Search Results

This introductory chapter outlines the empirical context of the debate over reparations for historic international injustice, with particular reference to colonialism and the slave trade. It characterizes the argument of the book as a specific type of non-ideal theory, and explains the book's commitment to a particular kind of practicality, whereby its arguments can be employed by real world political actors. It outlines an approach to international justice labelled ‘international libertarianism’, advocated by writers including John Rawls, David Miller, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel, which is analogous to domestic libertarianism in terms of its commitment to respect for sovereignty, self-ownership, and the minimal state. This is distinguished from alternative accounts of international justice such as cosmopolitanism and realism. The book's focus on rectificatory duties, rather than rights, is explained, and the terminological relation between terms such as restitution and compensation, and nation and state, is explicated.

This chapter sketches a proposed substantive account of human rights. It begins with a discussion of the two general ways for philosophy to supply a more substantive account of human rights: a top-down approach which starts with an overarching principle, or principles, or an authoritative decision procedure from which human rights can then be derived; and a bottom-up approach that starts with human rights as used in our actual social life by politicians, lawyers, social campaigners, as well as theorists of various sorts, and then sees what higher principles one must resort to in order to explain their moral weight, when one thinks they have it, and to resolve conflicts between them. It identifies two grounds for human rights: personhood and practicalities. The existence conditions for a human right would, then, be these.

Therapeutic communities (TCs) supposedly encourage their clients to learn certain values, habits, and skills from what they pertain to as “right living.” All the events that are facilitated in TCs are designed to promote change in an individual through self-help activities like peer interactions, community roles, and job functions. TCs promote more realistic ways of bringing clients closer to recovery, but do TCs enable the development of a spiritual life? This chapter presents the history of TCs, how TCs have evolved, and how TCs have helped addicts realize their spirituality through realistic and practical activities.

Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical rationality that nevertheless still meets this requirement. Foot also denies that moral evaluation is opposed to descriptive statements, or matters of fact, as the non‐cognitivists argue; it has to do rather with facts about a particular subject matter, i.e. human life. Her main argument, which she will pursue throughout the book, is that the grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in these facts, or in what Elizabeth Anscombe refers to as ‘Aristotelian necessities’, i.e. the moral virtues; and thus the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts about the nature of human beings and of the life of our species.

This chapter examines how low modernism did not just involve a commercial mentality, but also took a highly practical turn with the development of small-scale devices such as the MUAC band. Taking the story into the 1980s and 1990s, the chapter shows how a new generation of compact solutions began to act on the problem of measurement and micronutrient deficiencies. These were objects that worked on a smaller scale, such as Sprinkles and Plumpy'nut, and the chapter indicates both the hopes and the limitations of new technology. It also indicates a growing disillusionment with dominant paradigms. Indeed, after Donald McLaren had undermined the idea of a protein gap with his paper on the “Great Protein Fiasco” and Derrick Jelliffe had inspired suspicion of high modernist commerce and food technology, there was a concerted move toward smaller and more manageable interventions like the MUAC.

This chapter studies Lori Laitman’s Men with Small Heads (2000). From a large and tempting selection of song cycles, this one is especially to be prized, since the counter-tenor repertoire is in need of a boost. The piece, though, lies just as well for mezzo or baritone. It fizzes with confidence and verve from start to finish, with words always audible, as long as the singer has the requisite verbal panache and slickness. The texts are a delight too—their bracing ironies aptly captured throughout. The composer has given careful thought to phrasing, and her markings throughout demonstrate her innate understanding of the voice. The words do, of course, suit an American accent, and this should be borne in mind. The musical idiom is neatly poised on the edge of tonality, identifiably ‘American’ yet entirely personal and cohesive, with an inbuilt rhythmic flexibility tailored to the flow of the texts. The piano writing also has flair and vitality and is clear-textured enough for the voice to come through.

This chapter explores Canadian composer Jocelyn Morlock’s Involuntary Love Songs (2008). Morlock’s lively, distinctive voice and clear vision are immediately evident in this trio of satisfying, ear-catching songs, written in an accessible style that recalls elements of an earlier North American ‘art-song’ tradition. The cycle will be an asset to any recital programme. The vibrantly evocative poems by Alan Ashton are ideal musical vehicles, and Morlock responds to them with spontaneity and empathy, mirroring their emotional surges and bracing contrasts. An enviably uncluttered musical language often has modal overtones, and she favours spare, lean textures, with frequent open fifths and fourths anchored to a stable, tonic base. Words are set so as to ring out clearly and vocal lines stay within a practical range, following the contours of natural speech. The piece was originally written for soprano, but, in keeping with a current trend, exists in different transposed versions, each also open to adaptation for individual performers.

Patrick Widrig and Sara Pearson—artistic directors of the Pearson–Widrig Dance Theater, a company that holds workshops and performances across the world—have invested their efforts in various site-adaptive works that highlight a place's specific and universal attributes. Widrig and Pearson articulate that artistic vision is different from having to deal with the practical world's restrictions. Site-adaptive works may be associated with economic practicality since they may be adapted to the specifics of any architectural or natural space. They are also able to differentiate space and place: space refers to an inherent choreographic element and requires a spatial awareness. Pearson and Widrig talk about the initial attempts at their transition from performing on stage to holding site performances, and how historical research plays no small part in determining their work's direction.

This chapter explores Rousseau's attitude towards various arts, especially as they are addressed in his Discours sur les sciences et les arts, and compares them with the artisan's practical activity. His view of human progress is discussed in the context of his personal ‘reform’ and disaffection with Parisian worldly life, though the ambivalence of his feelings for creative literature is not disguised. His taste for handwork and suspicion of technical and other aspects of modernity are further examined.

