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Federalism holds out the possibility of mutually profitable economic and cultural exchanges that gradually erode differences over fundamental interests, and that, given enough time, people may come to see that the benefits of those exchanges outweigh the incremental changes in fundamental interests that accompany each exchange, until the incremental changes accumulate into a larger transformation in fundamental views. The Court rejected the possibility of using centralized national power to protect religious communities as locations of value pluralism, once in 1990 when it abjured the use of its own centralized authority, and again in 1997 when it barred Congress from using its authority. Professor Sandel sees federalism as a valuable institution not because it promotes or protects value pluralism as such but because it offers the possibility of a transformation of values from those we do not approve into universalist values of which we do approve. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution’s Preamble set the nation on a course to realize something that can be summarized somewhat inaccurately as a set of universal human rights justified to other people by reason. This account makes American universalism distinctive, to the extent that it connects that universalism to a project with roots not in the abstract philosophical theorizing that Professor Sandel argues cannot motivate appropriate citizen behavior, but in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and more generally in the working out of the project of American constitutionalism through the course of United States history.

The last week of July was a critical period for the framing of Japan's postwar Constitution. Ashida Hitoshi appointed 14 Diet members (including Kita Reikichi and Inukai Takeru) to a special subcommittee. It was assigned the delicate task of combing through the text and, where necessary, preparing amendments, based on the preceding weeks’ discussions. Ch. 16 recounts how the subcommittee – under the watchful eye of Charles Kades, deputy director of SCAP's Government Section (GS) – devoted particular attention to the preamble, the correct terms to express popular sovereignty, and Article 9, renouncing war and armed forces. It was during this period that Article 9 was significantly amended. Ch. 16 carefully examines the intentions of the framers of these amendments.

This chapter addresses the substantive provisions: the Preamble and Article 1, which introduce complementarity as a general principle, and Articles 17 and 20 (3), which translate that principle into criteria for the admissibility of cases before the ICC, including the key notions of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’. These criteria bear the potential of responding to many of the obstacles that hamper effective domestic suppression of core crimes. Conversely, the criteria provide yardsticks for what States have to do in order to retain jurisdiction. However, the detailed nature of the definitions of ‘unwillingness' and ‘inability’ result in some gaps vis-à-vis some situations and considerable overlap in others. With a view to overcome these difficulties in defining the criteria for admissibility, it is suggested that consideration should be given to replace the notions of ‘unwillingness’ and ‘inability’ with the criterion of ‘effectiveness’ of domestic proceedings.

This chapter addresses the question whether and to what extent the Statute obliges States to exercise their jurisdiction over ICC crimes. It concludes that the Statute imposes on States Parties, which have established jurisdiction that conforms to international law — an affirmative obligation to exercise their jurisdiction. That obligation is a uniform obligation applicable to all ICC crimes. Some doubt is expressed as to whether this essentially categorical obligation is entirely satisfactory. While it is a well-founded general rule, account should have been taken (or should be taken in the future) of the fact that there might be exceptions to that rule. However, the Statute fails to accommodate genuine alternatives to criminal prosecutions and does not set forth parameters, which could guide States in considering whether and under what conditions they may opt for mechanisms such as truth commissions, traditional forms of justice, and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

This chapter shows that an awareness of human mortality is evident throughout the Constitution of 1787 and in its Amendments. It notes that such an awareness is implicit in the traditional civic trinity of “Life, Liberty, and Property.” It observes that the conversion of “Property” into “Pursuit of Happiness,” as in the Declaration of Independence, may acknowledge further the transitory aspects of human existence. It further observes that the Preamble, in expressing the concern of the Framers to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to [them]selves and [their] Posterity,” attempts to build upon the stable elements in our ever-changing lives. It notes that “posterity” suggests that although one may not personally endure forever, at least on Earth, one may have descendants, just as one has had ancestors.

The point of this chapter is to argue against the idea of constitutional identity on the one hand and, on the other, to argue that the EU is secular, and that its secularism is the only framework that makes the cohabitation of different world-views possible at the same time.

This chapter explains how the existence of God is philosophically provable. It adopts the terminology of Thomas Aquinas about some of the basic beliefs of monotheistic religion. In attempting to delineate the distinct domain of theology, Aquinas distinguished between the “preambles of faith” and the “articles of faith.” This chapter analyzes the underlying assumption that human reason can prove and explain some of the basic beliefs of monotheistic religion. Not only does it discuss the common ground for philosophy and faith, but it explains monotheistic religions without religiously based assumptions. It describes the ontological proof of Anselm of Canterbury and points out various arguments about the world and how they cannot be explained without positing the existence of God.

