Nicholas Rescher
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199261826
- eISBN:
- 9780191698781
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261826.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its ...
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Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. It draws together the philosophy of science, metaphysics and epistemology to study the relationship between what there is and how we can understand it. The author seeks to describe — in a way accessible to philosophers and non-philosophers alike — the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions.Less
Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. It draws together the philosophy of science, metaphysics and epistemology to study the relationship between what there is and how we can understand it. The author seeks to describe — in a way accessible to philosophers and non-philosophers alike — the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions.
Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251520
- eISBN:
- 9780191719165
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251520.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book contains a collection of ten chapters by philosophers and linguists on how semantics and pragmatics relate to one another. Some discuss the distinction directly; others approach it ...
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This book contains a collection of ten chapters by philosophers and linguists on how semantics and pragmatics relate to one another. Some discuss the distinction directly; others approach it indirectly by arguing for specific semantic or pragmatic treatments of linguistic phenomena in the twilight zone, such as focus, presupposition, or anaphora.Less
This book contains a collection of ten chapters by philosophers and linguists on how semantics and pragmatics relate to one another. Some discuss the distinction directly; others approach it indirectly by arguing for specific semantic or pragmatic treatments of linguistic phenomena in the twilight zone, such as focus, presupposition, or anaphora.
Christian Illies
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198238324
- eISBN:
- 9780191679612
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238324.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. ...
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Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.Less
Transcendental arguments have gained a lot of attention over the past twenty years, mainly in the field of theoretical reason. Yet few scholars have looked at their relevance to practical reason. This book argues that although this methodological avenue is not yet well-paved, transcendental arguments have great potential in ethics, as they promise rational justification of normative judgements. There are two main types of transcendental argument that have been developed for this purpose in recent years. One is based on an analysis of the implications of agency (mainly by Alan Gewirth), the other on an analysis of reason as a discursive process with normative presuppositions (Karl-Otto Apel and other continental philosophers, but also Onora O'Neill). This book finds that these arguments have severe limitations, and argues that practical reason should involve a different analysis: judgement formation must be analysed as a form of agency. Once this starting point is secured, by showing that it cannot rationally be denied, then two things can be transcendentally inferred: first, that there exists a categorical demand upon agents to arrive at true judgements, and second, that we must respect freedom of agency in general. Here our ordinary notions of right and wrong find secure ground.
Pieter A. M. Seuren
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199559473
- eISBN:
- 9780191721137
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559473.003.0009
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Psycholinguistics / Neurolinguistics / Cognitive Linguistics
This chapter concentrates on the problems posed by lexical meanings for any formal theory. Among the topics discussed are the noncompositionality of compound meanings, vagueness phenomena, the ...
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This chapter concentrates on the problems posed by lexical meanings for any formal theory. Among the topics discussed are the noncompositionality of compound meanings, vagueness phenomena, the nonintersectivity of adjectives, presuppositional aspects of lexical meaning, metaphor, polysemy, built‐in cognitive parameters and intrinsically higher‐order predicates.Less
This chapter concentrates on the problems posed by lexical meanings for any formal theory. Among the topics discussed are the noncompositionality of compound meanings, vagueness phenomena, the nonintersectivity of adjectives, presuppositional aspects of lexical meaning, metaphor, polysemy, built‐in cognitive parameters and intrinsically higher‐order predicates.
Walter Sinnott‐Armstrong
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195169720
- eISBN:
- 9780199786343
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195169727.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all ...
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This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the problems and objections raised by its critics.Less
This essay invokes a technical framework of contrast classes within which Pyrrhonians can accept (or deny) knowledge claims that are relativized to specific contrast classes, but avoid all unrelativized knowledge claims and all presuppositions about which contrast classes are really relevant. Pyrrhonians can then assert part of the content of everyday knowledge claims without privileging the everyday perspective or any other perspective. This framework provides a precise way to understand the central claims of neo-Pyrrhonism while avoiding most, if not all, of the problems and objections raised by its critics.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212460
- eISBN:
- 9780191707193
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212460.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book is divided into three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 4) investigates how truth can be conveyed in allegory, parable, or myth by analogy and metaphor, within false presuppositions about ...
