James Ladyman
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199218844
- eISBN:
- 9780191711732
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter questions what epistemic reason van Fraassen has for focusing on empirical adequacy. It contrasts van Fraassen's constructive empiricism with a pragmatic empiricism, where one gives ...
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This chapter questions what epistemic reason van Fraassen has for focusing on empirical adequacy. It contrasts van Fraassen's constructive empiricism with a pragmatic empiricism, where one gives pragmatic, not epistemic, reasons for believing in the claims of a theory. It suggests that van Fraassen does not give adequate justification for why belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory could ever be epistemically warranted. Van Fraassen is also relying on a priori knowledge — a charge with which van Fraassen would presumably be unhappy.Less
This chapter questions what epistemic reason van Fraassen has for focusing on empirical adequacy. It contrasts van Fraassen's constructive empiricism with a pragmatic empiricism, where one gives pragmatic, not epistemic, reasons for believing in the claims of a theory. It suggests that van Fraassen does not give adequate justification for why belief in the empirical adequacy of a theory could ever be epistemically warranted. Van Fraassen is also relying on a priori knowledge — a charge with which van Fraassen would presumably be unhappy.
Neil Tennant
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199251605
- eISBN:
- 9780191698057
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
This chapter aims to arrest the slide to pragmatic empiricism with its holistic pessimism over the prospect of ever being able to demarcate the empirically meaningful from the metaphysically ...
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This chapter aims to arrest the slide to pragmatic empiricism with its holistic pessimism over the prospect of ever being able to demarcate the empirically meaningful from the metaphysically meaningless. It proposes a criterion of cognitive significance that distinguishes those sentences that depend for their truth and falsity on understanding and experience and those that do not. It argues that this criterion is itself of considerable significance even if it were to be criticized as presupposing too extreme an idealization of the logical shape of actual scientific endeavours.Less
This chapter aims to arrest the slide to pragmatic empiricism with its holistic pessimism over the prospect of ever being able to demarcate the empirically meaningful from the metaphysically meaningless. It proposes a criterion of cognitive significance that distinguishes those sentences that depend for their truth and falsity on understanding and experience and those that do not. It argues that this criterion is itself of considerable significance even if it were to be criticized as presupposing too extreme an idealization of the logical shape of actual scientific endeavours.
