Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256174
- eISBN:
- 9780191599354
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256179.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Democracy used to be seen as a relatively mechanical matter of merely adding up everyone's votes in free and fair elections. That mechanistic model has many virtues, among them allowing democracy to ...
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Democracy used to be seen as a relatively mechanical matter of merely adding up everyone's votes in free and fair elections. That mechanistic model has many virtues, among them allowing democracy to ‘track the truth’, where purely factual issues are all that is at stake. Political disputes invariably mix facts with values, however, and then it is essential to listen to what people are saying rather than merely note how they are voting. The great challenge is how to implement that deliberative ideal among millions of people at once. In this book, Goodin offers a solution: ‘democratic deliberation within’. Building on models of ordinary conversational dynamics, he suggests that people simply imagine themselves in the position of various other people they have heard or read about and ask, ‘What would they say about this proposal’? Informing the democratic imaginary then becomes the key to making deliberations more reflective—more empathetic, more considered, and more expansive across time and distance. After an introductory chapter, the book has eleven further chapters arranged in three sections: Preference Democracy (two chapters); Belief Democracy (four chapters); and Value Democracy (five chapters, including a conclusion).Less
Democracy used to be seen as a relatively mechanical matter of merely adding up everyone's votes in free and fair elections. That mechanistic model has many virtues, among them allowing democracy to ‘track the truth’, where purely factual issues are all that is at stake. Political disputes invariably mix facts with values, however, and then it is essential to listen to what people are saying rather than merely note how they are voting. The great challenge is how to implement that deliberative ideal among millions of people at once. In this book, Goodin offers a solution: ‘democratic deliberation within’. Building on models of ordinary conversational dynamics, he suggests that people simply imagine themselves in the position of various other people they have heard or read about and ask, ‘What would they say about this proposal’? Informing the democratic imaginary then becomes the key to making deliberations more reflective—more empathetic, more considered, and more expansive across time and distance. After an introductory chapter, the book has eleven further chapters arranged in three sections: Preference Democracy (two chapters); Belief Democracy (four chapters); and Value Democracy (five chapters, including a conclusion).
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort ...
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This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.Less
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.
Nils Holtug
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199580170
- eISBN:
- 9780191722707
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580170.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This is a book on welfare and its importance for distributive justice. Part I is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for having a ...
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This is a book on welfare and its importance for distributive justice. Part I is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for having a self‐interest in a particular benefit. It includes discussions of the extent to which self‐interest depends on preferences, personal identity, and what matters in survival. It also considers the issue of whether it can benefit (or harm) a person to come into existence and what the implications are for our theory of self‐interest. A ‘Prudential View’ is defended, according to which a person has a present self‐interest in a future benefit if and only if she stands in a relation of continuous physical realization of (appropriate) psychology to the beneficiary, where the strength of the self‐interest depends both on the size of the benefit and on the strength of this relation. Part II concerns distributive justice and so how to distribute welfare or self‐interest fulfilment over individuals. It includes discussions of welfarism, egalitarianism and prioritarianism, population ethics, the importance of personal identity and what matters for distributive justice, and the importance of all these issues for various topics in applied ethics, including the badness of death. Here, a version of prioritarianism is defended, according to which, roughly, the moral value of a benefit to an individual at one time depends on both the size of the benefit and on the individual's self‐interest, at that time, in the other benefits that accrue to her at this and other times.Less
This is a book on welfare and its importance for distributive justice. Part I is concerned with prudence; more precisely, with what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for having a self‐interest in a particular benefit. It includes discussions of the extent to which self‐interest depends on preferences, personal identity, and what matters in survival. It also considers the issue of whether it can benefit (or harm) a person to come into existence and what the implications are for our theory of self‐interest. A ‘Prudential View’ is defended, according to which a person has a present self‐interest in a future benefit if and only if she stands in a relation of continuous physical realization of (appropriate) psychology to the beneficiary, where the strength of the self‐interest depends both on the size of the benefit and on the strength of this relation. Part II concerns distributive justice and so how to distribute welfare or self‐interest fulfilment over individuals. It includes discussions of welfarism, egalitarianism and prioritarianism, population ethics, the importance of personal identity and what matters for distributive justice, and the importance of all these issues for various topics in applied ethics, including the badness of death. Here, a version of prioritarianism is defended, according to which, roughly, the moral value of a benefit to an individual at one time depends on both the size of the benefit and on the individual's self‐interest, at that time, in the other benefits that accrue to her at this and other times.