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This book is divided into three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 4) investigates how truth can be conveyed in allegory, parable, or myth by analogy and metaphor, within false presuppositions about science and history. Part 2 (Chapters 5 to 6) considers what is shown when some book or creed constitutes a revelation from God. Its content needs to be intrinsically plausible and also to be confirmed by miracle. Part 3 (Chapters 7 to 12) assesses the claim that Christian doctrinal and moral teaching and the Christian Bible constitute revealed truth. It sets out the criteria for a society descended from the society of the apostles being the Church founded by Jesus Christ, and shown by his miraculous Resurrection to be a source of revealed truth. It argues that the authority of its teaching and of the Bible depends on their being authenticated by that church. It analyses the extent of analogy and metaphor in the Church's teaching, claims that the moral teaching is intrinsically plausible, and that the Bible is to be interpreted in the light of the Church's teaching and of our knowledge of science and history.Less
This book is divided into three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 4) investigates how truth can be conveyed in allegory, parable, or myth by analogy and metaphor, within false presuppositions about science and history. Part 2 (Chapters 5 to 6) considers what is shown when some book or creed constitutes a revelation from God. Its content needs to be intrinsically plausible and also to be confirmed by miracle. Part 3 (Chapters 7 to 12) assesses the claim that Christian doctrinal and moral teaching and the Christian Bible constitute revealed truth. It sets out the criteria for a society descended from the society of the apostles being the Church founded by Jesus Christ, and shown by his miraculous Resurrection to be a source of revealed truth. It argues that the authority of its teaching and of the Bible depends on their being authenticated by that church. It analyses the extent of analogy and metaphor in the Church's teaching, claims that the moral teaching is intrinsically plausible, and that the Bible is to be interpreted in the light of the Church's teaching and of our knowledge of science and history.
Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199572380
- eISBN:
- 9780191728914
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572380.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
This book brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of the intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language ...
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This book brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of the intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, this book gives both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest. The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules.Less
This book brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of the intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work available in a single volume, this book gives both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which this interaction is manifest. The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212460
- eISBN:
- 9780191707193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212460.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Christian doctrinal definitions (e.g., creeds) try to state doctrines in as precise a way as possible, using words — as far as possible — in literal senses. But they incorporate presuppositions which ...
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Christian doctrinal definitions (e.g., creeds) try to state doctrines in as precise a way as possible, using words — as far as possible — in literal senses. But they incorporate presuppositions which need to be siphoned off, for example, the Nicene Creed's presupposition that the Universe consists of ‘the sky’ (Heaven) and the Earth. And they often use words in analogical and metaphorical senses. Examples of the latter in the Nicene creed are its description of the relation of the Son to the Father as ‘light from light’, and of Jesus ‘sitting’ ‘at the right hand of the Father’.Less
Christian doctrinal definitions (e.g., creeds) try to state doctrines in as precise a way as possible, using words — as far as possible — in literal senses. But they incorporate presuppositions which need to be siphoned off, for example, the Nicene Creed's presupposition that the Universe consists of ‘the sky’ (Heaven) and the Earth. And they often use words in analogical and metaphorical senses. Examples of the latter in the Nicene creed are its description of the relation of the Son to the Father as ‘light from light’, and of Jesus ‘sitting’ ‘at the right hand of the Father’.
Richard Swinburne
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199212460
- eISBN:
- 9780191707193
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212460.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
Humans need propositional revelation from God in order to know better what God is like, what he has done for us (e.g., become incarnate and made atonement for our sins), and will do for us (e.g., ...
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Humans need propositional revelation from God in order to know better what God is like, what he has done for us (e.g., become incarnate and made atonement for our sins), and will do for us (e.g., provide an after-life), and also in order to know moral truths. Some moral truths are independent of the will of God, but God may command us to do certain actions and his command will make those actions obligatory when they would not be so otherwise. The revelation would probably be expressed within the presuppositions of the culture to which it was originally delivered; and so there needs to be a continuing church which can interpret the original revelation for new cultures.Less
Humans need propositional revelation from God in order to know better what God is like, what he has done for us (e.g., become incarnate and made atonement for our sins), and will do for us (e.g., provide an after-life), and also in order to know moral truths. Some moral truths are independent of the will of God, but God may command us to do certain actions and his command will make those actions obligatory when they would not be so otherwise. The revelation would probably be expressed within the presuppositions of the culture to which it was originally delivered; and so there needs to be a continuing church which can interpret the original revelation for new cultures.
K. M. Jaszczolt
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199261987
- eISBN:
- 9780191718656
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261987.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
The book offers an original theory of meaning in discourse that combines a dynamic representation of discourse with an intentional explanation of processing. It contains an exposition of a theory of ...
