Frank Fischer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282838
- eISBN:
- 9780191712487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282838.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Moving beyond the traditional conceptions of value-neutrality and context independence that have dominated the epistemology of the policy sciences, this chapter offers a social constructivist ...
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Moving beyond the traditional conceptions of value-neutrality and context independence that have dominated the epistemology of the policy sciences, this chapter offers a social constructivist interpretation of real-world practices. Introducing the constructivist perspective, it presents an alternative dialectical understanding of knowledge and its relation to practical reason in policy deliberation. Here the postempiricist expert, as deliberative policy analysis, is posited as an interpretive mediator operating between the available analytic frameworks of social science, particular policy findings, and the differing perspectives of the public actors, both those of policy decision-makers and citizens.Less
Moving beyond the traditional conceptions of value-neutrality and context independence that have dominated the epistemology of the policy sciences, this chapter offers a social constructivist interpretation of real-world practices. Introducing the constructivist perspective, it presents an alternative dialectical understanding of knowledge and its relation to practical reason in policy deliberation. Here the postempiricist expert, as deliberative policy analysis, is posited as an interpretive mediator operating between the available analytic frameworks of social science, particular policy findings, and the differing perspectives of the public actors, both those of policy decision-makers and citizens.
G. F. Schueler
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250370
- eISBN:
- 9780191598364
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250375.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what ...
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This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself.In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well.Less
This book involves rethinking the answer to Davidson's question, ”What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did?” It focuses on the thought that practical deliberation is central to explaining human action. One common version of the widely held view that explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons are causal explanations understands desires and beliefs as the main causal factors and says roughly that what might be called a purely causal or ’non‐purposive’ account of desire‐belief interactions underlies the surface and (apparently) purposive or teleological explanation in terms of the agent's reasons. It is argued in this book that any such view can make no sense in the end of a common, and indeed essential, element in reasons explanations, practical reasoning itself.
In the alternative account suggested here, explanations of actions in terms of the agent's reasons have an ineliminable normative element, not explicable in unadorned causal terms, which stems from the central role of practical deliberation in the genesis, and thus in the explanation, of actions. Intentional actions are always done for reasons, and the agent's reasons for doing what she did, even when there is no explicit deliberation, are whatever led her to think that this action is what she should do. So her reasons for doing what she did are intelligible only as features of her actual or possible practical deliberation, which must therefore always be at least implicitly referred to in explanations of her actions in terms of her reasons. At the same time, practical deliberation is inherently normative, both in the sense that the agent must employ evaluations in her deliberation and in the sense that her reasons are automatically open to normative criticism from herself and others. It is argued here that this requires that explanations of actions that refer essentially to the agent's deliberation have a normative element as well.
Robert Kane
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195126563
- eISBN:
- 9780199868506
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195126564.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The task of constructing an indeterminist account of free will without appeal to obscure or mysterious notions of agency or causation (begun in Ch. 8) is continued in this chapter. The theory is ...
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The task of constructing an indeterminist account of free will without appeal to obscure or mysterious notions of agency or causation (begun in Ch. 8) is continued in this chapter. The theory is extended to additional topics beyond free choices in moral and prudential contexts, for example, to “efforts of will sustaining purposes” that may be involved in different human activities where resistance in the will must be overcome, to acts of attention, to self‐control and self‐modification, practical deliberation, creative problem solving and changes of intention in action. Along the way, a number of other topics are discussed: evolution and rationality, the role of chance in problem solving, self‐deception, the role of “effort” in Eastern philosophies, such as Taoism, and the relation of incommensurability of values to free will.Less
The task of constructing an indeterminist account of free will without appeal to obscure or mysterious notions of agency or causation (begun in Ch. 8) is continued in this chapter. The theory is extended to additional topics beyond free choices in moral and prudential contexts, for example, to “efforts of will sustaining purposes” that may be involved in different human activities where resistance in the will must be overcome, to acts of attention, to self‐control and self‐modification, practical deliberation, creative problem solving and changes of intention in action. Along the way, a number of other topics are discussed: evolution and rationality, the role of chance in problem solving, self‐deception, the role of “effort” in Eastern philosophies, such as Taoism, and the relation of incommensurability of values to free will.
