Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s ...
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The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s conception, and linking questions about time addressed in metaphysics with questions addressed in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, the book explores the temporal dimension of the material world in relation to the temporal dimension of our ordinary discourse about the world. The discussion is centred around the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists about whether the temporal profile of ordinary objects mirrors their spatial profile. Are ordinary objects extended in time in the same way in which they are extended in space? Do they have temporal as well as spatial parts? Four-dimensionalists say ‘yes’, three-dimensionalists say ‘no’. The book develops an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world, and argues that this picture is preferable to its four-dimensionalists rivals if ordinary thought and talk are taken seriously. Among the issues discussed are the metaphysics of persistence, change, composition, location, coincidence, and relativity; the ontology of past, present, and future; and the semantics of predication, tense, temporal modifiers, and sortal terms.Less
The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s conception, and linking questions about time addressed in metaphysics with questions addressed in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, the book explores the temporal dimension of the material world in relation to the temporal dimension of our ordinary discourse about the world. The discussion is centred around the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists about whether the temporal profile of ordinary objects mirrors their spatial profile. Are ordinary objects extended in time in the same way in which they are extended in space? Do they have temporal as well as spatial parts? Four-dimensionalists say ‘yes’, three-dimensionalists say ‘no’. The book develops an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world, and argues that this picture is preferable to its four-dimensionalists rivals if ordinary thought and talk are taken seriously. Among the issues discussed are the metaphysics of persistence, change, composition, location, coincidence, and relativity; the ontology of past, present, and future; and the semantics of predication, tense, temporal modifiers, and sortal terms.
Thomas McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These ...
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Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These predicates can be true of some people without being true of any one of them; they are non-distributive predications. Yet the apparatus of predication and quantification in standard modern logic does not allow a place for such non-distributive predicates. This book explores the enrichment of modern logic with plural predication and quantification. We can have genuinely non-distributive predication without relying on singularizing procedures from set theory and mereology. The fundamental ‘among’ relation can be understood in a way that does not generate any hierarchy of plurals analogous to a hierarchy of types or a hierarchy of higher-order logics. Singular quantification can be understood as a special case, with the general type being quantifiers that allow both singular and plural quantification. The ‘among’ relation is formally similar to a ‘part of’ relation, but the relations are distinct, so that mass quantification and plural quantification cannot be united in the same way that plural and singular are united. Analysis of singular and plural definite descriptions follows, with a defence of a fundamentally Russellian analysis, but coupled with some new ideas about how to be sensitive to the role of context. This facilitates an analysis of some central features of the use of pronouns, both singular and plural.Less
Plural predication is a pervasive part of ordinary language. We can say that some people are fifty in number, are surrounding a building, come from many countries, and are classmates. These predicates can be true of some people without being true of any one of them; they are non-distributive predications. Yet the apparatus of predication and quantification in standard modern logic does not allow a place for such non-distributive predicates. This book explores the enrichment of modern logic with plural predication and quantification. We can have genuinely non-distributive predication without relying on singularizing procedures from set theory and mereology. The fundamental ‘among’ relation can be understood in a way that does not generate any hierarchy of plurals analogous to a hierarchy of types or a hierarchy of higher-order logics. Singular quantification can be understood as a special case, with the general type being quantifiers that allow both singular and plural quantification. The ‘among’ relation is formally similar to a ‘part of’ relation, but the relations are distinct, so that mass quantification and plural quantification cannot be united in the same way that plural and singular are united. Analysis of singular and plural definite descriptions follows, with a defence of a fundamentally Russellian analysis, but coupled with some new ideas about how to be sensitive to the role of context. This facilitates an analysis of some central features of the use of pronouns, both singular and plural.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow ...
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This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow for the representation of non-distributive plural predication. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow for the representation of non-distributive plural predication. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Samuel Guttenplan
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199280896
- eISBN:
- 9780191602627
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199280894.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Objects of Metaphor offers a philosophical account of the phenomenon of metaphor which is radically different from others in the literature. Yet for all its difference, the underlying ...