This chapter discusses the emergence of a social ethos of practicality in higher education by the end of the nineteenth century. Throughout the antebellum era, the expansion of scientific and technical knowledge joined with the rise of political populism to lead existing institutions to add practical studies to their curricula. Many advocates of practical studies, however, were not satisfied with simply incorporating courses or appending schools to already-established colleges and universities. They sought to break with tradition by establishing a new kind of higher-education institution, one that would teach students scientific and investigative principles while also requiring the application of those principles outside of the classroom, both on the farm and in the field. This new institutional type would contribute to the common good by being unprecedentedly accessible and affordable to agrarian and laboring youth. The chapter then looks at the establishment of the Agricultural College of the State of Michigan.

Sets out the aims of the book, arguing that the operation of insurance lies at the core of obligations law in both conceptual and practical terms. Explores significant obstacles to this understanding, explaining how and why the role of insurance has been understated in existing accounts of the law of obligations. The sources of this relative neglect include a near universal emphasis on liability rather than recoverability, and the prevalence of two-party models for analysis of private law. Introduces the book’s general approach both to obligations and to the role of insurance; and sets out the structure of the work and its intended contribution.

This chapter talks about the influence of scholars' general worldview on how they see social work. Turning its gaze to the past, the chapter briefly demonstrates how the ways scholars write and speak about research have changed, giving significant space to the role of experimentation in social work. The chapter examines the idea of the experimenting society, especially through the work of Ada Sheffield; at the success story of evidence based practice; and at a forgotten strand of experimental sociology. It then moves to consider the emergence of innovations in social work, taking task-centred social work as a main example. The ground covered in this chapter distinctively exemplifies the point regarding the synthesis of scepticism and practicality.

Pragmatism is a feature of the American national culture that has disappeared from American Studies as few historians seem to be genuinely interested in the country's pragmatic heritage. This chapter explores the apparent fissure in American culture and the pronounced coexistence between cool practicality and its antitheses in America. It also examines whether America can somehow be a nation of pragmatic Lockeans who are also tormented saints, why pragmatism as a way of life has dropped off the agenda of American scholarship, and whether pragmatism is a fixed trait or a changeable disposition. Moreover, it considers two overlapping but somewhat distinct categories of American intellectuals' commentaries on pragmatic mentality. The first group of commentators argues that practicality contrasts with idealism and focuses on the prevalence of pragmatic materialism in America. The second group of commentators claims that practicality contrasts with fixed or constraining beliefs and associates pragmatism with experimentalism.

This chapter explains several valid points about the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed method for National Time Accounting (NTA), particularly regarding the idea of measuring subjective well-being by the fraction of time people spend in an unpleasant emotional state. The assumptions underlying the proposal for NTA seem to strike a reasonable balance between measurement requirements and practicality. The U-index and related indicators can provide a useful indicator of situations that are associated with unpleasant emotional experiences and of groups that are more likely to endure emotionally unpleasant experiences. It is hoped that NTA can provide a means for tracking whether societies are spending their time in more or less enjoyable ways, which can be an input along with others to derive a picture of the progress of society.

This chapter discusses how Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ARTs) affected women’s agency. Mothering and experiencing motherhood are the ultimate forms of woman’s agency. Yet with the emergence of ARTs, patriarchal norms are reinforced and woman’s desire to undergo biological motherhood is undermined. Some argue, however, that ARTs improve the freedom of a woman to whether or not to engage in another pregnancy; to simply put it, freedom to practice the sense of economic practicality. This chapter explores how ARTs somehow promote women’s agency within the context of pronatalism, a movement that encourages childbearing, through citing the works of sociology experts in the field of womanhood, reproduction, and motherhood.

Sam tries support-mustering once again, to re-enlist the Thjostarssons to recover his lost position; they decline, offering two different reasons; one that he should have killed Hrafnkel when he had the chance and secured his position, and second, that it is just too far away, which indicates it is outside their field of interests, and that it would be quite expensive as well as dangerous to test their luck twice. They do, however, offer him the chance to come and live near them, under their protection. The chapter studies Sam’s petulant reaction to their refusal to come back east to help him. There is discussion of how much Sam could expect Hrafnkel to honor their previous settlement, and what options were open for a man in Sam’s position once Hrafnkel had breached the settlement.

Arguments from the practicality of moral judgment are typically taken to be among the more powerful arguments for meta-ethical expressivism. However, analogous arguments seem unpromising in meta-epistemology. Morality is obviously practical in a very direct way, whereas epistemic judgments tell one what to believe, not what to do. It is argued in this chapter that what epistemologists call ‘pragmatic encroachment’ provides the best starting point for an argument from practicality in meta-epistemology. However, the best argument drawing on this idea seems compelling only for judgments about what someone has sufficient reason to believe, not judgments about what there is some reason to believe. But a similar dichotomy can be found in the moral context, and seeing why this does not spell doom there helps in the meta-epistemological context too. The chapter concludes by defending a better strategy for defending epistemic expressivism which relies on a specific conception of non-representational ‘direction of fit’.

This general conclusion recapitulates the main arguments of the book and summarizes its theoretical, methodological and practical implications. Theoretically, it re-connects the law with the social world to shed light on both the meaning of the law and the nature of the society in which it intervenes. Methodologically, it casts doubt on the broad definition of ‘norm conflict’ adopted by the ILC Fragmentation Report for its lack of typology, and challenges the use of ‘legal techniques’ as a one-size-fits-all solution. Practically, it emphasizes the different requirements of different laws on the use of force against individuals in war, not to nullify or bypass any of them, but precisely to preserve and vindicate all of them.