Juliet Johnson
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- August 2016
- ISBN:
- 9781501700224
- eISBN:
- 9781501703751
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Cornell University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7591/cornell/9781501700224.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Economy
This chapter views the entire transplantation experience through the lens of the global financial crisis, which fundamentally challenged the central banking model that the transnational community had ...
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This chapter views the entire transplantation experience through the lens of the global financial crisis, which fundamentally challenged the central banking model that the transnational community had just spent two decades intensively promoting to the postcommunist world. Leading central banks were forced to adopt unconventional monetary policies to address the challenges of the crisis and to rethink their basic mandates and operations. In addition to defending against inflation, central bankers were now to expand their monetary policy toolbox, engage in macroprudential regulation, and take a stronger role in micro-level financial sector regulation and supervision. These wider mandates, in turn, undermined the predominant rationale for central bank independence because they demanded increasing cooperation with other government agencies and more overtly engaged political questions of regulation and distribution.Less
This chapter views the entire transplantation experience through the lens of the global financial crisis, which fundamentally challenged the central banking model that the transnational community had just spent two decades intensively promoting to the postcommunist world. Leading central banks were forced to adopt unconventional monetary policies to address the challenges of the crisis and to rethink their basic mandates and operations. In addition to defending against inflation, central bankers were now to expand their monetary policy toolbox, engage in macroprudential regulation, and take a stronger role in micro-level financial sector regulation and supervision. These wider mandates, in turn, undermined the predominant rationale for central bank independence because they demanded increasing cooperation with other government agencies and more overtly engaged political questions of regulation and distribution.
