Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199282609
- eISBN:
- 9780191712432
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282609.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive ...
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Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive a category for much more to be said about it than this; we should focus attention instead on the vaguely defined but interesting category of things rich in narrative structure. Such devices offer significant possibilities, not merely for the representation of stories, but for the expression of point of view; they have also played an important role in the evolution of reliable channels of information, an issue pursued in three chapter appendices. This book argues that much of the pleasure of narrative depends on early developing tendencies in human beings to imitation and to joint attention, and imitation turns out to be the key to understanding such important literary techniques as free indirect discourse and character‐focused narration. The book also examines irony in narrative, with an emphasis on the idea of the expression of ironic points of view; a case study of this phenomenon is offered. Finally, the book examines the idea of Character, as evidenced in robust, situation‐independent ways of acting and thinking, and its important role in many narratives. It is asked whether scepticism about the notion of Character should have us reassess the dramatic and literary tradition which places such emphasis on Character.Less
Narratives are artefacts of a special kind: they are devices which function to tell stories, and do so by conveying the storytelling intentions of their makers. But, narrative itself is too inclusive a category for much more to be said about it than this; we should focus attention instead on the vaguely defined but interesting category of things rich in narrative structure. Such devices offer significant possibilities, not merely for the representation of stories, but for the expression of point of view; they have also played an important role in the evolution of reliable channels of information, an issue pursued in three chapter appendices. This book argues that much of the pleasure of narrative depends on early developing tendencies in human beings to imitation and to joint attention, and imitation turns out to be the key to understanding such important literary techniques as free indirect discourse and character‐focused narration. The book also examines irony in narrative, with an emphasis on the idea of the expression of ironic points of view; a case study of this phenomenon is offered. Finally, the book examines the idea of Character, as evidenced in robust, situation‐independent ways of acting and thinking, and its important role in many narratives. It is asked whether scepticism about the notion of Character should have us reassess the dramatic and literary tradition which places such emphasis on Character.
Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- January 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256280
- eISBN:
- 9780191601712
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256284.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Thirteen essays, five not previously published, on the arts. These are philosophical essays, mostly concerned with the ways in which theories about mind and language can contribute to our ...
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Thirteen essays, five not previously published, on the arts. These are philosophical essays, mostly concerned with the ways in which theories about mind and language can contribute to our understanding of art. Some explore the challenges posed by art to the empirical sciences of mind – linguistics and pragmatics, psychology and anthropology. Particular problems confronted include: the nature of literary works, genres, and fictional characters; whether there is coherent and useful concept of documentary; whether fiction can tell us anything interesting about time; what pragmatics tells us about interpretation; the prospects for cognitive film theory; the role of empathy in our engagement with fiction; the role of the unreliable narrator; the relations between children's pretend play and their mind reading skills; how we should decide whether animals engage in pretence; what biological and cultural evolution can tell us about the development of art.Less
Thirteen essays, five not previously published, on the arts. These are philosophical essays, mostly concerned with the ways in which theories about mind and language can contribute to our understanding of art. Some explore the challenges posed by art to the empirical sciences of mind – linguistics and pragmatics, psychology and anthropology. Particular problems confronted include: the nature of literary works, genres, and fictional characters; whether there is coherent and useful concept of documentary; whether fiction can tell us anything interesting about time; what pragmatics tells us about interpretation; the prospects for cognitive film theory; the role of empathy in our engagement with fiction; the role of the unreliable narrator; the relations between children's pretend play and their mind reading skills; how we should decide whether animals engage in pretence; what biological and cultural evolution can tell us about the development of art.
Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238089
- eISBN:
- 9780191679568
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238089.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Aesthetics
This book develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon recent theories and results in psychology. Ideas about how we read the minds of others have put the concept of imagination ...
