W. D. Ross
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199252657
- eISBN:
- 9780191598333
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199252653.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the ...
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This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and (hedonistic) utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty (prima facie duty), and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences (or optimific). The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right (including individual right acts) is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights (as opposed to right); the second discusses punishment (in connection with the preceding discussion on rights).Less
This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and (hedonistic) utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty (prima facie duty), and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences (or optimific). The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right (including individual right acts) is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights (as opposed to right); the second discusses punishment (in connection with the preceding discussion on rights).
Philip Stratton‐Lake
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199577446
- eISBN:
- 9780191725425
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577446.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, History of Philosophy
In this chapter the notion of a derivative prima facie duty is considered. An eliminatitivist understanding of derivative prima facie is defended, according to which basic duties do not ground ...
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In this chapter the notion of a derivative prima facie duty is considered. An eliminatitivist understanding of derivative prima facie is defended, according to which basic duties do not ground distinct derivative duties, but replace (eliminate) them. On the eliminativist view, discovering that a prima facie duty is derivative is discovering that it is not genuine. The only genuine ones are the basic ones. It is then argued that eliminativism makes it harder to ground Ross's supposedly basic prima facie duties in some single duty.Less
In this chapter the notion of a derivative prima facie duty is considered. An eliminatitivist understanding of derivative prima facie is defended, according to which basic duties do not ground distinct derivative duties, but replace (eliminate) them. On the eliminativist view, discovering that a prima facie duty is derivative is discovering that it is not genuine. The only genuine ones are the basic ones. It is then argued that eliminativism makes it harder to ground Ross's supposedly basic prima facie duties in some single duty.
Thomas L. Carson
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577415
- eISBN:
- 9780191722813
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577415.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong ...
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If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong other things being equal. He holds that this is “self-evident.” Ross also thinks that it is obvious that it is wrong to lie when lying produces only slightly better consequences than not lying. In contrast with Ross, Moore claims that it is self-evident that we should always do whatever has the best consequences. Ross's criticisms of act-utilitarianism are inconclusive because they appeal to disputed moral intuitions and because he doesn't do enough to justify his own moral intuitions. Brad Hooker's argument in favor of his well-known version of rule-consequentialism is inconclusive for similar reasons — it rests on an appeal to disputed considered moral judgments that he doesn't adequately justify.Less
If lying and not lying will have exactly the same consequences, then, according to act-utilitarianism, it doesn't matter whether or not one lies. Ross claims that lying is prima facie wrong, or wrong other things being equal. He holds that this is “self-evident.” Ross also thinks that it is obvious that it is wrong to lie when lying produces only slightly better consequences than not lying. In contrast with Ross, Moore claims that it is self-evident that we should always do whatever has the best consequences. Ross's criticisms of act-utilitarianism are inconclusive because they appeal to disputed moral intuitions and because he doesn't do enough to justify his own moral intuitions. Brad Hooker's argument in favor of his well-known version of rule-consequentialism is inconclusive for similar reasons — it rests on an appeal to disputed considered moral judgments that he doesn't adequately justify.
Kristin Shrader‐Frechette
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780195325461
- eISBN:
- 9780199869275
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195325461.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Building on the severity and inequity of public-health risks and the way polluters sometimes undercut rights to know and consent to these risks, by manipulating media or science, this chapter ...
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Building on the severity and inequity of public-health risks and the way polluters sometimes undercut rights to know and consent to these risks, by manipulating media or science, this chapter sketches an ethical response — the responsibility argument. It shows that because most citizens receive undeserved financial or medical benefits when minorities and poor people bear higher levels of pollution, citizens have prima facie ethical duties to help stop these harmful inequities.Less
Building on the severity and inequity of public-health risks and the way polluters sometimes undercut rights to know and consent to these risks, by manipulating media or science, this chapter sketches an ethical response — the responsibility argument. It shows that because most citizens receive undeserved financial or medical benefits when minorities and poor people bear higher levels of pollution, citizens have prima facie ethical duties to help stop these harmful inequities.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190602185
- eISBN:
- 9780190602208
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190602185.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter focuses on Ross’s most important conceptual innovation: the idea of prima facie duty. Four main claims are defended: first, contra some of his harsher critics, that though much of what ...
