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Belief and Conjunction

Simon J. Evnine

in Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood

Published in print:
2008
Published Online:
September 2008
ISBN:
9780199239948
eISBN:
9780191716898
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239948.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology

It is argued that it is both rational for persons to believe the conjunctions of their beliefs and that they must do so to a large extent. Arguments against the rationality claim stemming from the ... More


DEDUCTIVE CONSTRAINTS: PROBLEM CASES, POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

David Christensen

in Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199263257
eISBN:
9780191602603
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263256.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Develops an extended version of the Preface Paradox to show how the counter-intuitive binary beliefs mandated by deductive consistency and deductive closure can cascade into massive irrationality. ... More


ARGUMENTS FOR DEDUCTIVE COGENCY

David Christensen

in Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief

Published in print:
2004
Published Online:
July 2005
ISBN:
9780199263257
eISBN:
9780191602603
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/0199263256.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

Examines and rejects several arguments claiming that the fundamental purposes of binary belief requires deductive cogency. The strongest such argument claims that if deductive cogency were not ... More


Dilemmas of Thinking

Adam Morton

in Bounded Thinking: Intellectual virtues for limited agents

Published in print:
2012
Published Online:
January 2013
ISBN:
9780199658534
eISBN:
9780191746192
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658534.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

There are situations in which the best strategy for a person depends on what intellectual virtues she possesses. The chapter discusses Pascal problems, where one has a motive to acquire beliefs one ... More


Paradox, probability, and inductive knowledge

Krista Lawlor

in Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
May 2013
ISBN:
9780199657896
eISBN:
9780191748127
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657896.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Chapter 4 looks at some paradoxes in recent epistemology that can be resolved in light of the Austinian view of assurances. The paradoxes considered are each driven by a closure principle, roughly to ... More


Prefaces, Sorites and Guides to Reasoning

Rosanna Keefe

in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
January 2021
ISBN:
9780198712732
eISBN:
9780191781070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0013
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language

Is there an interesting relation between the Preface paradox and the Sorites paradox that might be used to illuminate either or both of those paradoxes and the phenomena of rationality and vagueness ... More


Expressions of Humility and Epistemological Psychology

Jonathan L. Kvanvig

in Faith and Humility

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
June 2018
ISBN:
9780198809487
eISBN:
9780191846823
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198809487.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion

Intellectual humility can be merely implicit, but can also be articulated. One context in which it is expressed gives rise to the preface paradox. The danger of this paradox is that it constitutes a ... More


Action, Assertability, Acceptance

Hannes Leitgeb and Hannes Leitgeb

in The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198732631
eISBN:
9780191796852
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732631.003.0006
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter deals with the practical rationality of all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief—the consequences that the stability theory of rational belief from the previous chapters has for: ... More


Hysteresis Hypotheses

Alan Hájek

in Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
January 2021
ISBN:
9780198712732
eISBN:
9780191781070
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198712732.003.0014
Subject:
Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language

This chapter assimilates the Sorites Paradox and the Preface Paradox, drawing parallels between reasoning with uncertainty and reasoning with vague concepts (a theme that Dorothy Edgington has ... More


Individual Coherence and Group Coherence

Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden Fitelson

in Essays in Collective Epistemology

Published in print:
2014
Published Online:
January 2015
ISBN:
9780199665792
eISBN:
9780191748615
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665792.003.0010
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Paradoxes of individual coherence (e.g., the preface paradox for individual judgment) and group coherence (e.g., the doctrinal paradox for judgment aggregation) typically presuppose that deductive ... More


Multiple Premise Closure

Martin Smith

in Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief

Published in print:
2016
Published Online:
March 2016
ISBN:
9780198755333
eISBN:
9780191816635
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755333.003.0005
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

According to the principle of multiple premise closure, if one has justification for believing each of a series of propositions, one has justification for believing their joint deductive ... More


Logical Closure and the Lockean Thesis

Hannes Leitgeb

in The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability

Published in print:
2017
Published Online:
April 2017
ISBN:
9780198732631
eISBN:
9780191796852
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732631.003.0003
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics

This chapter develops a stability theory of rational all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief again, but the starting point differs from that of Chapter 2. The theory in Chapter 3 is based on ... More


Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

Jody Azzouni

in Attributing Knowledge: What It Means to Know Something

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
October 2020
ISBN:
9780197508817
eISBN:
9780197508848
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780197508817.003.0011
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut ... More


Introduction: Avoiding a Paradoxical Preface

Samuel Lebens

in The Principles of Judaism

Published in print:
2020
Published Online:
November 2020
ISBN:
9780198843252
eISBN:
9780191879098
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198843252.003.0001
Subject:
Religion, Judaism

After introducing the three principles of Judaism, and the structure of the rest of the book, this chapter addresses a paradox. This book seeks to lay out the fundamental principles of Judaism, and ... More


The Norms of Acceptance

Joëlle Proust

in The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness

Published in print:
2013
Published Online:
January 2014
ISBN:
9780199602162
eISBN:
9780191758096
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199602162.003.0008
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Several problems plague acceptance. First, it is unclear how a context of acceptance is to be construed. Second, the possibility of conjoining an epistemic component and a utility component is merely ... More


How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface

Mark Kaplan

in Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method

Published in print:
2018
Published Online:
August 2018
ISBN:
9780198824855
eISBN:
9780191863530
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198824855.003.0004
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy

Argues that, far from presenting an insurmountable obstacle to the project of constructive epistemology, the deployment of Austin’s requirement of fidelity enables us to find new solutions to ... More


Applications

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0007
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

To earn their keep, theories of justification must be shown to have fruitful applications and to provide the means to address well-known puzzles and paradoxes. It is argued that the present account ... More


Rational Belief

Daniel Whiting

in The Range of Reasons: in Ethics and Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
November 2021
ISBN:
9780192893956
eISBN:
9780191915185
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780192893956.003.0009
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy

This chapter generalizes the modal theory of subjective reasons to the epistemic domain and combines it with the first-order commitment that truth is the sole right-maker for belief. The result is a ... More


Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Sven Rosenkranz

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
book
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.001.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Justification as Ignorance offers an original account of epistemic justification as both non-factive and luminous that vindicates core internalist intuitions, without construing justification as an ... More


Outline of a theory of justification

Sven Rosenkranz

in Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology

Published in print:
2021
Published Online:
April 2021
ISBN:
9780198865636
eISBN:
9780191897979
Item type:
chapter
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:
10.1093/oso/9780198865636.003.0001
Subject:
Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology

Core theses of the novel account of justification to be developed are first stated: one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to ... More


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