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This introductory chapter provides an overview of reputation for resolve and why leaders care about their reputations. Leaders worry about their reputations for resolve because they believe certain reputations, such as a reputation for irresolute action, will make them and their states more vulnerable to international threats; but other reputations, such as a reputation for resolute action, will make them and their states more secure. While reputations are perceptions actors hold about each other, resolve is about an actor's determination, “firmness, or steadfastness of purpose.” Reputation for resolve, therefore, is the belief others hold about an actor's willingness to stand firm and face costs, based on that actor's past behavior. Reputations for resolve can help explain when international crises and disputes start, which actors are most likely to face international threats, and who will win international conflicts. The chapter then looks at the debate on how much reputations matter in international politics.

This concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the experiments and case studies in the previous chapters, discussing their implications for the study of reputation for resolve and the debate between reputation supporters and skeptics. The evidence from across the experiments and case studies shows that leaders can indeed acquire individual reputations for resolve. While these reputations are rooted in a leader's statements and behavior, they can be influenced by certain contextual factors—primarily a preexisting state reputation for resolve and the state's strategic interest in an issue under dispute. Yet, these two contextual factors influence leader reputations by interacting with a leader's own statements and behavior. Moreover, these leader-specific reputational assessments can affect the negotiating and crisis bargaining strategies individual leaders pursue. Leaders, therefore, are not wrong to care about their personal reputations for resolve or to believe that their reputations for resolve influence international politics. The chapter then explains how policymakers can best communicate their resolve to make themselves and their states less vulnerable to international threats.

This chapter studies how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President John F. Kennedy, looking at Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. According to evidence made available from declassified and translated Soviet archives, as well as information drawn from additional sources, Kennedy quickly formed a reputation for irresolute action largely because of his repeated failure to back up his strong rhetoric with firm action and his wavering support of the Bay of Pigs invasion early during his tenure. While Kennedy rather quickly established a poor reputation for resolve, it was difficult for him to alter this reputation. Throughout the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and during the early stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev continued to doubt Kennedy's firmness and determination, despite the president's repeated attempts to signal his resolve. Declassified Soviet documents further indicate that Kennedy was able to change this negative perception of his resolve during the Cuban Missile Crisis only by presenting a consistently resolute position and altering his signals of strategic interest. Thus, it was Kennedy's communication of high strategic interest in Cuba combined with his resolute behavior during the missile crisis that enabled him to alter his poor reputation.

This chapter explores how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, considering Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the 1958 Berlin Crisis. The historical record shows that Eisenhower's early statements were particularly influential to the formation of his reputation, as they created expectations of how he would behave in the future. However, Eisenhower was unable to solidify his reputation for resolve at the 1955 Geneva Summit, as Khrushchev perceived Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rather than President Eisenhower as being in direct control of negotiations at the summit. Yet, in the year leading up to the 1958 Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev's perception of who was in control of U.S. foreign policy shifted to emphasize the importance of Eisenhower to America's Berlin policy. And the president's statements leading up to the Berlin Crisis led Khrushchev to believe Eisenhower was unlikely to make major concessions on the issue. Eisenhower's subsequent firm response to the Berlin Crisis then confirmed Khrushchev's expectations of the president's resolve. Accordingly, Eisenhower established a reputation for resolute action that would last until the end of his presidency. Further evidence suggests that Eisenhower's actions as a general during World War II were influential to Khrushchev's early perceptions of the president.

This chapter focuses on Aaron Burr's political identity and the dismal turn of his career after 1800. Nicknamed the “little emperor,” Burr, the first presidential candidate tried for treason, was also known for his unquenchable ambition and sexual exploits. The chapter argues that his career reveals the role of gendered, sexualized discourses in creating public identities and destroying political reputations. Burr left a legacy that shows how gender insinuated itself into the vocabulary of treason and created a new definition of party loyalty.

This chapter evaluates Blair’s form of management in relation to the goals covered in Chapter 4 and a realist’s view of its controlling organisational successes. It is argued here that these successes, although considerable, obscure the problems of this form of management involving a variety of faulty judgments, a propensity to self-deceit, and a partial blindness to collateral and consequential damage. It shows this management to be a threat to party cohesion, a major generator of costly pervasive distrust and an encouragement to the very conservatism that ‘New Labour’ sought to overcome. In operation it undermined organisational vitality and grass roots electoral capacity. It was also very costly in terms of the party’s ethical renewal, its reputation and its contribution to confidence in politicians and British political life.