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This chapter focuses on Ross’s most important conceptual innovation: the idea of prima facie duty. Four main claims are defended: first, contra some of his harsher critics, that though much of what Ross says in introducing and explaining the concept of prima facie duty is problematic or misleading, he nonetheless has a clear and coherent theoretical picture; second, contra Hurka, that Ross lacks the contemporary concept of a normative reason, but that his views should be reframed in ways that do employ that concept; third, that Ross is not and should not be a scalar deontologist; and fourth that he was wrong in the Foundations to follow Prichard in favoring subjective over objective rightness.Less
This chapter focuses on Ross’s most important conceptual innovation: the idea of prima facie duty. Four main claims are defended: first, contra some of his harsher critics, that though much of what Ross says in introducing and explaining the concept of prima facie duty is problematic or misleading, he nonetheless has a clear and coherent theoretical picture; second, contra Hurka, that Ross lacks the contemporary concept of a normative reason, but that his views should be reframed in ways that do employ that concept; third, that Ross is not and should not be a scalar deontologist; and fourth that he was wrong in the Foundations to follow Prichard in favoring subjective over objective rightness.
Thomas Hurka
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199233625
- eISBN:
- 9780191792694
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233625.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The basic concepts have different forms, the most important of which are discussed here. First is intrinsic goodness, which Moore took to depend only on a thing’s intrinsic properties; this view is ...
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The basic concepts have different forms, the most important of which are discussed here. First is intrinsic goodness, which Moore took to depend only on a thing’s intrinsic properties; this view is contrasted with others’ and related to his doctrine of organic unities. Next is Ross’s crucial concept of prima facie duty, which he understood in one way in The Right and the Good and in another in Foundations of Ethics; the chapter defends his earlier view, which defines prima facie duty in terms of duty proper. Last is objective vs. subjective duty, the first depending on the facts of your situation and the second on your beliefs about them. Whereas Prichard and Ross thought one of these must be the true duty-concept, the chapter prefers Ewing’s view that they are different concepts appropriate to different evaluative contexts.Less
The basic concepts have different forms, the most important of which are discussed here. First is intrinsic goodness, which Moore took to depend only on a thing’s intrinsic properties; this view is contrasted with others’ and related to his doctrine of organic unities. Next is Ross’s crucial concept of prima facie duty, which he understood in one way in The Right and the Good and in another in Foundations of Ethics; the chapter defends his earlier view, which defines prima facie duty in terms of duty proper. Last is objective vs. subjective duty, the first depending on the facts of your situation and the second on your beliefs about them. Whereas Prichard and Ross thought one of these must be the true duty-concept, the chapter prefers Ewing’s view that they are different concepts appropriate to different evaluative contexts.
Jonathan Dancy
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- June 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199699575
- eISBN:
- 9780191793035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199699575.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Some critics argue that while Kant’s view has trouble making sense of the notion of a moral reason, W. D. Ross’s view does not. In “The Importance of Moral Rules and Principles,” Tom Hill argues that ...
