Stephen L. White
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the ...
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This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections.Less
This chapter defends the property dualism argument. The term “semantic premise” mentioned is used to refers to an assumption identified by Brian Loar that antiphysicalist arguments, such as the property dualism argument, tacitly assume that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property. It is argued that, the property that does the work in explaining the possibility of a posteriori identities need not be a first-order property of the referent in question. On his view, the property dualism argument requires only a weaker semantic premise, which allows that the property in question be a higher order property. A refined version of the property dualism argument is formulated, which uses the weaker premise, and defends the argument against various objections.
Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199547944
- eISBN:
- 9780191720116
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547944.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Theory
In its recent ‘deliberative’ turn, democratic theory has forgotten a conventional wisdom, once widely appreciated, that there is much in politics that is better not discussed. This chapter catalogues ...
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In its recent ‘deliberative’ turn, democratic theory has forgotten a conventional wisdom, once widely appreciated, that there is much in politics that is better not discussed. This chapter catalogues what topics might be deemed ‘politically undiscussable’, and why, as a first step toward showing how and to what extent talking about such matters might help or hinder their resolution. One important way discussion helps is by information-pooling helping to establish the truth of the matter. Even where that is not a viable aspiration, discussion might nonetheless serve a ‘premise-revealing’ function, showing one another that we are reasonable agents and in that way helping to desensitize contentious issues.Less
In its recent ‘deliberative’ turn, democratic theory has forgotten a conventional wisdom, once widely appreciated, that there is much in politics that is better not discussed. This chapter catalogues what topics might be deemed ‘politically undiscussable’, and why, as a first step toward showing how and to what extent talking about such matters might help or hinder their resolution. One important way discussion helps is by information-pooling helping to establish the truth of the matter. Even where that is not a viable aspiration, discussion might nonetheless serve a ‘premise-revealing’ function, showing one another that we are reasonable agents and in that way helping to desensitize contentious issues.
Chun Wei Choo
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195176780
- eISBN:
- 9780199789634
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195176780.003.0005
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Knowledge Management
Depending on the degree of goal uncertainty and procedural uncertainty, organizational decision making may follow the bounded rationality model, process model, political model, or anarchic model. ...
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Depending on the degree of goal uncertainty and procedural uncertainty, organizational decision making may follow the bounded rationality model, process model, political model, or anarchic model. Individual decision making relies on heuristics that can lead to biases. Group decision making is vulnerable to the tendencies for groupthink, group polarization, and an escalation of commitment. In an attempt to reduce decision uncertainty and complexity, organizations control the creation and use of information by establishing decision premises, rules, and routines for different types of decision situations.Less
Depending on the degree of goal uncertainty and procedural uncertainty, organizational decision making may follow the bounded rationality model, process model, political model, or anarchic model. Individual decision making relies on heuristics that can lead to biases. Group decision making is vulnerable to the tendencies for groupthink, group polarization, and an escalation of commitment. In an attempt to reduce decision uncertainty and complexity, organizations control the creation and use of information by establishing decision premises, rules, and routines for different types of decision situations.
Richard Kraut
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199844463
- eISBN:
- 9780199919550
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199844463.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter states some premises about the relationship that consists in something's being good for someone and its opposite (something's being bad for someone). First, that there are these two ...
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This chapter states some premises about the relationship that consists in something's being good for someone and its opposite (something's being bad for someone). First, that there are these two relationships: being good for someone and being bad for someone; furthermore, some things are related in these ways; and in favorable circumstances, we can know that these relationships hold. Second, that the relationship of being good for someone should not be defined, partly or wholly, in terms of something's being absolutely good.Less
This chapter states some premises about the relationship that consists in something's being good for someone and its opposite (something's being bad for someone). First, that there are these two relationships: being good for someone and being bad for someone; furthermore, some things are related in these ways; and in favorable circumstances, we can know that these relationships hold. Second, that the relationship of being good for someone should not be defined, partly or wholly, in terms of something's being absolutely good.
