Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow ...
More
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow for the representation of non-distributive plural predication. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the codification, interpretation, and development of first-order logic. It then argues that first-order logic should be extended to allow for the representation of non-distributive plural predication. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Paul M. Pietroski
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199244300
- eISBN:
- 9780191714153
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199244300.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This book articulates and defends a simple conception of semantic composition: when two meaningful expressions are concatenated, the result is understood as a conjunction of monadic predicates; in ...
More
This book articulates and defends a simple conception of semantic composition: when two meaningful expressions are concatenated, the result is understood as a conjunction of monadic predicates; in human languages, concatenation always signifies predicate conjunction. From this ‘Conjunctivist’ perspective, simple cases of adjunction (like ‘black cat’) are paradigms, and neo-Davidsonian event analyzes rightly associate certain grammatical relations with thematic roles. The sentence ‘Fido chased Garfield yesterday’ means, roughly, that something satisfies four conditions: its Agent was Fido, it was a chase, its Theme was Garfield, and it occurred yesterday. Such analyses, involving existential closure of a covert variable, are easily extended to examples involving negation and sentential connectives. This book contains four chapters. Chapter 1 compares elementary Conjunctivist proposals with ‘Functionist’ accounts according to which (i) predicate-argument concatenation signifies function-application, and (ii) adjuncts are accommodated by appeal to type-shifting or function-conjunction. Chapter 2 provides a Conjunctivist account of quantificational constructions, like ‘chased every cat’, in terms of a metalanguage with plural variables. This account is extended to plural noun phrases, as in ‘Three dogs chased the cats’; and this suggests a treatment of apparently nonconjunctive phrases like ‘big ants’. The resulting proposals — which explain the conservativity of determiners, and handle collective readings without quantifying over collections — are better than Functionist alternatives. Chapter 3 shows that Conjunctivism is superior to Functionism with regards to causative constructions, serial verbs, and many verbs that combine with complementizer phrases. Chapter 4 is a summary of conclusions, and discusses some difficulties facing all extant accounts of meaning.Less
This book articulates and defends a simple conception of semantic composition: when two meaningful expressions are concatenated, the result is understood as a conjunction of monadic predicates; in human languages, concatenation always signifies predicate conjunction. From this ‘Conjunctivist’ perspective, simple cases of adjunction (like ‘black cat’) are paradigms, and neo-Davidsonian event analyzes rightly associate certain grammatical relations with thematic roles. The sentence ‘Fido chased Garfield yesterday’ means, roughly, that something satisfies four conditions: its Agent was Fido, it was a chase, its Theme was Garfield, and it occurred yesterday. Such analyses, involving existential closure of a covert variable, are easily extended to examples involving negation and sentential connectives. This book contains four chapters. Chapter 1 compares elementary Conjunctivist proposals with ‘Functionist’ accounts according to which (i) predicate-argument concatenation signifies function-application, and (ii) adjuncts are accommodated by appeal to type-shifting or function-conjunction. Chapter 2 provides a Conjunctivist account of quantificational constructions, like ‘chased every cat’, in terms of a metalanguage with plural variables. This account is extended to plural noun phrases, as in ‘Three dogs chased the cats’; and this suggests a treatment of apparently nonconjunctive phrases like ‘big ants’. The resulting proposals — which explain the conservativity of determiners, and handle collective readings without quantifying over collections — are better than Functionist alternatives. Chapter 3 shows that Conjunctivism is superior to Functionism with regards to causative constructions, serial verbs, and many verbs that combine with complementizer phrases. Chapter 4 is a summary of conclusions, and discusses some difficulties facing all extant accounts of meaning.
Gary Ebbs
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557936
- eISBN:
- 9780191721403
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557936.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book explains how to define a disquotational truth predicate that we are directly licensed to apply not only to our own sentences as we use them now, but also to other speakers' sentences and ...