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Some critics argue that while Kant’s view has trouble making sense of the notion of a moral reason, W. D. Ross’s view does not. In “The Importance of Moral Rules and Principles,” Tom Hill argues that for Kantians, particular facts are reasons because they are especially salient features that figure in a fuller possible rationale for or against an action. However, unless more is said about what makes some fact an especially salient feature of one’s circumstances, one will lose the distinction between roles played by reasons and roles played by other aspects of the “fuller rationale.” This chapter argues that even if more can be said about this matter, Ross’s theory remains inferior to standard readings of Kant. After explaining the troubles for Ross’s view, which concern his account of the relation between prima facie duties and duty proper, the chapter proceeds to consider how one might improve upon Ross.Less
Some critics argue that while Kant’s view has trouble making sense of the notion of a moral reason, W. D. Ross’s view does not. In “The Importance of Moral Rules and Principles,” Tom Hill argues that for Kantians, particular facts are reasons because they are especially salient features that figure in a fuller possible rationale for or against an action. However, unless more is said about what makes some fact an especially salient feature of one’s circumstances, one will lose the distinction between roles played by reasons and roles played by other aspects of the “fuller rationale.” This chapter argues that even if more can be said about this matter, Ross’s theory remains inferior to standard readings of Kant. After explaining the troubles for Ross’s view, which concern his account of the relation between prima facie duties and duty proper, the chapter proceeds to consider how one might improve upon Ross.
Thomas Hurka
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that Audi's attempt to ground Ross's prima facie duties in Kant's categorical imperative does not succeed. Audi has attempted to give a Kantian basis for Rossian pluralism that ...
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This chapter argues that Audi's attempt to ground Ross's prima facie duties in Kant's categorical imperative does not succeed. Audi has attempted to give a Kantian basis for Rossian pluralism that can explain the comparative strength of duties, offer an epistemic guide for such comparisons, unify the duties, and provide the duties a deeper rationale. This chapter objects that Audi's Kantian explanations tend to assume what should be explained and that Kantian notions such as dignity might not have enough independent content to help matters. Moreover, any Kantian attempt to explain limits on the duty of beneficence faces problems stemming from the fact that the value Kant locates in persons is agent‐neutral and independent of states of affairs. This chapter closes by suggesting that a Thomist account can do some of the unifying work Audi wants, but without partaking of the “grandiose” ambition of Kant's project.Less
This chapter argues that Audi's attempt to ground Ross's prima facie duties in Kant's categorical imperative does not succeed. Audi has attempted to give a Kantian basis for Rossian pluralism that can explain the comparative strength of duties, offer an epistemic guide for such comparisons, unify the duties, and provide the duties a deeper rationale. This chapter objects that Audi's Kantian explanations tend to assume what should be explained and that Kantian notions such as dignity might not have enough independent content to help matters. Moreover, any Kantian attempt to explain limits on the duty of beneficence faces problems stemming from the fact that the value Kant locates in persons is agent‐neutral and independent of states of affairs. This chapter closes by suggesting that a Thomist account can do some of the unifying work Audi wants, but without partaking of the “grandiose” ambition of Kant's project.
Thomas Hurka
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199233625
- eISBN:
- 9780191792694
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233625.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The school’s members defended specific versions of consequentialism and deontology. This chapter first discusses Sidgwick’s and Moore’s combination of act- and indirect consequentialism, where the ...
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The school’s members defended specific versions of consequentialism and deontology. This chapter first discusses Sidgwick’s and Moore’s combination of act- and indirect consequentialism, where the latter says we should mostly abandon act-consequentialist reasoning in everyday life and follow those simpler rules whose adoption will have the best consequences. It then looks in detail at Ross’s version of pluralist deontology, discussing the points where it overlaps with consequentialism, for example by leaving no room for supererogation; its account of conflicts of prima facie duties; and some ways in which it needs elaboration, either to specify some duties more fully or to give them a further rationale. The chapter ends by noting some important moral ideas omitted from Ross’s theory but compatible with his general framework, for example about agent-relative permissions, the duty to respect free choice, and the evil of racial injustice.Less
The school’s members defended specific versions of consequentialism and deontology. This chapter first discusses Sidgwick’s and Moore’s combination of act- and indirect consequentialism, where the latter says we should mostly abandon act-consequentialist reasoning in everyday life and follow those simpler rules whose adoption will have the best consequences. It then looks in detail at Ross’s version of pluralist deontology, discussing the points where it overlaps with consequentialism, for example by leaving no room for supererogation; its account of conflicts of prima facie duties; and some ways in which it needs elaboration, either to specify some duties more fully or to give them a further rationale. The chapter ends by noting some important moral ideas omitted from Ross’s theory but compatible with his general framework, for example about agent-relative permissions, the duty to respect free choice, and the evil of racial injustice.
