Richard Rorty
- Published in print:
- 1998
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294962
- eISBN:
- 9780191598708
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294964.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Most people nowadays believe both that a free society is one in which citizens participate in government, and that it is one in which people are, within the limits Mill defined, left alone to choose ...
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Most people nowadays believe both that a free society is one in which citizens participate in government, and that it is one in which people are, within the limits Mill defined, left alone to choose their own values and ends. Liberals should not allow themselves to be encumbered with the idea of a self which is prior to its ends: existentialist, Californian, self which can somehow sit back and choose ends, values, and affiliations without reference to anything except its own momentary pleasure. The pragmatist, minimalist liberal, position is: try to educate the citizenry in the civic virtue of having as few compelling interests, beliefs, and desires as possible, to get them to be as flexible and wishy-washy as possible, and to value democratic consensus more than they value almost anything else. When Sandel says that liberals who have a merely “cooperative” vision of a community cannot meet Nozickian objections to redistributivist policies, the minimalist liberal should reply that they are met sentimentally, by telling sob stories about what happens to the poor in nonredistributivist societies. What emerges from Rawlsian attempts to put the search for consensual compromise above moral and religious conviction is not an absence of morality and religion, but new moralities and new religions.Less
Most people nowadays believe both that a free society is one in which citizens participate in government, and that it is one in which people are, within the limits Mill defined, left alone to choose their own values and ends. Liberals should not allow themselves to be encumbered with the idea of a self which is prior to its ends: existentialist, Californian, self which can somehow sit back and choose ends, values, and affiliations without reference to anything except its own momentary pleasure. The pragmatist, minimalist liberal, position is: try to educate the citizenry in the civic virtue of having as few compelling interests, beliefs, and desires as possible, to get them to be as flexible and wishy-washy as possible, and to value democratic consensus more than they value almost anything else. When Sandel says that liberals who have a merely “cooperative” vision of a community cannot meet Nozickian objections to redistributivist policies, the minimalist liberal should reply that they are met sentimentally, by telling sob stories about what happens to the poor in nonredistributivist societies. What emerges from Rawlsian attempts to put the search for consensual compromise above moral and religious conviction is not an absence of morality and religion, but new moralities and new religions.
John Levi Martin
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199773312
- eISBN:
- 9780199897223
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199773312.003.0005
- Subject:
- Sociology, Social Theory
Chapter 5 investigates three alternatives to the Durkheimian understanding of the nature of the cognitive components to action. The first is the Russian activity school, associated ...
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Chapter 5 investigates three alternatives to the Durkheimian understanding of the nature of the cognitive components to action. The first is the Russian activity school, associated most clearly with Vygotsky and his critique of Piaget for neglecting the social aspect of the formation of the child’s cognitive system. Vygotsky emphasized this social aspect, but persisted with the Durkheimian assumption of the arbitrariness of categories, and hence the social relationships he imagined were intrinsically authoritarian. In contrast, the Gestalt school emphasized the non-arbitrariness of the conceptual system, but at the cost of de-emphasizing the active side of cognition. The pragmatic tradition as exemplified by Dewey incorporated both the active nature of cognition and the embracing of the reality of experience. Dewey emphasized that what we perceive is properly seen as an interaction between the active animal and the environment, and what we mean by the qualities of objects are necessarily and nonproblematically what they call out for us to do. Dewey’s perspective implies an embracing of the fundamentally qualitative nature of experience, which technically calls for a theory of aesthetics.Less
Chapter 5 investigates three alternatives to the Durkheimian understanding of the nature of the cognitive components to action. The first is the Russian activity school, associated most clearly with Vygotsky and his critique of Piaget for neglecting the social aspect of the formation of the child’s cognitive system. Vygotsky emphasized this social aspect, but persisted with the Durkheimian assumption of the arbitrariness of categories, and hence the social relationships he imagined were intrinsically authoritarian. In contrast, the Gestalt school emphasized the non-arbitrariness of the conceptual system, but at the cost of de-emphasizing the active side of cognition. The pragmatic tradition as exemplified by Dewey incorporated both the active nature of cognition and the embracing of the reality of experience. Dewey emphasized that what we perceive is properly seen as an interaction between the active animal and the environment, and what we mean by the qualities of objects are necessarily and nonproblematically what they call out for us to do. Dewey’s perspective implies an embracing of the fundamentally qualitative nature of experience, which technically calls for a theory of aesthetics.