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This book develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon recent theories and results in psychology. Ideas about how we read the minds of others have put the concept of imagination firmly back on the agenda for philosophy and psychology. The authors present a theory of what they call imaginative projection; they show how it fits into a philosophically-motivated picture of the mind and of mental states, and how it illuminates and is illuminated by recent developments in cognitive psychology. They argue that we need to recognize a category of desire-in-imagination, and that supposition and fantasy should be classed as forms of imagination. They accommodate some of the peculiarities of perceptual forms of imagining such as visual and motor imagery, and suggest that they are important for mind-reading. They argue for a novel view about the relations between imagination and pretence, and suggest that imagining can be, but need not be, the cause of pretending. They show how the theory accommodates but goes beyond the idea of mental simulation, and argue that the contrast between simulation and theory is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. They argue that we can understand certain developmental and psychiatric disorders as arising from faulty imagination. Throughout, they link their discussion to the uses of imagination in our encounters with art, and they conclude with a chapter on responses to tragedy. The final chapter also offers a theory of emotions that suggests that these states have much in common with perceptual states.Less
This book develops a philosophical theory of imagination that draws upon recent theories and results in psychology. Ideas about how we read the minds of others have put the concept of imagination firmly back on the agenda for philosophy and psychology. The authors present a theory of what they call imaginative projection; they show how it fits into a philosophically-motivated picture of the mind and of mental states, and how it illuminates and is illuminated by recent developments in cognitive psychology. They argue that we need to recognize a category of desire-in-imagination, and that supposition and fantasy should be classed as forms of imagination. They accommodate some of the peculiarities of perceptual forms of imagining such as visual and motor imagery, and suggest that they are important for mind-reading. They argue for a novel view about the relations between imagination and pretence, and suggest that imagining can be, but need not be, the cause of pretending. They show how the theory accommodates but goes beyond the idea of mental simulation, and argue that the contrast between simulation and theory is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. They argue that we can understand certain developmental and psychiatric disorders as arising from faulty imagination. Throughout, they link their discussion to the uses of imagination in our encounters with art, and they conclude with a chapter on responses to tragedy. The final chapter also offers a theory of emotions that suggests that these states have much in common with perceptual states.
Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238089
- eISBN:
- 9780191679568
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238089.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Aesthetics
This chapter begins with a discussion of the account of imagination presented in this book, which starts with what is considered the obvious function of the imagination: enabling us to project ...
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This chapter begins with a discussion of the account of imagination presented in this book, which starts with what is considered the obvious function of the imagination: enabling us to project ourselves into another situation and to see, or think about, the world from another perspective. The perspective taken might be that of another actual person or a hypothetical perspective. It argues that this is the best way to understand the role of imagination on play, pretence, and fiction. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This chapter begins with a discussion of the account of imagination presented in this book, which starts with what is considered the obvious function of the imagination: enabling us to project ourselves into another situation and to see, or think about, the world from another perspective. The perspective taken might be that of another actual person or a hypothetical perspective. It argues that this is the best way to understand the role of imagination on play, pretence, and fiction. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Shaun Nichols and Stephen P. Stich
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780198236108
- eISBN:
- 9780191600920
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198236107.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense ...
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This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.Less
This volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.
Alvin I. Goldman
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195138924
- eISBN:
- 9780199786480
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195138929.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Modularists claim that folk psychology is mediated by an innate modularized database, the structures of which support inferences concerning representational relations like belief, desire, and ...
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Modularists claim that folk psychology is mediated by an innate modularized database, the structures of which support inferences concerning representational relations like belief, desire, and pretense. It is doubtful, however, that mindreading really qualifies as modular, specifically, that it satisfies Fodor’s chief criteria of modularity: domain specificity and informational encapsulation. Alan Leslie postulates a core module called the “theory of mind mechanism”, but most of the work in assigning mental states is done by the “selection processor”, which is a non-modular mechanism. Finally, no real evidence is provided that propositional attitudes are ascribed via theoretical inference rather than simulation.Less
Modularists claim that folk psychology is mediated by an innate modularized database, the structures of which support inferences concerning representational relations like belief, desire, and pretense. It is doubtful, however, that mindreading really qualifies as modular, specifically, that it satisfies Fodor’s chief criteria of modularity: domain specificity and informational encapsulation. Alan Leslie postulates a core module called the “theory of mind mechanism”, but most of the work in assigning mental states is done by the “selection processor”, which is a non-modular mechanism. Finally, no real evidence is provided that propositional attitudes are ascribed via theoretical inference rather than simulation.
