Search Results

Chapter 2 addresses the most critical issue related to selecting heads of state: the extent to which direct elections enhance presidential powers and political involvement. First, it outlines the conventional argument that direct elections influence presidential activism by increasing presidents' legitimacy. Next, this chapter develops an alternative explanation that concrete political opportunity framework, rather than abstract legitimacy, constrains presidents' incentives and opportunities for participating in political processes. Finally, this chapter presents the results of a large-N empirical test of the alternative rival hypotheses, using presidential intervention in the process of cabinet formation to measure political activism. The results corroborate the theory on political opportunity framework, and show that election mechanisms do not affect presidential activism.

Examines how institutional features combine with other factors to exacerbate one particular threat to democracy—the expansion of presidential power. It identifies three key conditions under which presidents in societies undergoing regime change expand their formal powers: first, that economic reforms producing concentrated benefits may lead the winners from those reforms to seek institutional change in the powers of the presidency; second, that countries with fragmented parliaments tend to experience an increase in presidential powers; third, that presidents in countries with newly crafted constitutions are just as likely to seek expansion of their powers as those in countries with revised versions of communist‐era constitutions. It then reviews the generally negative consequences of increases in presidential power for democracy, with examples from various formerly communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

This chapter discusses challenges to the compound nature of American democracy raised by the global role the country has played since the end of World War II. Topics covered include the justifications and implications of America as a compound democracy, the role of President in the Cold War ear, presidential power in the era of divided government, and the rise and fall of presidential power.

Argues that the historical pattern of democratization in Latin America requires a reconsideration of the prevailing thesis that presidentialism has caused regime instability in Latin America, and of the mechanisms allegedly responsible for presidentialism's poor performance. The purpose of the chapter is to do so by means of an empirical examination of the factors that, according to the thesis, should account for variations in the political and economic performance of presidential regimes.

Representative democracy means delegation, and delegation implies the risk of agency problems. Parliamentary democracy is a particular delegation regime, a way to structure the democratic policy process, and an attempt to solve agency problems. This chapter finds that there are persistent and essential cross-national differences between European parliamentary democracies along two dimensions of citizen control: partisan influence and external constraints. This chapter’s investigation leads us to conclude that there has been a decline in the strength and cohesion of political parties and an enhancement of international, sub-national, judicial, and direct democratic external constraints. In most respects, these changes strengthen ex post controls and weaken ex ante screening devices.

The Republic of Lithuania is known as a semi‐presidential state, and while it has some basic similarities with other semi‐presidential states, this chapter looks at the main peculiarities of the regime and describes the status of presidential power. The first section explains the reasons why the citizens of Lithuania voted for a semi‐presidential regime, while those in the other two Baltic states (Latvia and Estonia), preferred to adopt a parliamentary form of government where the presidency has little constitutional power; some of the peculiarities of the Lithuanian political system are explained with particular reference to the historical background which had such an impact on the creation of the system. The second section defines the constitutional, or de jure, power of the Lithuanian presidency and clarifies its relationship with the de jure power of the Seimas, or parliament, and the government. The third section analyses the political ‘triangle’ of the president, parliament, and the government, and also presents the political realities of the last six years in Lithuania. The fourth section focuses on the personality of the president with an analysis of the period from 1993 to 1998, and the last section sets out the main conclusions of the chapter and provides a prognosis for the development of the future political system in the country.

Ukraine can be said to have a semi‐presidential system insofar as it has direct presidential elections combined with a prime minister and a government answerable to both president and parliament. Since winning independence in 1991, Ukraine has also gained a reputation for political gridlock: both of the presidents elected since independence disappointed the initial hopes of their supporters, building up an impressive array of powers on paper, but proving unable to match this in practice. Conflict between presidents, prime ministers, and the chairmen of parliament has been an endemic feature of Ukrainian politics, as have the frustrations of a weak and fractious post‐communist party system. This chapter seeks to explain why semi‐presidentialism has nevertheless provided an attractive form of political compromise in Ukraine's ethnically, linguistically, and regionally divided society, despite the problems of political stasis that it has both reflected and helped to promote. The aim is to explain why circumstances have made it difficult for Ukraine to choose any other regime type, despite the residual enthusiasm of the Ukrainian Left for a Soviet (i.e. parliamentary) republic. The chapter first examines how semi‐presidentialism was established in Ukraine and then looks at Duverger's other key criteria of semi‐presidentialism: the constitutional powers of the key political actors, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relations between the president and that majority.

Portugal’s blend of semi-presidentialism with multipartism has created a regime capable of generating a wide variety of governing solutions. This flexibility has helped consolidate one of Western Europe’s youngest democracies, but it is indicative of how complex the country’s delegation process is. The 1982 constitutional revision simplified the delegation process because it eliminated the possibility of presidential government. However, presidents have remained important in policy-making, particularly due to their use of the presidential veto, which is a unique characteristic of Portugal’s institutional design vis-à-vis its Western European partners. The President’s absolute veto over cabinet decrees constitutes an important constraint on the powerful Portuguese cabinet.

