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The introduction to this chapter discusses the question of why nations respond so differently to a set of social risks that are similar over various countries, and analyses three typical homines: Homo liberalisimus, Homo familias, and Homo socialdemocraticus. When the instincts of these ideal typical homines are combined, moral conflicts result, although a sufficient mass manages to profile itself in collective expression and sways society towards its preferred welfare regime. Old risks may fade and new ones emerge, but the response of a welfare regime will be, more likely than not, normatively path dependent. It is argued that since core institutional traits appear to be so unyielding to change, it is unlikely that the contemporary welfare state crisis will produce revolutionary change: there may be a blueprint for an ideal post‐industrial regime, but unless it is compatible with existing welfare regime practice, it may not be practicable. The author argues that, nonetheless, optimizing welfare in a post‐industrial setting will require radical departures, and these are discussed under the following headings: What is to be Optimized; Rival Reform Strategies; The Market Strategy; A Third Way?; and Equality with Inequality?

The introduction discusses the idea of a mature welfare state, and shows that the welfare state of the 1970s can be regarded as mature basically because few, if any, major changes have occurred since then. Not only did the welfare state stabilize but so also did the embracing welfare regime. Looks at the welfare state crisis and the paradoxes within this, noting (as at the beginning of the book) that the shocks come principally from the labour market and declining family stability, thus bringing growing pressures on the welfare state itself, and implying that it needs to be examined. Suggests that it would be much more fruitful to analyse the crisis as pertaining to welfare regimes. Argues that the essence of the problem lies in the growing disjuncture between existing institutional arrangements and emerging risk profiles: the bottom‐line analytical question is how and under what conditions welfare regimes are being recast to respond to the new—post‐industrial—economic realities. The first two sections look at the public attitudes to the welfare state, and the welfare state as a Trojan horse. The following sections discuss new risks and new equalities of welfare regimes—how they deal with the Trojan horse—under the following headings: Managing the Labour Market; Labour Market Risks and Welfare Regimes; Family Risks and Welfare Regimes; and Welfare State Adaptation to Exogenous Shocks and New Risks.