More
This book explains how to define a disquotational truth predicate that we are directly licensed to apply not only to our own sentences as we use them now, but also to other speakers' sentences and our own sentences as we used them in the past. The conventional wisdom is that there can be no such truth predicate. For it appears that the only instances of the disquotational pattern that we are directly licensed to accept are those that define ‘is true’ for our own sentences as we use them now. This book argues that this appearance is illusory. It constructs an account of words that licenses us to rely not only on formal (spelling-based) identifications of our own words, but also on our non-deliberative practical identifications of other speakers' words and of our own words as we used them in the past. To overturn the conventional wisdom about disquotational truth, this book argues, we need only combine this account of words with our disquotational definitions of truth for sentences as we use them now. The result radically transforms our understanding of truth and related topics, including anti-individualism, self-knowledge, and the intersubjectivity of logic.Less
This book explains how to define a disquotational truth predicate that we are directly licensed to apply not only to our own sentences as we use them now, but also to other speakers' sentences and our own sentences as we used them in the past. The conventional wisdom is that there can be no such truth predicate. For it appears that the only instances of the disquotational pattern that we are directly licensed to accept are those that define ‘is true’ for our own sentences as we use them now. This book argues that this appearance is illusory. It constructs an account of words that licenses us to rely not only on formal (spelling-based) identifications of our own words, but also on our non-deliberative practical identifications of other speakers' words and of our own words as we used them in the past. To overturn the conventional wisdom about disquotational truth, this book argues, we need only combine this account of words with our disquotational definitions of truth for sentences as we use them now. The result radically transforms our understanding of truth and related topics, including anti-individualism, self-knowledge, and the intersubjectivity of logic.
Scott Soames
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195123357
- eISBN:
- 9780199872114
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195123352.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is ...
More
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.Less
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.
John Heil
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199259748
- eISBN:
- 9780191597657
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates ...
More
Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates applying truthfully to objects, for instance, are taken to name properties of those objects possessed by every object to which the predicates apply. Such a principle might be thought to follow from a more general ‘truth‐making’ requirement (truths require truth‐makers) together with the idea that truth‐makers entail truths. I argue that truth‐making is not entailment and that the Picture Theory should be jettisoned and replaced by an attitude of ontological seriousness. Freed of constraints imposed by the Picture Theory, we are in a position to see our way through metaphysical difficulties associated with contemporary philosophy of mind. Following Locke (and C. B. Martin), I endorse a conception of properties as modes (or tropes): ways particular objects are. Modes are simultaneously qualities and powers: powerful qualities. Application of this thesis to familiar issues in the philosophy of mind yields surprising results.Less
Implicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates applying truthfully to objects, for instance, are taken to name properties of those objects possessed by every object to which the predicates apply. Such a principle might be thought to follow from a more general ‘truth‐making’ requirement (truths require truth‐makers) together with the idea that truth‐makers entail truths. I argue that truth‐making is not entailment and that the Picture Theory should be jettisoned and replaced by an attitude of ontological seriousness. Freed of constraints imposed by the Picture Theory, we are in a position to see our way through metaphysical difficulties associated with contemporary philosophy of mind. Following Locke (and C. B. Martin), I endorse a conception of properties as modes (or tropes): ways particular objects are. Modes are simultaneously qualities and powers: powerful qualities. Application of this thesis to familiar issues in the philosophy of mind yields surprising results.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to ...
More
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of sortal logic is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.Less
Traditional formal logic as developed by Fred Sommers is compared and contrasted with the modern quantified predicate logic that we owe to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell; the latter is argued to be implicitly committed to a two-category ontology of particulars and universals. A system of sortal logic is described, which exhibits some features of traditional formal logic and some of modern quantified predicate logic, such as its deployment of a symbol for identity. It is argued that this system represents more perspicuously than other systems the ontological distinctions of the four-category ontology, and that this counts as a distinct advantage in its favour.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The distinction between properties and predicates, and how best to draw the distinction between universals and particulars are discussed. The notion that properties are most aptly characterized as ...