G. F. Schueler
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250370
- eISBN:
- 9780191598364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250375.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
Practical reasoning has been misrepresented by the so‐called practical syllogism as not essentially involving evaluations. Correcting this error helps show why it is implausible to hold, as e.g. J. ...
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Practical reasoning has been misrepresented by the so‐called practical syllogism as not essentially involving evaluations. Correcting this error helps show why it is implausible to hold, as e.g. J. David Velleman and others have, that an underlying proper desire is always required to explain actions done on the basis of practical deliberation. The principle of charity is essential to making sense of the actions of others since it is essential to understanding what their reasons are when they act.Less
Practical reasoning has been misrepresented by the so‐called practical syllogism as not essentially involving evaluations. Correcting this error helps show why it is implausible to hold, as e.g. J. David Velleman and others have, that an underlying proper desire is always required to explain actions done on the basis of practical deliberation. The principle of charity is essential to making sense of the actions of others since it is essential to understanding what their reasons are when they act.
David Owens
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199691500
- eISBN:
- 9780191744938
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Should we breach an obligation, we are subject to blame. Obligation also shapes our practical deliberation about whether to discharge the obligation. According to the Sanction Theory of Obligation, ...
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Should we breach an obligation, we are subject to blame. Obligation also shapes our practical deliberation about whether to discharge the obligation. According to the Sanction Theory of Obligation, blame acts as an incentive to ensure performance of the obligation. In fact it is not the prospect of blame that gets the conscientious person to discharge their obligations. Rather obligation shapes the deliberations of the conscientious person by getting them to exclude certain considerations from those deliberations. The accounts of exclusion offered by T. M. Scanlon and Joseph Raz are examined and rejected. Rather it is proposed that obligation pre-empts practical deliberation in the same way as habit (rather than policy). The logic of exclusion makes room for the possibility of moral dilemmas, of situations in which whatever you do, you wrong someone.Less
Should we breach an obligation, we are subject to blame. Obligation also shapes our practical deliberation about whether to discharge the obligation. According to the Sanction Theory of Obligation, blame acts as an incentive to ensure performance of the obligation. In fact it is not the prospect of blame that gets the conscientious person to discharge their obligations. Rather obligation shapes the deliberations of the conscientious person by getting them to exclude certain considerations from those deliberations. The accounts of exclusion offered by T. M. Scanlon and Joseph Raz are examined and rejected. Rather it is proposed that obligation pre-empts practical deliberation in the same way as habit (rather than policy). The logic of exclusion makes room for the possibility of moral dilemmas, of situations in which whatever you do, you wrong someone.
G. F. Schueler
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199250370
- eISBN:
- 9780191598364
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199250375.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
There is a crucial difference between explaining actions on the basis of the agent's actual or possible practical deliberation (the deliberative model) and explaining them on the basis of some ...
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There is a crucial difference between explaining actions on the basis of the agent's actual or possible practical deliberation (the deliberative model) and explaining them on the basis of some motivating desire (the direct desire model). The former applies the model of one's own rational deliberation to others in roughly the way Dennett's ‘intentional stance’ model suggests. It views the agent as genuinely rational and requires ascribing evaluations to the agent whose actions are being explained. It also entails that action explanations are themselves irreducibly normative.Less
There is a crucial difference between explaining actions on the basis of the agent's actual or possible practical deliberation (the deliberative model) and explaining them on the basis of some motivating desire (the direct desire model). The former applies the model of one's own rational deliberation to others in roughly the way Dennett's ‘intentional stance’ model suggests. It views the agent as genuinely rational and requires ascribing evaluations to the agent whose actions are being explained. It also entails that action explanations are themselves irreducibly normative.
Angus Ritchie
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199652518
- eISBN:
- 9780191745850
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652518.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter defends our pre-philosophical commitment to moral objectivism. It is an essential prelude to the main argument, for it establishes the standard which the rest of the book will use to ...
