russian presidency is of recent origin, although there was always a prime minister, or (in the Soviet period) a chairman of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister and his colleagues were elected by the Soviet parliament, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in addition, there was a collective presidency or Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, with the chairman of that body carrying out the functions of head of state—although there was still no presidency as such. Neither the chairman of the Presidium nor the prime minister was accountable in any meaningful way to the parliament, or (still more so) a mass electorate; rather, decisions on matters of this kind were taken by the party leadership and routinely ratified. All this began to change in the late Soviet period: a presidency was approved with some haste in March 1990, and Gorbachev was elected as its first incumbent with the support of 71% of the Congress of People's Deputies who voted (there was no popular vote). The next president was Yeltsin, who had been elected chairman of the Russian parliament in May 1990, and in June 1991 was elected Russia's first‐ever president in a direct popular election against five other candidates. The presidency, as it was established by this time, was normally an elective office, and it was a position of executive authority, but its powers extended under Yeltsin. The four sections of this chapter look at the experience of the Russian presidency under the following headings: The Context of Semi‐Presidentialism in Russia; Constitutional Powers; Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Parliaments; and Yeltsin and the Russian Semi‐Presidency.

Ukraine can be said to have a semi‐presidential system insofar as it has direct presidential elections combined with a prime minister and a government answerable to both president and parliament. Since winning independence in 1991, Ukraine has also gained a reputation for political gridlock: both of the presidents elected since independence disappointed the initial hopes of their supporters, building up an impressive array of powers on paper, but proving unable to match this in practice. Conflict between presidents, prime ministers, and the chairmen of parliament has been an endemic feature of Ukrainian politics, as have the frustrations of a weak and fractious post‐communist party system. This chapter seeks to explain why semi‐presidentialism has nevertheless provided an attractive form of political compromise in Ukraine's ethnically, linguistically, and regionally divided society, despite the problems of political stasis that it has both reflected and helped to promote. The aim is to explain why circumstances have made it difficult for Ukraine to choose any other regime type, despite the residual enthusiasm of the Ukrainian Left for a Soviet (i.e. parliamentary) republic. The chapter first examines how semi‐presidentialism was established in Ukraine and then looks at Duverger's other key criteria of semi‐presidentialism: the constitutional powers of the key political actors, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relations between the president and that majority.

The office of private secretary to the sovereign is crucial to the working of constitutional monarchy. But it evolved in an unnoticed and unplanned way, almost by accident. The history of the development of the office is traced, and it is contrasted with the office of private secretary to the Governor‐General in Commonwealth monarchies. The private secretary needs to enjoy the confidence not only of the sovereign but also of the Prime Minister and of the Leader of the Opposition.

Describes the chain of delegation in the context of a semi-presidential democracy, which grafts a popularly elected president with extensive constitutional powers onto a more or less conventional parliamentary system. The direct linkage between the president and voters enables the president to dominate the other actors in the French parliamentary system, especially if the president is from the same party group as the parliamentary majority. If the president and the parliamentary majority are from different party groups (cohabitation), then the French system conforms more to the traditional delegation chain of a parliamentary regime.