This chapter attempts to rethink how we categorize and periodize political time by focusing on liberal presidential synthesis, a framework that is centered on the rise and fall of the presidency from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon. It first considers the basic narrative of the liberal presidential synthesis and argues that the works of the last generation of postwar political historians, while providing a much richer understanding of each individual, have downplayed institutional questions about the evolution of the office over time. It then reviews the literature on individual presidencies before discussing presidential power from the perspective of political science. It also examines a number of possibilities for reordering political time and concludes by reflecting on how political history may be revitalized and reconceptualized.

This chapter examines how conservatives have come to embrace presidential power after an initial wariness. Before the 1970s, there were some conservative activists skeptical of—if not downright hostile toward—presidential power. A key turning point was the 1970s, when many conservatives believed that the congressional reforms that were passed in the aftermath of Watergate weakened the power of the executive branch and were a symbol of what went wrong as a result of the 1960s. The chapter first considers how the conservatives began to accept presidential power during the presidency of Richard Nixon between 1969 and 1974 before discussing congressional reforms in the area of national security. It also discusses the use of executive power under Ronald Reagan, who strengthened the marriage between American conservatism and presidential power; Bill Clinton; and George W. Bush, who expanded presidential power in his war on terrorism.

This chapter on presidential powers first analyzes three concepts that go beyond powers expressly stated: “implied,” “inherent,” and “prerogative.” It then considers specific presidential powers, such as the power to remove executive officials and to issue pardons. Presidential powers wax and wane depending on who occupies the Oval Office; initiatives urged by advisers and supporters, national, and international pressures; popular support (and lack thereof); and actions taken by the legislative and judicial branches to encourage or curb executive power.

The eight long years of the second Bush Administration and the War on Terror that it prosecuted have generated an extraordinary number of complex and divisive questions of constitutional law. Notably, however, most of the constitutional disputes arising out of the War on Terror have not primarily implicated the main topic of this book, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, they have tended to relate to topics such as the separation of powers, the scope of and limits on executive power, and the role of international law. This is not to say that the Bill of Rights is completely irrelevant to these disputes; in particular, the detention of enemy combatants clearly implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the National Security Agency's (NSA) program of warrantless wiretapping potentially violates the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment. On the whole, however, the role of the Bill of Rights has certainly been peripheral in recent disputes, and even when clearly implicated, their application to these disputes has been far from clear. Why that is so, but why the insights we have developed up to this point nonetheless shed important light on the constitutionality of certain aspects of the War on Terror, is the subject of this chapter.

This chapter discusses the following concepts: enumerated and implied powers of the three branches of government; overlapping powers; judicial misconceptions; historical framework; the British model; the Articles of Confederation; constitutional convention and ratification; separation of powers; Articles I and II of the Constitution; evolving powers; approaches by lawyers and professors in analyzing executive and presidential power; and interpretive theories adopted by the Supreme Court in decisions on separation of powers.

This chapter discusses constitutional provisions covering the presidential veto; the pocket veto; a hybrid veto; item vetoes; signing statements; legislative vetoes; executive privilege; and employee access to Congress.

This chapter examines powers that routinely call for interactions between the President and Congress. These include the legislative process, appointments, independent counsels, delegation of authority, and independent commissions.

This chapter uses surveys of the general public and several governmental elite groups (political appointees from the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, congressional staffers, and member of the Senior Executive Service) to examine what conservatives believe and the degree to which the policies of the Bush administration resonated with those who call themselves conservatives. It documents the fact that self-identified conservatives in the general public want the federal government to take responsibility for many areas of American life. Though they tend to be less enthusiastic about conserving the nation's natural resources, promoting racial equality or reducing poverty than people who call themselves liberals, the differences are more ones of degree than direction. The data, overall, give strong support to the message of “big-government” conservatives and point to a continuing set of dilemmas for the conservative movement.

This chapter discusses the following: the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) which has been cited as evidence that the Supreme Court has the authority to not only strike down the acts of Presidents, Congress, and the states but to do so permanently; independent presidential judgment; advisory opinions; nominating judges, recess appointments; FDR's court-packing; national security and judicial deference; and the state secrets privilege.

This chapter characterizes longstanding literatures in the fields of law, history, and political science on war and presidential power. After summarizing their main claims, the chapter then identifies areas of disagreement, empirical weaknesses, and a general lack of theory. The chapter then calls for two advancements: first, theory that is grounded in clear micro-foundations about the relevance of war for inter-branch deliberations over policy; and second, empirical evaluations that pay particular attention to issues of causal inference.

This chapter talks about necessity that enables presidential discretion, such as the aftermath of September 11 where the president argued he must have all the powers needed to fulfill his obligation on national security. It responds to arguments regarding the president having all the power that necessity confers. It scrutinizes the view that there is an implied “necessary and proper” power that applies to the president that are analogous to the Article I Necessary and Proper Clause enumerated for Congress. The chapter also considers the scope of implied presidential power, arguing that even if there is power to do what is necessary, it is still constrained by conceptions of what is proper. It points out why propriety becomes a way of incorporating Chief Justice Marshall's argument in McCulloch that constitutional principles constrain necessitarian discretion.