Christopher Peacocke
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199239443
- eISBN:
- 9780191717000
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book argues that truth and reference have a much deeper role in the explanation of meaning and understanding than has hitherto been appreciated. Examination of specific concepts shows that a ...
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This book argues that truth and reference have a much deeper role in the explanation of meaning and understanding than has hitherto been appreciated. Examination of specific concepts shows that a grasp of these concepts has to be characterized in terms of reference, identity, and relations to the world. The book develops a positive general theory of understanding based on the idea that concepts are individuated by their fundamental reference rules, which contrasts sharply with conceptual-role, inferentialist, and pragmatist approaches to meaning. It treats thought about the material world, about places and times, and about the self within the framework of this general account, and extends the theory to explain the normative dimensions of content, which the book theorizes are founded in the network of connections between concepts and the level of reference and truth. The second part of the book explores the application of this account to some problematic mental phenomena, including the conception of many subjects of experience, concepts of conscious states, mental action, and our ability to think about the contents of our own and others' mental states.Less
This book argues that truth and reference have a much deeper role in the explanation of meaning and understanding than has hitherto been appreciated. Examination of specific concepts shows that a grasp of these concepts has to be characterized in terms of reference, identity, and relations to the world. The book develops a positive general theory of understanding based on the idea that concepts are individuated by their fundamental reference rules, which contrasts sharply with conceptual-role, inferentialist, and pragmatist approaches to meaning. It treats thought about the material world, about places and times, and about the self within the framework of this general account, and extends the theory to explain the normative dimensions of content, which the book theorizes are founded in the network of connections between concepts and the level of reference and truth. The second part of the book explores the application of this account to some problematic mental phenomena, including the conception of many subjects of experience, concepts of conscious states, mental action, and our ability to think about the contents of our own and others' mental states.
Catherine Gander and Sarah Garland (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9781784991500
- eISBN:
- 9781526115003
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Manchester University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7228/manchester/9781784991500.001.0001
- Subject:
- Art, Art History
Mixed Messages presents and interrogates ten distinct moments from the arts of nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century America where visual and verbal forms blend and clash. Charting ...
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Mixed Messages presents and interrogates ten distinct moments from the arts of nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century America where visual and verbal forms blend and clash. Charting correspondences concerned with the expression and meaning of human experience, this volume moves beyond standard interdisciplinary theoretical approaches to consider the written and visual artwork in embodied, cognitive, and contextual terms.
Offering a genuinely interdisciplinary contribution to the intersecting fields of art history, avant-garde studies, word-image relations, and literary studies, Mixed Messages takes in architecture, notebooks, poetry, painting, conceptual art, contemporary art, comic books, photographs and installations, ending with a speculative conclusion on the role of the body in the experience of digital mixed media. Each of the ten case studies explores the juxtaposition of visual and verbal forms in a manner that moves away from treating verbal and visual symbols as operating in binary or oppositional systems, and towards a consideration of mixed media, multi-media and intermedia work as brought together in acts of creation, exhibition, reading, viewing, and immersion. The collection advances research into embodiment theory, affect, pragmatist aesthetics, as well as into the continuing legacy of romanticism and of dada, conceptual art and surrealism in an American context.Less
Mixed Messages presents and interrogates ten distinct moments from the arts of nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century America where visual and verbal forms blend and clash. Charting correspondences concerned with the expression and meaning of human experience, this volume moves beyond standard interdisciplinary theoretical approaches to consider the written and visual artwork in embodied, cognitive, and contextual terms.
Offering a genuinely interdisciplinary contribution to the intersecting fields of art history, avant-garde studies, word-image relations, and literary studies, Mixed Messages takes in architecture, notebooks, poetry, painting, conceptual art, contemporary art, comic books, photographs and installations, ending with a speculative conclusion on the role of the body in the experience of digital mixed media. Each of the ten case studies explores the juxtaposition of visual and verbal forms in a manner that moves away from treating verbal and visual symbols as operating in binary or oppositional systems, and towards a consideration of mixed media, multi-media and intermedia work as brought together in acts of creation, exhibition, reading, viewing, and immersion. The collection advances research into embodiment theory, affect, pragmatist aesthetics, as well as into the continuing legacy of romanticism and of dada, conceptual art and surrealism in an American context.
Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195328578
- eISBN:
- 9780199855339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328578.003.0011
- Subject:
- Law, Constitutional and Administrative Law
Leading pragmatists including Stanley Fish and Richard Posner have argued that the philosophic approach is fruitless because moral philosophy is a fruitless activity; indeed, they have challenged the ...