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The book offers an original theory of meaning in discourse that combines a dynamic representation of discourse with an intentional explanation of processing. It contains an exposition of a theory of default semantics and its application to a range of language constructions. Default semantics provides cognitive foundations of discourse interpretation and does so in a broadly conceived truth-conditional framework where truth conditions are applied to utterances. The theory combines the subject matter of post-Gricean ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ with the formalism and semanticization of meaning found in discourse representation theory (DRT). It is assumed that pragmatic information can contribute to the truth-conditional representation of an utterance. This information can have the form of (i) conscious inference, or it can have a form of default interpretation conceived of as (ii) cognitive defaults and (iii) social-cultural defaults. From DRT, it borrows the idea of dynamic semantics as context change implemented in semantic representation and the idea that meaning in discourse will, somehow or other, turn out to be compositional, that is, it will turn out to be a function of the parts and the structure. In short, default semantics combines two seemingly incompatible assumptions that (i) pragmatic input contributes to the truth conditions and (ii) the theory of meaning of utterances and discourses is a compositional, semantic theory. Such semantic representations are called merger representations in that they combine (merge) information from word meaning, sentence structure, pragmatic inference, and various kinds of defaults. Predicating compositionality of such merger representations aided by using an extended and amended language of DRT allows for the semanticization of the account of discourse meaning. The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains theoretical foundations and addresses the questions of the semantics/pragmatics boundary, underspecification, logical form, levels of representation, default meanings, and ‘pragmatic’ compositionality of merger representations. Part II contains some applications of the theory, including definite descriptions, propositional attitude reports, temporality, presupposition, sentential connectives, and number terms.Less
The book offers an original theory of meaning in discourse that combines a dynamic representation of discourse with an intentional explanation of processing. It contains an exposition of a theory of default semantics and its application to a range of language constructions. Default semantics provides cognitive foundations of discourse interpretation and does so in a broadly conceived truth-conditional framework where truth conditions are applied to utterances. The theory combines the subject matter of post-Gricean ‘truth-conditional pragmatics’ with the formalism and semanticization of meaning found in discourse representation theory (DRT). It is assumed that pragmatic information can contribute to the truth-conditional representation of an utterance. This information can have the form of (i) conscious inference, or it can have a form of default interpretation conceived of as (ii) cognitive defaults and (iii) social-cultural defaults. From DRT, it borrows the idea of dynamic semantics as context change implemented in semantic representation and the idea that meaning in discourse will, somehow or other, turn out to be compositional, that is, it will turn out to be a function of the parts and the structure. In short, default semantics combines two seemingly incompatible assumptions that (i) pragmatic input contributes to the truth conditions and (ii) the theory of meaning of utterances and discourses is a compositional, semantic theory. Such semantic representations are called merger representations in that they combine (merge) information from word meaning, sentence structure, pragmatic inference, and various kinds of defaults. Predicating compositionality of such merger representations aided by using an extended and amended language of DRT allows for the semanticization of the account of discourse meaning. The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains theoretical foundations and addresses the questions of the semantics/pragmatics boundary, underspecification, logical form, levels of representation, default meanings, and ‘pragmatic’ compositionality of merger representations. Part II contains some applications of the theory, including definite descriptions, propositional attitude reports, temporality, presupposition, sentential connectives, and number terms.
Nicholas Jardine
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198250395
- eISBN:
- 9780191681288
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250395.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter explains the ways in which a shift of scene may be brought about by changes in presuppositions and methodological commitments. It proposes the important role of local and tacit methods, ...
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This chapter explains the ways in which a shift of scene may be brought about by changes in presuppositions and methodological commitments. It proposes the important role of local and tacit methods, practices, and techniques in determining of scenes of inquiry, and examines the problems of access imposed for historians. It first considers the existential, explanatory, and categorical presuppositions as determinants of scenes of inquiry. Then, it examines methodological commitments that affect different perceptions of relevance. The last section pays attention to the problems of access to local beliefs, commitments, and practices faced by the historians in explaining the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of scenes of inquiry.Less
This chapter explains the ways in which a shift of scene may be brought about by changes in presuppositions and methodological commitments. It proposes the important role of local and tacit methods, practices, and techniques in determining of scenes of inquiry, and examines the problems of access imposed for historians. It first considers the existential, explanatory, and categorical presuppositions as determinants of scenes of inquiry. Then, it examines methodological commitments that affect different perceptions of relevance. The last section pays attention to the problems of access to local beliefs, commitments, and practices faced by the historians in explaining the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of scenes of inquiry.