John Chapman and Bisserka Gaydarska
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197264522
- eISBN:
- 9780191734724
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197264522.003.0020
- Subject:
- Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology
This chapter introduces the fragmentation premise — the idea that the deliberate breakage of a complete object and the re-use of the resultant fragments as new and separate objects ‘after the break’ ...
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This chapter introduces the fragmentation premise — the idea that the deliberate breakage of a complete object and the re-use of the resultant fragments as new and separate objects ‘after the break’ was a common practice in the past. It also summarizes the main implications of the fragmentation premise for the study of enchained social relations and of the creation and development of personhood in the past. Enchained relations connect the distributed elements of a person's social identity using material culture. These concepts of fragmentation, enchainment and fractality are used to think through some of the earliest remains of objects in the world. Following the philosopher David Bohm, the discussion supports the co-evolution of fragmentation in both consciousness and in objects, and compares Bohm's three-stage ideas to Mithen's model of cognitive evolution and Donald's model of external symbolic storage.Less
This chapter introduces the fragmentation premise — the idea that the deliberate breakage of a complete object and the re-use of the resultant fragments as new and separate objects ‘after the break’ was a common practice in the past. It also summarizes the main implications of the fragmentation premise for the study of enchained social relations and of the creation and development of personhood in the past. Enchained relations connect the distributed elements of a person's social identity using material culture. These concepts of fragmentation, enchainment and fractality are used to think through some of the earliest remains of objects in the world. Following the philosopher David Bohm, the discussion supports the co-evolution of fragmentation in both consciousness and in objects, and compares Bohm's three-stage ideas to Mithen's model of cognitive evolution and Donald's model of external symbolic storage.
Matthew A. Baum and Philip B. K. Potter
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691164984
- eISBN:
- 9781400866472
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691164984.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
This chapter examines the validity of the “Downsian Premise,” which states that democratic multiparty systems tend to engender political coverage that is more diverse, more policy-centric, and more ...
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This chapter examines the validity of the “Downsian Premise,” which states that democratic multiparty systems tend to engender political coverage that is more diverse, more policy-centric, and more prone to challenge the government's policy line than coverage in two-party democracies. To test this proposition, the chapter conducts content analyses of international media coverage of four recent multinational conflicts (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, and Libya 2011). Newspapers in countries with more political parties offered relatively more policy-oriented news, more criticism of government policy, and more varied topical coverage than their counterparts in countries with fewer parties. These results lend credence to the Downsian Premise.Less
This chapter examines the validity of the “Downsian Premise,” which states that democratic multiparty systems tend to engender political coverage that is more diverse, more policy-centric, and more prone to challenge the government's policy line than coverage in two-party democracies. To test this proposition, the chapter conducts content analyses of international media coverage of four recent multinational conflicts (Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003, and Libya 2011). Newspapers in countries with more political parties offered relatively more policy-oriented news, more criticism of government policy, and more varied topical coverage than their counterparts in countries with fewer parties. These results lend credence to the Downsian Premise.
Larry S. Temkin
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199759446
- eISBN:
- 9780199932214
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General, Moral Philosophy
Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a ...
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Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a spectrum, certain factual premises, and the transitivity of the “better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense). Many people are suspicious of Spectrum Arguments, and many objections have been raised to such arguments. Some of these have already been addressed. But others have not. This chapter presents and responds to the most serious of the remaining objections, of which there are three main types. It considers a representative example of each type. Type one responds to this book's arguments by appealing to the significance of there being different kinds of alternatives along these spectrums. Type two claims that these arguments are versions of the Standard Sorites Paradox. Type three suggests that these arguments elicit well-known heuristics and similarity-based reasoning schemes that are leading our intuitions astray. It is argued that none of these objections is compelling.Less
Chapters 2 through 5 presented various Spectrum Arguments which revealed an inconsistency between certain standard views regarding how to make trade-offs between different alternatives along a spectrum, certain factual premises, and the transitivity of the “better than” relation (in this book's wide reason-implying sense). Many people are suspicious of Spectrum Arguments, and many objections have been raised to such arguments. Some of these have already been addressed. But others have not. This chapter presents and responds to the most serious of the remaining objections, of which there are three main types. It considers a representative example of each type. Type one responds to this book's arguments by appealing to the significance of there being different kinds of alternatives along these spectrums. Type two claims that these arguments are versions of the Standard Sorites Paradox. Type three suggests that these arguments elicit well-known heuristics and similarity-based reasoning schemes that are leading our intuitions astray. It is argued that none of these objections is compelling.