Alessandra Casella
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780195309096
- eISBN:
- 9780199918171
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195309096.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
Storable Votes are a simple voting scheme that allows the minority to win occasionally, while treating every voter equally. Because the minority wins when it cares strongly about a decision ...
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Storable Votes are a simple voting scheme that allows the minority to win occasionally, while treating every voter equally. Because the minority wins when it cares strongly about a decision while the majority does not, minority victories occur with little cost, in fact typically with gains, for the community as a whole. The idea is simple: Consider a group of voters faced with a series of proposals, each of which can either pass or fail. Decisions are taken according to the majority of votes cast, but each voter is endowed with a budget of votes to distribute freely over the multiple decisions. Because voters cast more votes on decisions that matter to them more, they reveal the intensity of their preferences and increase their probability of winning exactly when it matters to them most. Thus Storable Votes elicit and reward voters’ intensity of preferences without the need for any external knowledge of voters’ preferences. By treating everyone equally and ruling out interpersonal vote trades, they are in line with common ethical priors and are robust to criticisms, both normative and positive, that affect vote markets. The book complements the theoretical discussion with several experiments, showing that the idea is supported by the data: experimental outcomes match the predictions of the theory. Because the intuition behind Storable Votes is so simple—“vote more when you care more”—the results are robust across different scenarios, even when subtle strategic effects are not identified by the subjects, suggesting real potential for practical applications.Less
Storable Votes are a simple voting scheme that allows the minority to win occasionally, while treating every voter equally. Because the minority wins when it cares strongly about a decision while the majority does not, minority victories occur with little cost, in fact typically with gains, for the community as a whole. The idea is simple: Consider a group of voters faced with a series of proposals, each of which can either pass or fail. Decisions are taken according to the majority of votes cast, but each voter is endowed with a budget of votes to distribute freely over the multiple decisions. Because voters cast more votes on decisions that matter to them more, they reveal the intensity of their preferences and increase their probability of winning exactly when it matters to them most. Thus Storable Votes elicit and reward voters’ intensity of preferences without the need for any external knowledge of voters’ preferences. By treating everyone equally and ruling out interpersonal vote trades, they are in line with common ethical priors and are robust to criticisms, both normative and positive, that affect vote markets. The book complements the theoretical discussion with several experiments, showing that the idea is supported by the data: experimental outcomes match the predictions of the theory. Because the intuition behind Storable Votes is so simple—“vote more when you care more”—the results are robust across different scenarios, even when subtle strategic effects are not identified by the subjects, suggesting real potential for practical applications.
Donna Yarri
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780195181791
- eISBN:
- 9780199835744
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195181794.003.0008
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
The ultimate goal in animal experimentation is not necessarily to eliminate all experiments, but rather to establish a benign ethic for its practice. An interim ethic is described, which includes ...
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The ultimate goal in animal experimentation is not necessarily to eliminate all experiments, but rather to establish a benign ethic for its practice. An interim ethic is described, which includes changes in current animal legislation, specifically with regard to the Animal Welfare Act. Paying attention to animal husbandry conditions and utilizing preference tests can go a long way in establishing a more humane practice of animal experimentation. Finally, the idea of pet keeping is offered as a model for treating experimental animals much as we would pets. The result would be a movement away from simply an instrumental and often harmful use of animals, to one which is based on the intrinsic value of animals.Less
The ultimate goal in animal experimentation is not necessarily to eliminate all experiments, but rather to establish a benign ethic for its practice. An interim ethic is described, which includes changes in current animal legislation, specifically with regard to the Animal Welfare Act. Paying attention to animal husbandry conditions and utilizing preference tests can go a long way in establishing a more humane practice of animal experimentation. Finally, the idea of pet keeping is offered as a model for treating experimental animals much as we would pets. The result would be a movement away from simply an instrumental and often harmful use of animals, to one which is based on the intrinsic value of animals.
Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann, and Thierry Verdier
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290482
- eISBN:
- 9780191603471
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290482.003.0012
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
This chapter presents information on the utilization by the sub-Saharan African developing countries of EU, US, and Japanese trade preferences, and explores the reasons why rules of origin may ...
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This chapter presents information on the utilization by the sub-Saharan African developing countries of EU, US, and Japanese trade preferences, and explores the reasons why rules of origin may constrain the take-up of the preferences. Unlike previous studies, which have concentrated on the overall level of utilization of available preferences, the variations in the rate of utilization of preferences across beneficiaries and across the three developed-country preferential schemes are highlighted.Less
This chapter presents information on the utilization by the sub-Saharan African developing countries of EU, US, and Japanese trade preferences, and explores the reasons why rules of origin may constrain the take-up of the preferences. Unlike previous studies, which have concentrated on the overall level of utilization of available preferences, the variations in the rate of utilization of preferences across beneficiaries and across the three developed-country preferential schemes are highlighted.
Stathis N. Kalyvas and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199276998
- eISBN:
- 9780191707735
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276998.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines why organizations may be unwilling to resort to suicide missions (SMs). It considers five possible reasons: cognitive accessibility, ...
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The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines why organizations may be unwilling to resort to suicide missions (SMs). It considers five possible reasons: cognitive accessibility, normative preferences, counterproductive effects, constituency costs, and technological costs. The second part explores the factors that affect individual members' willingness to participate in SMs. Because evidence on the reasons or causes for the absence of SMs is particularly hard to come by, this chapter is more analytical than empirical. It formulates hypotheses and illustrates them by examples rather than testing them.Less
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part examines why organizations may be unwilling to resort to suicide missions (SMs). It considers five possible reasons: cognitive accessibility, normative preferences, counterproductive effects, constituency costs, and technological costs. The second part explores the factors that affect individual members' willingness to participate in SMs. Because evidence on the reasons or causes for the absence of SMs is particularly hard to come by, this chapter is more analytical than empirical. It formulates hypotheses and illustrates them by examples rather than testing them.
Ekkehart Schlicht
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292241
- eISBN:
- 9780191596865
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292244.003.0016
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics, History of Economic Thought
Reviews the thesis outlined in the book. Concept formation and learning are tied up with clarity requirements. Clarification shapes preferences and underlies the behavioural, motivational, and ...
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Reviews the thesis outlined in the book. Concept formation and learning are tied up with clarity requirements. Clarification shapes preferences and underlies the behavioural, motivational, and cognitive tendencies that give rise to property, the law, and the firm as a social institution and account for the way in which the division of labour is organized in society. There is a pervasive mutual interdependency between many features of society that is brought by the tendency towards clarity that underlies the formation and motivational force of custom.Less
Reviews the thesis outlined in the book. Concept formation and learning are tied up with clarity requirements. Clarification shapes preferences and underlies the behavioural, motivational, and cognitive tendencies that give rise to property, the law, and the firm as a social institution and account for the way in which the division of labour is organized in society. There is a pervasive mutual interdependency between many features of society that is brought by the tendency towards clarity that underlies the formation and motivational force of custom.
W. Kip Viscusi
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293637
- eISBN:
- 9780191596995
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293631.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This chapter introduces the linkage between economic behaviour and risk regulation policies. Analysis of individual behaviour often reveals the nature of private market failures and provides guidance ...
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This chapter introduces the linkage between economic behaviour and risk regulation policies. Analysis of individual behaviour often reveals the nature of private market failures and provides guidance with respect to the appropriate forms of intervention. However, irrationality in behaviour can also generate the impetus for misguided government policies to the extent that policies are responsive to citizen preferences even when they are irrational.Less
This chapter introduces the linkage between economic behaviour and risk regulation policies. Analysis of individual behaviour often reveals the nature of private market failures and provides guidance with respect to the appropriate forms of intervention. However, irrationality in behaviour can also generate the impetus for misguided government policies to the extent that policies are responsive to citizen preferences even when they are irrational.