Christopher Potts
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199273829
- eISBN:
- 9780191706653
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199273829.003.0002
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter begins with a brief history of the idea of conventional implicatures (CIs) and a close look at Grice’s original definition. It compares and contrasts CIs with conversational ...
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This chapter begins with a brief history of the idea of conventional implicatures (CIs) and a close look at Grice’s original definition. It compares and contrasts CIs with conversational implicatures, at-issue entailments, presuppositions, and intonational meanings, concluding that CIs, as Grice defined them, are distinct from all of them. The chapter then considers the linguistic consequences of Grice’s specifications. CIs should be scopeless, they should determine their own dimension of meaning, they should introduce new (but backgrounded) information, and they should serve as a kind of commentary on the main content of the sentence that contains them.Less
This chapter begins with a brief history of the idea of conventional implicatures (CIs) and a close look at Grice’s original definition. It compares and contrasts CIs with conversational implicatures, at-issue entailments, presuppositions, and intonational meanings, concluding that CIs, as Grice defined them, are distinct from all of them. The chapter then considers the linguistic consequences of Grice’s specifications. CIs should be scopeless, they should determine their own dimension of meaning, they should introduce new (but backgrounded) information, and they should serve as a kind of commentary on the main content of the sentence that contains them.
Regine Eckardt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199262601
- eISBN:
- 9780191718939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199262601.003.0003
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter offers a brief introduction to the core ideas and gives some notation concerning truth conditional semantics. It aims to revive earlier experiences with the field and ease later contact ...
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This chapter offers a brief introduction to the core ideas and gives some notation concerning truth conditional semantics. It aims to revive earlier experiences with the field and ease later contact with semantic representations of the items under investigation. Particular emphasis is laid on the explicitness of the paradigm which encourages to specify literal contents of words, the modes of semantic composition, presuppositions, implicatures and default inferences, indexical anchors of utterances, and other conceptual parameters that may influence the use and interpretation of language.Less
This chapter offers a brief introduction to the core ideas and gives some notation concerning truth conditional semantics. It aims to revive earlier experiences with the field and ease later contact with semantic representations of the items under investigation. Particular emphasis is laid on the explicitness of the paradigm which encourages to specify literal contents of words, the modes of semantic composition, presuppositions, implicatures and default inferences, indexical anchors of utterances, and other conceptual parameters that may influence the use and interpretation of language.
Regine Eckardt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199262601
- eISBN:
- 9780191718939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199262601.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter traces the development of intensifying selbst (self) to the focus particle selbst (even) in German. Starting from a semantic analysis of the intensifier, it surveys German literary data ...
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This chapter traces the development of intensifying selbst (self) to the focus particle selbst (even) in German. Starting from a semantic analysis of the intensifier, it surveys German literary data from when this development emerged (c.1550-1600) and traces passages which shift between old and new use of selbst. It is shown that such contexts of use do not support the presuppositions of selbst in its older sense and create a ‘pragmatic overload’ for the hearer. Striving for pragmatic simplicity and plausibility, hearers hypothesize a new possible use for the item, initiating the emergence of the new selbst/even entry.Less
This chapter traces the development of intensifying selbst (self) to the focus particle selbst (even) in German. Starting from a semantic analysis of the intensifier, it surveys German literary data from when this development emerged (c.1550-1600) and traces passages which shift between old and new use of selbst. It is shown that such contexts of use do not support the presuppositions of selbst in its older sense and create a ‘pragmatic overload’ for the hearer. Striving for pragmatic simplicity and plausibility, hearers hypothesize a new possible use for the item, initiating the emergence of the new selbst/even entry.
Regine Eckardt
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199262601
- eISBN:
- 9780191718939
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199262601.003.0008
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter surveys the driving factors of change that were encountered in the case studies. It is argued that language change does not arise as a result of experimentation and imitation of use of ...
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This chapter surveys the driving factors of change that were encountered in the case studies. It is argued that language change does not arise as a result of experimentation and imitation of use of poorly specified linguistic items. Speakers are able to hypothesize specific new uses of old words if confronted with suitable utterance contexts. Specifically, it was shown that utterances that carry a pragmatic overload — too much unwarranted presuppositions — can initiate change. The principle ‘avoid pragmatic overload’, parallel to Lightfoot’s ‘avoid structural complexity’ principle, hitherto unacknowledged in the literature on semantic change, is one of the main theories confirmed by this investigation.Less
This chapter surveys the driving factors of change that were encountered in the case studies. It is argued that language change does not arise as a result of experimentation and imitation of use of poorly specified linguistic items. Speakers are able to hypothesize specific new uses of old words if confronted with suitable utterance contexts. Specifically, it was shown that utterances that carry a pragmatic overload — too much unwarranted presuppositions — can initiate change. The principle ‘avoid pragmatic overload’, parallel to Lightfoot’s ‘avoid structural complexity’ principle, hitherto unacknowledged in the literature on semantic change, is one of the main theories confirmed by this investigation.