Marja‐Liisa Kakkuri‐Knuuttila and Miira Tuominen
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199666164
- eISBN:
- 9780191751936
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666164.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
In Topics I 8 Aristotle argues that all dialectical problems and premises involve the predicables: definition, peculiar property, genus, differentia, or accident. This claim of exhaustiveness is ...
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In Topics I 8 Aristotle argues that all dialectical problems and premises involve the predicables: definition, peculiar property, genus, differentia, or accident. This claim of exhaustiveness is important for understanding Aristotle’s dialectic but faces some objections. For example general notions of sameness, similarity, homonymy, and difference, introduced as dialectical tools in Topics I 13, are difficult to understand in terms of the predicables. Aristotle’s procedure suggests two interpretations of the claim. The first one restricts problems and premises to predications and offers formal criteria for classifying them. Second, Aristotle also offers extended definitions for definition and genus such that can accommodate freely formulated problems and premises if they occur in arguments leading up to arguments concerning the predicables. This paper argues that neither of the two interpretations is a satisfactory reading of the claim of exhaustiveness and that a tension remains between the formal criteria presented in the syllogism of I 8 and the variety of actual dialectical problems and premises.Less
In Topics I 8 Aristotle argues that all dialectical problems and premises involve the predicables: definition, peculiar property, genus, differentia, or accident. This claim of exhaustiveness is important for understanding Aristotle’s dialectic but faces some objections. For example general notions of sameness, similarity, homonymy, and difference, introduced as dialectical tools in Topics I 13, are difficult to understand in terms of the predicables. Aristotle’s procedure suggests two interpretations of the claim. The first one restricts problems and premises to predications and offers formal criteria for classifying them. Second, Aristotle also offers extended definitions for definition and genus such that can accommodate freely formulated problems and premises if they occur in arguments leading up to arguments concerning the predicables. This paper argues that neither of the two interpretations is a satisfactory reading of the claim of exhaustiveness and that a tension remains between the formal criteria presented in the syllogism of I 8 and the variety of actual dialectical problems and premises.
Isaac Levi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199698134
- eISBN:
- 9780191742323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698134.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
In 1865 and 1866, Peirce appealed to Aristotle’s proposal that an inductive inference be understood as a transformation of a categorical syllogism by permuting the major premise and the conclusion ...
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In 1865 and 1866, Peirce appealed to Aristotle’s proposal that an inductive inference be understood as a transformation of a categorical syllogism by permuting the major premise and the conclusion supported by a conversion of the minor premise to develop his own formal account of induction. He completed his theory by taking hypothetic inference to be the product of permuting the minor premise and the conclusion of the categorical syllogism. Peirce sought to extend the proposal beyond transformations of categorical syllogisms to cover reasoning where the major premise of the categorical syllogism is no longer a categorical proposition but is statistical. This chapter traces the adjustments Peirce made in his theory by the time he published “A Theory of Probable Inference” in 1883. “A Theory of Probable Inference” is rightly understood to contain an anticipation of the suggestion to replace inductive inference by inductive behavior found in the method of significance testing and confidence interval estimation proposed by Neyman and Pearson a half-century later. In 1883, Peirce continued, however, to classify hypothetic inference as a permutation of the premises of statistical syllogisms. In 1902, Peirce acknowledged that the account of hypothetic inference he had been proposing was confused. During this period, he replaced the term “hypothetic inference” by “abduction” and explicitly took the position that abduction has as its conclusion the introduction of a conjecture for testing rather than an inference to the best explanation.Less
In 1865 and 1866, Peirce appealed to Aristotle’s proposal that an inductive inference be understood as a transformation of a categorical syllogism by permuting the major premise and the conclusion supported by a conversion of the minor premise to develop his own formal account of induction. He completed his theory by taking hypothetic inference to be the product of permuting the minor premise and the conclusion of the categorical syllogism. Peirce sought to extend the proposal beyond transformations of categorical syllogisms to cover reasoning where the major premise of the categorical syllogism is no longer a categorical proposition but is statistical. This chapter traces the adjustments Peirce made in his theory by the time he published “A Theory of Probable Inference” in 1883. “A Theory of Probable Inference” is rightly understood to contain an anticipation of the suggestion to replace inductive inference by inductive behavior found in the method of significance testing and confidence interval estimation proposed by Neyman and Pearson a half-century later. In 1883, Peirce continued, however, to classify hypothetic inference as a permutation of the premises of statistical syllogisms. In 1902, Peirce acknowledged that the account of hypothetic inference he had been proposing was confused. During this period, he replaced the term “hypothetic inference” by “abduction” and explicitly took the position that abduction has as its conclusion the introduction of a conjecture for testing rather than an inference to the best explanation.