More
The distinction between properties and predicates, and how best to draw the distinction between universals and particulars are discussed. The notion that properties are most aptly characterized as ‘ways of being’ is defended. The need to distinguish between the formal ontological relations of instantiation and characterization is emphasized, as well as the need to distinguish both from that of exemplification. The advantages of immanent realism concerning universals over both transcendent realism and pure trope theory are explained, and two different notions of immanence are compared.Less
The distinction between properties and predicates, and how best to draw the distinction between universals and particulars are discussed. The notion that properties are most aptly characterized as ‘ways of being’ is defended. The need to distinguish between the formal ontological relations of instantiation and characterization is emphasized, as well as the need to distinguish both from that of exemplification. The advantages of immanent realism concerning universals over both transcendent realism and pure trope theory are explained, and two different notions of immanence are compared.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199254392
- eISBN:
- 9780191603600
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254397.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The notion of truthmaking is examined. A distinction is drawn between formal ontological predicates — which should not be taken to denote elements of being — and other predicates, with ‘is true’, ...
More
The notion of truthmaking is examined. A distinction is drawn between formal ontological predicates — which should not be taken to denote elements of being — and other predicates, with ‘is true’, ‘exists’, and ‘is identical with’ belonging to the former class. Metaphysical realism is defended in the face of W. V. Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. Various species of metaphysical dependence are identified, and an account of truthmaking as a species of essential dependence is proposed and defended. It is explained how contingent truths are possible, given this account and the framework of the four-category ontology.Less
The notion of truthmaking is examined. A distinction is drawn between formal ontological predicates — which should not be taken to denote elements of being — and other predicates, with ‘is true’, ‘exists’, and ‘is identical with’ belonging to the former class. Metaphysical realism is defended in the face of W. V. Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. Various species of metaphysical dependence are identified, and an account of truthmaking as a species of essential dependence is proposed and defended. It is explained how contingent truths are possible, given this account and the framework of the four-category ontology.
Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The chapter focuses on quantification as it figures in standard versions of the predicate calculus. These versions are straightforwardly reductive in that non-singular sentences must be re-cast into ...
More
The chapter focuses on quantification as it figures in standard versions of the predicate calculus. These versions are straightforwardly reductive in that non-singular sentences must be re-cast into singular form if they are to receive representation. However, various non-singular sentences, including certain kinds of plural sentences, are refractory to representation in this form. Essentially singular forms of quantifier-expression must be distinguished from non-singular forms to lay the basis for sui generis non-singular forms of quantification, appropriate to both plural nouns and non-count nouns. The maxim ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ must be rejected.Less
The chapter focuses on quantification as it figures in standard versions of the predicate calculus. These versions are straightforwardly reductive in that non-singular sentences must be re-cast into singular form if they are to receive representation. However, various non-singular sentences, including certain kinds of plural sentences, are refractory to representation in this form. Essentially singular forms of quantifier-expression must be distinguished from non-singular forms to lay the basis for sui generis non-singular forms of quantification, appropriate to both plural nouns and non-count nouns. The maxim ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’ must be rejected.
Timothy McCarthy
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195145069
- eISBN:
- 9780199833436
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195145062.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising ...
More
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.Less
Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
Thomas Sattig
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199279524
- eISBN:
- 9780191604041
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199279527.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter develops a three-dimensionalist account of temporal supervenience — the temporal-regions account — and argues that the latter shares the main virtues and avoids the main drawbacks of its ...
More
This chapter develops a three-dimensionalist account of temporal supervenience — the temporal-regions account — and argues that the latter shares the main virtues and avoids the main drawbacks of its four-dimensionalist rival. The three-dimensionalist account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporally unextended spacetime regions occupied by objects. Structural similarities of the temporal-regions account and the temporal-parts account are pointed out, and the temporal-regions account is shown to avoid the problems that threaten the temporal-parts account. The remainder of the chapter deals with various consequences and apparent difficulties of three-dimensionalist supervenience.Less
This chapter develops a three-dimensionalist account of temporal supervenience — the temporal-regions account — and argues that the latter shares the main virtues and avoids the main drawbacks of its four-dimensionalist rival. The three-dimensionalist account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene on facts about the spatiotemporal location of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene on the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporally unextended spacetime regions occupied by objects. Structural similarities of the temporal-regions account and the temporal-parts account are pointed out, and the temporal-regions account is shown to avoid the problems that threaten the temporal-parts account. The remainder of the chapter deals with various consequences and apparent difficulties of three-dimensionalist supervenience.