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Objects of Metaphor offers a philosophical account of the phenomenon of metaphor which is radically different from others in the literature. Yet for all its difference, the underlying rationale of the account is genuinely ecumenical. If one adopts its perspective, one should be able to understand the substantial correctness of many other accounts, while at the same time seeing why they are not in the end completely correct. The origins of the account lie in an examination of the conception of predication. Unreflectively thought of as a task accomplished by words, it is argued that predication, or something very much like it, can also be accomplished by non-word objects (‘objects’ here include events, states of affairs, situations, actions and the like). Liberated in this way from words, predication becomes one central element in the account of metaphor. The other element is the move from language to objects which, adapting an idea of Quine’s, is thought of as the limiting case of semantic descent. Whilst the Objects of Metaphor account presents other accounts in a new light, its main importance lies in what it says about metaphor itself. Powerful and flexible enough to cope with the syntactic complexity typical of genuine metaphor, it offers novel conceptions of both the relationship between simile and metaphor and the notion of dead metaphor. Additionally, it shows why metaphor is a robust theoretic kind, related to other tropes such as synecdoche and metonymy, but not to be confused with tropes generally, or with the figurative and non-literal.Less
Objects of Metaphor offers a philosophical account of the phenomenon of metaphor which is radically different from others in the literature. Yet for all its difference, the underlying rationale of the account is genuinely ecumenical. If one adopts its perspective, one should be able to understand the substantial correctness of many other accounts, while at the same time seeing why they are not in the end completely correct. The origins of the account lie in an examination of the conception of predication. Unreflectively thought of as a task accomplished by words, it is argued that predication, or something very much like it, can also be accomplished by non-word objects (‘objects’ here include events, states of affairs, situations, actions and the like). Liberated in this way from words, predication becomes one central element in the account of metaphor. The other element is the move from language to objects which, adapting an idea of Quine’s, is thought of as the limiting case of semantic descent. Whilst the Objects of Metaphor account presents other accounts in a new light, its main importance lies in what it says about metaphor itself. Powerful and flexible enough to cope with the syntactic complexity typical of genuine metaphor, it offers novel conceptions of both the relationship between simile and metaphor and the notion of dead metaphor. Additionally, it shows why metaphor is a robust theoretic kind, related to other tropes such as synecdoche and metonymy, but not to be confused with tropes generally, or with the figurative and non-literal.
Jonathan Barnes
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199568178
- eISBN:
- 9780191702037
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199568178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the ...
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This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the ‘justification of deduction’; and sixthly, the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs.Less
This book is a study of ancient logic based upon the John Locke lectures given in Oxford. Its six chapters discuss the following: firstly, certain ancient ideas about truth; secondly, the Aristotelian conception of predication; thirdly, various ideas about connectors which were developed by the ancient logicians and grammarians; fourthly, the notion of logical form, insofar as it may be discovered in the ancient texts; fifthly, the question of the ‘justification of deduction’; and sixthly, the attitude which has been called logical utilitarianism and which restricts the scope of logic to those forms of inference which are or might be useful for scientific proofs.
John Malcolm
- Published in print:
- 1991
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198239062
- eISBN:
- 9780191679827
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Much of the recent literature published on Plato's metaphysics has involved the Third Man Argument found in his dialogue Parmenides. This argument depends upon construing Forms both as universals and ...
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Much of the recent literature published on Plato's metaphysics has involved the Third Man Argument found in his dialogue Parmenides. This argument depends upon construing Forms both as universals and as paradigm examples, and thus as being subject to self-predication. This book first presents a new and radical interpretation of Plato's earlier dialogues. It argues that the few cases of self-predication contained therein are acceptable simply as statements concerning universals (for example, ‘beauty is beautiful’), and that therefore Plato is not vulnerable in these cases to the Third Man Argument. In considering the middle dialogues, the book takes a conservative stance, rejecting influential current doctrines which portray the Forms as being not self-predicative. It shows that the middle dialogues do indeed take Forms to be both universals and paradigms, and thus to exemplify themselves. The book goes on to consider why Plato should have been unsuccessful in avoiding self-predication. It shows that Plato's concern to explain how the truths of mathematics can indeed be true played an important role in his postulation of the Form as an Ideal Individual. The book concludes with the claim that reflection on the ambiguity of such notions as the ‘Standard Yard’ may help us to appreciate why Plato failed to distinguish Forms as universals from Forms as paradigm cases.Less
Much of the recent literature published on Plato's metaphysics has involved the Third Man Argument found in his dialogue Parmenides. This argument depends upon construing Forms both as universals and as paradigm examples, and thus as being subject to self-predication. This book first presents a new and radical interpretation of Plato's earlier dialogues. It argues that the few cases of self-predication contained therein are acceptable simply as statements concerning universals (for example, ‘beauty is beautiful’), and that therefore Plato is not vulnerable in these cases to the Third Man Argument. In considering the middle dialogues, the book takes a conservative stance, rejecting influential current doctrines which portray the Forms as being not self-predicative. It shows that the middle dialogues do indeed take Forms to be both universals and paradigms, and thus to exemplify themselves. The book goes on to consider why Plato should have been unsuccessful in avoiding self-predication. It shows that Plato's concern to explain how the truths of mathematics can indeed be true played an important role in his postulation of the Form as an Ideal Individual. The book concludes with the claim that reflection on the ambiguity of such notions as the ‘Standard Yard’ may help us to appreciate why Plato failed to distinguish Forms as universals from Forms as paradigm cases.
