Allen W. Wood
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780195395686
- eISBN:
- 9780199979295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195395686.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Kant’s derivation of the supreme principle of morality in the Second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds by way of a philosophical examination of “the practical faculty of ...
More
Kant’s derivation of the supreme principle of morality in the Second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds by way of a philosophical examination of “the practical faculty of reason” and an “exhibition” of its “rules of determination”. This essay attempts to explicate that account of practical reason, and also to relate it to systematic reflections on the (somewhat different) task of offering practical justifications of actions. Kant’s approach to practical reason is compared and contrasted with some contemporary ideas about “practical rationality”. Three species of practical reason -- instrumental, prudential and moral – are examined and developed. Finally, an attempt is made at relating Kant’s conception of the dignity of rational nature to questions of practical justification, by arguing that it points the way toward an intersubjective conception of practical reason not found explicitly in Kant’s account.Less
Kant’s derivation of the supreme principle of morality in the Second Section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals proceeds by way of a philosophical examination of “the practical faculty of reason” and an “exhibition” of its “rules of determination”. This essay attempts to explicate that account of practical reason, and also to relate it to systematic reflections on the (somewhat different) task of offering practical justifications of actions. Kant’s approach to practical reason is compared and contrasted with some contemporary ideas about “practical rationality”. Three species of practical reason -- instrumental, prudential and moral – are examined and developed. Finally, an attempt is made at relating Kant’s conception of the dignity of rational nature to questions of practical justification, by arguing that it points the way toward an intersubjective conception of practical reason not found explicitly in Kant’s account.
Sylvia Berryman
- Published in print:
- 2019
- Published Online:
- April 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780198835004
- eISBN:
- 9780191876561
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198835004.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. ...
More
Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s well-known emphasis on the nature of action, and his practice of beginning normative treatises from the nature of action, we can see implicit in this focus an argument that, for rational agents, the fact that we aim at some good commits us to seeking the genuine or true good. This chapter argues that an apparent fallacy in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics yields—if properly understood—an insistence that rational agency requires consideration of the truly best goal.Less
Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s well-known emphasis on the nature of action, and his practice of beginning normative treatises from the nature of action, we can see implicit in this focus an argument that, for rational agents, the fact that we aim at some good commits us to seeking the genuine or true good. This chapter argues that an apparent fallacy in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics yields—if properly understood—an insistence that rational agency requires consideration of the truly best goal.
Anne Meis Knupfer
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780801451140
- eISBN:
- 9780801467714
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9780801451140.003.0007
- Subject:
- History, American History: 20th Century
This chapter looks at the Green Mountains of Vermont, where the oldest and third oldest food co-ops in the United States are located. The Adamant Food Co-operative (started in 1935) is the oldest ...
More
This chapter looks at the Green Mountains of Vermont, where the oldest and third oldest food co-ops in the United States are located. The Adamant Food Co-operative (started in 1935) is the oldest food co-op in a village with a population of sixty-eight. It is reminiscent of an old general store, which sells various practical goods along with hardware, organic produce, and a fine selection of wines. It was able to survive through its rich traditions and the dedication of its members. The other Vermont co-op is the Putney Food Co-operative, which belongs to a different kind of community. Putney was a haven for hippies, artists, and other nonconformists during the 1960s. In contrast to Adamant's, Putney's co-op was more political, as it participated in boycotts and deliberated on which foods should be sold.Less
This chapter looks at the Green Mountains of Vermont, where the oldest and third oldest food co-ops in the United States are located. The Adamant Food Co-operative (started in 1935) is the oldest food co-op in a village with a population of sixty-eight. It is reminiscent of an old general store, which sells various practical goods along with hardware, organic produce, and a fine selection of wines. It was able to survive through its rich traditions and the dedication of its members. The other Vermont co-op is the Putney Food Co-operative, which belongs to a different kind of community. Putney was a haven for hippies, artists, and other nonconformists during the 1960s. In contrast to Adamant's, Putney's co-op was more political, as it participated in boycotts and deliberated on which foods should be sold.