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This chapter discusses how the ideal of equal status connects to democratic aspirations, and why people should take that ideal seriously. Equality of status constitutes, and is constituted by, relations of an egalitarian kind. When people mutually recognize one another's equal status, they put themselves in an egalitarian relation. However, there are further connections between status equality and egalitarian relations, in that the recognition of equal status in various respects helps promote relationships among citizens free of hierarchy, domination, servility, and the like. These further connections are contingent, depending upon truths of empirical sociology and psychology—about how, in fact, humans tend to respond to certain social conditions, like material or political inequality. A similar structure holds for the ideal of political equality. The shared status of “democratic citizen” is constituted by a range of expectations that regulate institutions and individual practices. That status is properly recognized when institutions and practices meet those expectations. When citizens mutually recognize one another's status, they thereby engage in, and promote, valuable egalitarian political relations.

This chapter examines the obstacles to egalitarian policies for health care. One is the decentralized nature of American politics, characterized by separation of powers and federalism, which provides multiple veto points for stopping new programs. The second factor is a high degree of political inequality that enables small but active and affluent groups of individuals and corporations to prevent major egalitarian policy changes. The chapter also suggests that removing the obstacles to egalitarian programs is possible through four political strategies: (1) organize, particularly at the grass roots; (2) build incrementally toward long-term goals; (3) think big and seize opportunities when they arise; and (4) reform the political process itself.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of democracy. Democracy draws much of its political and philosophical support from its claim to be the form of government in which citizens rule equally. It has long been associated, however imperfectly and incompletely, with political equality of citizens. Indeed, the greatest and most profound advances of democracy have been rejections of political inequalities: the demand that the “common born,” the propertyless, and the poor; racial minorities; and women were among those with whom citizens were obliged to share in rule equally. Democracy's claim to moral superiority as a regime draws from its claim to be the political reflection and expression of this equality among citizens. This book then offers a full account of political equality: an account that can help guide people's choices between electoral and law-making institutions and practices.

This chapter assesses how the inequalities in voting power involved in the US Senate and in the Electoral College used to elect the president violate the requirements of political equality. The Senate comprises two senators from each state. States with large populations get the same number of votes in the Senate as do states with small populations. Because the states vary considerably in population, there are large inequalities in how many citizens are represented by a senate delegation. This unequal representation of individuals in the Senate constitutes objectionable political inequality. The Senate is thus unjustifiably undemocratic. This conclusion has implications for the election of the US president, as the Electoral College process for such election tracks what the chapter argues is the malapportionment of the Senate. This inequality, too, is objectionable, and it should be eliminated. The reasons for a more egalitarian election of the president are all the more urgent given that the inequalities in the Senate are much more constitutionally entrenched, and thus likely to remain. The election of the president should mitigate that inequality rather than exaggerate it.

This chapter describes how the resources generated by the integrated European economy have been distributed as social rights of citizenship. As the European economy has developed, have European welfare states expanded, stabilized, or retrenched? These trends and effects matter because they reveal the changing structure of political inequality in Europe, and because the European welfare state has a strong effect on the distribution of income across European households. The first part of the chapter addresses the question of whether the development of the integrated European economy contributed to expansion of the social rights of citizenship, which would be a sign of reduced political inequality within European nations. The second part addresses the subject of political inequality in Europe as an integrating whole more directly by engaging with the convergence debate: with respect to citizenship rights, does it now matter more or less which national political economy one inhabits?

This chapter returns to the research question of this study and briefly restates its argument and main findings. It discusses the role of explanatory factors of this study, namely party system institutionalization, turnout, social policy legacy in shaping welfare policies, and inequality in new democracies. Then it asks to what extent income inequality and political inequality foster one another, and argues for the importance of economic resources in creating political equality among citizens. The chapter ends with a discussion of the major debate on populism and democratic backsliding in new democracies, with a focus on Turkey and Poland. It emphasizes the conducive political and economic context that encouraged the rise of (populist) parties with nationalist/illiberal discourse and policies in these countries.

This chapter summarizes the results of this study: changes in social structure and participation patterns are increasing social-status-based inequality in political participation. Those with higher educational levels, incomes, or occupation have greater political voice, while lower-status individuals are less politically involved. Moreover, the politically rich are getting richer, and the politically poor are getting poorer. The chapter then discusses the implications of these results. The chapter considers claims that participation erodes governance and some form of epistocracy (rule by the knowledgeable) is preferable. Cross-national analysis shows that well-governed democracies have high levels of citizen participation, including both conventional and contentious forms of action. In addition, the size of the SES participation gap is negatively related to good governance. The conclusion discusses ways that democracies might narrow the participation gap and give voice to those citizens who need government support.

Highly redistributive taxation and left-wing regimes like property-owning democracy and liberal socialism cannot create trust for the right reasons. They are either likely to reduce social and political trust or cannot be publicly justified, or both. For example, property-owning democracy and liberal socialism are likely to sacrifice economic growth, violating the principle of sustainable improvements, and undermining the economic bases for political trust in particular. However, liberal societies can probably increase trust for the right reasons by adopting coercion-reducing policies aimed at compressing economic inequalities, such as reducing local control over residential zoning. The market may also be restricted to protect workers from workplace coercion. This chapter addresses important work on the matter from John Rawls, Thomas Piketty, and Martin Gilens.

This chapter proposes an international regulating body for the purposes of eliminating the problem of diffusion of innovation. Patent laws, intellectual property rights, monopolies, among other things, exacerbate political and economic inequalities by withholding access of innovations to those who need it. A major branch of concern is the distribution of pharmaceuticals. In order to maintain distributive justice and reduce the global burden of disease, a Global Institute for Justice in Innovation can be established to encourage rapid diffusion of innovations and discourage firms that restrict access to them.

This chapter develops a political economy of institutions framework, which facilitates a cross-national, inter-temporal, and cross-scale analysis of the processes and outcomes of institutional change related to the recognition of forest and land rights in the forested regions of India, Mexico, and Tanzania. It also introduces the unique features of the problem of forestland conflicts around the world, which makes it a suitable topic for a political analysis of the different ways that societies seek to resolve the apparent tensions between the goals of social justice and environmental conservation in the hinterlands. This analysis fuses together theoretical insights from the fields of comparative politics, institutional analysis, development studies, and policy studies to identify gaps that are relevant to contemporary debates about the politics and policies at the intersection of environment, economic development, and inequality—especially in the context of emerging climate change mitigation and adaptation programs.