Bernard Gert
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195311952
- eISBN:
- 9780199871070
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311952.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter compares two conceptions of morality, one championed by Aristotle, Ross, and Kant, the other championed by Hobbes and Mill. In The Good in the Right, Audi develops a version of the first ...
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This chapter compares two conceptions of morality, one championed by Aristotle, Ross, and Kant, the other championed by Hobbes and Mill. In The Good in the Right, Audi develops a version of the first tradition by using Kant as a foundation for Ross, and presents ten midlevel axioms that are intended as modifications of Ross's prima facie duties. In addition to being self‐evident, Audi claims that these middle axioms are supported by various versions of Kant's categorical imperative. This chapter compares these ten midlevel axioms with the ten moral rules that it claims are the universally known rules of common morality. The point of this comparison is to show the great difference between the two conceptions of morality mentioned above. Gert defends the Hobbes‐Mill conception.Less
This chapter compares two conceptions of morality, one championed by Aristotle, Ross, and Kant, the other championed by Hobbes and Mill. In The Good in the Right, Audi develops a version of the first tradition by using Kant as a foundation for Ross, and presents ten midlevel axioms that are intended as modifications of Ross's prima facie duties. In addition to being self‐evident, Audi claims that these middle axioms are supported by various versions of Kant's categorical imperative. This chapter compares these ten midlevel axioms with the ten moral rules that it claims are the universally known rules of common morality. The point of this comparison is to show the great difference between the two conceptions of morality mentioned above. Gert defends the Hobbes‐Mill conception.
Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195374049
- eISBN:
- 9780199871889
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374049.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
A goal of machine morality is not just to raise many questions but to provide a resource for further development of artificial moral agents. Chapter 9 surveys software that is currently under ...
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A goal of machine morality is not just to raise many questions but to provide a resource for further development of artificial moral agents. Chapter 9 surveys software that is currently under development for moral decision making by (ro)bots. These experiments utilize a variety of strategies including case‐based reasoning or casuistry, deontic logic, connectionism (particularism), and the prima facie duties of W. D. Ross (also related to the principles of biomedical ethics). In addition to agent approaches that focus on the reasoning of one agent, researchers are working with multi‐agent environments and with multibots. This discussion serves as a comprehensive summary of research to date directed at making (ro)bots explicit moral reasoners. These experiments range from ethical advisors in health care to strategies for ensuring that (ro)bot soldiers won't violate international conventions.Less
A goal of machine morality is not just to raise many questions but to provide a resource for further development of artificial moral agents. Chapter 9 surveys software that is currently under development for moral decision making by (ro)bots. These experiments utilize a variety of strategies including case‐based reasoning or casuistry, deontic logic, connectionism (particularism), and the prima facie duties of W. D. Ross (also related to the principles of biomedical ethics). In addition to agent approaches that focus on the reasoning of one agent, researchers are working with multi‐agent environments and with multibots. This discussion serves as a comprehensive summary of research to date directed at making (ro)bots explicit moral reasoners. These experiments range from ethical advisors in health care to strategies for ensuring that (ro)bot soldiers won't violate international conventions.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues that the bare possibility of moral knowledge in particular cases is already enough to ensure the availability of a certain sort of ‘hedged’ moral principle called a ‘default ...
