George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.001.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on ...
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Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.Less
Provides a full defence of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness (or fair play). The book responds to the most important objections and extends a theory-based on fairness into a developed ‘multiple principle’ theory of obligation. The ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations is explored through examination of judicial decisions in three different democratic countries, while the book also breaks new ground by studying attitudes towards political obligations, through the use of small focus groups.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke ...
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The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke subjective identification and fair play. Some questions relating to political authority are also discussed, including the question of the standing to punish. Several objections that might or have been raised to plural subject theory, including some from A. John Simmons are noted, and responses are offered. The practical importance of political obligations according to the theory is discussed, and some substantive moral questions relating to them are noted.Less
The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke subjective identification and fair play. Some questions relating to political authority are also discussed, including the question of the standing to punish. Several objections that might or have been raised to plural subject theory, including some from A. John Simmons are noted, and responses are offered. The practical importance of political obligations according to the theory is discussed, and some substantive moral questions relating to them are noted.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an ...
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Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.Less
Does one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter argues that a fully satisfactory theory of political obligation will pass certain tests. It will offer an affirmative answer to the membership problem and, among other things, it will ...
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This chapter argues that a fully satisfactory theory of political obligation will pass certain tests. It will offer an affirmative answer to the membership problem and, among other things, it will show how membership in a political society gives one obligations to uphold that society’s political institutions. There are discussions of A. John Simmons’s ‘generality test’ and of some broad notions of membership: membership through residence and imputed membership.Less
This chapter argues that a fully satisfactory theory of political obligation will pass certain tests. It will offer an affirmative answer to the membership problem and, among other things, it will show how membership in a political society gives one obligations to uphold that society’s political institutions. There are discussions of A. John Simmons’s ‘generality test’ and of some broad notions of membership: membership through residence and imputed membership.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The best-known theory of political obligation is actual contract theory: a political society is founded on an agreement, and the parties to the agreement — now the members of the society — are ...
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The best-known theory of political obligation is actual contract theory: a political society is founded on an agreement, and the parties to the agreement — now the members of the society — are obligated accordingly. As is generally admitted, actual contract theory has significant attractions as a solution to the membership problem. For one, agreements are a canonical source of obligations. For another, an agreement may indeed suffice to found a social group in general. This chapter details eight analytic points that have been or might be judged to favour of the theory, and five ways in which it might appear to be morally attractive.Less
The best-known theory of political obligation is actual contract theory: a political society is founded on an agreement, and the parties to the agreement — now the members of the society — are obligated accordingly. As is generally admitted, actual contract theory has significant attractions as a solution to the membership problem. For one, agreements are a canonical source of obligations. For another, an agreement may indeed suffice to found a social group in general. This chapter details eight analytic points that have been or might be judged to favour of the theory, and five ways in which it might appear to be morally attractive.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the ...
More
Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the claim that most people believe that they have political obligations.Less
Reviews the basic features of a theory of political obligation on the basis of the principle of fairness, discusses the criteria a successful theory of obligation should satisfy, and explores the claim that most people believe that they have political obligations.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
In recent years, certain theorists, most notably John Rawls, have attempted to establish general political obligations based on so-called ‘natural duties of justice’. However, because natural duties ...
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In recent years, certain theorists, most notably John Rawls, have attempted to establish general political obligations based on so-called ‘natural duties of justice’. However, because natural duties are of limited force, they cannot ground political obligations, which may well require significant sacrifice. Natural duty theories confront a dilemma: either they will not be sufficiently strong to ground obligations, or if they are, they will not be ‘natural’ duties. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls's argument for a natural duty to support the state is flawed by running together arguments from behind and outside the veil of ignorance. Properly developed, behind the veil of ignorance, such a natural duty to support the state would be seen to be actually a variant of the principle of fairness. Because natural duties cannot establish adequate theories on their own, they can play a role in theories of political obligation only by working in conjunction with other principles.Less
In recent years, certain theorists, most notably John Rawls, have attempted to establish general political obligations based on so-called ‘natural duties of justice’. However, because natural duties are of limited force, they cannot ground political obligations, which may well require significant sacrifice. Natural duty theories confront a dilemma: either they will not be sufficiently strong to ground obligations, or if they are, they will not be ‘natural’ duties. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls's argument for a natural duty to support the state is flawed by running together arguments from behind and outside the veil of ignorance. Properly developed, behind the veil of ignorance, such a natural duty to support the state would be seen to be actually a variant of the principle of fairness. Because natural duties cannot establish adequate theories on their own, they can play a role in theories of political obligation only by working in conjunction with other principles.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide ...
