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Environmental political philosophy has generally been framed around the differing axiologies of ecocentrism (nature‐centred) and anthropocentric (human‐centred) forms of ethics. This book seeks to challenge the political relevance of this philosophical dispute with respect to the problem of nature preservation as public policy. A detailed analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of both ecocentric and ‘ecological humanist’ positions shows that the ‘embedded humanism’ within ecocentric arguments offers an opportunity to move beyond the ecocentric‐anthropocentric divide. Furthermore, a principle of ‘strong irreplaceability’ with regard to natural goods can provide the basis for a political argument for nature preservation that is compatible with both human‐centred and nature‐centred concerns.

This book is a collection of 11 essays written from a perspective that is at once sympathetic towards, and critical of, liberalism and liberal political philosophy. The essays explore the capacity of liberal thought, and of the moral traditions on which it draws, to accommodate a variety of challenges posed by the changing circumstances of the modern world. Scheffler considers how, in an era of rapid globalization, we can best conceive of the responsibilities of individual agents and the normative significance of people's diverse commitments and allegiances. Some of the essays are primarily concerned with the role of individual desert in liberal theory. Others focus on the nature of people's special responsibilities to their families, communities, and societies, and assess the compatibility of such responsibilities with liberal ideas of justice and equality. Still others deal with the possibility of developing a liberal conception of justice that acknowledges the normative significance of social and global interdependencies, while reaffirming the values of personal life and the continuing importance of ideas of individual responsibility.

When constructing environmental policies in democratic regimes, there is a need for a theory that can be used not only by academics but also by politicians and activists. So why has the major part of environmental ethics failed to penetrate environmental policy and serve as its rationale? Obviously, there is a gap between the questions that environmental philosophers discuss and the issues that motivate environmental activists. Avner de‐Shalit attempts to bridge this gap by combining tools of political philosophy with questions of environmental ethics and environmental politics. He defends a radical position in relation to both environmental protection and social policies, in order to put forward a political theory, which is not only philosophically sound, but also relevant to the practice of environmental activism. The author argues that several directions in environmental ethics can be at odds with the contemporary political debates surrounding environmental politics. He then goes on to examine the environmental scope of liberalism, communitarianism, participatory democracy, and socialism, and concludes that while elements of liberalism and communitarianism may support environmental protection, it is participatory democracy and a modified version of socialism that are crucial for protecting the environment.

The desirability, or lack thereof, of bills of rights has been the focus of some of the most enduring political debates over the last two centuries. Unlike civil and political rights, social rights to the meeting of needs, standard rights to adequate minimum income, education, housing, and health care are usually not given constitutional protection. The book argues that individuals have social rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education, and that those rights must be entrenched in the constitution of a democratic state. That is, the democratic majority should not be able to repeal them, and certain institutions (for instance, the judiciary) should be given the power to strike down laws passed by the legislature that are in breach of those rights. Thus, the book is located at the crossroads of two major issues of contemporary political philosophy, to wit, the issue of democracy and the issue of distributive justice. It stems from the perception that there may be conflicts between the demands of democracy and the demands of distributive justice, both of which are crucially important, and from the resulting recognition that the question of the relationship between these two values cannot be ignored.

Offers a detailed critical analysis of the ideal of ‘community’ in politics. Traces elements of the idea of community in a number of social, philosophical, and political contexts over the last century, exploring how these have been and continue to be articulated in recent political and public policy debates. ‘Community’ is invoked as a justification for reorganization of state institutions, as the source of care and support for individuals, and as an entity that is valuable in its own right and must therefore be sustained and defended. In community development, community action, community care and community politics, the tensions and contradictions within the concept are invariably felt. Community is both inclusive and exclusive, both organized and unstructured, both hierarchical and egalitarian. The book argues that analysis of the concept ‘community’ reveals the role of ideas and ideals in shaping political action, the barriers to the realization of community in practical contexts, and ultimately the untenability of the ideal itself.

This work argues for a liberal account of multiculturalism, which draws on a liberalism of fear, like that articulated by Judith Shklar and inspired by Montesquieu. Liberalism should not be centrally concerned either with preserving or with transcending cultural communities, practices, and identities. Rather, it should focus on mitigating evils such as interethnic civil wars, cruel practices internal to cultural communities, and state violence against ethnic minorities. This ‘multiculturalism of fear’ must be grounded in the realities of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict. It must therefore take seriously the importance, which persons feel their ethnic identities and cultural practices to have, without falling into a celebration of cultural belonging. Levy argues against nationalist and multicultural theories that accord significant moral weight to cultural communities as such. Yet he also insists that the challenges of life in a multicultural world cannot be met with appeals to cosmopolitanism, with attempts to deny the importance that particularist identities and practices have to individual persons and to social life. The book applies the multiculturalism of fear to a variety of policy problems confronting multi‐ethnic states. These include the regulation of sexist practices internal to cultural communities, secession and national self‐determination, land rights, customary law, and the symbols and words used by the state, including official apologies. It draws on cases from diverse states such as Australia, Canada, Israel, India, South Africa, and the US.

The book is a comprehensive study of early Stoic political philosophy. It considers the conceptions of the cosmic city and the common law as central to the Stoics' theory, and discusses how these conceptions are integral to Stoic thought on reason, wisdom, and life in agreement with nature. Accordingly, the book devotes detailed attention to central areas of Stoic philosophy, such as the theory of affiliation (oikeiôsis), appropriate and perfect action, epistemology, and theology. The book discusses competing interpretations of Stoic cosmopolitanism, arguing that the ideal city of the early Stoics is the cosmos and thus is already in existence. All human beings live in the cosmic city, but only the wise and the gods are its citizens. The book devotes equal attention to the interpretation of the Stoics' conception of law. To live by the law, it is argued, is to live by nature, in a way which relies on understanding what is of value to human beings, rather than on following a set of rules. Against the view that early Stoic thought about these issues is best described as exploring an ideal for individual agents, the book argues that the Stoics are offering a theory which, while deeply connected with the core concerns of Stoic ethics, can be considered a genuine contribution to political philosophy.

This is a controversial book that challenges established views of contemporary political theory. It offers a synoptic, critical, and comparative analysis of the widely different accounts of how the discipline developed during the twentieth century. Its ‘nature’ is seen as intrinsically pluralistic and internally divided. The discussion utilizes the idea of foundationalism to bring coherence to the complex practices associated with theory during the twentieth century. Overall, the book aims to dispute current monistic trends in the way the discipline is understood. It will be an immensely useful resource for students of politics, as well as in providing critical perspectives on the future of the subject.