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This chapter defends our pre-philosophical commitment to moral objectivism. It is an essential prelude to the main argument, for it establishes the standard which the rest of the book will use to determine which secular accounts are ‘sufficiently’ objective. The chapter defends two distinct claims. The first is that in their practical deliberation, all human beings seek to approximate a truth which goes beyond their sentiments or the conventions of their culture. The second is that this quest is not in vain: which is to say, that humans have some capacity to attune their beliefs more closely to that moral truth, when they honestly and carefully seek it out. It draws on arguments made by David Enoch, Ronald Dworkin and Roger Crisp, and considers the case against moral realism presented by John Mackie.Less
This chapter defends our pre-philosophical commitment to moral objectivism. It is an essential prelude to the main argument, for it establishes the standard which the rest of the book will use to determine which secular accounts are ‘sufficiently’ objective. The chapter defends two distinct claims. The first is that in their practical deliberation, all human beings seek to approximate a truth which goes beyond their sentiments or the conventions of their culture. The second is that this quest is not in vain: which is to say, that humans have some capacity to attune their beliefs more closely to that moral truth, when they honestly and carefully seek it out. It draws on arguments made by David Enoch, Ronald Dworkin and Roger Crisp, and considers the case against moral realism presented by John Mackie.
Erasmus Mayr
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199606214
- eISBN:
- 9780191731631
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606214.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
A different non-causal account of acting for a reason is developed which explains this notion in terms of following a standard of success. Following a standard of success includes a teleological ...
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A different non-causal account of acting for a reason is developed which explains this notion in terms of following a standard of success. Following a standard of success includes a teleological structure of the agent's behaviour, as well as connection to ‘success or failure feelings’ and use of correlated premisses in practical deliberation. The notion of ‘following a standard of success’ is compared to Wittgenstein's notion of rule-following and is shown not to implicity rely on an event-causal link between the agent's motivating desire and the action. To conclude the overall investigation, the offered account of acting for a reason is related to the agent-causal account developed in the preceding chapters, and it is shown how the resulting theory provides a satisfactory answer to the problem of human agency.Less
A different non-causal account of acting for a reason is developed which explains this notion in terms of following a standard of success. Following a standard of success includes a teleological structure of the agent's behaviour, as well as connection to ‘success or failure feelings’ and use of correlated premisses in practical deliberation. The notion of ‘following a standard of success’ is compared to Wittgenstein's notion of rule-following and is shown not to implicity rely on an event-causal link between the agent's motivating desire and the action. To conclude the overall investigation, the offered account of acting for a reason is related to the agent-causal account developed in the preceding chapters, and it is shown how the resulting theory provides a satisfactory answer to the problem of human agency.
Mikkel Gerken
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198803454
- eISBN:
- 9780191841637
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). ...
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Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.Less
Chapter 6 concerns the normative relationship between action and knowledge ascriptions. Arguments are provided against a Knowledge Norm of Action (KNAC) and in favor of the Warrant-Action norm (WA). According to WA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her deliberative context to meet the epistemic requirements for acting on p. WA is developed by specifying the deliberative context and by arguing that its explanatory power exceeds that of knowledge norms. A general conclusion is that the knowledge norm is an important example of a folk epistemological principle that does not pass muster as an epistemological principle. More generally, Chapter 6 introduces the debates about epistemic normativity and develops a specific epistemic norm of action.
Daniel Star
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199570416
- eISBN:
- 9780191804182
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570416.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter builds up to the presentation of a new argument for the account of normative reasons introduced in the previous chapter. This argument utilizes a new conception of practical authority ...
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This chapter builds up to the presentation of a new argument for the account of normative reasons introduced in the previous chapter. This argument utilizes a new conception of practical authority that is a variation on Joseph Raz’s famous “service” conception of authority. Both Raz’s conception and the new “minimalist” conception of authority face a line of criticism from Stephen Darwall, but this line of criticism is found wanting. It is argued, partly through considering alternative candidates, that facts that are evidence concerning what we ought to do best fulfil the authoritative role that we take many ordinary facts to have in relation to practical deliberation. This explains why such ordinary facts are derivative reasons for action when we are ignorant of fundamental reasons for action.Less
This chapter builds up to the presentation of a new argument for the account of normative reasons introduced in the previous chapter. This argument utilizes a new conception of practical authority that is a variation on Joseph Raz’s famous “service” conception of authority. Both Raz’s conception and the new “minimalist” conception of authority face a line of criticism from Stephen Darwall, but this line of criticism is found wanting. It is argued, partly through considering alternative candidates, that facts that are evidence concerning what we ought to do best fulfil the authoritative role that we take many ordinary facts to have in relation to practical deliberation. This explains why such ordinary facts are derivative reasons for action when we are ignorant of fundamental reasons for action.