THOMA SUDDENDORF and ANDREW WHITEN
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264195
- eISBN:
- 9780191734540
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264195.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
The imaginative powers of humans obviously exceed those of other species; however these characteristics and knowledge did not spring from nowhere. Instead they evolved on the shoulders of the ...
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The imaginative powers of humans obviously exceed those of other species; however these characteristics and knowledge did not spring from nowhere. Instead they evolved on the shoulders of the distinctive psychology of man’s pre-human ancestors. This chapter defines the key characteristics of the ancestral foundations of man and describes the evidence in great ape behaviour for two aspects of imagination. The first level of imagination is inventiveness. Inventiveness is the capacity to generate novel and diverse behavioural responses to any given environmental circumstance. In the experimental studies presented in this chapter wherein chimpanzees are tasked to solve particular problems, it was found that great apes such as gorillas, orang-utans, and chimpanzees display imaginative skills compared to other primates. The second aspect of imagination refers to the capacity to operate mentally in a ‘pretend’ world. This second level of imagination is higher than inventiveness as it requires holding mind distinctions between the hypothetical and real world. Although the experimental studies generated intriguing results, these results are limited, and while the pretence in apes should be observable, it is dominated by the manifestation of a more general capacity for secondary representation.Less
The imaginative powers of humans obviously exceed those of other species; however these characteristics and knowledge did not spring from nowhere. Instead they evolved on the shoulders of the distinctive psychology of man’s pre-human ancestors. This chapter defines the key characteristics of the ancestral foundations of man and describes the evidence in great ape behaviour for two aspects of imagination. The first level of imagination is inventiveness. Inventiveness is the capacity to generate novel and diverse behavioural responses to any given environmental circumstance. In the experimental studies presented in this chapter wherein chimpanzees are tasked to solve particular problems, it was found that great apes such as gorillas, orang-utans, and chimpanzees display imaginative skills compared to other primates. The second aspect of imagination refers to the capacity to operate mentally in a ‘pretend’ world. This second level of imagination is higher than inventiveness as it requires holding mind distinctions between the hypothetical and real world. Although the experimental studies generated intriguing results, these results are limited, and while the pretence in apes should be observable, it is dominated by the manifestation of a more general capacity for secondary representation.
Shaun Nichols (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199275731
- eISBN:
- 9780191706103
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book presents essays in the form of thirteen chapters on the propositional imagination. The propositional imagination — the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that everyone is ...
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This book presents essays in the form of thirteen chapters on the propositional imagination. The propositional imagination — the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that everyone is colour-blind or that Hamlet is a procrastinator — plays an essential role in philosophical theorizing, engaging with fiction, and in everyday life. These thirteen chapters extend the theoretical picture of the imagination and explore the philosophical implications of cognitive accounts of the imagination. The book also investigates broader philosophical issues surrounding the propositional imagination. The first section addresses the nature of the imagination, its role in emotion production, and its sophistication manifestation in childhood. The chapters in the second section focus on the nature of pretence and how pretence is implicated in adult communication. The third section addresses the problem of ‘imaginative resistance’, the striking fact that when we encounter morally repugnant assertions in fiction, we seem to resist imagining them and accepting them as fictionally true. In the final section, contributors explore the relation between imagining, conceiving, and judgements of possibility and impossibility.Less
This book presents essays in the form of thirteen chapters on the propositional imagination. The propositional imagination — the mental capacity we exploit when we imagine that everyone is colour-blind or that Hamlet is a procrastinator — plays an essential role in philosophical theorizing, engaging with fiction, and in everyday life. These thirteen chapters extend the theoretical picture of the imagination and explore the philosophical implications of cognitive accounts of the imagination. The book also investigates broader philosophical issues surrounding the propositional imagination. The first section addresses the nature of the imagination, its role in emotion production, and its sophistication manifestation in childhood. The chapters in the second section focus on the nature of pretence and how pretence is implicated in adult communication. The third section addresses the problem of ‘imaginative resistance’, the striking fact that when we encounter morally repugnant assertions in fiction, we seem to resist imagining them and accepting them as fictionally true. In the final section, contributors explore the relation between imagining, conceiving, and judgements of possibility and impossibility.