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Leading pragmatists including Stanley Fish and Richard Posner have argued that the philosophic approach is fruitless because moral philosophy is a fruitless activity; indeed, they have challenged the entire enterprise of constitutional interpretation, rejecting the assumptions underlying it and claiming to expose the “myths” of the rule of law. This chapter shows the incoherence of practical pragmatism (Posner's pragmatism) and the admitted political impotence of purely theoretical pragmatism (Fish's pragmatism). It also rejects pragmatists' claim to explain legal phenomena scientifically. But the chapter doesn't quarrel with all that pragmatism stands for. It rejects the skepticism of pragmatism's leading figures about constitutional meaning and the duty of judges and other interpreters to pursue that meaning through a self-critical process best represented by the philosophic approach. The chapter has no quarrel with pragmatism's instrumental view of law in general, for legal instrumentalism, without more, is perfectly compatible with the philosophic approach to constitutional meaning.Less
Leading pragmatists including Stanley Fish and Richard Posner have argued that the philosophic approach is fruitless because moral philosophy is a fruitless activity; indeed, they have challenged the entire enterprise of constitutional interpretation, rejecting the assumptions underlying it and claiming to expose the “myths” of the rule of law. This chapter shows the incoherence of practical pragmatism (Posner's pragmatism) and the admitted political impotence of purely theoretical pragmatism (Fish's pragmatism). It also rejects pragmatists' claim to explain legal phenomena scientifically. But the chapter doesn't quarrel with all that pragmatism stands for. It rejects the skepticism of pragmatism's leading figures about constitutional meaning and the duty of judges and other interpreters to pursue that meaning through a self-critical process best represented by the philosophic approach. The chapter has no quarrel with pragmatism's instrumental view of law in general, for legal instrumentalism, without more, is perfectly compatible with the philosophic approach to constitutional meaning.
Paul Helm
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199256631
- eISBN:
- 9780191698330
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199256631.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
According to the evidential proportion view, the strength of trust in an object of trust ought to be proportioned to the strength of belief. This chapter applies this view to the problem of the ...
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According to the evidential proportion view, the strength of trust in an object of trust ought to be proportioned to the strength of belief. This chapter applies this view to the problem of the relation between faith and action, or faith and virtue. It considers some of the connections and dislocations between faith and the moral virtues. One contemporary philosopher who has paid considerable attention to the relation between faith and virtue is Richard Swinburne, who answers the question ‘May a scoundrel be a man of faith? ’ with a no. The view of faith favoured by Swinburne, what he calls the Pragmatist view, is compared with the evidential proportion view. Swinburne argues that it is only the Pragmatist view of what faith is which ensures that a man of faith cannot be a scoundrel.Less
According to the evidential proportion view, the strength of trust in an object of trust ought to be proportioned to the strength of belief. This chapter applies this view to the problem of the relation between faith and action, or faith and virtue. It considers some of the connections and dislocations between faith and the moral virtues. One contemporary philosopher who has paid considerable attention to the relation between faith and virtue is Richard Swinburne, who answers the question ‘May a scoundrel be a man of faith? ’ with a no. The view of faith favoured by Swinburne, what he calls the Pragmatist view, is compared with the evidential proportion view. Swinburne argues that it is only the Pragmatist view of what faith is which ensures that a man of faith cannot be a scoundrel.
Phaedra Daipha
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226298542
- eISBN:
- 9780226298719
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226298719.001.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Science, Technology and Environment
This book draws on a two-year ethnography of forecasting operations at the National Weather Service (NWS) to theorize decision-making in action. Contrary to popular wisdom, weather forecasters are ...