Nikolas Gisborne
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199577798
- eISBN:
- 9780191722417
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577798.003.0006
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics, Syntax and Morphology
This chapter is concerned with the non‐finite complementation of hear‐class verbs in structures such as we saw her cross the road. These structures present a number of theoretical challenges which ...
More
This chapter is concerned with the non‐finite complementation of hear‐class verbs in structures such as we saw her cross the road. These structures present a number of theoretical challenges which are addressed here in terms of the WG network. The differences between infinitival and participial non‐finite clauses, the interaction between the different senses of see and the infinitival clauses, and the ontological nature of the percept are all discussed; a solution to the ungrammaticality of *he was seen cross the road is also offered. There is also an account of the widely discussed properties of veridicality and exportability displayed by these structures.Less
This chapter is concerned with the non‐finite complementation of hear‐class verbs in structures such as we saw her cross the road. These structures present a number of theoretical challenges which are addressed here in terms of the WG network. The differences between infinitival and participial non‐finite clauses, the interaction between the different senses of see and the infinitival clauses, and the ontological nature of the percept are all discussed; a solution to the ungrammaticality of *he was seen cross the road is also offered. There is also an account of the widely discussed properties of veridicality and exportability displayed by these structures.
Barry Taylor
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286690
- eISBN:
- 9780191604065
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286698.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines the case for natural properties made by David Lewis. Section 5.1 looks at the role such properties play in Lewis’s system. Section 5.2 sets out his reasons for believing in ...
More
This chapter examines the case for natural properties made by David Lewis. Section 5.1 looks at the role such properties play in Lewis’s system. Section 5.2 sets out his reasons for believing in them: that they are required to accommodate Moorean facts about the similarity of objects; and that they are indispensable to philosophical theorizing. Section 5.3 proposes an alternative to natural properties: these are the T-cosy predicates, defined by the role predicates play in theories. Section 5.4 argues that T-cosy predicates can be used to accommodate the Moorean facts as well as natural properties can do; and section 5.5 that where natural properties have an uncontroversially legitimate role to play in philosophical theory, T-cosy predicates will once again do the job. The conclusion is that natural properties constitute unnecessary metaphysical baggage, to be rejected along with the Eliteness Constraint they underpin.Less
This chapter examines the case for natural properties made by David Lewis. Section 5.1 looks at the role such properties play in Lewis’s system. Section 5.2 sets out his reasons for believing in them: that they are required to accommodate Moorean facts about the similarity of objects; and that they are indispensable to philosophical theorizing. Section 5.3 proposes an alternative to natural properties: these are the T-cosy predicates, defined by the role predicates play in theories. Section 5.4 argues that T-cosy predicates can be used to accommodate the Moorean facts as well as natural properties can do; and section 5.5 that where natural properties have an uncontroversially legitimate role to play in philosophical theory, T-cosy predicates will once again do the job. The conclusion is that natural properties constitute unnecessary metaphysical baggage, to be rejected along with the Eliteness Constraint they underpin.
Paola Monachesi
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199274758
- eISBN:
- 9780191705908
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199274758.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Syntax and Morphology
This book explores the interface between syntax and the other components of the grammar, particularly phonology, morphology, and argument structure. It contains case studies, on subjects such as ...