Peter Carruthers
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199275731
- eISBN:
- 9780191706103
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter studies the question of children's motivations to engage in pretence, using an account provided by Nichols and Stich in 2003 as a stalking horse. It argues that they are correct about ...
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This chapter studies the question of children's motivations to engage in pretence, using an account provided by Nichols and Stich in 2003 as a stalking horse. It argues that they are correct about much of the basic cognitive architecture necessary to explain pretence, but wrong on the question of motivation. Following a discussion of the views of Currie and Ravenscroft in 2002 on this issue, the chapter draws on Damasio's 1994 description of the way in which emotions enter into practical reasoning involving mental rehearsal. It concludes by defending a novel explanation of the motivations underlying pretence.Less
This chapter studies the question of children's motivations to engage in pretence, using an account provided by Nichols and Stich in 2003 as a stalking horse. It argues that they are correct about much of the basic cognitive architecture necessary to explain pretence, but wrong on the question of motivation. Following a discussion of the views of Currie and Ravenscroft in 2002 on this issue, the chapter draws on Damasio's 1994 description of the way in which emotions enter into practical reasoning involving mental rehearsal. It concludes by defending a novel explanation of the motivations underlying pretence.
Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199275731
- eISBN:
- 9780191706103
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter defends the thesis that irony is a form of pretence. It traces the development of this view, and presents a stronger version of it than has previously been available. It contrasts the ...
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This chapter defends the thesis that irony is a form of pretence. It traces the development of this view, and presents a stronger version of it than has previously been available. It contrasts the pretence theory with its strongest rival: the echoic theory. The similarities and differences between the theories are described, and the conclusion reached is that the pretence theory is better. Empirical evidence used to support the echoic theory is examined; this evidence supports the pretence theory at least as well. While the pretence theory does not apply directly to what are called dramatic and situational irony, it can be seen that these are closely related to irony proper as the pretence theory characterizes it.Less
This chapter defends the thesis that irony is a form of pretence. It traces the development of this view, and presents a stronger version of it than has previously been available. It contrasts the pretence theory with its strongest rival: the echoic theory. The similarities and differences between the theories are described, and the conclusion reached is that the pretence theory is better. Empirical evidence used to support the echoic theory is examined; this evidence supports the pretence theory at least as well. While the pretence theory does not apply directly to what are called dramatic and situational irony, it can be seen that these are closely related to irony proper as the pretence theory characterizes it.
Gregory Currie
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199282609
- eISBN:
- 9780191712432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282609.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind
Narrators occasionally help themselves to pretended points of view. Such points of view are crucial to understanding one kind of irony, sometimes called ‘verbal irony’ but better termed ...
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Narrators occasionally help themselves to pretended points of view. Such points of view are crucial to understanding one kind of irony, sometimes called ‘verbal irony’ but better termed representational irony. This chapter argues that an ironic performance is the pretended adoption of a point of view — a defective one — and that there are ways in which narrators are led to ironize their characters' points of view, and sometimes their own. Criticisms of the idea that irony is pretence, due to Dan Sperber, are rebutted. A notion that will be important later on is introduced: narration from an ironic point of view, which is distinct from the mere use of irony in narration. The chapter also discusses the relation between representational and situational irony.Less
Narrators occasionally help themselves to pretended points of view. Such points of view are crucial to understanding one kind of irony, sometimes called ‘verbal irony’ but better termed representational irony. This chapter argues that an ironic performance is the pretended adoption of a point of view — a defective one — and that there are ways in which narrators are led to ironize their characters' points of view, and sometimes their own. Criticisms of the idea that irony is pretence, due to Dan Sperber, are rebutted. A notion that will be important later on is introduced: narration from an ironic point of view, which is distinct from the mere use of irony in narration. The chapter also discusses the relation between representational and situational irony.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? ...
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This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.Less
This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.
François Recanati
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199226993
- eISBN:
- 9780191710223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226993.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, General
This chapter argues that the notion of ‘context’ that has to be used in the study of indexicals is far from univocal. Several distinctions are made, including one between the context of the ...