Frank Sibley
John Benson, Betty Redfern, and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198238997
- eISBN:
- 9780191598418
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198238991.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather ...
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Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather a theoretical discussion of some core topics. The first three papers study the difference and the relation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. Papers 4–6 show how aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones. In papers 7–9 is discussed the difficulty in finding criteria of aesthetic merit. The distinction between attributive and predicative use of adjectives and its application to the cases of beautiful and ugly is considered in Chs 12–14. The nature of aesthetic and the relation between concepts of the aesthetic of art are the arguments of papers 10 and 15. Finally, papers 11 and 16 investigate the impossibility of isolating and defining a ‘purely music’ experience and illustrate the ontological status of works of visual art respectively.Less
Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather a theoretical discussion of some core topics. The first three papers study the difference and the relation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. Papers 4–6 show how aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones. In papers 7–9 is discussed the difficulty in finding criteria of aesthetic merit. The distinction between attributive and predicative use of adjectives and its application to the cases of beautiful and ugly is considered in Chs 12–14. The nature of aesthetic and the relation between concepts of the aesthetic of art are the arguments of papers 10 and 15. Finally, papers 11 and 16 investigate the impossibility of isolating and defining a ‘purely music’ experience and illustrate the ontological status of works of visual art respectively.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241811
- eISBN:
- 9780191598029
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241813.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book discusses the nature of identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth. Its main claims are that identity, existence, and truth are logical properties, that predicates are singular ...
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This book discusses the nature of identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth. Its main claims are that identity, existence, and truth are logical properties, that predicates are singular terms that refer to properties, and that necessity (and other modalities) are modes of instantiation of properties by objects. The book develops a realist anti‐naturalist stance on logical properties, which takes logical notions at face value, and refuses to reduce them to other notions. Two further contentions central to this work are, first, that the quantifier has been overrated as an instrument of logico‐linguistic analysis; and secondly, that past attempts to define logical notions such as identity or existence have been largely unsuccessful.Less
This book discusses the nature of identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth. Its main claims are that identity, existence, and truth are logical properties, that predicates are singular terms that refer to properties, and that necessity (and other modalities) are modes of instantiation of properties by objects. The book develops a realist anti‐naturalist stance on logical properties, which takes logical notions at face value, and refuses to reduce them to other notions. Two further contentions central to this work are, first, that the quantifier has been overrated as an instrument of logico‐linguistic analysis; and secondly, that past attempts to define logical notions such as identity or existence have been largely unsuccessful.
Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, ...
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The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, especially when associated with collective predication, the assumption takes the form of the thought that this is reference to collective entities, plural objects, or sets. Perhaps the most suggestive and profound, albeit notorious idea of this genre is Russell’s doctrine of the ‘class as many’. George Boolos’ explicitly ‘no-class’ approach to the logic of plurality is then compared favourably with ‘reductive’ approaches.Less
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, especially when associated with collective predication, the assumption takes the form of the thought that this is reference to collective entities, plural objects, or sets. Perhaps the most suggestive and profound, albeit notorious idea of this genre is Russell’s doctrine of the ‘class as many’. George Boolos’ explicitly ‘no-class’ approach to the logic of plurality is then compared favourably with ‘reductive’ approaches.
Steven French and Décio Krause
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199278244
- eISBN:
- 9780191603952
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199278245.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Traditionally by ‘quantum logic’, one understands the study of the lattice of the subspace of Hilbert space. Here, ‘quantum logic’ is taken to be the underlying logic of quantum physics. Following ...