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226283982
- eISBN:
- 9780226284019
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226284019.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This chapter shows that virtue, the good condition of the soul, is the power to perform for their own sake virtuous actions, which have the right relation to both internal and external goods. We ...
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This chapter shows that virtue, the good condition of the soul, is the power to perform for their own sake virtuous actions, which have the right relation to both internal and external goods. We always deliberate about what to do. But figuring out what to do puts our souls in the best shape. The rationality of deliberating about what to do explicates how rationally to persuade the passions, and so it is the rationality of practical deliberation that defines the right amount of the passions.Less
This chapter shows that virtue, the good condition of the soul, is the power to perform for their own sake virtuous actions, which have the right relation to both internal and external goods. We always deliberate about what to do. But figuring out what to do puts our souls in the best shape. The rationality of deliberating about what to do explicates how rationally to persuade the passions, and so it is the rationality of practical deliberation that defines the right amount of the passions.
Daniel Star
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780199570416
- eISBN:
- 9780191804182
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570416.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter takes an idea associated with Timothy Williamson’s work, that the norm of practical reasoning is knowledge, and argues that the account of normative reasons previously defended provides ...
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This chapter takes an idea associated with Timothy Williamson’s work, that the norm of practical reasoning is knowledge, and argues that the account of normative reasons previously defended provides a much needed supplement to that idea. The combination of these two views provides an attractive picture of when it is rationally appropriate for facts to figure in practical deliberation as pro tanto reasons, and when it is rationally appropriate for them to be the basis for action. A challenge to this view may force us to accept that appropriate practical deliberation requires not just non-ethical knowledge, but ethical knowledge as well. This is not the knowledge that we aim for as an ideal in normative ethics, but instead takes other forms. A concern that the favored account of reasons is talking past other accounts of reasons is addressed, in a manner that sheds light on the nature of unpossessed reasons.Less
This chapter takes an idea associated with Timothy Williamson’s work, that the norm of practical reasoning is knowledge, and argues that the account of normative reasons previously defended provides a much needed supplement to that idea. The combination of these two views provides an attractive picture of when it is rationally appropriate for facts to figure in practical deliberation as pro tanto reasons, and when it is rationally appropriate for them to be the basis for action. A challenge to this view may force us to accept that appropriate practical deliberation requires not just non-ethical knowledge, but ethical knowledge as well. This is not the knowledge that we aim for as an ideal in normative ethics, but instead takes other forms. A concern that the favored account of reasons is talking past other accounts of reasons is addressed, in a manner that sheds light on the nature of unpossessed reasons.
Edna Ullmann-Margalit
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780198802433
- eISBN:
- 9780191840753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198802433.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The springboard for this paper is the nature of the negation relation between the notions of trust and distrust. In order to explore this relation, an analysis of full trust is offered. An ...
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The springboard for this paper is the nature of the negation relation between the notions of trust and distrust. In order to explore this relation, an analysis of full trust is offered. An investigation follows of the ways in which this “end-concept” of full trust can be negated. In particular, the sense in which distrust is the negation of trust is focused on. An asymmetry is pointed to, between ‘not-to-trust’ and ‘not-to-distrust’. This asymmetry helps explain the existence of a gap between trust and distrust: the possibility of being suspended between the two. Since both trust and distrust require reasons, the question that relates to this gap is what if there are no reasons, or at any rate no sufficient reasons, either way. This kind of situation, of being suspended between two poles without a sufficient reason to opt for any one of them, paradigmatically calls for a presumption.Less
The springboard for this paper is the nature of the negation relation between the notions of trust and distrust. In order to explore this relation, an analysis of full trust is offered. An investigation follows of the ways in which this “end-concept” of full trust can be negated. In particular, the sense in which distrust is the negation of trust is focused on. An asymmetry is pointed to, between ‘not-to-trust’ and ‘not-to-distrust’. This asymmetry helps explain the existence of a gap between trust and distrust: the possibility of being suspended between the two. Since both trust and distrust require reasons, the question that relates to this gap is what if there are no reasons, or at any rate no sufficient reasons, either way. This kind of situation, of being suspended between two poles without a sufficient reason to opt for any one of them, paradigmatically calls for a presumption.