Angelika Kratzer
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199234684
- eISBN:
- 9780191738432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199234684.003.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Theoretical Linguistics
The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for ...
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The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for conflict resolution. There are many areas in human cognition where inconsistencies arise. Inconsistent beliefs are the topic of theories of belief revision; conflicting grammatical constraints are investigated in Optimality Theory; and clashes between presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and at issue meanings have been explored in formal pragmatics since the late 1970s. With potentially inconsistent premise sets, the presentation of premises matters. Deductively equivalent premise sets like {p&q} and {p, q} can show different behavior when a conflicting premise is added. The chapter takes this fact as an invitation for a promising research program that seeks evidence for the way the premises from which we reason are split up and lumped together. The semantics of counterfactuals is a rich source for such evidence, as shown in subsequent chapters.Less
The chapter presents an account of the meaning of “must” and “can” that relies on general principles for reasoning from premise sets. Premise sets can be inconsistent, so the account has to allow for conflict resolution. There are many areas in human cognition where inconsistencies arise. Inconsistent beliefs are the topic of theories of belief revision; conflicting grammatical constraints are investigated in Optimality Theory; and clashes between presuppositions, conversational implicatures, and at issue meanings have been explored in formal pragmatics since the late 1970s. With potentially inconsistent premise sets, the presentation of premises matters. Deductively equivalent premise sets like {p&q} and {p, q} can show different behavior when a conflicting premise is added. The chapter takes this fact as an invitation for a promising research program that seeks evidence for the way the premises from which we reason are split up and lumped together. The semantics of counterfactuals is a rich source for such evidence, as shown in subsequent chapters.
Robert Fine and Charles Turner (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- June 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780853239659
- eISBN:
- 9781846314087
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Liverpool University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5949/UPO9781846314087
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This collection of essays explores the character and quality of the Holocaust's impact and the abiding legacy it has left for social theory. The premise which informs the contributions is that, ten ...
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This collection of essays explores the character and quality of the Holocaust's impact and the abiding legacy it has left for social theory. The premise which informs the contributions is that, ten years after its publication, Zygmunt Bauman's claim that social theory has either failed to address the Holocaust or protected itself from its implications remains true.Less
This collection of essays explores the character and quality of the Holocaust's impact and the abiding legacy it has left for social theory. The premise which informs the contributions is that, ten years after its publication, Zygmunt Bauman's claim that social theory has either failed to address the Holocaust or protected itself from its implications remains true.
Eli M. Noam
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195188523
- eISBN:
- 9780199852574
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195188523.003.0011
- Subject:
- Business and Management, Information Technology
This chapter examines market concentration trends in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The overall concentration trend of the telecom sector has been strongly U-shaped; this ...