His Majesty The King of the Belgians, The President of the Federal Republic of Germany, The President of the French Republic, The President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty The Queen of the Netherlands

This first part of the book contains the text of the Preamble to Walker's Appeal. In it, Walker justifies the reasons for his appeal and anticipates the reaction to it. This Preamble is followed by the four articles of the appeal which advocate immediate emancipation and slave rebellion.

This chapter examines the surviving royal charters of Alfonso VIII of Castile, focusing on those preambles and other ancillary components that express ideas of kingship. The preambles to his charters—some short formulaic statements, others displaying rhetorical flourishes—emphasized certain aspects of his manifold responsibilities. Notable among them was the administration of justice summarized in the principle “to render to each one his due.” That task was carried out in the royal court, employing a variety of legal procedures, including the inquest. As the leader of a society that was professedly Christian, the king was also expected to provide moral and financial support to the Church and its institutions. By doing so, the community was assured of God's continuing favor and a life of peace and prosperity. That tranquility was threatened, however, by the Almohad menace that loomed ever larger. Thus, it was the king's task to defend the patria and, by extension, the whole of Christendom (Christianitas), against the possibility of Muslim conquest.

This chapter uses Nahua and Maya last will and testaments to expose the similarities and differences in how natives experienced Catholicism upon dying. It examines the preambles of testaments and their religious content to better understand the roles of both the notary and testator in determining the posthumous care of the soul. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates how Nahua testators had greater access to Catholic rituals and traditions upon dying than the Maya.

While deferral of contentious constitutional issues is possible through the drafting of flexible framework text, this is not the case as for those provisions of a constitution that are less substantive as a legal matter, and more symbolic. Such provisions are not a matter of post ratification constitutional construction but instead require consensual phrasing at drafting. Examples of symbolic provisions include those that might refer to Iraq as an “Arab state” or as part of the broader Arab nation. Such provisions have deep emotional resonance, particularly in a divided state, and the drafters of the Iraq constitution needed to find formulations that proved consensual at drafting. This was difficult, but ultimately achieved.

This chapter undertakes a textual analysis of the Preambles and Parts I and II of the two principal UN human rights Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to assess their aptness to deal with existing and future phenomena associated with human-induced global climate change. While these phenomena apparently invoke the human rights ‘protections’ envisaged in the Covenants, it is argued that the particular shape the Covenants have taken in the decades since entering into force renders them ill-suited to the emerging context of climate change.

This chapter examines whether the constitutional clause that gives Congress power to legislate copyright and patent law (the Intellectual Property Clause) represents a limitation on Congress’s power. It interprets the constitutional purpose stated in the Clause—“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”—as barring Congress from extending protection to individual works that fail to fulfill that purpose. To support that interpretation, this chapter examines the constitutional policy underlying the Intellectual Property Clause, as well as the text and interpretive history of the Clause. It also responds to the argument that the Clause’s purpose should be construed as a non-limiting preamble and even if it is not, that the purpose should limit only the overall regime that Congress enacts—not individual works.

The drafting of legislation containing sweeping, optimistic preambles is a far more simple undertaking than lending substantive meaning to those codified ambitions. The ICC’s articles and rules may lead to the reasonable belief that victim participation will be both substantive and widespread. However, the ICC has not lived up to the high expectations it set for itself. Consider the number of victims in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where between 1998 and 2004 more than three million people died from murder, starvation, and disease, and millions more were displaced. Despite these atrocities, as well as those committed elsewhere, the ICC in its first seven years received fewer than one thousand victim applications to participate in proceedings. Only a fraction of these victims have obtained the “status of victim.” The toll of administrative burdens foisted on this court of limited jurisdiction will undoubtedly dissuade many victims from joining the process.

This chapter asks why so many drafters of constitutions believe that it is essential to include preambles. It first considers the legal status of constitutional preambles, including the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, focusing in particular on the Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793). It then discusses the “non-legal” functions of constitutional preambles, with special reference to concepts of national identity, religious identity, and nationalism. It also examines whether people share the visions instantiated in a particular preamble.