José Luis Bermúdez
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199548026
- eISBN:
- 9780191720246
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. ...
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The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.Less
The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.
W. M. Gorman
C. Blackorby and A. F. Shorrocks (eds)
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198285212
- eISBN:
- 9780191596322
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198285213.003.0017
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
This short note, published in Metroeconomica 13 (1961), begins with the assumption that the preferences of the consumer exhibit linear Engel curves, which were shown in ’Community preference fields’ ...
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This short note, published in Metroeconomica 13 (1961), begins with the assumption that the preferences of the consumer exhibit linear Engel curves, which were shown in ’Community preference fields’ (Ch. 15) to be necessary for the existence of a community indifference map. Engel curves are curves showing the relationship between income level and spending on the consumption of some good, at a given price, and linear Engel curves crop up in several branches of economics. The note explores some of the properties of the preference fields in which linear Engel curves arise, and, in particular, of those in which the marginal propensity to consume each good is an absolute constant. The preference fields are characterized by closed‐form representations in terms of both the indirect utility function and the cost function. An application to international trade theory is discussed.Less
This short note, published in Metroeconomica 13 (1961), begins with the assumption that the preferences of the consumer exhibit linear Engel curves, which were shown in ’Community preference fields’ (Ch. 15) to be necessary for the existence of a community indifference map. Engel curves are curves showing the relationship between income level and spending on the consumption of some good, at a given price, and linear Engel curves crop up in several branches of economics. The note explores some of the properties of the preference fields in which linear Engel curves arise, and, in particular, of those in which the marginal propensity to consume each good is an absolute constant. The preference fields are characterized by closed‐form representations in terms of both the indirect utility function and the cost function. An application to international trade theory is discussed.
Michael D. McDonald and Ian Budge
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286720
- eISBN:
- 9780191603327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286728.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter describes the data and the way thse are deployed operationally in the subsequent analysis. The data falls into three main categories: aggregate voting results for post-war national ...
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This chapter describes the data and the way thse are deployed operationally in the subsequent analysis. The data falls into three main categories: aggregate voting results for post-war national elections over 21 democracies with the resulting distribution of seats in parliaments and places in cabinets; policy preferences stated by all significant parties in each election in their published policy programme (their manifesto or platform); party policy preferences can also be weighted if they are in government by their share of cabinet seats. The research questions asked with these data are how far policy outputs compare with preferences on an election-to-election and government-to-government basis. More importantly, how policy relationships evolve over time canbe examined, and equilibria both for policy and preferences can be established and compared.Less
This chapter describes the data and the way thse are deployed operationally in the subsequent analysis. The data falls into three main categories: aggregate voting results for post-war national elections over 21 democracies with the resulting distribution of seats in parliaments and places in cabinets; policy preferences stated by all significant parties in each election in their published policy programme (their manifesto or platform); party policy preferences can also be weighted if they are in government by their share of cabinet seats. The research questions asked with these data are how far policy outputs compare with preferences on an election-to-election and government-to-government basis. More importantly, how policy relationships evolve over time canbe examined, and equilibria both for policy and preferences can be established and compared.
Cees van der Eijk, Mark N. Franklin, and Wouter van der Brug
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198296614
- eISBN:
- 9780191600227
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198296614.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, European Union
This chapter is the third of six on the question of political representation in the EU, and the third of four that put the five requirements of the Responsible Party Model (outlined in Ch. 6) to an ...