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This book draws on a two-year ethnography of forecasting operations at the National Weather Service (NWS) to theorize decision-making in action. Contrary to popular wisdom, weather forecasters are considerably better than most other so-called expert decision-makers at mastering uncertainty. Following them in their quest for ground truth, therefore, promises to hold the key to the analytically elusive process of diagnosis and prognosis as it actually happens. That is the ultimate objective of this book—by systematically excavating how weather forecasters achieve a provisional coherence in the face of deep uncertainty, how they harness diverse information to project themselves into the future, it endeavors to develop a better conceptual framework for studying uncertainty management in action. Accordingly, the six empirically substantive chapters of the book illuminate key aspects of the process of meteorological decision-making at the NWS: the institutionalized socio-technical environment in which forecasters operate, the forecast production routine; the distillation of atmospheric complexity; the negotiation of accuracy and timeliness in the face of hazardous weather and after a missed forecast; the organization of future anticipation at different time horizons; the tradeoffs of offering expert advice to multiple audiences. The proposed conceptual framework provides the analytic tools to maintain sustained attention to the stable cultural and broader social field of decision-making practice but without losing sight of the situationally-driven micro-context of action and interaction. It reinstates decision-makers as makers of decisions, creatively implementing institutional goals in locally rational ways in order to fashion a workable solution to the decision-making task at hand.Less
This book draws on a two-year ethnography of forecasting operations at the National Weather Service (NWS) to theorize decision-making in action. Contrary to popular wisdom, weather forecasters are considerably better than most other so-called expert decision-makers at mastering uncertainty. Following them in their quest for ground truth, therefore, promises to hold the key to the analytically elusive process of diagnosis and prognosis as it actually happens. That is the ultimate objective of this book—by systematically excavating how weather forecasters achieve a provisional coherence in the face of deep uncertainty, how they harness diverse information to project themselves into the future, it endeavors to develop a better conceptual framework for studying uncertainty management in action. Accordingly, the six empirically substantive chapters of the book illuminate key aspects of the process of meteorological decision-making at the NWS: the institutionalized socio-technical environment in which forecasters operate, the forecast production routine; the distillation of atmospheric complexity; the negotiation of accuracy and timeliness in the face of hazardous weather and after a missed forecast; the organization of future anticipation at different time horizons; the tradeoffs of offering expert advice to multiple audiences. The proposed conceptual framework provides the analytic tools to maintain sustained attention to the stable cultural and broader social field of decision-making practice but without losing sight of the situationally-driven micro-context of action and interaction. It reinstates decision-makers as makers of decisions, creatively implementing institutional goals in locally rational ways in order to fashion a workable solution to the decision-making task at hand.
Irving Singer
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300080377
- eISBN:
- 9780300128536
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300080377.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book concludes by discussing the consequences of studying Santayana. The author's increased acquaintance with Santayana's philosophy started when he returned to Harvard. One of the main reasons ...
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This book concludes by discussing the consequences of studying Santayana. The author's increased acquaintance with Santayana's philosophy started when he returned to Harvard. One of the main reasons this author veered toward Santayana is because Santayana was the first great aesthetician in the history of American philosophy. The author was convinced that, despite their differences, Santayana's humanistic works were worthy of the closest attention. This Epilogue attempts to show here how much Santayana resembled the very pragmatists whose views he strenuously opposed. The pragmatists were not Neoplatonists like Santayana, but they also retained vestiges of traditional thinking that the author considers flawed and unprofitable. Pragmatism, the Epilogue argues, is also often liable to the same kind of difficulties detected in Santayana.Less
This book concludes by discussing the consequences of studying Santayana. The author's increased acquaintance with Santayana's philosophy started when he returned to Harvard. One of the main reasons this author veered toward Santayana is because Santayana was the first great aesthetician in the history of American philosophy. The author was convinced that, despite their differences, Santayana's humanistic works were worthy of the closest attention. This Epilogue attempts to show here how much Santayana resembled the very pragmatists whose views he strenuously opposed. The pragmatists were not Neoplatonists like Santayana, but they also retained vestiges of traditional thinking that the author considers flawed and unprofitable. Pragmatism, the Epilogue argues, is also often liable to the same kind of difficulties detected in Santayana.
Bruce Kuklick
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199260164
- eISBN:
- 9780191597893
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260168.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The most successful idealistic response to Darwin occurred in Cambridge, Massachusetts and, soon thereafter, at Harvard University. At first promoted by a group of amateurs in ‘the Metaphysical ...
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The most successful idealistic response to Darwin occurred in Cambridge, Massachusetts and, soon thereafter, at Harvard University. At first promoted by a group of amateurs in ‘the Metaphysical Club’, this version of idealism was called pragmatism, and its first champion was Charles Peirce. Pragmatism defined the mental as a form of behaviour, allowed for a religious dimension to exist, and (for Peirce) looked to the practice of natural scientists and logicians for the paradigms of knowledge.Less
The most successful idealistic response to Darwin occurred in Cambridge, Massachusetts and, soon thereafter, at Harvard University. At first promoted by a group of amateurs in ‘the Metaphysical Club’, this version of idealism was called pragmatism, and its first champion was Charles Peirce. Pragmatism defined the mental as a form of behaviour, allowed for a religious dimension to exist, and (for Peirce) looked to the practice of natural scientists and logicians for the paradigms of knowledge.