More
This book explores the interface between syntax and the other components of the grammar, particularly phonology, morphology, and argument structure. It contains case studies, on subjects such as clitics and complex predicates (auxiliary and modal verbs) in Romance and grounding theoretical analysis in constant exemplification. It shows that a careful analysis of their properties can lead to a better understanding of the interaction of the various components of the grammar. The syntactic properties of clitics are considered in relation to their phonological and morphological characteristic. The properties of auxiliary verbs are analysed from the perspective of the interface between argument structure and syntactic structure. Modal verbs are examined at the interface between syntax and phonology. The analyses of clitics and auxiliaries shed new light on the link between Romanian and Balkan/Slavic.Less
This book explores the interface between syntax and the other components of the grammar, particularly phonology, morphology, and argument structure. It contains case studies, on subjects such as clitics and complex predicates (auxiliary and modal verbs) in Romance and grounding theoretical analysis in constant exemplification. It shows that a careful analysis of their properties can lead to a better understanding of the interaction of the various components of the grammar. The syntactic properties of clitics are considered in relation to their phonological and morphological characteristic. The properties of auxiliary verbs are analysed from the perspective of the interface between argument structure and syntactic structure. Modal verbs are examined at the interface between syntax and phonology. The analyses of clitics and auxiliaries shed new light on the link between Romanian and Balkan/Slavic.
Mark Donohue and Søren Wichmann (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199238385
- eISBN:
- 9780191716768
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199238385.001.0001
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
Semantic alignment refers to a type of language that has two means of morphosyntactically encoding the arguments of intransitive predicates, typically treating these as an agent or as a patient of a ...
More
Semantic alignment refers to a type of language that has two means of morphosyntactically encoding the arguments of intransitive predicates, typically treating these as an agent or as a patient of a transitive predicate, or else by a means of a treatment that varies according to lexical aspect. This book presents a collection of new typological examinations and case studies. International typologists explore the differences and commonalities of languages with semantic alignment systems and compare the structure of these languages to languages without them. They look at how such systems arise or disappear and provide areal overviews of Eurasia, the Americas, and the south-west Pacific — the areas where semantically aligned languages are concentrated.Less
Semantic alignment refers to a type of language that has two means of morphosyntactically encoding the arguments of intransitive predicates, typically treating these as an agent or as a patient of a transitive predicate, or else by a means of a treatment that varies according to lexical aspect. This book presents a collection of new typological examinations and case studies. International typologists explore the differences and commonalities of languages with semantic alignment systems and compare the structure of these languages to languages without them. They look at how such systems arise or disappear and provide areal overviews of Eurasia, the Americas, and the south-west Pacific — the areas where semantically aligned languages are concentrated.
Penelope Mackie
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272204
- eISBN:
- 9780191604034
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272204.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re ...
More
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.Less
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.
C. W. A. Whitaker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199254194
- eISBN:
- 9780191598654
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254192.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle now turns his attention to assertions involving the ideas of necessity and possibility, and examines how they should be arranged into their correct contradictory pairs. Here, he argues, the ...
More
Aristotle now turns his attention to assertions involving the ideas of necessity and possibility, and examines how they should be arranged into their correct contradictory pairs. Here, he argues, the contradictory is formed not (as in other cases) by negating the copula ’is’, which unites subject and predicate, but by negating the modal word instead. Being becomes a kind of 'subject’, and the modal words are ’additions’ or copulas, thus establishing an interesting parity between the modal and non‐modal classes of assertion.Less
Aristotle now turns his attention to assertions involving the ideas of necessity and possibility, and examines how they should be arranged into their correct contradictory pairs. Here, he argues, the contradictory is formed not (as in other cases) by negating the copula ’is’, which unites subject and predicate, but by negating the modal word instead. Being becomes a kind of 'subject’, and the modal words are ’additions’ or copulas, thus establishing an interesting parity between the modal and non‐modal classes of assertion.
C. W. A. Whitaker
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199254194
- eISBN:
- 9780191598654
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199254192.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
Aristotle moves on to define longer utterances, distinguishing those, which possess truth‐value, from those such as prayers, which do not. Also, no single word can be an assertion, since an assertion ...