Elliott Sober
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199297306
- eISBN:
- 9780191713729
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297306.003.0003
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
The use of a principle of parsimony in phylogenetic inference is both widespread and controversial. It is controversial because biologists, who view phylogenetic inference as first and foremost a ...
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The use of a principle of parsimony in phylogenetic inference is both widespread and controversial. It is controversial because biologists, who view phylogenetic inference as first and foremost a statistical problem, have pressed the question of what one must assume about the evolutionary process if one is entitled to use parsimony in this way. They suspect, not just that parsimony makes assumptions about the evolutionary process, but that it makes highly specific assumptions that are often implausible. That it must make some assumptions seems clear to them because they are confident that the method of maximum parsimony must resemble the main statistical procedure used to make phylogenetic inferences: the method of maximum likelihood. Likelihoodists suspect that parsimony nonetheless involves an implicit model. The question for them is to discover what that model is. This chapter discusses parsimony's ostensive presuppositions by examining the relationship that exists between maximum likelihood and maximum parsimony among simple examples in which parsimony and likelihood disagree.Less
The use of a principle of parsimony in phylogenetic inference is both widespread and controversial. It is controversial because biologists, who view phylogenetic inference as first and foremost a statistical problem, have pressed the question of what one must assume about the evolutionary process if one is entitled to use parsimony in this way. They suspect, not just that parsimony makes assumptions about the evolutionary process, but that it makes highly specific assumptions that are often implausible. That it must make some assumptions seems clear to them because they are confident that the method of maximum parsimony must resemble the main statistical procedure used to make phylogenetic inferences: the method of maximum likelihood. Likelihoodists suspect that parsimony nonetheless involves an implicit model. The question for them is to discover what that model is. This chapter discusses parsimony's ostensive presuppositions by examining the relationship that exists between maximum likelihood and maximum parsimony among simple examples in which parsimony and likelihood disagree.
Todd May
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780748635320
- eISBN:
- 9780748671922
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Edinburgh University Press
- DOI:
- 10.3366/edinburgh/9780748635320.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This book is devoted entirely to the thought of Jacques Rancière. It focuses on his central political idea that a democratic politics emerges from the presupposition of equality. The book examines ...
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This book is devoted entirely to the thought of Jacques Rancière. It focuses on his central political idea that a democratic politics emerges from the presupposition of equality. The book examines and extends this presupposition, offering a framework for understanding it, placing it in the current political context, and showing how it challenges traditional political philosophy and opens up neglected political paths. The book aims to show that Rancière's view offers both hope and perspective for those who seek to think about and engage in progressive political action.Less
This book is devoted entirely to the thought of Jacques Rancière. It focuses on his central political idea that a democratic politics emerges from the presupposition of equality. The book examines and extends this presupposition, offering a framework for understanding it, placing it in the current political context, and showing how it challenges traditional political philosophy and opens up neglected political paths. The book aims to show that Rancière's view offers both hope and perspective for those who seek to think about and engage in progressive political action.
William Lane Craig
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198269854
- eISBN:
- 9780191600517
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198269854.003.0010
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
John Dominic Crossan's reconstruction of the events of Easter is based upon idiosyncratic presuppositions concerning sources and methodology, which would not be accepted by any other major NT critic. ...