Bruce Kuklick
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199260164
- eISBN:
- 9780191597893
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199260168.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Although Charles Peirce never secured an appointment at Harvard, in 1872 his friend William James did, and made the institution known for a peculiar variant of pragmatism. James gathered around him a ...
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Although Charles Peirce never secured an appointment at Harvard, in 1872 his friend William James did, and made the institution known for a peculiar variant of pragmatism. James gathered around him a talented group of colleagues, including the leading proponent of idealism, Josiah Royce, and together they made Harvard central to the study of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. The institution would remain the leading place to study professional philosophy until late in the twentieth century.Less
Although Charles Peirce never secured an appointment at Harvard, in 1872 his friend William James did, and made the institution known for a peculiar variant of pragmatism. James gathered around him a talented group of colleagues, including the leading proponent of idealism, Josiah Royce, and together they made Harvard central to the study of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. The institution would remain the leading place to study professional philosophy until late in the twentieth century.
Christopher Hookway
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256587
- eISBN:
- 9780191597718
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256586.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a ...
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This chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a discussion of the problem of ‘buried secrets’, of truths that are lost and will never be recovered. It is argued that pragmatist clarifications of concepts differ from other kinds of philosophical analyses, and that Peirce's account of truth is an account of the commitments we incur when we assert a proposition. It is also argued that the pragmatist clarification of truth is metaphysically neutral, leading neither to realism nor to anti‐realism.Less
This chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a discussion of the problem of ‘buried secrets’, of truths that are lost and will never be recovered. It is argued that pragmatist clarifications of concepts differ from other kinds of philosophical analyses, and that Peirce's account of truth is an account of the commitments we incur when we assert a proposition. It is also argued that the pragmatist clarification of truth is metaphysically neutral, leading neither to realism nor to anti‐realism.
Jay F. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251339
- eISBN:
- 9780191598326
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251339.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Devoted to an explicit exploration of the relationships between knowledge and truth. Opens with a critique of reliabilist externalist views of epistemic justification and defends the ...
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Devoted to an explicit exploration of the relationships between knowledge and truth. Opens with a critique of reliabilist externalist views of epistemic justification and defends the characteristically pragmatist conclusion that truth cannot function as the goal of enquiry. What is arguably wanted is not truth but objectivity, and C. S. Peirce's appeal to the ‘abductive’ method of science, as a fallible and inter‐subjective means of fixing beliefs, yields a useful analysis of the latter notion.Less
Devoted to an explicit exploration of the relationships between knowledge and truth. Opens with a critique of reliabilist externalist views of epistemic justification and defends the characteristically pragmatist conclusion that truth cannot function as the goal of enquiry. What is arguably wanted is not truth but objectivity, and C. S. Peirce's appeal to the ‘abductive’ method of science, as a fallible and inter‐subjective means of fixing beliefs, yields a useful analysis of the latter notion.
Ilkka Niiniluoto
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199251612
- eISBN:
- 9780191598098
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199251614.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Epistemological realism claims that it is possible to obtain knowledge about mind‐independent reality. Critical realism accepts fallibilism as a via media between scepticism and dogmatism: scientific ...
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Epistemological realism claims that it is possible to obtain knowledge about mind‐independent reality. Critical realism accepts fallibilism as a via media between scepticism and dogmatism: scientific knowledge is uncertain, incomplete, and truthlike. Against Kantianism, such knowledge is directly about reality, so that the Kantian idea of unknowable things‐in‐themselves is rejected. Epistemic definitions of truth (coherence, pragmatist, and consensus theories) are rejected, but epistemic probability and estimated verisimilitude are shown to be fallible indicators of truth and truthlikeness.Less
Epistemological realism claims that it is possible to obtain knowledge about mind‐independent reality. Critical realism accepts fallibilism as a via media between scepticism and dogmatism: scientific knowledge is uncertain, incomplete, and truthlike. Against Kantianism, such knowledge is directly about reality, so that the Kantian idea of unknowable things‐in‐themselves is rejected. Epistemic definitions of truth (coherence, pragmatist, and consensus theories) are rejected, but epistemic probability and estimated verisimilitude are shown to be fallible indicators of truth and truthlikeness.
C. J. Misak
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199270590
- eISBN:
- 9780191603174
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199270597.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter argues that Peirce’s account of inquiry has a sane empiricism at its core: inquirers aim to get beliefs that fit with experience, broadly construed. When a belief, which has come into ...