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This chapter argues that the notion of ‘context’ that has to be used in the study of indexicals is far from univocal. Several distinctions are made, including one between the context of the locutionary act and the context of the illocutionary act. As far as context-shifts are concerned, five types of case are distinguished. Certain features of the context can be shifted at will; others can be shifted through pretence. Two types of context-shifting pretence are distinguished, corresponding to the distinction between locutionary context and illocutionary context. In a fourth type of case, the expressions at issue are not really indexical, but perspectival, and their shifty behaviour raises no particular problem. Finally, the idea that in certain languages there are ‘shiftable indexicals’, interpretable with respect to the context of a reported speech or thought episode, is presented and discussed.Less
This chapter argues that the notion of ‘context’ that has to be used in the study of indexicals is far from univocal. Several distinctions are made, including one between the context of the locutionary act and the context of the illocutionary act. As far as context-shifts are concerned, five types of case are distinguished. Certain features of the context can be shifted at will; others can be shifted through pretence. Two types of context-shifting pretence are distinguished, corresponding to the distinction between locutionary context and illocutionary context. In a fourth type of case, the expressions at issue are not really indexical, but perspectival, and their shifty behaviour raises no particular problem. Finally, the idea that in certain languages there are ‘shiftable indexicals’, interpretable with respect to the context of a reported speech or thought episode, is presented and discussed.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Drawing on literature from developmental psychology, this chapter identifies and discusses some of the central features that characterize both early childhood and adult pretense. It offers a view ...
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Drawing on literature from developmental psychology, this chapter identifies and discusses some of the central features that characterize both early childhood and adult pretense. It offers a view that both draws on and differs from many standard psychological and philosophical conceptions of imagination, pretense, and make‐belief, including those of Paul Harris, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, and Kendall Walton.Less
Drawing on literature from developmental psychology, this chapter identifies and discusses some of the central features that characterize both early childhood and adult pretense. It offers a view that both draws on and differs from many standard psychological and philosophical conceptions of imagination, pretense, and make‐belief, including those of Paul Harris, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, and Kendall Walton.
Tamar Szabó Gendler
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199589760
- eISBN:
- 9780191595486
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
This chapter offers an account of self‐deception. It proposes that in paradigmatic cases, the self‐deceived subject pretends (in the sense of makes‐believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not‐P is ...
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This chapter offers an account of self‐deception. It proposes that in paradigmatic cases, the self‐deceived subject pretends (in the sense of makes‐believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not‐P is the case, and the pretense that not‐P comes to play many of the roles normally played by belief. Understanding self‐deception in this way is highly natural, and it provides a non‐paradoxical characterization of the phenomenon that explains both its distinctive patterns of instability and its ordinary association with irrationality. One might then wonder why this diagnosis has largely been overlooked. The chapter suggests that the oversight is due to a failure to recognize the philosophical significance of a crucial fact about the human mind, namely, the degree to which attitudes other than belief often play a central role in our mental and practical lives. The view is contrasted with those of Al Mele, Donald Davidson, and others.Less
This chapter offers an account of self‐deception. It proposes that in paradigmatic cases, the self‐deceived subject pretends (in the sense of makes‐believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not‐P is the case, and the pretense that not‐P comes to play many of the roles normally played by belief. Understanding self‐deception in this way is highly natural, and it provides a non‐paradoxical characterization of the phenomenon that explains both its distinctive patterns of instability and its ordinary association with irrationality. One might then wonder why this diagnosis has largely been overlooked. The chapter suggests that the oversight is due to a failure to recognize the philosophical significance of a crucial fact about the human mind, namely, the degree to which attitudes other than belief often play a central role in our mental and practical lives. The view is contrasted with those of Al Mele, Donald Davidson, and others.
Patricia Spacks
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- February 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226768601
- eISBN:
- 9780226768618
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226768618.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, 18th-century Literature
Today we consider privacy a right to be protected. But in eighteenth-century England, privacy was seen as a problem, even a threat. Women reading alone and people hiding their true thoughts from one ...