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This chapter argues that the bare possibility of moral knowledge in particular cases is already enough to ensure the availability of a certain sort of ‘hedged’ moral principle called a ‘default principle’. Default principles are consistent with holism about reasons because they claim that a given action has a given moral property only if no further feature of the situation explains why it does not. One obvious worry about this proposal is that default principles are vacuous (trivially true). This worry bears interesting parallels to worries about ceteris paribus laws in science. It is argued that once default principles are properly understood, this worry is easily met. The key point is to distinguish there being an explanation for a moral property’s absence from its absence being explained by some feature of the situation.Less
This chapter argues that the bare possibility of moral knowledge in particular cases is already enough to ensure the availability of a certain sort of ‘hedged’ moral principle called a ‘default principle’. Default principles are consistent with holism about reasons because they claim that a given action has a given moral property only if no further feature of the situation explains why it does not. One obvious worry about this proposal is that default principles are vacuous (trivially true). This worry bears interesting parallels to worries about ceteris paribus laws in science. It is argued that once default principles are properly understood, this worry is easily met. The key point is to distinguish there being an explanation for a moral property’s absence from its absence being explained by some feature of the situation.
Susan Wolf
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- December 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780195332803
- eISBN:
- 9780190219123
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332803.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Because people cannot and should not be expected to devote themselves entirely to the good of the world, it would be desirable to draw a distinction between what is morally required, and what is ...
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Because people cannot and should not be expected to devote themselves entirely to the good of the world, it would be desirable to draw a distinction between what is morally required, and what is morally good but not required. The concept of duty is useful for this purpose, but it is impossible to draw a line between what is required, and what is good but not required, that is perfectly clear and determinate. Some people think of one’s duty as given by a set of rules (or by a set of rules, understood as prima facie duties, together with a decision procedure that tells us what to do when the rules conflict). But however the content of duty is substantively formulated, this chapter argues that it is a mistake to think of duties as specifying a minimal standard of moral decency.Less
Because people cannot and should not be expected to devote themselves entirely to the good of the world, it would be desirable to draw a distinction between what is morally required, and what is morally good but not required. The concept of duty is useful for this purpose, but it is impossible to draw a line between what is required, and what is good but not required, that is perfectly clear and determinate. Some people think of one’s duty as given by a set of rules (or by a set of rules, understood as prima facie duties, together with a decision procedure that tells us what to do when the rules conflict). But however the content of duty is substantively formulated, this chapter argues that it is a mistake to think of duties as specifying a minimal standard of moral decency.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190602185
- eISBN:
- 9780190602208
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190602185.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, ...
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This book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” According to classical deontology the most fundamental normative principles are principles of prima facie duty, principles which specify general kinds of reasons. Consequentialists are right to think that reasons always derive from goods; and ideal utilitarians are right, contra hedonistic utilitarians, to think that there are a small number of distinct kinds of intrinsic goods. But consequentialists are wrong to think that all reasons have the same weight for all agents. Instead there are a small number of distinct kinds of agent-relative intensifiers: features that increase the importance of certain goods for certain agents. It is argued that classical deontology combines the best elements of the moral theories of Ross and of Sidgwick, and that the best philosophical interpretation of Ross is that he is a classical deontologist.Less
This book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” According to classical deontology the most fundamental normative principles are principles of prima facie duty, principles which specify general kinds of reasons. Consequentialists are right to think that reasons always derive from goods; and ideal utilitarians are right, contra hedonistic utilitarians, to think that there are a small number of distinct kinds of intrinsic goods. But consequentialists are wrong to think that all reasons have the same weight for all agents. Instead there are a small number of distinct kinds of agent-relative intensifiers: features that increase the importance of certain goods for certain agents. It is argued that classical deontology combines the best elements of the moral theories of Ross and of Sidgwick, and that the best philosophical interpretation of Ross is that he is a classical deontologist.
David Phillips
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- July 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780190602185
- eISBN:
- 9780190602208
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780190602185.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, General
This chapter introduces the project of Rossian Ethics. The book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: ...
