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This chapter turns to just hierarchies between citizens—mainly strangers to one another—in modern large-scale political communities. It argues that hierarchies between rulers and ruled in such communities are justified if the political system selects and promotes public officials with above-average ability and a willingness to serve the political community over and above their own private and family interests. The chapter demonstrates that this kind of ideal—the “political meritocracy”—helped to inspire the imperial political system in China's past and Chinese political reformers in the early twentieth century, and may help to justify the political system in China today. However, the meritocratic system needs to be accompanied by democratic mechanisms short of competitive elections at the top that allow citizens to show that they trust their rulers and provide a measure of accountability at different levels of government. In the Chinese context, however, there is a large gap between the ideal and the reality. Thus, this chapter recommends that a judicious mixture of Confucian-style “soft power” combined with democratic openness, Maoist-style mass line, and Daoist-style skepticism about the whole political system can help to reinvigorate political meritocracy in China.

This chapter examines three key problems associated with any attempt to implement political meritocracy: the problem of corruption, the problem of ossification, and the problem of legitimacy. Given that electoral democracy at the top is not politically realistic in China, the chapter asks whether it is possible to address these problems without democratic elections. The problem of corruption can be addressed by mechanisms such as independent supervisory institutions and improved moral education, whereas the problem of ossification of hierarchies can be addressed by means of a humble political discourse, or opening the ruling party to diverse social groups. On the other hand, the problem of legitimacy can be addressed only by providing more opportunities for political participation. The chapter considers whether political meritocracy can be reconciled with democracy in morally desirable ways without multiparty competition and free and fair elections for top leaders.

This chapter discusses three models of “democratic meritocracy,” along with their pros and cons: a model that combines democracy and meritocracy at the level of the voter; a horizontal model that combines democracy and meritocracy at the level of central political institutions; and a vertical model with political meritocracy at the level of the central government and democracy at the local level. It argues that the third model is the best of the three and goes on to consider John Stuart Mill's proposal for a plural voting scheme, Jiang Qing's proposal for a tricameral legislature, and Chinese Minister Li Yuanchao's views on the meritocratic nature of selection at higher levels of government in China. Finally, it examines the implications of referendum for electoral democracy by citing the case of Chile in the second half of the twentieth century.

This book argues in favor of political meritocracy using China's one-party political system as example. It considers four key flaws of democracy, along with theoretical and real meritocratic alternatives for each: “the tyranny of the majority,” “the tyranny of the minority,” “the tyranny of the voting community,” and “the tyranny of competitive individualists.” The book also discusses three key problems associated with any attempt to implement political meritocracy and asks whether it is possible to address these problems without democratic elections: the problem of corruption, the problem of ossification, and the problem of legitimacy. Finally, it explores the pros and cons of different models of “democratic meritocracy” as well as three basic planks of the China model and how political reform in the post-Mao era has been guided by the principles of “democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top”.

This chapter examines which abilities and virtues should set the standard for the selection and promotion of public officials/servants so that China's political system can be improved. The discussion draws on the following assumptions: it is good for a political community to be governed by high-quality rulers; China's one (ruling) party political system is not about to collapse; the meritocratic aspect of the system is partly good; and it can be improved. The chapter then offers suggestions about which qualities matter most for political leaders in the context of large, peaceful, and modernizing (nondemocratic) meritocratic states, followed by suggestions about mechanisms that increase the likelihood of selecting leaders with such qualities. The findings reveal which abilities, social skills, and virtues matter most for political leaders in the context of a large, peaceful, and modernizing political meritocracy. These findings are used as a standard for evaluating the Chinese meritocratic system.

This chapter considers three basic principles of the China model and how they have guided political reform in the post-Mao era: democracy at the bottom, experimentation in the middle, and political meritocracy at the top. There remains a large gap between the ideal and the reality, however, and the chapter suggests ways of closing that gap, noting that the legitimacy problem is perhaps the most serious threat to the meritocratic system. It argues that the Chinese government may need to secure the people's consent to the Chinese adaptation of vertical democratic meritocracy by means such as a referendum. It concludes by discussing the exportability of the China model: while the model as a whole cannot readily be adopted by countries with a different history and culture, its different planks can be selectively adopted and the Chinese government can play a more active role in promoting its model abroad.

This chapter examines whether democratic elections lead to good consequences, and more specifically whether democracy is the least bad political system. It considers four key flaws of electoral democracy: the tyranny of the majority, the tyranny of the minority, the tyranny of the voting community, and the tyranny of competitive individualists. Using examples primarily from the United States, the chapter challenges the idea that one person, one vote is the least bad way of choosing leaders to enact good policies, rather than provide a comprehensive defense of political meritocracy as an alternative to electoral democracy. It suggests that there may be morally desirable and political feasible alternatives to electoral democracy that help to remedy its major disadvantages. It also discusses examples of actually existing political meritocratic arrangements in China and/or Singapore that may minimize the flaws of electoral democracies.

Lay politics lies at the heart of democracy. Every adult citizen has the constitutional right to run for office. Contemporary political practices are diametrically opposed to this constitutional ideal. University graduates have come to dominate all relevant political institutions. This rise of a political meritocracy is part of larger trend. In the information society, educational background is a very significant social marker. Like class, or religion, educational background is an important source of social and political divides. This chapter introduces the central argument and what we mean by diploma democracy and the rise of political meritocracy. A diploma democracy is a democracy which is dominated by the citizens with the highest formal educational qualifications. In less academic terms: a diploma democracy is ruled by the citizens with the highest degrees.