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This chapter examines market concentration trends in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The overall concentration trend of the telecom sector has been strongly U-shaped; this concentration declined significantly in 1983 with the AT&T divestiture; a gradual decline occurred from 1984 to 1996, the multichannel phase of communications media; this was followed by a pronounced reconcentration. The chapter then turns to the equipment side of the sector. Traditionally, telecommunications equipment industries were divided into two categories based on the destination of their products: fairly simple consumer and office-oriented “customer premises equipment”, and carrier-oriented network equipment. As instability became part of the environment, telecom companies responded in three ways: by cutting costs and prices, by creating differentiated products and services, and by reducing competition and the commoditization that lowers profitability and future investments. The third response requires market power, which leads to consolidation of firms into oligopoly. This is a main driver of concentration trends in the telecommunications sector.Less
This chapter examines market concentration trends in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The overall concentration trend of the telecom sector has been strongly U-shaped; this concentration declined significantly in 1983 with the AT&T divestiture; a gradual decline occurred from 1984 to 1996, the multichannel phase of communications media; this was followed by a pronounced reconcentration. The chapter then turns to the equipment side of the sector. Traditionally, telecommunications equipment industries were divided into two categories based on the destination of their products: fairly simple consumer and office-oriented “customer premises equipment”, and carrier-oriented network equipment. As instability became part of the environment, telecom companies responded in three ways: by cutting costs and prices, by creating differentiated products and services, and by reducing competition and the commoditization that lowers profitability and future investments. The third response requires market power, which leads to consolidation of firms into oligopoly. This is a main driver of concentration trends in the telecommunications sector.
Christian List and Clemens Puppe
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199290420
- eISBN:
- 9780191710506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0020
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Public and Welfare
The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The ...
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The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The classical preference aggregation problem is a special case in which propositions take the form of binary preference judgments (“alternative x is better than alternative y”). The first part of the chapter focuses on aggregation methods that satisfy an Arrowian independence condition (“propositionwise aggregation”). In the independent case, the literature has produced a number of general characterization results that precisely demarcate the circumstances in which satisfactory aggregation is possible from those in which it is not Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbards oligarchy theorem are special cases of these results. The independence condition is, however, not uncontroversial and the second part of the chapter considers various relaxations of it. Judgment aggregation is still a very active field and the chapter concludes with an outlook on what we believe are important topics for future research.Less
The chapter surveys the recent and fast‐growing literature on the aggregation of logically interrelated propositions, following List and Pettit's formalization of the “doctrinal paradox”. The classical preference aggregation problem is a special case in which propositions take the form of binary preference judgments (“alternative x is better than alternative y”). The first part of the chapter focuses on aggregation methods that satisfy an Arrowian independence condition (“propositionwise aggregation”). In the independent case, the literature has produced a number of general characterization results that precisely demarcate the circumstances in which satisfactory aggregation is possible from those in which it is not Arrow's impossibility theorem and Gibbards oligarchy theorem are special cases of these results. The independence condition is, however, not uncontroversial and the second part of the chapter considers various relaxations of it. Judgment aggregation is still a very active field and the chapter concludes with an outlook on what we believe are important topics for future research.
Esha Niyogi De
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198072553
- eISBN:
- 9780199080915
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198072553.003.0006
- Subject:
- Literature, Women's Literature
This introductory chapter examines the postcolonial and subaltern theoretical models of agency, which are founded on a position against Enlightenment individualism. The chapter studies a few Western ...
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This introductory chapter examines the postcolonial and subaltern theoretical models of agency, which are founded on a position against Enlightenment individualism. The chapter studies a few Western intellectual premises of this position and attempts to pinpoint where the basic position can be considered inadequate for modern Bengali and Anglophone texts. Most of this chapter concentrates on a definition of a critical apparatus. Such apparatus is predominantly used for reading how the individual autonomy and transhistorical agency elaborate on material grounds simultaneously. Furthermore, the chapter brings to light sections on the feminist transcultural individuation, anti-enlightenment critique, postcolonial theories, gendered indigenous engagement, and responsible evaluation.Less
This introductory chapter examines the postcolonial and subaltern theoretical models of agency, which are founded on a position against Enlightenment individualism. The chapter studies a few Western intellectual premises of this position and attempts to pinpoint where the basic position can be considered inadequate for modern Bengali and Anglophone texts. Most of this chapter concentrates on a definition of a critical apparatus. Such apparatus is predominantly used for reading how the individual autonomy and transhistorical agency elaborate on material grounds simultaneously. Furthermore, the chapter brings to light sections on the feminist transcultural individuation, anti-enlightenment critique, postcolonial theories, gendered indigenous engagement, and responsible evaluation.