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This chapter argues that Peirce’s account of inquiry has a sane empiricism at its core: inquirers aim to get beliefs that fit with experience, broadly construed. When a belief, which has come into doubt, is replaced, the new belief is probably better. However, it may eventually be overthrown and shown to be false. When there are beliefs that would forever withstand the tests of experience and argument, what is the point of refusing to confer upon them the title ‘true’. According to the pragmatist, there is no point at all — only a spurious desire for transcendental metaphysics.Less
This chapter argues that Peirce’s account of inquiry has a sane empiricism at its core: inquirers aim to get beliefs that fit with experience, broadly construed. When a belief, which has come into doubt, is replaced, the new belief is probably better. However, it may eventually be overthrown and shown to be false. When there are beliefs that would forever withstand the tests of experience and argument, what is the point of refusing to confer upon them the title ‘true’. According to the pragmatist, there is no point at all — only a spurious desire for transcendental metaphysics.
David Boersema
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262026604
- eISBN:
- 9780262268882
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026604.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Despite a recent revival of interest in pragmatist philosophy, most work in the analytic philosophy of language ignores insights offered by classical pragmatists and contemporary neopragmatists. This ...
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Despite a recent revival of interest in pragmatist philosophy, most work in the analytic philosophy of language ignores insights offered by classical pragmatists and contemporary neopragmatists. This book argues that a pragmatist perspective on reference presents a distinct alternative—and corrective—to the prevailing analytic views on the topic. The book finds that the pragmatist approach to reference, with alternative understandings of the nature of language, the nature of conceptualization and categorization, and the nature of inquiry, is suggested in the work of Wittgenstein and more thoroughly developed in the works of such classical and contemporary pragmatists as Charles Peirce and Hilary Putnam. It first discusses the descriptivist and causal theories of reference—the received views on the topic in analytic philosophy. Then, after considering Wittgenstein's approach to reference, the book details the pragmatist approach to reference by nine philosophers: the “Big Three,” of classical pragmatism, Peirce, William James, and John Dewey; three contemporary American philosophers, Putnam, Catherine Elgin, and Richard Rorty; and three important continental philosophers, Umberto Eco, Karl-Otto Apel, and Jürgen Habermas. Finally, it shows explicitly how pragmatism offers a genuinely alternative account of reference, presenting several case studies on the nature and function of names. Here, the book focuses on conceptions of individuation, similarity, essences, and sociality of language.Less
Despite a recent revival of interest in pragmatist philosophy, most work in the analytic philosophy of language ignores insights offered by classical pragmatists and contemporary neopragmatists. This book argues that a pragmatist perspective on reference presents a distinct alternative—and corrective—to the prevailing analytic views on the topic. The book finds that the pragmatist approach to reference, with alternative understandings of the nature of language, the nature of conceptualization and categorization, and the nature of inquiry, is suggested in the work of Wittgenstein and more thoroughly developed in the works of such classical and contemporary pragmatists as Charles Peirce and Hilary Putnam. It first discusses the descriptivist and causal theories of reference—the received views on the topic in analytic philosophy. Then, after considering Wittgenstein's approach to reference, the book details the pragmatist approach to reference by nine philosophers: the “Big Three,” of classical pragmatism, Peirce, William James, and John Dewey; three contemporary American philosophers, Putnam, Catherine Elgin, and Richard Rorty; and three important continental philosophers, Umberto Eco, Karl-Otto Apel, and Jürgen Habermas. Finally, it shows explicitly how pragmatism offers a genuinely alternative account of reference, presenting several case studies on the nature and function of names. Here, the book focuses on conceptions of individuation, similarity, essences, and sociality of language.
Isaac Levi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199698134
- eISBN:
- 9780191742323
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199698134.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, History of Philosophy
Foundationalists require that (1) current beliefs be justified and there (2) should be self-certified first principles and premises. Antifoundationalists reject (2) but typically endorse (1). ...
