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Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of parliamentary democracy is introduced to reveal that singularity and indirect delegation are key ingredients of delegation and accountability. Develops a delegation model that reveals more agency loss (policy slippage) in parliamentary democracy than in two versions of presidentialism. Parliamentary democracies use ex ante screening by cohesive political parties to protect against adverse selection. Delegation and accountability make parliamentary democracies more efficient, but frequently less transparent. Identifies the implications of different forms of parliamentarism, such as Westminster parliamentarism, pivotal parliamentarism, and constrained parliamentarism.

Portugal’s blend of semi-presidentialism with multipartism has created a regime capable of generating a wide variety of governing solutions. This flexibility has helped consolidate one of Western Europe’s youngest democracies, but it is indicative of how complex the country’s delegation process is. The 1982 constitutional revision simplified the delegation process because it eliminated the possibility of presidential government. However, presidents have remained important in policy-making, particularly due to their use of the presidential veto, which is a unique characteristic of Portugal’s institutional design vis-à-vis its Western European partners. The President’s absolute veto over cabinet decrees constitutes an important constraint on the powerful Portuguese cabinet.

The focus of this chapter is the academic debate on the choice of semi‐presidentialism as an appropriate constitutional arrangement. However, it does not aim to demonstrate that semi‐presidentialism is either a better or worse form of government than presidentialism or parliamentarism, and it has not been written with the intention of establishing a definitive list of the advantages and disadvantages of semi‐presidential regimes. Rather, the chapter is concerned with the terms of the debate. It aims to show that as it currently stands the debate about the pros and cons of the various regime types is fundamentally flawed, and that the assumptions underlying the contemporary debate need to be reconsidered before meaningful conclusions about the true advantages and disadvantages of these regime types can be drawn. Drawing on the country studies in the previous chapters, the first part of this chapter identifies the diverse patterns of leadership to be found in European semi‐presidential regimes; the second part returns to Duverger's framework for the study of semi‐presidentialism and considers the importance of historical, constitutional, party political, and other factors in determining why these leadership patterns should vary so much; and finally, the third part indicates what the experience of European semi‐presidentialism tells us about the issue of comparative institutional engineering.

A parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model, Canada does not qualify formally as a presidential system: The prime minister and other members of the political executive are responsible to a popularly elected House of Commons. Nonetheless, the Canadian prime minister enjoys wide-ranging powers that in practice are far more extensive than those enjoyed by prime ministers in other Westminster systems. The nature of the leadership selection process, strict party discipline and a fragmented opposition, help ensure prime ministerial dominance over both parliament and cabinet. So too do strong central agencies. While personalization and popularization of prime ministerial leadership is not as pronounced in Canada as in the UK, it is nevertheless an important factor. Prime ministers are beholden to very few interests in their parties, which they dominate. In the Canadian system, one finds many of the characteristics of presidentialization without any of the formal attributes. Federalism and the strength of the provinces act as the major constraint on prime ministerial power. In important respects, Canadian prime ministers are more powerful than presidents in some presidential systems.

After Yeltsin abandoned attempts to influence the course of republican transitions from authoritarianism, few republics persevered along clearly democratic paths. This chapter examines the course those transition paths followed, with particular attention paid to the drafting of republican constitutions. Who controlled that process set the political agenda by defining the ‘rules of the game’. The strong presidentialism found in virtually all of the republics is a recurring theme. Ten years of presidential and parliamentary elections are examined to discern the effect of these institutional choices. The crude sultanism that emerged in the republic of Kalmykia is examined in detail.

This chapter asks a deceptively simple question: How do we understand the relationship between the prime minister, cabinet, and the rest of the Westminster system? It explores the dilemmas posed by the alleged centralization of power on prime ministers. It concludes the arguments for presidentialism are not persuasive. The chapter suggests that four factors shape and constrain both the capacity of prime ministers and the expectations about cabinet in Westminster systems: the contingent nature of ‘court politics’, traditions of leadership, competing notions of cabinet and its role as authoritative decision-maker, and territorial interdependence. There is recurring dilemmas running through the debate between Westminster and the governance tale with its stress on the prime minister as one actor embedded in, and dependent on, webs of organizations and governments. The inescapable fact for all governments, unitary or federal, is that they have to work in, with and through a complex of organizations, governments, and networks with power constrained by ever more pervasive and complex patterns of dependence.

Since the early 1980s, the regime type of the Finnish political system has gradually mutated, because of the complementary processes of de-presidentialization and re-presidentialization. The former entailed the erosion of the formal prerogatives of the President and a switch from a semi-presidential towards a parliamentary type of executive. This process culminated in the coming into force of a totally new constitution in 2000. Re-presidentialization, in turn, consists of the growing power of the Prime Minister within the newly parliamentarized political executive. Most of the causes of the de facto ‘re-presidentialization’ of Finnish politics are structural rather than contingent. The internal activities of political parties have declined as they have transformed themselves into modern electoralist organizations, and the autonomy of the leaders from their parties has increased. Partisan dealignment and ideological convergence between the parties has made space for the personalization of politics. The personalization of politics, in combination with the declining role of party organizations, enhances the autonomy of party leaders within their own parties. In contemporary Finland, the leaders with the strongest presidential capacities contest the premiership rather than the presidency.