Wael B. Hallaq
- Published in print:
- 1993
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198240433
- eISBN:
- 9780191680175
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240433.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The point covered in this chapter is the fourth and the enigmatic one which has to do with the logicians' doctrine that syllogism or demonstration leads to the certain knowledge of judgements. The ...
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The point covered in this chapter is the fourth and the enigmatic one which has to do with the logicians' doctrine that syllogism or demonstration leads to the certain knowledge of judgements. The logicians' error concerning the first three points covered in the previous chapters is clear with the least of reflection. It was rather easy to prove and comprehend and the confusions were mostly caused by exaggerations and protracted discussions. For this fourth point, however, it is rather different since a syllogism formed of two premises resulting in a conclusion is in itself valid. The previous points mentioned in the earlier chapters are relatively easy as it was obvious that there was no way to establish with certainty such categorical denials.Less
The point covered in this chapter is the fourth and the enigmatic one which has to do with the logicians' doctrine that syllogism or demonstration leads to the certain knowledge of judgements. The logicians' error concerning the first three points covered in the previous chapters is clear with the least of reflection. It was rather easy to prove and comprehend and the confusions were mostly caused by exaggerations and protracted discussions. For this fourth point, however, it is rather different since a syllogism formed of two premises resulting in a conclusion is in itself valid. The previous points mentioned in the earlier chapters are relatively easy as it was obvious that there was no way to establish with certainty such categorical denials.
Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195328578
- eISBN:
- 9780199855339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328578.003.0007
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Broad originalists seek a middle way between narrow or concrete originalism and abstract originalism or the philosophic approach. They agree that concrete originalism is, for various theoretical and ...
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Broad originalists seek a middle way between narrow or concrete originalism and abstract originalism or the philosophic approach. They agree that concrete originalism is, for various theoretical and practical reasons, unworkable and indefensible. But they also feel that the philosophic approach is incapable of being faithful to the Constitution. Broad originalists believe the cure for Ronald Dworkin's abstract arguments for rights is greater respect for historical beliefs and practices and therefore a turn to history in constitutional interpretation. The chapter shows that a turn to history need not be and, understood correctly, cannot be a turn away from the responsibility of philosophic reflection and choice. The turn to history should be reconceived as in service of, not as alternative to, the philosophic approach.Less
Broad originalists seek a middle way between narrow or concrete originalism and abstract originalism or the philosophic approach. They agree that concrete originalism is, for various theoretical and practical reasons, unworkable and indefensible. But they also feel that the philosophic approach is incapable of being faithful to the Constitution. Broad originalists believe the cure for Ronald Dworkin's abstract arguments for rights is greater respect for historical beliefs and practices and therefore a turn to history in constitutional interpretation. The chapter shows that a turn to history need not be and, understood correctly, cannot be a turn away from the responsibility of philosophic reflection and choice. The turn to history should be reconceived as in service of, not as alternative to, the philosophic approach.
L. JONATHAN COHEN
- Published in print:
- 1995
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198236047
- eISBN:
- 9780191679179
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
While folk-psychological explanations about human behaviour are commonly believed to be rooted on presenting desires and beliefs to be combined, these in contrast reveal relevant combinations of what ...
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While folk-psychological explanations about human behaviour are commonly believed to be rooted on presenting desires and beliefs to be combined, these in contrast reveal relevant combinations of what a particular person establishes as goals and accepts as his premises. While recognizing this concept aids in the clarifying of the extent to which certain purposes may be attributed to infants and animals, the position is evidently complementary to how programmed artefacts work and to the various aspects of human organizations. As such, we can apply this notion across the prospective reasoning employed in deliberation, persuasion, and prediction, but also in retrospective explanation. This chapter looks into belief and desire in terms of providing purposive explanations for the actions of others.Less
While folk-psychological explanations about human behaviour are commonly believed to be rooted on presenting desires and beliefs to be combined, these in contrast reveal relevant combinations of what a particular person establishes as goals and accepts as his premises. While recognizing this concept aids in the clarifying of the extent to which certain purposes may be attributed to infants and animals, the position is evidently complementary to how programmed artefacts work and to the various aspects of human organizations. As such, we can apply this notion across the prospective reasoning employed in deliberation, persuasion, and prediction, but also in retrospective explanation. This chapter looks into belief and desire in terms of providing purposive explanations for the actions of others.