More
Aristotle moves on to define longer utterances, distinguishing those, which possess truth‐value, from those such as prayers, which do not. Also, no single word can be an assertion, since an assertion must represent a predicate as truly holding of a subject; similarly, no part of a word can have signification. At best, the elements of a compound word can only ’tend to signify’.Less
Aristotle moves on to define longer utterances, distinguishing those, which possess truth‐value, from those such as prayers, which do not. Also, no single word can be an assertion, since an assertion must represent a predicate as truly holding of a subject; similarly, no part of a word can have signification. At best, the elements of a compound word can only ’tend to signify’.
Mark Wilson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199269259
- eISBN:
- 9780191710155
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269259.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Drawing upon the rich experience gathered within applied mathematics, various ‘facade patterns’ are examined that frequently develop when an originating usage enlarges its descriptive scope through ...
More
Drawing upon the rich experience gathered within applied mathematics, various ‘facade patterns’ are examined that frequently develop when an originating usage enlarges its descriptive scope through patch-to-patch prolongation. The completed results can generate a global structure that is syntactically inconsistent as a whole, yet avoids logical ruination through simple restrictions upon data exportation from one patch to another (a ‘Riemann surface’ represents a standard mathematical prototype of the phenomenon). It is argued that not only do such facades often represent the natural end products of ordinary linguistic development, they often provide particularly effective forms of linguistic engineering. Philosophical puzzles sometimes arise when these alternative patterns of semantic design get mistaken for classical models, as the troubled history of ‘force’ effectively illustrates. The fact that we can rarely determine whether an initial collection of descriptive vocabulary is destined to develop into a facade rather than implementing a simpler pattern of word/world alignment provides a convenient indication of the degree to which a classical picture of conceptual grasp exaggerates our capacity to augur the fate of our descriptive words over time.Less
Drawing upon the rich experience gathered within applied mathematics, various ‘facade patterns’ are examined that frequently develop when an originating usage enlarges its descriptive scope through patch-to-patch prolongation. The completed results can generate a global structure that is syntactically inconsistent as a whole, yet avoids logical ruination through simple restrictions upon data exportation from one patch to another (a ‘Riemann surface’ represents a standard mathematical prototype of the phenomenon). It is argued that not only do such facades often represent the natural end products of ordinary linguistic development, they often provide particularly effective forms of linguistic engineering. Philosophical puzzles sometimes arise when these alternative patterns of semantic design get mistaken for classical models, as the troubled history of ‘force’ effectively illustrates. The fact that we can rarely determine whether an initial collection of descriptive vocabulary is destined to develop into a facade rather than implementing a simpler pattern of word/world alignment provides a convenient indication of the degree to which a classical picture of conceptual grasp exaggerates our capacity to augur the fate of our descriptive words over time.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter considers the significance of the context sensitivity of definite descriptions (singular and plural) and suggests some ways of understanding it. It argues that many uses of definite ...
More
This chapter considers the significance of the context sensitivity of definite descriptions (singular and plural) and suggests some ways of understanding it. It argues that many uses of definite descriptions are ‘incomplete’. That is, the explicit definite description does not uniquely specify an individual or, in the plural case, some maximally inclusive individuals; we rely on context to provide the additional resources that make the description uniquely applicable. Two processes of contextual supplementation are important here. One is predicate supplementation: a brief definite description stands proxy for a longer definite description that can be constructed by adding predicates that are explicit in the discourse context. The other is domain restriction: the context restricts the domain for the definite description, with uniqueness achieved within that smaller domain.Less
This chapter considers the significance of the context sensitivity of definite descriptions (singular and plural) and suggests some ways of understanding it. It argues that many uses of definite descriptions are ‘incomplete’. That is, the explicit definite description does not uniquely specify an individual or, in the plural case, some maximally inclusive individuals; we rely on context to provide the additional resources that make the description uniquely applicable. Two processes of contextual supplementation are important here. One is predicate supplementation: a brief definite description stands proxy for a longer definite description that can be constructed by adding predicates that are explicit in the discourse context. The other is domain restriction: the context restricts the domain for the definite description, with uniqueness achieved within that smaller domain.