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This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide to justify political obligations provides an empirical test of normative theories. Although judicial decisions have no claim to moral truth, the fact that justices regularly argue from certain principles rather than others adds to the plausibility of a theory based on the former and increases the burden of justification for proponents of other principles. Supreme Court justices usually defend their opinions on the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation and seldom appeal directly to moral principles. However, on occasion they do invoke moral principles to support their opinions, especially in difficult cases. Justices of the US Supreme Court consistently ground obligations on protection that individuals receive from society. The most likely basis of these ‘reciprocal obligations’ is a principle of fairness, as expressed most notably in Arver v. U.S., the most important of the 'Selective Draft Law Cases'.Less
This and the following chapters explore the ‘self-image of the state’ in regard to political obligations through analysis of judicial decisions. Examining the reasons that states themselves provide to justify political obligations provides an empirical test of normative theories. Although judicial decisions have no claim to moral truth, the fact that justices regularly argue from certain principles rather than others adds to the plausibility of a theory based on the former and increases the burden of justification for proponents of other principles. Supreme Court justices usually defend their opinions on the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation and seldom appeal directly to moral principles. However, on occasion they do invoke moral principles to support their opinions, especially in difficult cases. Justices of the US Supreme Court consistently ground obligations on protection that individuals receive from society. The most likely basis of these ‘reciprocal obligations’ is a principle of fairness, as expressed most notably in Arver v. U.S., the most important of the 'Selective Draft Law Cases'.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements ...
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The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements are possible and obligate the parties. The obligation in question is not a moral requirement deriving from a general moral principle, it is an obligation of joint commitment as discussed in Chapter 7. Actual contract theory can thus be defended against the no-obligation objection construed in terms of obligation simply; the no-agreement objection remains. Plural subject theory avoids both objections and is therefore to be preferred.Less
The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements are possible and obligate the parties. The obligation in question is not a moral requirement deriving from a general moral principle, it is an obligation of joint commitment as discussed in Chapter 7. Actual contract theory can thus be defended against the no-obligation objection construed in terms of obligation simply; the no-agreement objection remains. Plural subject theory avoids both objections and is therefore to be preferred.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or ...
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Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. A stronger position can result from combining different principles in a single theory. This chapter develops a multi-principle theory of political obligation, on the basis of the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the ‘common good’ principle. The three principles interact in three main ways: ‘cumulation’, combining the separate state services that different principles cover; ‘mutual support’, combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The result is a theory that can satisfy the main criteria of a theory of political obligation.Less
Scholars who doubt the existence of general political obligations typically criticize and reject theories of obligation on the basis of individual moral principles, for example, consent, fairness, or a natural duty of justice. A stronger position can result from combining different principles in a single theory. This chapter develops a multi-principle theory of political obligation, on the basis of the principle of fairness, a natural duty of justice, and what I call the ‘common good’ principle. The three principles interact in three main ways: ‘cumulation’, combining the separate state services that different principles cover; ‘mutual support’, combining the force of different principles in regard to the same state services; and simple overlap. The result is a theory that can satisfy the main criteria of a theory of political obligation.
Andrew Dobson
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- April 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199258444
- eISBN:
- 9780191601002
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199258449.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Environmental Politics
Post‐cosmopolitan citizenship is offered as an alternative to liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship. It is contrasted with cosmopolitan citizenship, in the belief that it offers a more ...
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Post‐cosmopolitan citizenship is offered as an alternative to liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship. It is contrasted with cosmopolitan citizenship, in the belief that it offers a more compelling practical account of transnational political obligations.Less
Post‐cosmopolitan citizenship is offered as an alternative to liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship. It is contrasted with cosmopolitan citizenship, in the belief that it offers a more compelling practical account of transnational political obligations.
Peter Liddel
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199226580
- eISBN:
- 9780191710186
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226580.003.0005
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, European History: BCE to 500CE
This chapter surveys the obligations of the citizen and the ways in which their performance was presented. The chapter opens with those domestic obligations of male and female Athenian citizens which ...