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John Dominic Crossan's reconstruction of the events of Easter is based upon idiosyncratic presuppositions concerning sources and methodology, which would not be accepted by any other major NT critic. Concerning Jesus’ burial, Crossan is unable to make a plausible case for regarding Mark's account as historicized prophecy, nor does he render doubtful the historicity of Joseph of Arimathea's role in the burial. With respect to the empty tomb, Crossan fails to sustain his hypothesis that the Markan account is rooted in the Gospel of Peter and that the female dramatis personae are residue from the prior Secret Gospel of Mark. Crossan is largely silent concerning the appearances traditions, adopting the long‐refuted interpretation of the appearance stories as legitimations of authority. Finally, Crossan is unable to provide any convincing explanation of the origin of the disciples’ belief in Jesus’ resurrection.On the whole, Eddy finds Craig's critique of Crossan to be convincing. His critical comments, then, are to be construed as suggestions for refining and polishing an already strong argument. He begins by noting two points at which revision of the argument might be considered. Next, he briefly discusses several points at which further support and/or development of the argument could be profitable. Finally, he raises several issues related to the very important question of ‘presuppositions’.Less
John Dominic Crossan's reconstruction of the events of Easter is based upon idiosyncratic presuppositions concerning sources and methodology, which would not be accepted by any other major NT critic. Concerning Jesus’ burial, Crossan is unable to make a plausible case for regarding Mark's account as historicized prophecy, nor does he render doubtful the historicity of Joseph of Arimathea's role in the burial. With respect to the empty tomb, Crossan fails to sustain his hypothesis that the Markan account is rooted in the Gospel of Peter and that the female dramatis personae are residue from the prior Secret Gospel of Mark. Crossan is largely silent concerning the appearances traditions, adopting the long‐refuted interpretation of the appearance stories as legitimations of authority. Finally, Crossan is unable to provide any convincing explanation of the origin of the disciples’ belief in Jesus’ resurrection.
On the whole, Eddy finds Craig's critique of Crossan to be convincing. His critical comments, then, are to be construed as suggestions for refining and polishing an already strong argument. He begins by noting two points at which revision of the argument might be considered. Next, he briefly discusses several points at which further support and/or development of the argument could be profitable. Finally, he raises several issues related to the very important question of ‘presuppositions’.
Eric Plumer
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199244393
- eISBN:
- 9780191601194
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199244391.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
Drawing partly upon De Doctrina Christiana, partly upon other writings of Augustine, Ch. 4 examines the hermeneutical presuppositions with which Augustine approaches the Bible. Of these ...
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Drawing partly upon De Doctrina Christiana, partly upon other writings of Augustine, Ch. 4 examines the hermeneutical presuppositions with which Augustine approaches the Bible. Of these presuppositions, the ones pertaining to the following three topics are of particular importance for an appreciation of Augustine's Commentary on Galatians: the inspiration of the Bible, the unity of the Bible, and the relation between Scripture and the rule of faith, or Creed. This chapter also considers the closely related matter of Augustine's sensitivity to questions of text and translation. The chapter ends by summarizing Augustine's Commentary and highlighting significant points.Less
Drawing partly upon De Doctrina Christiana, partly upon other writings of Augustine, Ch. 4 examines the hermeneutical presuppositions with which Augustine approaches the Bible. Of these presuppositions, the ones pertaining to the following three topics are of particular importance for an appreciation of Augustine's Commentary on Galatians: the inspiration of the Bible, the unity of the Bible, and the relation between Scripture and the rule of faith, or Creed. This chapter also considers the closely related matter of Augustine's sensitivity to questions of text and translation. The chapter ends by summarizing Augustine's Commentary and highlighting significant points.
Michael Blome-Tillmann
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693702
- eISBN:
- 9780191741265
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter considers counterexamples to presuppositional epistemic contextualism (PEC), a view about the semantics of ‘knowledge’-ascriptions. According to PEC, the semantic content of the ...
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This chapter considers counterexamples to presuppositional epistemic contextualism (PEC), a view about the semantics of ‘knowledge’-ascriptions. According to PEC, the semantic content of the predicate ‘know’ at a context Cis partly determined by the speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions at C. The problem for the view arises from the fact that pragmatic presuppositions are sometimes known to be true by speakers who make them: hence the problem of known presuppositions. After discussing several unsuccessful ways to solve the problem, it is proposed to add a new Lewisian rule of proper ignoring to the semantics of PEC — namely, the rule of evidence-based ignoring. If the proposed account succeeds, the problem of known presuppositions has a straightforward solution within the framework of PEC.Less
This chapter considers counterexamples to presuppositional epistemic contextualism (PEC), a view about the semantics of ‘knowledge’-ascriptions. According to PEC, the semantic content of the predicate ‘know’ at a context Cis partly determined by the speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions at C. The problem for the view arises from the fact that pragmatic presuppositions are sometimes known to be true by speakers who make them: hence the problem of known presuppositions. After discussing several unsuccessful ways to solve the problem, it is proposed to add a new Lewisian rule of proper ignoring to the semantics of PEC — namely, the rule of evidence-based ignoring. If the proposed account succeeds, the problem of known presuppositions has a straightforward solution within the framework of PEC.
