Joseph Raz
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199693818
- eISBN:
- 9780191731907
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693818.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
We have two distinct notions of single-agent conflicts reflecting two distinct theoretical questions. The first concerns the possibility of there being a right action in conflicts. It is the question ...
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We have two distinct notions of single-agent conflicts reflecting two distinct theoretical questions. The first concerns the possibility of there being a right action in conflicts. It is the question whether, and if so how, reasons deriving from different concerns or affecting different people can be of comparable strengths. The second concerns a sense that there is something unfortunate about conflicts, and that when facing conflicting options just taking the best or the right one is not sufficient. The chapter offers (in outline) an answer to the second question, which indirectly helps with the first question as well, in the form of the conformity principle, which asserts that if one cannot conform to reason completely one should come as close to complete conformity as possible. I will show that this innocent-sounding principle has far reaching consequences.Less
We have two distinct notions of single-agent conflicts reflecting two distinct theoretical questions. The first concerns the possibility of there being a right action in conflicts. It is the question whether, and if so how, reasons deriving from different concerns or affecting different people can be of comparable strengths. The second concerns a sense that there is something unfortunate about conflicts, and that when facing conflicting options just taking the best or the right one is not sufficient. The chapter offers (in outline) an answer to the second question, which indirectly helps with the first question as well, in the form of the conformity principle, which asserts that if one cannot conform to reason completely one should come as close to complete conformity as possible. I will show that this innocent-sounding principle has far reaching consequences.
Michael Nelson
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199662951
- eISBN:
- 9780191745195
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Velleman defends a position intermediate between moral rationalism and arationalism. Like the moral rationalist, he maintains that only irrational agents act immorally. Like the arationalist, he ...
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Velleman defends a position intermediate between moral rationalism and arationalism. Like the moral rationalist, he maintains that only irrational agents act immorally. Like the arationalist, he maintains that some immoral acts are not irrational; immorality is not always contrary to the dictates of practical reason. Velleman motivates his arationalism by considering “hard cases”‘ of agents allegedly lacking reason to be moral. The chapter defends an orthodox Kantian view, arguing that Velleman misdescribes the reasons the hard cases have. It is argued that every autonomous agent has reason to be moral. This follows from Velleman's conception of practical reason as having the aim of self-understanding. This is because there are constraints on the explanations an autonomous agent can employ to make sense of her behavior. Only when an agent acts from considerations that can be willed as universal law can those considerations render the behavior intelligible while being compatible with the agent being self-determining in acting as she did. The chapter concludes by briefly discussing the problem of conflicting requirements and Velleman's argument against the claim that morality is self-imposed.Less
Velleman defends a position intermediate between moral rationalism and arationalism. Like the moral rationalist, he maintains that only irrational agents act immorally. Like the arationalist, he maintains that some immoral acts are not irrational; immorality is not always contrary to the dictates of practical reason. Velleman motivates his arationalism by considering “hard cases”‘ of agents allegedly lacking reason to be moral. The chapter defends an orthodox Kantian view, arguing that Velleman misdescribes the reasons the hard cases have. It is argued that every autonomous agent has reason to be moral. This follows from Velleman's conception of practical reason as having the aim of self-understanding. This is because there are constraints on the explanations an autonomous agent can employ to make sense of her behavior. Only when an agent acts from considerations that can be willed as universal law can those considerations render the behavior intelligible while being compatible with the agent being self-determining in acting as she did. The chapter concludes by briefly discussing the problem of conflicting requirements and Velleman's argument against the claim that morality is self-imposed.