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Traditionally by ‘quantum logic’, one understands the study of the lattice of the subspace of Hilbert space. Here, ‘quantum logic’ is taken to be the underlying logic of quantum physics. Following Schrödinger’s idea that the standard concept of identity cannot be applied to quantum objects, a kind of ‘non-reflexive’ logic called Schrödinger logic is presented, in which the reflexive law of identity is taken not to apply. First order Schrödinger logics are presented, and extended to higher order logics and also to an intensional logic. Classical semantics is presented, and a weak completeness theorem is sketched. The last part of the chapter covers a logic of sortal predicates for which a quasi-set semantics is delineated. This completes the formal framework capable of accommodating quantum non-individuality and thus the initial understanding of Born, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger, as well as the second horn of the above metaphysical underdetermination, can be formally represented.Less
Traditionally by ‘quantum logic’, one understands the study of the lattice of the subspace of Hilbert space. Here, ‘quantum logic’ is taken to be the underlying logic of quantum physics. Following Schrödinger’s idea that the standard concept of identity cannot be applied to quantum objects, a kind of ‘non-reflexive’ logic called Schrödinger logic is presented, in which the reflexive law of identity is taken not to apply. First order Schrödinger logics are presented, and extended to higher order logics and also to an intensional logic. Classical semantics is presented, and a weak completeness theorem is sketched. The last part of the chapter covers a logic of sortal predicates for which a quasi-set semantics is delineated. This completes the formal framework capable of accommodating quantum non-individuality and thus the initial understanding of Born, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger, as well as the second horn of the above metaphysical underdetermination, can be formally represented.
Jonathan Kvanvig (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199656417
- eISBN:
- 9780191742163
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656417.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This book is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. ...
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This book is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes work in any area of philosophy of religion. Topics covered include secular belief, theories of analogical predication, nominalism and divine aseity, meticulous providence and gratuitous evil, many-one identity and how it relates to the Trinity, atheism and theistic belief, the Epistemology of the Agape struggle, Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism, the semantics for blasphemy, and grounding and omniscience.Less
This book is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes work in any area of philosophy of religion. Topics covered include secular belief, theories of analogical predication, nominalism and divine aseity, meticulous providence and gratuitous evil, many-one identity and how it relates to the Trinity, atheism and theistic belief, the Epistemology of the Agape struggle, Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism, the semantics for blasphemy, and grounding and omniscience.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
An account of temporal supervenience requires an account of temporal predication: a semantic account of the language in which facts about ordinary time are stated. For the detenser, the problem of ...
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An account of temporal supervenience requires an account of temporal predication: a semantic account of the language in which facts about ordinary time are stated. For the detenser, the problem of temporal predication is essentially the task of giving an account of the semantic function of the modifier ‘at t’ in ‘a is F at t’. In the project of explaining temporal supervenience, an account of temporal predication functions as an analysis of ordinary temporal facts, which is required to build an explanatory bridge from these temporal facts to their spatiotemporal supervenience base. This chapter discusses various accounts of temporal predication that share the common feature that temporal supervenience cannot be explained on the basis of them, because these accounts allow no plausible explanatory link between the facts of persistence and change and any facts about spacetime.Less
An account of temporal supervenience requires an account of temporal predication: a semantic account of the language in which facts about ordinary time are stated. For the detenser, the problem of temporal predication is essentially the task of giving an account of the semantic function of the modifier ‘at t’ in ‘a is F at t’. In the project of explaining temporal supervenience, an account of temporal predication functions as an analysis of ordinary temporal facts, which is required to build an explanatory bridge from these temporal facts to their spatiotemporal supervenience base. This chapter discusses various accounts of temporal predication that share the common feature that temporal supervenience cannot be explained on the basis of them, because these accounts allow no plausible explanatory link between the facts of persistence and change and any facts about spacetime.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This ...
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This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects. It is further shown that the questions of temporal supervenience as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences. Three problems are raised, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account’s failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.Less
This chapter presents a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects. It is further shown that the questions of temporal supervenience as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences. Three problems are raised, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account’s failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the ...
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The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.Less
The customary distinction between dispositional and categorical properties is critically examined, and replaced by one between dispositional and occurrent predication. The ontological ground of the latter distinction is explained using the framework of the four-category ontology. An account is sketched of the ontological status of laws of nature, and its similarities to and differences from D. M. Armstrong’s account are discussed, particularly the key role in the new account of the categorial distinction between substantial and non-substantial universals. A theory of natural powers is advanced and contrasted with the recent theories of C. B. Martin and George Molnar.