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Foundationalists require that (1) current beliefs be justified and there (2) should be self-certified first principles and premises. Antifoundationalists reject (2) but typically endorse (1). Pragmatists reject both (1) and (2). Peirce, James, and Dewey all agreed that well-conducted inquiry seeks to modify attitudes. Peirce and James focused on attitudes that carry truth-values and urged agents to “seek Truth and shun Error” (James 1897). Dewey did not require that the attitudes to be modified should carry truth-values. Inquiries that issue in change in moral or political values or in the production and evaluation of works of art share broad structural similarities to scientific inquiries. Dewey departed from Peirce and James in abandoning the injunction to “seek Truth, shun Error.” Dewey emphasized his view that inquiry terminates with an “assertion.” Some assertions are true and some are false. But many carry no truth-value. If the inquiry is well conducted, the assertion is warranted. Warranted assertion is not a replacement for true assertion. Peirce, James, and Dewey agreed that inquiry is goal-directed. Some inquiries seek truth and shun error in some sense or other. Others do not. There is a need for some understanding of practical deliberation and the models of rational choice that help articulate such understanding. Pace Dewey, there is a need for a model or models of inquiries that focus on seeking valuable information while avoiding error. But there is also a need for accounts of inquiries where other desiderata are the focus of attention.Less
Foundationalists require that (1) current beliefs be justified and there (2) should be self-certified first principles and premises. Antifoundationalists reject (2) but typically endorse (1). Pragmatists reject both (1) and (2). Peirce, James, and Dewey all agreed that well-conducted inquiry seeks to modify attitudes. Peirce and James focused on attitudes that carry truth-values and urged agents to “seek Truth and shun Error” (James 1897). Dewey did not require that the attitudes to be modified should carry truth-values. Inquiries that issue in change in moral or political values or in the production and evaluation of works of art share broad structural similarities to scientific inquiries. Dewey departed from Peirce and James in abandoning the injunction to “seek Truth, shun Error.” Dewey emphasized his view that inquiry terminates with an “assertion.” Some assertions are true and some are false. But many carry no truth-value. If the inquiry is well conducted, the assertion is warranted. Warranted assertion is not a replacement for true assertion. Peirce, James, and Dewey agreed that inquiry is goal-directed. Some inquiries seek truth and shun error in some sense or other. Others do not. There is a need for some understanding of practical deliberation and the models of rational choice that help articulate such understanding. Pace Dewey, there is a need for a model or models of inquiries that focus on seeking valuable information while avoiding error. But there is also a need for accounts of inquiries where other desiderata are the focus of attention.
Phaedra Daipha
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780226298542
- eISBN:
- 9780226298719
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226298719.003.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Science, Technology and Environment
After outlining the gaps and limitations of the mainstream models of decision-making used in cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and organization studies, this chapter advocates for a ...
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After outlining the gaps and limitations of the mainstream models of decision-making used in cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and organization studies, this chapter advocates for a holistic, therefore sociological, approach that, adopting a pragmatist theory of action, bridges the extant literatures with insights from science and technology studies. This approach to studying the process of decision-making eschews normative criteria of rationality in favor of context-dependent explanations of judgment in action. The unit of analysis is neither the individual nor the organization but the task at hand. Four guiding assumptions about decision-making in action are identified: (1) decision-making takes place within a more or less institutionalized environment that, over time, affords its members a certain stock of knowledge; (2) this stock of knowledge consists of cognitive heuristics and decision-making techniques that help initially frame and specify the empirical context of action; (3) decision-making may not be perfectly rational but rarely is it unreflective or routinized—instead, it is habitual and eminently practical; (4) it is within the evolving micro-context of action, and the human and nonhuman others populating it, that decision-making practice takes shape first and foremost.Less
After outlining the gaps and limitations of the mainstream models of decision-making used in cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and organization studies, this chapter advocates for a holistic, therefore sociological, approach that, adopting a pragmatist theory of action, bridges the extant literatures with insights from science and technology studies. This approach to studying the process of decision-making eschews normative criteria of rationality in favor of context-dependent explanations of judgment in action. The unit of analysis is neither the individual nor the organization but the task at hand. Four guiding assumptions about decision-making in action are identified: (1) decision-making takes place within a more or less institutionalized environment that, over time, affords its members a certain stock of knowledge; (2) this stock of knowledge consists of cognitive heuristics and decision-making techniques that help initially frame and specify the empirical context of action; (3) decision-making may not be perfectly rational but rarely is it unreflective or routinized—instead, it is habitual and eminently practical; (4) it is within the evolving micro-context of action, and the human and nonhuman others populating it, that decision-making practice takes shape first and foremost.
Björn Ramberg
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015561
- eISBN:
- 9780262295796
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015561.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter discusses the nature of the pragmatist critique of metaphysics, of which Davidson has been an important source of inspiration. It begins by expanding on the claim that Davidson is easily ...
