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The focus of this chapter is the academic debate on the choice of semi‐presidentialism as an appropriate constitutional arrangement. However, it does not aim to demonstrate that semi‐presidentialism is either a better or worse form of government than presidentialism or parliamentarism, and it has not been written with the intention of establishing a definitive list of the advantages and disadvantages of semi‐presidential regimes. Rather, the chapter is concerned with the terms of the debate. It aims to show that as it currently stands the debate about the pros and cons of the various regime types is fundamentally flawed, and that the assumptions underlying the contemporary debate need to be reconsidered before meaningful conclusions about the true advantages and disadvantages of these regime types can be drawn. Drawing on the country studies in the previous chapters, the first part of this chapter identifies the diverse patterns of leadership to be found in European semi‐presidential regimes; the second part returns to Duverger's framework for the study of semi‐presidentialism and considers the importance of historical, constitutional, party political, and other factors in determining why these leadership patterns should vary so much; and finally, the third part indicates what the experience of European semi‐presidentialism tells us about the issue of comparative institutional engineering.

Identifies three motivations for political delegation (capacity, competence, collective action problems) and discusses agency problems and mechanisms of accountability. An ideal-typical form of parliamentary democracy is introduced to reveal that singularity and indirect delegation are key ingredients of delegation and accountability. Develops a delegation model that reveals more agency loss (policy slippage) in parliamentary democracy than in two versions of presidentialism. Parliamentary democracies use ex ante screening by cohesive political parties to protect against adverse selection. Delegation and accountability make parliamentary democracies more efficient, but frequently less transparent. Identifies the implications of different forms of parliamentarism, such as Westminster parliamentarism, pivotal parliamentarism, and constrained parliamentarism.

Portugal’s blend of semi-presidentialism with multipartism has created a regime capable of generating a wide variety of governing solutions. This flexibility has helped consolidate one of Western Europe’s youngest democracies, but it is indicative of how complex the country’s delegation process is. The 1982 constitutional revision simplified the delegation process because it eliminated the possibility of presidential government. However, presidents have remained important in policy-making, particularly due to their use of the presidential veto, which is a unique characteristic of Portugal’s institutional design vis-à-vis its Western European partners. The President’s absolute veto over cabinet decrees constitutes an important constraint on the powerful Portuguese cabinet.

A parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster model, Canada does not qualify formally as a presidential system: The prime minister and other members of the political executive are responsible to a popularly elected House of Commons. Nonetheless, the Canadian prime minister enjoys wide-ranging powers that in practice are far more extensive than those enjoyed by prime ministers in other Westminster systems. The nature of the leadership selection process, strict party discipline and a fragmented opposition, help ensure prime ministerial dominance over both parliament and cabinet. So too do strong central agencies. While personalization and popularization of prime ministerial leadership is not as pronounced in Canada as in the UK, it is nevertheless an important factor. Prime ministers are beholden to very few interests in their parties, which they dominate. In the Canadian system, one finds many of the characteristics of presidentialization without any of the formal attributes. Federalism and the strength of the provinces act as the major constraint on prime ministerial power. In important respects, Canadian prime ministers are more powerful than presidents in some presidential systems.

Since the early 1980s, the regime type of the Finnish political system has gradually mutated, because of the complementary processes of de-presidentialization and re-presidentialization. The former entailed the erosion of the formal prerogatives of the President and a switch from a semi-presidential towards a parliamentary type of executive. This process culminated in the coming into force of a totally new constitution in 2000. Re-presidentialization, in turn, consists of the growing power of the Prime Minister within the newly parliamentarized political executive. Most of the causes of the de facto ‘re-presidentialization’ of Finnish politics are structural rather than contingent. The internal activities of political parties have declined as they have transformed themselves into modern electoralist organizations, and the autonomy of the leaders from their parties has increased. Partisan dealignment and ideological convergence between the parties has made space for the personalization of politics. The personalization of politics, in combination with the declining role of party organizations, enhances the autonomy of party leaders within their own parties. In contemporary Finland, the leaders with the strongest presidential capacities contest the premiership rather than the presidency.

Since the 1960s, the electoral process in America has undergone a pronounced process of personalization. Candidates for the presidency have grown increasingly independent of the traditional party organizations. There has arisen a highly personalized process of selecting the presidential candidate. However, this personalization of the electoral process has not been matched by an equivalent personalization of the system of government. There are both structural and contingent reasons for this circumstance. The structural ones have to do with the nature of the American system of government, which is a system of separated government. The contingent reasons have to do with the progressive institutionalization—especially since the 1980s—of a divided government within the separated government. Thus, having conquered the presidency on the basis of his personal resources, the President finds that he lacks the instrument essential for him to exercise that office to the fullest extent, namely, a party able to link him with Congress. The difficulty of governing with a divided government was exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, because it deprived the President of a crucial reason for asserting his leadership in the institutional system. The dramatic terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 reaffirmed the need for presidential leadership, but it could not resolve the problems that had led to the institutional weakening of the presidency.