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This chapter surveys the obligations of the citizen and the ways in which their performance was presented. The chapter opens with those domestic obligations of male and female Athenian citizens which were couched in a public context (5.1), and investigates political and litigious obligations in Athens as they were performed by both professional politicians and the mass of citizens (5.2‐3). Financial obligations (trierarchy, epidosis, choregia) and military obligations are analysed alongside the opportunity that they offered for ostentatious expenditure and supererogation (5.4‐5). Finally, it will analyse those obligations unfamiliar to a Rawlsian universe: providing grain for the city (5.6), not leaving the city in a time of crisis (5.7) and religious obligations (5.8). This chapter illustrates how the compatibility of these considerable obligations with a notion of citizenship as liberty was worked out in the oratorical and epigraphical discussion of obligations: obligations were presented even as upholding Athenian liberty.Less
This chapter surveys the obligations of the citizen and the ways in which their performance was presented. The chapter opens with those domestic obligations of male and female Athenian citizens which were couched in a public context (5.1), and investigates political and litigious obligations in Athens as they were performed by both professional politicians and the mass of citizens (5.2‐3). Financial obligations (trierarchy, epidosis, choregia) and military obligations are analysed alongside the opportunity that they offered for ostentatious expenditure and supererogation (5.4‐5). Finally, it will analyse those obligations unfamiliar to a Rawlsian universe: providing grain for the city (5.6), not leaving the city in a time of crisis (5.7) and religious obligations (5.8). This chapter illustrates how the compatibility of these considerable obligations with a notion of citizenship as liberty was worked out in the oratorical and epigraphical discussion of obligations: obligations were presented even as upholding Athenian liberty.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
With theories of political obligation based on consent now generally discredited because most people have not actually consented, certain theorists attempt to rescue consent by proposing mechanisms ...
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With theories of political obligation based on consent now generally discredited because most people have not actually consented, certain theorists attempt to rescue consent by proposing mechanisms through which individuals could consent to government. Various mechanisms are examined, including ‘consent-or-leave’ and Michael Walzer's proposal that citizens who refuse to consent be allowed a lesser status, analogous to that of ‘resident aliens at home’. All these mechanisms confront insuperable difficulties concerning essential public goods. Because resident aliens at home will continue to receive public goods, the alternatives are that they be allowed to receive them cost-free or that they incur obligations, even though they explicitly refused to consent.Less
With theories of political obligation based on consent now generally discredited because most people have not actually consented, certain theorists attempt to rescue consent by proposing mechanisms through which individuals could consent to government. Various mechanisms are examined, including ‘consent-or-leave’ and Michael Walzer's proposal that citizens who refuse to consent be allowed a lesser status, analogous to that of ‘resident aliens at home’. All these mechanisms confront insuperable difficulties concerning essential public goods. Because resident aliens at home will continue to receive public goods, the alternatives are that they be allowed to receive them cost-free or that they incur obligations, even though they explicitly refused to consent.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular ...
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Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular theories to which they subscribe and increase burdens of justification for proponents of alternative theories. Responses of participants in ten focus groups indicate strong consensus on basic points. Participants strongly believe they have political obligations, although they make exceptions for particular laws, which seem to them to serve no real social purpose. They ground their obligations on benefits provided by the state, and strongly connect up their own requirements to obey the law with requirements that all other people behave similarly. The moral principle that appears to coincide most closely with their views is a variant of the principle of fairness.Less
Examines opinions of ordinary people in regard to political obligations through small focus groups. Under certain circumstances, the views of ordinary people can lend support to the particular theories to which they subscribe and increase burdens of justification for proponents of alternative theories. Responses of participants in ten focus groups indicate strong consensus on basic points. Participants strongly believe they have political obligations, although they make exceptions for particular laws, which seem to them to serve no real social purpose. They ground their obligations on benefits provided by the state, and strongly connect up their own requirements to obey the law with requirements that all other people behave similarly. The moral principle that appears to coincide most closely with their views is a variant of the principle of fairness.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ...
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The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.Less
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject ...
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The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject prefers not to receive particular benefits from the state, then he need not incur obligations through their provision. However, as the discussion in Ch. 2 shows, for certain essential public goods, there is no alternative to state provision. Moreover, the fact that a subject prefers that goods be provided in a different form or by a mechanism other than the state is not ordinarily sufficient to dissolve obligations that they would otherwise incur.Less
The most powerful objection to political obligations based on the principle of fairness concerns alternative supply of necessary public goods. According to this line of argument, if the subject prefers not to receive particular benefits from the state, then he need not incur obligations through their provision. However, as the discussion in Ch. 2 shows, for certain essential public goods, there is no alternative to state provision. Moreover, the fact that a subject prefers that goods be provided in a different form or by a mechanism other than the state is not ordinarily sufficient to dissolve obligations that they would otherwise incur.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all ...
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A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.Less
A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.
Rex Martin
- Published in print:
- 1997
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198292937
- eISBN:
- 9780191599811
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198292937.003.0009
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This chapter is concerned with political obligation, i.e. with one's obligation to obey the laws of one's own country. Here, it is suggested that such an obligation (or one's ‘allegiance,’ as I ...
