Katerina Sideri
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545520
- eISBN:
- 9780191721113
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545520.003.0005
- Subject:
- Law, Medical Law
This chapter explores the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics to link the relevant discussion to bioethics, the idea of human flourishing, and the principles of practical reason, justice, and ...
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This chapter explores the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics to link the relevant discussion to bioethics, the idea of human flourishing, and the principles of practical reason, justice, and equity. It argues that a dynamic understanding of health, promoting empowerment and capacity building, should present us with a primary bioethical endeavour. This position brings to the foreground important questions as to the ways bioethics should be governed at the international level, whilst capturing the pluralist content of secular bioethics by means of stressing the importance of participation and deliberation when facing relevant regulatory dilemmas.Less
This chapter explores the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics to link the relevant discussion to bioethics, the idea of human flourishing, and the principles of practical reason, justice, and equity. It argues that a dynamic understanding of health, promoting empowerment and capacity building, should present us with a primary bioethical endeavour. This position brings to the foreground important questions as to the ways bioethics should be governed at the international level, whilst capturing the pluralist content of secular bioethics by means of stressing the importance of participation and deliberation when facing relevant regulatory dilemmas.
Jason Stanley
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199288038
- eISBN:
- 9780191603679
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at ...
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The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.Less
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.
Alan Thomas
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780198250173
- eISBN:
- 9780191604072
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198250177.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian ...
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This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian cognitivists’ position by Bernard Williams. Williams’s arguments are presented in a different light from the way in which they are usually understood. The mention of Humeanism in his initial presentation of his ideas led to Williams being viewed as a representative of someone committed to the Humean theory of motivation, or to a Humean view of the self or of the psychological. Williams’s position is seen as a set of relatively neutral constraints on the very idea of a practical reason.Less
This chapter examines a proposal concerning the nature of practical reasons: that all such reasons are internal reasons. It is the first obstacle that was placed in the way of the Wittgensteinian cognitivists’ position by Bernard Williams. Williams’s arguments are presented in a different light from the way in which they are usually understood. The mention of Humeanism in his initial presentation of his ideas led to Williams being viewed as a representative of someone committed to the Humean theory of motivation, or to a Humean view of the self or of the psychological. Williams’s position is seen as a set of relatively neutral constraints on the very idea of a practical reason.
Katerina Deligiorgi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199646159
- eISBN:
- 9780191741142
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646159.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of ...
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Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.Less
Autonomy is a key concept in contemporary moral philosophy with deep roots in the history of the subject. However, there is still no agreed view about the correct way to formulate an account of autonomy that adequately captures both our capacity for self-determination and our responsiveness to reasons. This book develops a theory of autonomy that is Kantian in orientation but which engages closely with recent arguments about agency, morality, and practical reasoning. There are two aspects in which the theory defended in this book is distinctive. First, whereas autonomy has primarily been understood in terms of our relation to ourselves, the theory defended here shows that it also centrally involves our relation to others. Identifying the intersubjective dimension of autonomy is crucial for the defence of autonomy as a morality of freedom. Second, autonomy must be treated as a composite concept and hence not capturable in simple definitions such as acting on one’s higher order desires or on principles one endorses. One of the virtues of the composite picture is that it shows autonomy at the intersection of concerns with morality, practical rationality, and freedom. Autonomy pertains to all these areas, though it does not exactly coincide with any of them. Showing this, and so tracing the scope of autonomy, is an essential part of the project. The aim is to show that autonomy is theoretically plausible, psychologically realistic, and morally attractive.
Neil MacCormick
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780198268772
- eISBN:
- 9780191713071
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268772.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law — acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do ...
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The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law — acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of ‘right and wrong’ fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom — our freedom to form our own moral commitments — relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments? This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents an account of practical reason. It also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Adam Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's ‘moral sentiments’ to Kant's ‘categorical imperative’.Less
The concept of practical reason is central to contemporary thought on ethics and the philosophy of law — acting well means acting for good reasons. Explaining this requires several stages. How do reasons relate to actions at all, as incentives and in explanations? What are values, how do they relate to human nature, and how do they enter practical reasoning? How do the concepts of ‘right and wrong’ fit in, and in what way do they involve questions of mutual trust among human beings? How does our moral freedom — our freedom to form our own moral commitments — relate to our responsibilities to each other? How is this final question transposed into law and legal commitments? This book explores these questions, vital to understanding the nature of law and morality. It presents an account of practical reason. It also offers a reinterpretation of Kant's views on moral autonomy and Adam Smith's on self-command, marrying Smith's ‘moral sentiments’ to Kant's ‘categorical imperative’.
Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199290659
- eISBN:
- 9780191603617
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199290652.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter argues against the hedged principles laid out in Chapter 6. It contends that the best explanation of the possibility of practical wisdom entails that morality can be codified. It gives ...
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This chapter argues against the hedged principles laid out in Chapter 6. It contends that the best explanation of the possibility of practical wisdom entails that morality can be codified. It gives three main arguments. The first argument contends that generalism as a regulative ideal better preserves a broad scope for practical wisdom than its particularist rivals. In pressing this argument, it is shown how generalism is better situated to accommodate an important role for certain kinds of fiction and narrative in moral thinking. The second argument contends that generalism as a regulative ideal is better situated to distinguish the a priori from the a posteriori elements of moral knowledge than its particularist rivals. The third argument simply appeals to pre-theoretical intuitions about the codifiability of morality.Less
This chapter argues against the hedged principles laid out in Chapter 6. It contends that the best explanation of the possibility of practical wisdom entails that morality can be codified. It gives three main arguments. The first argument contends that generalism as a regulative ideal better preserves a broad scope for practical wisdom than its particularist rivals. In pressing this argument, it is shown how generalism is better situated to accommodate an important role for certain kinds of fiction and narrative in moral thinking. The second argument contends that generalism as a regulative ideal is better situated to distinguish the a priori from the a posteriori elements of moral knowledge than its particularist rivals. The third argument simply appeals to pre-theoretical intuitions about the codifiability of morality.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the notion of a reason for action. It begins by distinguishing epistemic from practical reasons, and suggests that all practical reasons must be grounded in well-being. It ...
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This chapter discusses the notion of a reason for action. It begins by distinguishing epistemic from practical reasons, and suggests that all practical reasons must be grounded in well-being. It distinguishes between explanatory (including motivating) reasons, and normative reasons. Normative reasons are defined as properties of actions that count, for the agent in question, in favour of the performance of those actions by that agent. Normative reasons are then categorized as either grounding or justificatory, the former being those of primary interest in ethics. It is argued that reasons, to use Williams's term, are ‘external’. This external view is defended against his objections, and then realism about reasons against Humean and Kantian critiques. The chapter concludes with discussions of the relation between reasons and values and a defence against the arguments of G. E. Moore and T. M. Scanlon that the concept of well-being cannot be central to ethics.Less
This chapter discusses the notion of a reason for action. It begins by distinguishing epistemic from practical reasons, and suggests that all practical reasons must be grounded in well-being. It distinguishes between explanatory (including motivating) reasons, and normative reasons. Normative reasons are defined as properties of actions that count, for the agent in question, in favour of the performance of those actions by that agent. Normative reasons are then categorized as either grounding or justificatory, the former being those of primary interest in ethics. It is argued that reasons, to use Williams's term, are ‘external’. This external view is defended against his objections, and then realism about reasons against Humean and Kantian critiques. The chapter concludes with discussions of the relation between reasons and values and a defence against the arguments of G. E. Moore and T. M. Scanlon that the concept of well-being cannot be central to ethics.
Maria Alvarez
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199550005
- eISBN:
- 9780191720239
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199550005.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, ...
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Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Kinds of Reasons offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. The account offered builds on some important recent work in the area; but it takes its main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G. E. M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. The book offers an alternative to the Humean view that our reason for acting are mental states: it explains and develops a distinctive version of the view that our reasons for acting are facts, and defends it against difficulties that have been thought to be insurmountable. In addition, it proposes an account of the relation between reasons and desires, and of the role these play in practical reasoning and in the explanation of action.Less
Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities is one of the central tasks of philosophy. The task requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and of how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Kinds of Reasons offers a fresh and incisive treatment of these issues, focusing in particular on reasons as they feature in contexts of agency. The account offered builds on some important recent work in the area; but it takes its main inspiration from the tradition that receives its seminal contemporary expression in the writings of G. E. M. Anscombe, a tradition that runs counter to the broadly Humean orthodoxy that has dominated the theory of action for the past forty years. The book offers an alternative to the Humean view that our reason for acting are mental states: it explains and develops a distinctive version of the view that our reasons for acting are facts, and defends it against difficulties that have been thought to be insurmountable. In addition, it proposes an account of the relation between reasons and desires, and of the role these play in practical reasoning and in the explanation of action.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
With practical reason, as with theoretical reason, there is an important difference between reasons that are in some sense basic and those based on further reasons. Beliefs, actions, and desires can ...
