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Subjective Local Preferentism about Happiness

Fred Feldman

in What Is This Thing Called Happiness?

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199571178
eISBN:
9780191722547
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Preferentism is the view that the concept of happiness can be explicated by appeal to the concepts of desire and satisfaction. There are subjective as well as objective forms. According to a typical ... More


Kahneman's “Objective Happiness”

Fred Feldman

in What Is This Thing Called Happiness?

Published in print:
2010
Published Online:
May 2010
ISBN:
9780199571178
eISBN:
9780191722547
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

In ‘Objective Happiness', Daniel Kahneman apparently means to offer an account of the nature of happiness. A person's objective happiness level at a moment (or “instant utility”) is defined as the ... More


Attitudinal Hedonism

Fred Feldman

in Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
August 2004
ISBN:
9780199265169
eISBN:
9780191601385
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/019926516X.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Moral Philosophy

The distinction between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure is drawn. Arguments are given to show that these are distinct kinds of pleasure. The concept of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is ... More


Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare 1

Chris Heathwood

in Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6

Published in print:
2011
Published Online:
September 2011
ISBN:
9780199606375
eISBN:
9780191729478
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

One of the most important disputes in the foundations of ethics concerns the source of practical reasons. On the desire-based view, only one's desires (broadly construed) provide one with reasons to ... More


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