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This chapter is the third of six on the question of political representation in the EU, and the third of four that put the five requirements of the Responsible Party Model (outlined in Ch. 6) to an empirical test. The questions investigated here are whether voters have preferences on the issues at stake, and whether those preferences motivate their electoral choices; the analysis is carried out using data from the European Election Study 1994. The data are found largely to support the condition that voters hold policy preferences. They also allow two contrasts to be made while studying determinants of party choice—nation‐specific issues can be contrasted with common issues, and position issues (as exemplified by the common European currency, border control, and unemployment) with valence issues; it can then be seen which of these types of issues are most important in explaining party preferences. In addition, degrees of policy voting can be contrasted in each of the political systems. The results are hardly supportive of the Responsible Party Model in that hardly any motivational basis is found in terms of specific issues and policies for voters’ party preferences; however, the model becomes more persuasive when the focus is not only on specific policy and issue concerns but more generally on substantive political concerns and voter orientations relating to the left–right ideological position of parties.Less
This chapter is the third of six on the question of political representation in the EU, and the third of four that put the five requirements of the Responsible Party Model (outlined in Ch. 6) to an empirical test. The questions investigated here are whether voters have preferences on the issues at stake, and whether those preferences motivate their electoral choices; the analysis is carried out using data from the European Election Study 1994. The data are found largely to support the condition that voters hold policy preferences. They also allow two contrasts to be made while studying determinants of party choice—nation‐specific issues can be contrasted with common issues, and position issues (as exemplified by the common European currency, border control, and unemployment) with valence issues; it can then be seen which of these types of issues are most important in explaining party preferences. In addition, degrees of policy voting can be contrasted in each of the political systems. The results are hardly supportive of the Responsible Party Model in that hardly any motivational basis is found in terms of specific issues and policies for voters’ party preferences; however, the model becomes more persuasive when the focus is not only on specific policy and issue concerns but more generally on substantive political concerns and voter orientations relating to the left–right ideological position of parties.
Paul Weirich
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195388381
- eISBN:
- 9780199866700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388381.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
A committee's passing a resolution may be rational or irrational. Groups of people perform acts that are evaluable for rationality. This observation raises two philosophical questions: What makes a ...
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A committee's passing a resolution may be rational or irrational. Groups of people perform acts that are evaluable for rationality. This observation raises two philosophical questions: What makes a collective act evaluable for rationality? What principles of rationality govern collective acts? Collective rationality extends principles of evaluation from individuals to groups. However, because groups of people lack minds, their acts' evaluability does not require collective preferences, beliefs, or intentions. The evaluability of a group's act originates in the freedom of the group's members and their control over acts constituting the group's act. Common principles of collective rationality, such as efficiency, require grounding in general principles of rationality. Game theory demonstrates the origin of principles of collective rationality from principles governing all agents.Less
A committee's passing a resolution may be rational or irrational. Groups of people perform acts that are evaluable for rationality. This observation raises two philosophical questions: What makes a collective act evaluable for rationality? What principles of rationality govern collective acts? Collective rationality extends principles of evaluation from individuals to groups. However, because groups of people lack minds, their acts' evaluability does not require collective preferences, beliefs, or intentions. The evaluability of a group's act originates in the freedom of the group's members and their control over acts constituting the group's act. Common principles of collective rationality, such as efficiency, require grounding in general principles of rationality. Game theory demonstrates the origin of principles of collective rationality from principles governing all agents.
Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256174
- eISBN:
- 9780191599354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256179.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them ...
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This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy.Less
This is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy.
Ken Binmore
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195178111
- eISBN:
- 9780199783670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195178111.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Microeconomics
Sympathy refers to caring about another to some degree as one cares for oneself. Empathy refers to the capacity to put yourself in the position of others to see things from their point of view. ...