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With practical reason, as with theoretical reason, there is an important difference between reasons that are in some sense basic and those based on further reasons. Beliefs, actions, and desires can all be rational on the basis of rational elements that “transmit” rationality to them. This chapter addresses the following questions: what sorts of relationships hold between desires that are, for the agent, basic, as a desire to maintain good health might be, and desires based on those, such as the desire to swim? And how might desires, taken together with beliefs, justify actions?Less
With practical reason, as with theoretical reason, there is an important difference between reasons that are in some sense basic and those based on further reasons. Beliefs, actions, and desires can all be rational on the basis of rational elements that “transmit” rationality to them. This chapter addresses the following questions: what sorts of relationships hold between desires that are, for the agent, basic, as a desire to maintain good health might be, and desires based on those, such as the desire to swim? And how might desires, taken together with beliefs, justify actions?
Matthew Levering
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199535293
- eISBN:
- 9780191715839
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535293.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Biblical Studies
This chapter surveys the efforts of three contemporary Catholic theorists to recover a deeper appreciation for the natural law: Martin Rhonheimer, Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer. Whereas ...
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This chapter surveys the efforts of three contemporary Catholic theorists to recover a deeper appreciation for the natural law: Martin Rhonheimer, Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer. Whereas Rhonheimer suggests that human practical reason humanizes the natural inclinations, thereby constituting the natural law, Pinckaers and McAleer give a stronger place to created receptivity and body-soul unity.Less
This chapter surveys the efforts of three contemporary Catholic theorists to recover a deeper appreciation for the natural law: Martin Rhonheimer, Servais Pinckaers, and Graham McAleer. Whereas Rhonheimer suggests that human practical reason humanizes the natural inclinations, thereby constituting the natural law, Pinckaers and McAleer give a stronger place to created receptivity and body-soul unity.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
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The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
John Bishop
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199205547
- eISBN:
- 9780191709432
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205547.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic ...
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This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.Less
This chapter argues that reflective believers' concern is ultimately not just for the epistemic, but for the moral justifiability of their taking faith-beliefs to be true. In response to the doxastic voluntarism this seems to imply, it is argued that control in relation to beliefs is exercised at two ‘loci’: indirect control over what we hold to be true, and direct control over what we take to be true in our practical reasoning. This latter is open to moral evaluation whenever the actions to which such reasoning can lead are morally significant. This condition is met in the case of theistic faith-beliefs, which pervasively influence how people live. We therefore need an ethics of belief, or better, of faith-commitment that specifies the conditions under which it is morally permissible to commit oneself practically to the truth of a theistic (or any other) faith-belief.
Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195382440
- eISBN:
- 9780199870158
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195382440.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional ...
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Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.Less
Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of “good” or the notion of “desire” have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of ‘desire’ and ‘good’, how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the “Guise of the Good” thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good — has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. The book aims to bring together “systematic” and more historically-oriented work on these issues.
Mark Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199299508
- eISBN:
- 9780191714917
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Long claimed to be the ‘dominant conception of practical reason’, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the ...