After Yeltsin abandoned attempts to influence the course of republican transitions from authoritarianism, few republics persevered along clearly democratic paths. This chapter examines the course those transition paths followed, with particular attention paid to the drafting of republican constitutions. Who controlled that process set the political agenda by defining the ‘rules of the game’. The strong presidentialism found in virtually all of the republics is a recurring theme. Ten years of presidential and parliamentary elections are examined to discern the effect of these institutional choices. The crude sultanism that emerged in the republic of Kalmykia is examined in detail.

This chapter asks a deceptively simple question: How do we understand the relationship between the prime minister, cabinet, and the rest of the Westminster system? It explores the dilemmas posed by the alleged centralization of power on prime ministers. It concludes the arguments for presidentialism are not persuasive. The chapter suggests that four factors shape and constrain both the capacity of prime ministers and the expectations about cabinet in Westminster systems: the contingent nature of ‘court politics’, traditions of leadership, competing notions of cabinet and its role as authoritative decision-maker, and territorial interdependence. There is recurring dilemmas running through the debate between Westminster and the governance tale with its stress on the prime minister as one actor embedded in, and dependent on, webs of organizations and governments. The inescapable fact for all governments, unitary or federal, is that they have to work in, with and through a complex of organizations, governments, and networks with power constrained by ever more pervasive and complex patterns of dependence.

Describes Russia as an incomplete democracy, in which a compromise regarding constitutional engineering was never reached and important decisions regarding power‐sharing were postponed, ultimately leading to the institutionalization of a super‐presidential regime created through brute force. The chapter emphasizes that Russia was the only post‐communist country that experienced a military intervention after democratic elections had taken place. The first part of the chapter focuses on how the process of amending the 1978 Russian Constitution deteriorated into a power struggle between the parliament and the president and describes the institutional structure that resulted from this contentious process. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how the Russian Constitution, which set clear rules for the institutional game but without respect for the division of power principle, has contributed to state weakness. It is emphasized that by concentrating power in the presidency, the executive has become overburdened and the state ineffective.

Provides an introduction to the concept of semi‐presidentialism and establishes a framework for the study of the politics of semi‐presidential regimes. The first part sketches the evolution of the concept of semi‐presidentialism, considers some of the main criticisms of the concept, proposes a slight reformulation of the standard definition of the term, and identifies a list of semi‐presidential regimes. The second part of the chapter outlines a framework for the comparative study of semi‐presidential regimes, which provides for particular attention to be paid to the constitutional powers of political actors, the circumstances surrounding the creation of the regime, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relationship between the president and that majority. In this way, this chapter then provides the basis both for the in‐depth country studies of semi‐presidentialism that follow and for the conclusion, which examines the comparative experience of semi‐presidentialism and addresses the issue of whether countries should adopt a semi‐presidential form of government in preference to either presidential or parliamentary forms of government.

Since the constitutional reform of 1929, Austria comes under the rubric of semi‐presidentialism as defined in this volume: alongside the chancellor (prime minister), who is fully responsible to parliament, there is a directly elected president, who appoints the government and can dismiss it, although in practical terms the president has very little accountability. Nevertheless, Austria is generally considered as a parliamentary system by leading comparativists, and indeed it is parliamentary elections rather than presidential elections that decide the distribution of power. This chapter concentrates on the post‐war period, although the interwar years are also important for understanding the gap between the large constitutional powers and limited role that presidents have actually played. It draws on the literature on the Austrian presidency, original archival work, and interviews with political actors. The different sections of the chapter are: The Historical Legacy of Introducing Semi‐Presidentialism; Constitutional Powers and Their Practical Relevance; The Presidency and Party Politics; and Conclusion.

Since the retirement of President Kekkonen in 1981, a process of piecemeal constitutional reform has strengthened the core concept of parliamentary government at the expense of the old quasi‐monarchical elements in the Finnish political system; this modernization process has been propelled by a concern to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the ‘enlightened despotism’ of the Kekkonen era, and has been aided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Recent constitutional changes have also enhanced the involvement of the prime minister and government in the performance of the federative (foreign policy) function; above all, the institutional adaptation required by membership of the EU has emphasized the bicephalous character of the Finnish political executive in a way reminiscent of interwar practice. Political factors, notably the ability of the party system to deliver stable majority coalitions, have worked in the same direction, and indeed arguments have been made in favour of the abolition of the whole institution of the presidency. With parliament having recently accepted the main findings of the Nikula Committee's report and restricted the president's involvement in the process of coalition‐building, as well as vesting the government with powers jointly to manage foreign policy, it is clear that Finland is en route to becoming an orthodox parliamentary democracy: the head of state has lost his exclusive charge of the federative function; his involvement in the legislative process is limited and exceptional; and even his executive powers—particularly his powers of appointment—have been restricted in recent years. The different sections of the chapter are: Constitution‐Making 1917–1919: A Monarchical Republic?; The Shift to a President‐Dominant System, 1940–1987; From President‐Dominant to Pluralist Foreign Policy‐Making, 1987–1998; and Towards a Ceremonial Presidency?

The Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was adopted by referendum in September 1958, and this chapter explores the relationship between the president and the prime minister in that Fifth Republic. The first section of the chapter, Patterns of Political Leadership, provides an overview of presidential–prime ministerial relations. The second section, French Semi‐Presidentialism in Context, discusses the constitutional situation, the founding context of the 1962 reform, and the relationship between the president and the parliamentary majority. The concluding section, The Contemporary Nature of French Semi‐Presidentialism, considers the wider context of presidential–prime ministerial relations, and discusses the changing parameters of executive leadership generally. In these ways, the contemporary nature of the Fifth Republic's semi‐presidential system is established.

The office of Icelandic president was created in 1944 to take over the functions of the Danish monarch, which were largely ceremonial at that time, and is non‐party political. Although the president is directly elected, political power in Iceland lies with the parliament and a government that is responsible to it. This chapter explores the actual and potential powers of the Icelandic presidency in the light of Duverger's concept of semi‐presidential government, arguing that traditional interpretations of the Icelandic constitution have overlooked the distinctiveness of semi‐presidential government, and noting that the powerlessness of the presidency is less a fact of law than of politics. An attempt is also made to account for why the presidency has developed in the manner of a powerless figurehead rather than as an effective political leader. The three sections of the chapter are: The Presidency and Political Leadership in Iceland—formation of the regime, constitutional powers, parliamentary majorities; The Presidency and the Political Forces—presidentialism in Iceland, the choice of a president; and Conclusion.

The Irish presidency is usually seen as one of the weakest in any liberal democracy, certainly as the weakest presidency to be filled by direct election. This chapter does not argue that this characterization is necessarily wrong, but it does raise questions about the nature of the presidency: is it really as weak as it seems, and, if so, is this because of written or unwritten constraints; is the presidency weak at all times, or has it been in the past—or could it be in the future—more significant under some circumstances than others? The Irish political system is based very much on the Westminster model, and although it deviates from it in some important respects (e.g. it has a proportional representation electoral system, a written constitution, judicial review, and much experience of coalition government), the central role of the government in the political process is unquestionable and largely unquestioned. Within this overall framework of executive dominance, however, there is scope for some variation according to circumstances: parliament might be a little more effective vis‐à‐vis government during periods of minority government, or at times when the ever‐changing committee system is in one of its more productive modes; within the government, the Taoiseach (prime minister) is more likely to be dominant during periods of single‐party government than in coalitions; it is fair to say, though, that no one looks to the president for political leadership. The first section of the chapter considers two factors that have a strong influence upon the role of the president—the formation of the regime, and the provisions of the constitution; the next section examines relations between the president and other political actors; and the final one draws conclusions.

The semi‐presidential regime in Bulgaria is of recent origin: it was established in July 1991, when a Great National Assembly adopted a new constitution, which proclaims that ‘Bulgaria shall be a republic with a parliamentary form of government’; the emphasis on ‘parliamentary’ highlights the subordinate role of the president, who is elected directly by the voters for period five years. Even though the framers of the constitution deliberately created a dual structure of the executive branch, the text of the fundamental law envisages a mode of distribution of prerogatives that is heavily skewed in favour of the legislature and a cabinet accountable to the deputies. It is difficult, however, to sustain a claim that a general pattern of leadership is beginning to emerge under Bulgarian semi‐presidentialism, since the country has only had two presidents under its new constitution; the closest to a valid generalization which may be ventured in the light of the evidence is that, while parliament enjoys supremacy over law‐making and the government remains the primary site of executive decision‐making, the rapports between these two institutions and the presidency have varied dramatically, with the influence of the head of state running the gamut from almost complete exclusion to a palpable ability to shape agendas. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse the ways in which constitutionally designed patterns of institutional interaction shift in response to changes in the social and economic environment rather than to chronicle events—the analysis is conceived as a chronology of the successive problems with which political actors had to cope. The three sections of the chapter are: Constitutional Balance of Power; Presidential/Parliamentary Relations; and Conclusion.

The Republic of Lithuania is known as a semi‐presidential state, and while it has some basic similarities with other semi‐presidential states, this chapter looks at the main peculiarities of the regime and describes the status of presidential power. The first section explains the reasons why the citizens of Lithuania voted for a semi‐presidential regime, while those in the other two Baltic states (Latvia and Estonia), preferred to adopt a parliamentary form of government where the presidency has little constitutional power; some of the peculiarities of the Lithuanian political system are explained with particular reference to the historical background which had such an impact on the creation of the system. The second section defines the constitutional, or de jure, power of the Lithuanian presidency and clarifies its relationship with the de jure power of the Seimas, or parliament, and the government. The third section analyses the political ‘triangle’ of the president, parliament, and the government, and also presents the political realities of the last six years in Lithuania. The fourth section focuses on the personality of the president with an analysis of the period from 1993 to 1998, and the last section sets out the main conclusions of the chapter and provides a prognosis for the development of the future political system in the country.