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Sympathy refers to caring about another to some degree as one cares for oneself. Empathy refers to the capacity to put yourself in the position of others to see things from their point of view. Empathetic preferences compare being one person in one situation with being another person in another situation. John Harsanyi showed that mild assumptions imply that to have empathetic preferences is the same thing as having rates at which the utility units of different people are to be traded off against one another. A consequence is that empathetic preferences have the same structure as Hamilton's rule, and so may have originated from strangers adopted into a clan being treated as surrogate kinfolk. But since empathetic preferences are cultural artifacts, they are subject to cultural evolution. The idea of an empathy equilibrium is introduced to capture the medium-run effects of such cultural evolution on empathetic preferences.Less
Sympathy refers to caring about another to some degree as one cares for oneself. Empathy refers to the capacity to put yourself in the position of others to see things from their point of view. Empathetic preferences compare being one person in one situation with being another person in another situation. John Harsanyi showed that mild assumptions imply that to have empathetic preferences is the same thing as having rates at which the utility units of different people are to be traded off against one another. A consequence is that empathetic preferences have the same structure as Hamilton's rule, and so may have originated from strangers adopted into a clan being treated as surrogate kinfolk. But since empathetic preferences are cultural artifacts, they are subject to cultural evolution. The idea of an empathy equilibrium is introduced to capture the medium-run effects of such cultural evolution on empathetic preferences.
Michael A. Bailey and Forrest Maltzman
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691151045
- eISBN:
- 9781400840267
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691151045.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Legal History
How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical ...
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How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. The book shows how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, the book documents that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The book finds considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, it shows that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. This book shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.Less
How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? This book combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. The book shows how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, the book documents that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The book finds considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, it shows that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. This book shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs. By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.
Colin M. Macleod
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198293972
- eISBN:
- 9780191599798
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198293976.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines Dworkin's claim that what justice requires by way of an initial distribution of resources can be established by considering the operation of an ideal market. The special auction device used ...
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Examines Dworkin's claim that what justice requires by way of an initial distribution of resources can be established by considering the operation of an ideal market. The special auction device used by Dworkin to articulate his theory of equality of resources fails because it does not display adequate sensitivity to the conditions under which preferences for goods expressed in even ideal market settings assume ethical significance.Less
Examines Dworkin's claim that what justice requires by way of an initial distribution of resources can be established by considering the operation of an ideal market. The special auction device used by Dworkin to articulate his theory of equality of resources fails because it does not display adequate sensitivity to the conditions under which preferences for goods expressed in even ideal market settings assume ethical significance.
Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann, and Thierry Verdier
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290482
- eISBN:
- 9780191603471
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290482.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
This chapter surveys recent work on the economic effects, both theoretical and empirical, of Rules of Origin (ROO) in a Free Trade Area (FTA).
This chapter surveys recent work on the economic effects, both theoretical and empirical, of Rules of Origin (ROO) in a Free Trade Area (FTA).
Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann, and Thierry Verdier
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290482
- eISBN:
- 9780191603471
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290482.003.0008
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, International
Using data on the preference and utilization rates of NAFTA for Mexican exports to the United States in 2001, this chapter proposes a method to estimate the likely costs of different Rules of Origin ...
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Using data on the preference and utilization rates of NAFTA for Mexican exports to the United States in 2001, this chapter proposes a method to estimate the likely costs of different Rules of Origin (ROO) for final and intermediate goods, and compares these results with those obtained using the synthetic index proposed by Estevadeordal (2000). Econometric results indicate that changes in tariff classification are more costly for final goods than for intermediate ones, and that technical requirements are the most constraining. For activities subject to regional value content minima, illustrative simulations are carried out to indicate what tariff preference margin would be necessary to compensate for the import content minima. Cost estimates suggest that, at least in the case of NAFTA, preferential market access is quite small, leading to speculations that these conclusions may carry over to other North-South preferential schemes.Less
Using data on the preference and utilization rates of NAFTA for Mexican exports to the United States in 2001, this chapter proposes a method to estimate the likely costs of different Rules of Origin (ROO) for final and intermediate goods, and compares these results with those obtained using the synthetic index proposed by Estevadeordal (2000). Econometric results indicate that changes in tariff classification are more costly for final goods than for intermediate ones, and that technical requirements are the most constraining. For activities subject to regional value content minima, illustrative simulations are carried out to indicate what tariff preference margin would be necessary to compensate for the import content minima. Cost estimates suggest that, at least in the case of NAFTA, preferential market access is quite small, leading to speculations that these conclusions may carry over to other North-South preferential schemes.