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Long claimed to be the ‘dominant conception of practical reason’, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack over the last quarter century. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. This book explores the viability of this central Humean thesis about reasons in the face of this critical onslaught. Its thesis is that the purportedly general objections to the Humean theory actually turn on substantive assumptions that are non-essential to the theory, and in fact are better rejected on independent grounds. In the course of advancing this argument, the book develops and defends a version of the Humean theory that withstands these objections. If this is right, then the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely and deeply misunderstood. Along the way, the book raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action.Less
Long claimed to be the ‘dominant conception of practical reason’, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack over the last quarter century. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. This book explores the viability of this central Humean thesis about reasons in the face of this critical onslaught. Its thesis is that the purportedly general objections to the Humean theory actually turn on substantive assumptions that are non-essential to the theory, and in fact are better rejected on independent grounds. In the course of advancing this argument, the book develops and defends a version of the Humean theory that withstands these objections. If this is right, then the commitments of the Humean theory have been widely and deeply misunderstood. Along the way, the book raises and addresses questions about the fundamental structure of reasons, the nature of normative explanations, the aims of and challenges facing reductive views in metaethics, the weight of reasons, the nature of desire, moral epistemology, and most importantly, the relationship between agent-relational and agent-neutral reasons for action.
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199545285
- eISBN:
- 9780191719899
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199545285.001.0001
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured ...
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How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured by the law? For many leading legal philosophers the legal order is constructed on the foundations of factual sources and with materials provided by technical argument. For this ‘legal positivist’ school of jurisprudence, the law endorses rights by some official act suitably communicated. But how can any such legal enactment recreate the proper force of rights? Rights take their meaning and importance from moral reflection, which only expresses itself in practical reasoning. This puzzle about rights invites a reconsideration of the nature and methods of legal doctrine and of jurisprudence itself. Legal Rights argues that the theory of law and legal concepts is a project of moral and political philosophy, the best account of which is to be found in the social contract tradition. It outlines an argument according to which legal rights can be justified before equal citizens under the constraints of public reason. The place of rights in law is explained by the unique position of law as an essential component of the civil condition and a necessary condition for freedom.Less
How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured by the law? For many leading legal philosophers the legal order is constructed on the foundations of factual sources and with materials provided by technical argument. For this ‘legal positivist’ school of jurisprudence, the law endorses rights by some official act suitably communicated. But how can any such legal enactment recreate the proper force of rights? Rights take their meaning and importance from moral reflection, which only expresses itself in practical reasoning. This puzzle about rights invites a reconsideration of the nature and methods of legal doctrine and of jurisprudence itself. Legal Rights argues that the theory of law and legal concepts is a project of moral and political philosophy, the best account of which is to be found in the social contract tradition. It outlines an argument according to which legal rights can be justified before equal citizens under the constraints of public reason. The place of rights in law is explained by the unique position of law as an essential component of the civil condition and a necessary condition for freedom.
Paul Hurley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199559305
- eISBN:
- 9780191721212
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The arguments in the first half of this chapter demonstrate that an account of moral standards based upon an interpersonal conception of impartiality, in stark contrast with its impersonal ...
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The arguments in the first half of this chapter demonstrate that an account of moral standards based upon an interpersonal conception of impartiality, in stark contrast with its impersonal counterpart, has ample resources to establish the rational authority of its moral standards. In particular, it is argued that the impartial second-personal reasons identified by Stephen Darwall presuppose the rational authority of interpersonal moral reasons. In the second half of the chapter it is argued that the recognition of a foundational role for the interpersonal conception of impartiality in the moral evaluation of actions is supported by deep structural features of practical, as opposed to theoretical, reason. This argument proceeds first by arguing against the aspects of Thomas Nagel's account of practical reason, which suggest that the structural features of objective practical reason preclude a fundamental role for such an interpersonal conception of impartiality in the evaluation of action.Less
The arguments in the first half of this chapter demonstrate that an account of moral standards based upon an interpersonal conception of impartiality, in stark contrast with its impersonal counterpart, has ample resources to establish the rational authority of its moral standards. In particular, it is argued that the impartial second-personal reasons identified by Stephen Darwall presuppose the rational authority of interpersonal moral reasons. In the second half of the chapter it is argued that the recognition of a foundational role for the interpersonal conception of impartiality in the moral evaluation of actions is supported by deep structural features of practical, as opposed to theoretical, reason. This argument proceeds first by arguing against the aspects of Thomas Nagel's account of practical reason, which suggest that the structural features of objective practical reason preclude a fundamental role for such an interpersonal conception of impartiality in the evaluation of action.
Roger Crisp
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199290338
- eISBN:
- 9780191710476
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290338.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter begins by discussing the nature of self-interested reasons themselves, agreeing with Derek Parfit that what matters is not personal identity. It suggests that what matters to each of us ...