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Today we consider privacy a right to be protected. But in eighteenth-century England, privacy was seen as a problem, even a threat. Women reading alone and people hiding their true thoughts from one another in conversation generated fears of uncontrollable fantasies and profound anxieties about insincerity. This book explores eighteenth-century concerns about privacy and the strategies people developed to avoid public scrutiny and social pressure. The book examines, for instance, the way people hid behind common rules of etiquette to mask their innermost feelings and how, in fact, people were taught to employ such devices. It considers the erotic overtones that privacy aroused in its suppression of deeper desires. And perhaps most important, the book explores the idea of privacy as a societal threat—one that bred pretense and hypocrisy in its practitioners. Through readings of novels by Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, and Sterne, along with a glimpse into diaries, autobiographies, poems, and works of pornography written during the period, the book shows how writers charted the imaginative possibilities of privacy and its social repercussions.Less
Today we consider privacy a right to be protected. But in eighteenth-century England, privacy was seen as a problem, even a threat. Women reading alone and people hiding their true thoughts from one another in conversation generated fears of uncontrollable fantasies and profound anxieties about insincerity. This book explores eighteenth-century concerns about privacy and the strategies people developed to avoid public scrutiny and social pressure. The book examines, for instance, the way people hid behind common rules of etiquette to mask their innermost feelings and how, in fact, people were taught to employ such devices. It considers the erotic overtones that privacy aroused in its suppression of deeper desires. And perhaps most important, the book explores the idea of privacy as a societal threat—one that bred pretense and hypocrisy in its practitioners. Through readings of novels by Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, and Sterne, along with a glimpse into diaries, autobiographies, poems, and works of pornography written during the period, the book shows how writers charted the imaginative possibilities of privacy and its social repercussions.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A line of research aimed at determining whether Chicago, April, Spanish, etc., really exist can seem naive to the point of comicality. It's as though one were to call for research into whether April ...
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A line of research aimed at determining whether Chicago, April, Spanish, etc., really exist can seem naive to the point of comicality. It's as though one were to call for research into whether April is really the cruellest month, or Chicago the city with the big shoulders, or Spanish the loving tongue. It turns out the analogy is not entirely frivolous. Quine objects to Carnap that he assumes a clear line between analytic and synthetic. But Quine himself assumes that literally true existence claims can be told apart from ones that are only figuratively true. Analytic vs. synthetic may be a problematic distinction. But compared to literal vs. figurative, it is a marvel of clarity and precision.Less
A line of research aimed at determining whether Chicago, April, Spanish, etc., really exist can seem naive to the point of comicality. It's as though one were to call for research into whether April is really the cruellest month, or Chicago the city with the big shoulders, or Spanish the loving tongue. It turns out the analogy is not entirely frivolous. Quine objects to Carnap that he assumes a clear line between analytic and synthetic. But Quine himself assumes that literally true existence claims can be told apart from ones that are only figuratively true. Analytic vs. synthetic may be a problematic distinction. But compared to literal vs. figurative, it is a marvel of clarity and precision.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Quineans think that to establish the existence of so and so's, one must take a holistic a posteriori indispensability argument. Rationalists think that the existence of so and so's follows from a ...
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Quineans think that to establish the existence of so and so's, one must take a holistic a posteriori indispensability argument. Rationalists think that the existence of so and so's follows from a priori bridge principles such as: ‘An argument is valid if and only if it has no countermodels’. The reason this is a paradox and not merely a contradiction is that Quineanism is received opinion in philosophy, while Rationalism is a straightforward consequence of received opinion, viz., the opinion that we are capable in some cases of a priori insight into truth-conditions, and can a priori ‘see’ that an argument is valid if it lacks countermodels, that S is possible that if an S-world exists, and so on. The best explanation of our seemingly a priori entitlement to such bridge principles is that their felt content is not their literal content; the first is a priori but ontologically neutral, the second is ontologically committal but not a priori knowable.Less
Quineans think that to establish the existence of so and so's, one must take a holistic a posteriori indispensability argument. Rationalists think that the existence of so and so's follows from a priori bridge principles such as: ‘An argument is valid if and only if it has no countermodels’. The reason this is a paradox and not merely a contradiction is that Quineanism is received opinion in philosophy, while Rationalism is a straightforward consequence of received opinion, viz., the opinion that we are capable in some cases of a priori insight into truth-conditions, and can a priori ‘see’ that an argument is valid if it lacks countermodels, that S is possible that if an S-world exists, and so on. The best explanation of our seemingly a priori entitlement to such bridge principles is that their felt content is not their literal content; the first is a priori but ontologically neutral, the second is ontologically committal but not a priori knowable.