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This chapter discusses the nature of the pragmatist critique of metaphysics, of which Davidson has been an important source of inspiration. It begins by expanding on the claim that Davidson is easily absorbed by metaphysics, followed by pragmatist reservations toward metaphysics and toward the metaphysical Davidson. It is asked here whether it is not possible to recover a pragmatizing reading even of Davidson. Finally, the force and point of the pragmatist stance against metaphysics is explored. Even if metaphysics remains elusive, there remains the hope that some light will have been shed on the resources that Davidson offers pragmatists who are trying to affect the philosophical conversation, and also on what the metaphilosophical divergences are between a naturalistic pragmatism and contemporary analytic metaphysics.Less
This chapter discusses the nature of the pragmatist critique of metaphysics, of which Davidson has been an important source of inspiration. It begins by expanding on the claim that Davidson is easily absorbed by metaphysics, followed by pragmatist reservations toward metaphysics and toward the metaphysical Davidson. It is asked here whether it is not possible to recover a pragmatizing reading even of Davidson. Finally, the force and point of the pragmatist stance against metaphysics is explored. Even if metaphysics remains elusive, there remains the hope that some light will have been shed on the resources that Davidson offers pragmatists who are trying to affect the philosophical conversation, and also on what the metaphilosophical divergences are between a naturalistic pragmatism and contemporary analytic metaphysics.
Albert E. Moyer
- Published in print:
- 1992
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520076891
- eISBN:
- 9780520912137
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520076891.003.0013
- Subject:
- Anthropology, American and Canadian Cultural Anthropology
The intellectual and cultural world of the American pragmatists provides a telling historical context in which to place Newcomb's pronouncements on method; each sheds light on the other. Beyond the ...
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The intellectual and cultural world of the American pragmatists provides a telling historical context in which to place Newcomb's pronouncements on method; each sheds light on the other. Beyond the customary reaches of the history of philosophy and general American history, however, there exists an alternative historical context in which we can locate both Newcomb and the early pragmatists. This is the context of the history of science, specifically the politics and rhetoric of scientific method. Just as Newcomb both reflected and fostered key elements of the cluster of pragmatic assertions and hopes, so too did the pragmatists and allied thinkers such as Newcomb reflect and foster key elements of the rhetorical and political tradition.Less
The intellectual and cultural world of the American pragmatists provides a telling historical context in which to place Newcomb's pronouncements on method; each sheds light on the other. Beyond the customary reaches of the history of philosophy and general American history, however, there exists an alternative historical context in which we can locate both Newcomb and the early pragmatists. This is the context of the history of science, specifically the politics and rhetoric of scientific method. Just as Newcomb both reflected and fostered key elements of the cluster of pragmatic assertions and hopes, so too did the pragmatists and allied thinkers such as Newcomb reflect and foster key elements of the rhetorical and political tradition.
Trygve Throntveit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780226459875
- eISBN:
- 9780226460079
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226460079.003.0002
- Subject:
- History, Political History
This chapter looks at Woodrow Wilson's efforts to relate the world's states more closely, through an adaptive polity embodying the pragmatists' egalitarian, deliberative, experimental ethos. The ...
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This chapter looks at Woodrow Wilson's efforts to relate the world's states more closely, through an adaptive polity embodying the pragmatists' egalitarian, deliberative, experimental ethos. The basic elements uniting the thought of the pragmatist progressives originated in William James's theories of knowledge and truth—theories that gained collective renown as “pragmatism.” Knowledge, in James's view, arises from attempts to surmount problems impeding achievement of goals. Truth measures the degree to which knowledge solves problems while accommodating the rest of experience—that is, the rest of what has proven useful in navigating the physical and social worlds. These pragmatist theories of knowledge and truth had profound implications for ethics and politics. Indeed, they cannot be understood apart from the ethical and political challenges posed by the upheavals of the middle and late nineteenth century in the United States—upheavals that also shaped the style and content of Woodrow Wilson's thinking.Less
This chapter looks at Woodrow Wilson's efforts to relate the world's states more closely, through an adaptive polity embodying the pragmatists' egalitarian, deliberative, experimental ethos. The basic elements uniting the thought of the pragmatist progressives originated in William James's theories of knowledge and truth—theories that gained collective renown as “pragmatism.” Knowledge, in James's view, arises from attempts to surmount problems impeding achievement of goals. Truth measures the degree to which knowledge solves problems while accommodating the rest of experience—that is, the rest of what has proven useful in navigating the physical and social worlds. These pragmatist theories of knowledge and truth had profound implications for ethics and politics. Indeed, they cannot be understood apart from the ethical and political challenges posed by the upheavals of the middle and late nineteenth century in the United States—upheavals that also shaped the style and content of Woodrow Wilson's thinking.