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This chapter introduces the project of Rossian Ethics. The book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” The introductory chapter includes brief accounts of the kind of project of philosophical interpretation that the book undertakes, and of Ross’s place in the Sidgwick-to-Ewing school recently discussed by Hurka.Less
This chapter introduces the project of Rossian Ethics. The book has two connected aims. The first is to interpret and evaluate W. D. Ross’s ethics, focusing on the key elements of his moral theory: his introduction of the concept of prima facie duty, his limited pluralism about the right, and his limited pluralism about the good. The second is to articulate a distinctive view intermediate between consequentialism and absolutist deontology, “classical deontology.” The introductory chapter includes brief accounts of the kind of project of philosophical interpretation that the book undertakes, and of Ross’s place in the Sidgwick-to-Ewing school recently discussed by Hurka.
Nathan J. Palpant
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- November 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199926176
- eISBN:
- 9780199396788
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199926176.003.0021
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter begins by supporting the shared view that suffering is intrinsically evil and its alleviation ought to be a high moral priority. However, since the alleviation of suffering is inherently ...
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This chapter begins by supporting the shared view that suffering is intrinsically evil and its alleviation ought to be a high moral priority. However, since the alleviation of suffering is inherently only a prima facie duty, the core reflection centers on trying to understand the limits to our obligation to alleviate suffering. Our ethical thinking about suffering is informed by two related matters. First, we cannot know how to alleviate suffering unless we know the good we seek in its remediation. Second, it is the relationship between the goods we prioritize and the powers we use that markedly influences our ethical priorities about how to approach human suffering. Using psychotropic drugs as an example, the chapter addresses our proclivity to evaluate suffering in light of powers we are capable of, which puts at risk our sensitivity to the meaning of suffering in the human experience. In closing, the chapter outlines two ways that our priorities are disoriented to suffering in the human experience.Less
This chapter begins by supporting the shared view that suffering is intrinsically evil and its alleviation ought to be a high moral priority. However, since the alleviation of suffering is inherently only a prima facie duty, the core reflection centers on trying to understand the limits to our obligation to alleviate suffering. Our ethical thinking about suffering is informed by two related matters. First, we cannot know how to alleviate suffering unless we know the good we seek in its remediation. Second, it is the relationship between the goods we prioritize and the powers we use that markedly influences our ethical priorities about how to approach human suffering. Using psychotropic drugs as an example, the chapter addresses our proclivity to evaluate suffering in light of powers we are capable of, which puts at risk our sensitivity to the meaning of suffering in the human experience. In closing, the chapter outlines two ways that our priorities are disoriented to suffering in the human experience.
Derek Leben
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- May 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198815259
- eISBN:
- 9780191853012
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198815259.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Two recent papers have presented experimental evidence against the hypothesis that there is a semantic connection between OUGHT and CAN, rather than a pragmatic and defeasible one. However, there are ...
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Two recent papers have presented experimental evidence against the hypothesis that there is a semantic connection between OUGHT and CAN, rather than a pragmatic and defeasible one. However, there are two flaws with their designs. One is temporal ambiguity: just asking whether “x ought to A” is underspecified as to when the obligation exists. Another is failing to distinguish between prior obligations and all-things-considered obligations. To test these potential confounds, the chapter author ran two experiments. The first paired some of the original stories with a visual timeline specifying the time of the obligation. The second flipped the wording of the original “obligated but can’t” question into the reversed: “can’t, but still obligated.” In both experiments, there were large and significant differences between the original and modified conditions. These results undermine the conclusions of the previous experiments and remain consistent with the Semantic Hypothesis.Less
Two recent papers have presented experimental evidence against the hypothesis that there is a semantic connection between OUGHT and CAN, rather than a pragmatic and defeasible one. However, there are two flaws with their designs. One is temporal ambiguity: just asking whether “x ought to A” is underspecified as to when the obligation exists. Another is failing to distinguish between prior obligations and all-things-considered obligations. To test these potential confounds, the chapter author ran two experiments. The first paired some of the original stories with a visual timeline specifying the time of the obligation. The second flipped the wording of the original “obligated but can’t” question into the reversed: “can’t, but still obligated.” In both experiments, there were large and significant differences between the original and modified conditions. These results undermine the conclusions of the previous experiments and remain consistent with the Semantic Hypothesis.