Since the 1960s, the electoral process in America has undergone a pronounced process of personalization. Candidates for the presidency have grown increasingly independent of the traditional party organizations. There has arisen a highly personalized process of selecting the presidential candidate. However, this personalization of the electoral process has not been matched by an equivalent personalization of the system of government. There are both structural and contingent reasons for this circumstance. The structural ones have to do with the nature of the American system of government, which is a system of separated government. The contingent reasons have to do with the progressive institutionalization—especially since the 1980s—of a divided government within the separated government. Thus, having conquered the presidency on the basis of his personal resources, the President finds that he lacks the instrument essential for him to exercise that office to the fullest extent, namely, a party able to link him with Congress. The difficulty of governing with a divided government was exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, because it deprived the President of a crucial reason for asserting his leadership in the institutional system. The dramatic terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 reaffirmed the need for presidential leadership, but it could not resolve the problems that had led to the institutional weakening of the presidency.

Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.

Outlines Estonia's path to a new constitution along with an assessment of the new institutions in place since 1992. Because of constant political conflict, Pettai argues that the constitution‐making process was essential for creating the basis for conflict resolution and democratic consolidation. The chapter describes how Estonian leaders grappled with important aspects of their new democracy, including fundamental rights and duties, social welfare rights, judicial and constitutional review, the relationship between the president and the parliament, local government, minorities, and non‐citizens. Special attention is paid to the presidentialism versus parliamentarism debate. The author argues that institutional engineering enabled Estonia's leaders to secure its statehood and contributed to its economic development, European integration, and social progress.

Parliamentary government is the most common way to organize delegation and accountability in contemporary democracies. Parliamentary government is a system of government in which the prime minister and his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter. Parliamentary democracy is a chain of delegation and accountability, from the voters to the ultimate policy makers, in which at each link (stage), a principal (in whom authority is originally) delegates to an agent, whom the principal has conditionally authorized to act in his or her name and place. The parliamentary chain of delegation is characterized by indirectness and singularity (i.e. at each link of the parliamentary chain, a single principal delegates to a single agent). At each stage of this chain, delegation problems (such as adverse selection and moral hazard) can occur.

Describes the chain of delegation in the context of a semi-presidential democracy. The Finnish president has wide-ranging powers and is a strong political player, which influences the patterns of delegation and accountability in Finland. The chain of delegation and accountability in Finnish democracy is influenced by a number of constraints relating to political parties, the party system, and the power of various kinds of external agents (i.e. interest organizations and international actors like the European Union).

Describes the chain of delegation in the context of a semi-presidential democracy, which grafts a popularly elected president with extensive constitutional powers onto a more or less conventional parliamentary system. The direct linkage between the president and voters enables the president to dominate the other actors in the French parliamentary system, especially if the president is from the same party group as the parliamentary majority. If the president and the parliamentary majority are from different party groups (cohabitation), then the French system conforms more to the traditional delegation chain of a parliamentary regime.

Provides an introduction to the concept of semi‐presidentialism and establishes a framework for the study of the politics of semi‐presidential regimes. The first part sketches the evolution of the concept of semi‐presidentialism, considers some of the main criticisms of the concept, proposes a slight reformulation of the standard definition of the term, and identifies a list of semi‐presidential regimes. The second part of the chapter outlines a framework for the comparative study of semi‐presidential regimes, which provides for particular attention to be paid to the constitutional powers of political actors, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the regime, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relationship between the president and that majority. In this way, this chapter then provides the basis both for the in‐depth country studies of semi‐presidentialism that follow and for the conclusion, which examines the comparative experience of semi‐presidentialism and addresses the issue of whether countries should adopt a semi‐presidential form of government in preference to either presidential or parliamentary forms of government.

Since the constitutional reform of 1929, Austria comes under the rubric of semi‐presidentialism as defined in this volume: alongside the chancellor (prime minister), who is fully responsible to parliament, there is a directly elected president, who appoints the government and can dismiss it, although in practical terms the president has very little accountability. Nevertheless, Austria is generally considered as a parliamentary system by leading comparativists, and indeed it is parliamentary elections rather than presidential elections that decide the distribution of power. This chapter concentrates on the post‐war period, although the interwar years are also important for understanding the gap between the large constitutional powers and limited role that presidents have actually played. It draws on the literature on the Austrian presidency, original archival work, and interviews with political actors. The different sections of the chapter are: The Historical Legacy of Introducing Semi‐Presidentialism; Constitutional Powers and Their Practical Relevance; The Presidency and Party Politics; and Conclusion.

Since the retirement of President Kekkonen in 1981, a process of piecemeal constitutional reform has strengthened the core concept of parliamentary government at the expense of the old quasi‐monarchical elements in the Finnish political system; this modernization process has been propelled by a concern to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of the Kekkonen era, and has been aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent constitutional changes have also enhanced the involvement of the prime minister and government in the performance of the federative (foreign policy) function; above all, the institutional adaptation required by membership of the EU has emphasized the bicephalous character of the Finnish political executive in a way reminiscent of interwar practice. Political factors, notably the ability of the party system to deliver stable majority coalitions, have worked in the same direction, and indeed arguments have been made in favour of the abolition of the whole institution of the presidency. With parliament having recently accepted the main findings of the Nikula Committee's report and restricted the president's involvement in the process of coalition‐building, as well as vesting the government with powers jointly to manage foreign policy, it is clear that Finland is en route to becoming an orthodox parliamentary democracy: the head of state has lost his exclusive charge of the federative function; his involvement in the legislative process is limited and exceptional; and even his executive powers—particularly his powers of appointment—have been restricted in recent years. The different sections of the chapter are: Constitution‐Making 1917–1919: A Monarchical Republic?; The Shift to a President‐Dominant System, 1940–1987; From President‐Dominant to Pluralist Foreign Policy‐Making, 1987–1998; and Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?