Stephen Yablo
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199266487
- eISBN:
- 9780191594274
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266487.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Numbers have many puzzling features. Their properties are mostly essential to them, but they exist in all possible worlds. Number theory seems a priori, yet it makes existence claims and existence ...
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Numbers have many puzzling features. Their properties are mostly essential to them, but they exist in all possible worlds. Number theory seems a priori, yet it makes existence claims and existence (setting aside the Cogito) is not supposed to be a priori knowable. If-thenism can perhaps explain the felt a priority, but it makes numerical truth relative where it seems absolute. A figuralist solution is proposed: ‘2 + 3 = 5’ seems necessary, a priori, and absolute because it has a logical truth as its assertive content. A rule that associates logical truths with each arithmetical truth is given, and also a rule that associates a logical truth (modulo concrete combinatorics) with each truth about hereditarily finite impure sets. The view that emerges takes something from Frege and something from Kant; one might call it Kantian logicism. The view is Kantian because it sees mathematics as arising out of our representations. Numbers and sets are ‘there’ because they are inscribed on the spectacles through which we see other things. It is logicist because the facts seen through our numerical spectacles are facts of first-order logic.Less
Numbers have many puzzling features. Their properties are mostly essential to them, but they exist in all possible worlds. Number theory seems a priori, yet it makes existence claims and existence (setting aside the Cogito) is not supposed to be a priori knowable. If-thenism can perhaps explain the felt a priority, but it makes numerical truth relative where it seems absolute. A figuralist solution is proposed: ‘2 + 3 = 5’ seems necessary, a priori, and absolute because it has a logical truth as its assertive content. A rule that associates logical truths with each arithmetical truth is given, and also a rule that associates a logical truth (modulo concrete combinatorics) with each truth about hereditarily finite impure sets. The view that emerges takes something from Frege and something from Kant; one might call it Kantian logicism. The view is Kantian because it sees mathematics as arising out of our representations. Numbers and sets are ‘there’ because they are inscribed on the spectacles through which we see other things. It is logicist because the facts seen through our numerical spectacles are facts of first-order logic.
Jody Azzouni
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199738946
- eISBN:
- 9780199866175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738946.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
It’s common to think that demonstrations require something (that exists) that’s demonstrated. If, because of hallucination, there is no object, then the demonstration—and what’s said—is seen by some ...
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It’s common to think that demonstrations require something (that exists) that’s demonstrated. If, because of hallucination, there is no object, then the demonstration—and what’s said—is seen by some to fail to express anything. One can pretend (in the case where one is aware that one is hallucinating) that one is pointing at something, and others can pretend to understand what the hallucinator is talking about. This chapter shows that this way of thinking about hallucinations is wrong by developing at length a series of thought experiments that show how natural and cogent demonstrations are in hallucinatory contexts. Gareth Evans’s careful discussion of this matter is analyzed. Pretence approaches to singular hallucinatory talk are undercut by the external discourse demand, and by quantifying-in requirements on that discourse. The chapter also discusses how identity conditions for hallucinated objects can be cogent, and the argument from hallucination.Less
It’s common to think that demonstrations require something (that exists) that’s demonstrated. If, because of hallucination, there is no object, then the demonstration—and what’s said—is seen by some to fail to express anything. One can pretend (in the case where one is aware that one is hallucinating) that one is pointing at something, and others can pretend to understand what the hallucinator is talking about. This chapter shows that this way of thinking about hallucinations is wrong by developing at length a series of thought experiments that show how natural and cogent demonstrations are in hallucinatory contexts. Gareth Evans’s careful discussion of this matter is analyzed. Pretence approaches to singular hallucinatory talk are undercut by the external discourse demand, and by quantifying-in requirements on that discourse. The chapter also discusses how identity conditions for hallucinated objects can be cogent, and the argument from hallucination.