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This chapter begins by discussing the nature of self-interested reasons themselves, agreeing with Derek Parfit that what matters is not personal identity. It suggests that what matters to each of us is the hedonic quality of the experiences realized by the exercise of any capacity for conscious experience we now have or any such capacity in future which emerges from our present capacity (thus allowing for division of capacities, between which other things being equal we should be impartial). It argues that the well-being of others can ground reasons for each of us to act, sometimes to the detriment of our own individual well-being. The well-being of others is to be assessed impartially in the sense that no intrinsic weight is to be attached to relationships with others. This view may be described as a version of the ‘dualism of practical reason’.Less
This chapter begins by discussing the nature of self-interested reasons themselves, agreeing with Derek Parfit that what matters is not personal identity. It suggests that what matters to each of us is the hedonic quality of the experiences realized by the exercise of any capacity for conscious experience we now have or any such capacity in future which emerges from our present capacity (thus allowing for division of capacities, between which other things being equal we should be impartial). It argues that the well-being of others can ground reasons for each of us to act, sometimes to the detriment of our own individual well-being. The well-being of others is to be assessed impartially in the sense that no intrinsic weight is to be attached to relationships with others. This view may be described as a version of the ‘dualism of practical reason’.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The parallels between the theoretical and the practical reason are extensive. This chapter considers the structural ones, such as the analogy between, on the one hand, inferential beliefs and the ...
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The parallels between the theoretical and the practical reason are extensive. This chapter considers the structural ones, such as the analogy between, on the one hand, inferential beliefs and the beliefs they are based on and, on the other hand, instrumental desires (desires for things as means) and the basic desires to which they are subordinate. Beliefs of conclusions we infer from certain premises can be justified by our beliefs of those premises. Desires with certain contents can be justified by further desires, above all when the former are desires to take means toward satisfying the latter, “premise” desires. The chapter explains some major substantive parallels between theoretical and practical reason.Less
The parallels between the theoretical and the practical reason are extensive. This chapter considers the structural ones, such as the analogy between, on the one hand, inferential beliefs and the beliefs they are based on and, on the other hand, instrumental desires (desires for things as means) and the basic desires to which they are subordinate. Beliefs of conclusions we infer from certain premises can be justified by our beliefs of those premises. Desires with certain contents can be justified by further desires, above all when the former are desires to take means toward satisfying the latter, “premise” desires. The chapter explains some major substantive parallels between theoretical and practical reason.
Robert Audi
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195158427
- eISBN:
- 9780199871407
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195158427.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we ...
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Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.Less
Much of what we want, such as food and entertainment and good company, we want for our own consumption or enjoyment; but we can also want those same sorts of things for other people. Indeed, if we love other people, we must want certain kinds of things not only for them, but for their sake. This raises the question of whether we, as egoists hold, rationally want something for others only so far as it will lead to something we want for ourselves? Another question is whether given an ordinary knowledge of how others are like us, a kind of altruism is rationally demanded of us. If it is, then practical reason provides at least a limited foundation for ethics, in the sense that a rational person will, under certain conditions, have adequate reason to treat others in accordance with some basic moral principles. This chapter examines this issue and presents the general account of rationality.
Jacqueline Mariña
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206377
- eISBN:
- 9780191709753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206377.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he ...
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This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with Kant's practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the problem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent's character, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity and continuity of the self throughout its changing states. Schleiermacher's compatibalist view of freedom is examined, as well as his analysis of Kant's fundamental division of the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity. The principle focus of the chapter is Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom.Less
This chapter examines several fundamental philosophical problems regarding the conditions of the possibility of moral transformation preoccupying the younger Schleiermacher, especially as he struggled to come to terms with Kant's practical philosophy. Included in this set of issues is the problem of transcendental freedom and how it relates to an agent's character, as well as the problem of the relation of the faculty of representation (knowing) to the faculty of desire (doing). Both questions have to do with how we are to conceive of the unity and continuity of the self throughout its changing states. Schleiermacher's compatibalist view of freedom is examined, as well as his analysis of Kant's fundamental division of the sources of human knowledge into spontaneity and receptivity. The principle focus of the chapter is Schleiermacher's early essay On Freedom.