Mark Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269259
- eISBN:
- 9780191710155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269259.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
‘Where do musical or colour traits get primarily instantiated, directly in the physical world or merely within the realms of our own subjectivity?’ This chapter surveys how popular resolutions of ...
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‘Where do musical or colour traits get primarily instantiated, directly in the physical world or merely within the realms of our own subjectivity?’ This chapter surveys how popular resolutions of this traditional philosophical question sometimes affect real life practical decisions in unfortunate ways. Several cases involving musical preservation are provided to illustrate this theme.Less
‘Where do musical or colour traits get primarily instantiated, directly in the physical world or merely within the realms of our own subjectivity?’ This chapter surveys how popular resolutions of this traditional philosophical question sometimes affect real life practical decisions in unfortunate ways. Several cases involving musical preservation are provided to illustrate this theme.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents some preliminary considerations in favour of taking non-distributive predication seriously, introduces key concepts, and indicates some of the issues that need to be worked out ...
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This chapter presents some preliminary considerations in favour of taking non-distributive predication seriously, introduces key concepts, and indicates some of the issues that need to be worked out in order to have a successful treatment of non-distributive predication, plural quantification with a full range of quantifiers, and compound plural terms. It argues that although plural language is widely used and understood in ordinary discourse, further exploration of the notation and the semantics for such a language leads to some interesting insights and surprises.Less
This chapter presents some preliminary considerations in favour of taking non-distributive predication seriously, introduces key concepts, and indicates some of the issues that need to be worked out in order to have a successful treatment of non-distributive predication, plural quantification with a full range of quantifiers, and compound plural terms. It argues that although plural language is widely used and understood in ordinary discourse, further exploration of the notation and the semantics for such a language leads to some interesting insights and surprises.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Because of the power and significance of first-order logic in its traditional form, restricted to distributive predication, it has been natural to try to express non-distributive plurals within that ...
More
Because of the power and significance of first-order logic in its traditional form, restricted to distributive predication, it has been natural to try to express non-distributive plurals within that framework. Two approaches leap quickly to the mind of the student of standard first-order logic who is trying to come to terms with non-distributive plurals. The first is ‘the multiple relations idea’. The second is the adoption of some variety of singularism, representing plurals by a single object that encompasses many. This chapter presents some initial considerations for the case that it will ultimately be better to reconsider the underlying logic.Less
Because of the power and significance of first-order logic in its traditional form, restricted to distributive predication, it has been natural to try to express non-distributive plurals within that framework. Two approaches leap quickly to the mind of the student of standard first-order logic who is trying to come to terms with non-distributive plurals. The first is ‘the multiple relations idea’. The second is the adoption of some variety of singularism, representing plurals by a single object that encompasses many. This chapter presents some initial considerations for the case that it will ultimately be better to reconsider the underlying logic.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter develops a systematic semantics for non-distributive predication with plural quantification that does not employ the resources of set theory or any other ‘singularization’ of plural ...
More
This chapter develops a systematic semantics for non-distributive predication with plural quantification that does not employ the resources of set theory or any other ‘singularization’ of plural reference. This methodological constraint has some value for philosophy (especially metaphysics), but it also has value for linguistics and for the foundations of mathematics.Less
This chapter develops a systematic semantics for non-distributive predication with plural quantification that does not employ the resources of set theory or any other ‘singularization’ of plural reference. This methodological constraint has some value for philosophy (especially metaphysics), but it also has value for linguistics and for the foundations of mathematics.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter connects formal language more explicitly with some problems in formal representation of English sentences. This provides a better understanding of the formal apparatus, and it also ...
More
This chapter connects formal language more explicitly with some problems in formal representation of English sentences. This provides a better understanding of the formal apparatus, and it also indicates the direction of some applications in the semantics of natural language. A major development is the use of quantifiers as the basis for representing distributive predication.Less
This chapter connects formal language more explicitly with some problems in formal representation of English sentences. This provides a better understanding of the formal apparatus, and it also indicates the direction of some applications in the semantics of natural language. A major development is the use of quantifiers as the basis for representing distributive predication.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents the development of the semantics within a set-theoretic context. It also provides a base for reconsidering limitations of the set-theoretic approach.
This chapter presents the development of the semantics within a set-theoretic context. It also provides a base for reconsidering limitations of the set-theoretic approach.