Duncan Pritchard
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199557912
- eISBN:
- 9780191743290
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter deals with the second of the three problems facing epistemological disjunctivism: the access problem. It starts by stating The Access Problem: (AP1) S can know by reflection alone that ...
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This chapter deals with the second of the three problems facing epistemological disjunctivism: the access problem. It starts by stating The Access Problem: (AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific empirical proposition p is the factive reason R. [Premise]; (AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. [Premise]; (APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. [From (AP1), (AP2)]. It shows that the access problem for epistemological disjunctivism is neutralized since the problematic conclusion in question is never generated. Given that one of the other key prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism — the basis problem — is similarly ineffective, we are well on our way towards demonstrating that this proposal — and in particular, this proposal's endorsement of factive reflectively accessible reasons — has far more going for it than at first meets the eye.Less
This chapter deals with the second of the three problems facing epistemological disjunctivism: the access problem. It starts by stating The Access Problem: (AP1) S can know by reflection alone that her reason for believing the specific empirical proposition p is the factive reason R. [Premise]; (AP2) S can know by reflection alone that R entails p. [Premise]; (APC) S can know by reflection alone the specific empirical proposition p. [From (AP1), (AP2)]. It shows that the access problem for epistemological disjunctivism is neutralized since the problematic conclusion in question is never generated. Given that one of the other key prima facie problems for epistemological disjunctivism — the basis problem — is similarly ineffective, we are well on our way towards demonstrating that this proposal — and in particular, this proposal's endorsement of factive reflectively accessible reasons — has far more going for it than at first meets the eye.
Nick Bosanquet and Chris Salisbury
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198206750
- eISBN:
- 9780191677304
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198206750.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, British and Irish Modern History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter discusses the changes in activities, staffing, finances, and premises under the three policy regimes that have shaped the local strategy and response of family doctors in general ...
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This chapter discusses the changes in activities, staffing, finances, and premises under the three policy regimes that have shaped the local strategy and response of family doctors in general practice.Less
This chapter discusses the changes in activities, staffing, finances, and premises under the three policy regimes that have shaped the local strategy and response of family doctors in general practice.
A. W. Price
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199609611
- eISBN:
- 9780191731846
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609611.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Since Aristotle follows Plato in recognizing the existence of irrational desires, we might expect him to recognize the reality of ‘hard acrasia’, wherein an agent does what he knows or judges to be ...
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Since Aristotle follows Plato in recognizing the existence of irrational desires, we might expect him to recognize the reality of ‘hard acrasia’, wherein an agent does what he knows or judges to be bad. In fact he doesn’t, and rather supposes that acrasia is made possible by ignorance of a kind. Some take this to be a failure to grasp some practical consideration in a full way that makes it motivating. Yet the evidence rather suggests that desire, being located with perception in a lower stratum of the soul than reason, can sabotage perception so that a good choice is subverted, and nothing opposes acting on a passion or appetite. Why does Aristotle exclude hard acrasia? In part because of his conception of practical thinking as being inherently for the sake of action; but more, perhaps, because he does not believe that an agent can appreciate what is needed for his eudaimonia, and yet consciously turn his back on it.Less
Since Aristotle follows Plato in recognizing the existence of irrational desires, we might expect him to recognize the reality of ‘hard acrasia’, wherein an agent does what he knows or judges to be bad. In fact he doesn’t, and rather supposes that acrasia is made possible by ignorance of a kind. Some take this to be a failure to grasp some practical consideration in a full way that makes it motivating. Yet the evidence rather suggests that desire, being located with perception in a lower stratum of the soul than reason, can sabotage perception so that a good choice is subverted, and nothing opposes acting on a passion or appetite. Why does Aristotle exclude hard acrasia? In part because of his conception of practical thinking as being inherently for the sake of action; but more, perhaps, because he does not believe that an agent can appreciate what is needed for his eudaimonia, and yet consciously turn his back on it.