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This chapter is concerned with political obligation, i.e. with one's obligation to obey the laws of one's own country. Here, it is suggested that such an obligation (or one's ‘allegiance,’ as I prefer to call it) varies from system to system; it is one thing in Plato's republic but something quite different in a democratic system of rights. We are concerned, then, with the allegiance of a typical citizen, when acting in character, within a given system of political principles and institutions.It is argued that citizens have an obligation, a system‐specific duty, in a democratic system of rights to conform to the civil rights laws there. This institutional duty is then extended to take in one's duties towards some non‐rights laws (e.g. tax laws), but it never embraces literally all laws in that society. In the course of the analysis, the views of both John Simmons and John Rawls are criticized.Democratic institutions provide an example of an inherently imperfect procedure for making civil rights laws; the connection between such institutions and such laws represents at best only a probabilistic tendency. In the end, then, we find that citizens have no duty to conform to all non‐defective rights laws simply in so far as they are enacted laws; The typical citizen can be civilly disobedient with respect to some civil rights laws (subject to certain constraints, e.g. nonviolence) while still satisfying fully the conditions of allegiance in a democratic system of rights.Less
This chapter is concerned with political obligation, i.e. with one's obligation to obey the laws of one's own country. Here, it is suggested that such an obligation (or one's ‘allegiance,’ as I prefer to call it) varies from system to system; it is one thing in Plato's republic but something quite different in a democratic system of rights. We are concerned, then, with the allegiance of a typical citizen, when acting in character, within a given system of political principles and institutions.
It is argued that citizens have an obligation, a system‐specific duty, in a democratic system of rights to conform to the civil rights laws there. This institutional duty is then extended to take in one's duties towards some non‐rights laws (e.g. tax laws), but it never embraces literally all laws in that society. In the course of the analysis, the views of both John Simmons and John Rawls are criticized.
Democratic institutions provide an example of an inherently imperfect procedure for making civil rights laws; the connection between such institutions and such laws represents at best only a probabilistic tendency. In the end, then, we find that citizens have no duty to conform to all non‐defective rights laws simply in so far as they are enacted laws; The typical citizen can be civilly disobedient with respect to some civil rights laws (subject to certain constraints, e.g. nonviolence) while still satisfying fully the conditions of allegiance in a democratic system of rights.
George Klosko
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- April 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199256204
- eISBN:
- 9780191602351
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256209.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been ...
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Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been much discussed by scholars, little attention has been paid to moral reasons advanced by actual states to justify the compliance of their subjects. Because in US cases, justices appeal to moral reasons most explicitly in difficult cases that concern imposing military service on conscientious objectors, the analysis focuses on this area. In spite of their important constitutional and judicial differences, Germany and Israel support military obligations along similar lines. German decisions emphasize norms of equality or fairness. Israeli Justices have generally appealed to the importance of each individual's contribution to national defence. However, in a recent decision, norms of fairness are invoked.Less
Examines judicial decisions in Germany and Israel in order to provide a comparative test of the analysis of US Supreme Court decisions in Ch. 7. Although questions of political obligation have been much discussed by scholars, little attention has been paid to moral reasons advanced by actual states to justify the compliance of their subjects. Because in US cases, justices appeal to moral reasons most explicitly in difficult cases that concern imposing military service on conscientious objectors, the analysis focuses on this area. In spite of their important constitutional and judicial differences, Germany and Israel support military obligations along similar lines. German decisions emphasize norms of equality or fairness. Israeli Justices have generally appealed to the importance of each individual's contribution to national defence. However, in a recent decision, norms of fairness are invoked.
Stephen Perry
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199546145
- eISBN:
- 9780191706462
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546145.003.0009
- Subject:
- Law, Philosophy of Law
Part of the complex fabric of Dworkin's Law's Empire is an argument that, under certain conditions, there is a general moral obligation to obey the law. This chapter fleshes out Dworkin's argument ...
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Part of the complex fabric of Dworkin's Law's Empire is an argument that, under certain conditions, there is a general moral obligation to obey the law. This chapter fleshes out Dworkin's argument for a general obligation to obey the law. The argument turns on the premise that the general obligation to obey the law is an associative obligation — an obligation that arises within certain kinds of limited human associations. The chapter makes a novel suggestion regarding the proper way of understanding Dworkin's key premise: that certain human associations give rise to political obligation in virtue of their being relationships of intrinsic value.Less
Part of the complex fabric of Dworkin's Law's Empire is an argument that, under certain conditions, there is a general moral obligation to obey the law. This chapter fleshes out Dworkin's argument for a general obligation to obey the law. The argument turns on the premise that the general obligation to obey the law is an associative obligation — an obligation that arises within certain kinds of limited human associations. The chapter makes a novel suggestion regarding the proper way of understanding Dworkin's key premise: that certain human associations give rise to political obligation in virtue of their being relationships of intrinsic value.
