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In practice, the relational approach of this book turns out to have much in common with the perspectives of impartial concern, global egalitarianism, or demanding global beneficence whose foundations it undermines. Combined with the real if limited transnational demands of beneficence, the transnational interactions whose moral impact has been traced generate a vast sum of unmet responsibilities of people in developed countries to help needy people in all developing countries. Despite the limited efficacy of foreign aid, fulfillment of these responsibilities would provide great benefits to these people, at significant cost to some disadvantaged people in developed countries. Within stringent limits of political feasibility, efforts to reduce irresponsibility should give priority to the neediest, the same priorities as follow from impartial concern. The positive long‐term goal unifying these efforts is an aspiration to replace subordination and deprivation with global civic friendship, paralleling the aspiration to civic friendship among compatriots while taking very different forms.

This chapter examines whether a Citizen's Basic Income is feasible — that is, capable of being legislated and implemented. To answer this question, the chapter considers multiple feasibilities: financial feasibility (whether it would be possible to finance a Citizen's Basic Income, and whether implementation would impose substantial financial losses on any households or individuals); psychological feasibility (whether the idea is readily understood, and understood to be beneficial); administrative feasibility (whether it would be possible to administer a Citizen's Basic Income and to manage the transition); behavioural feasibility (whether a Citizen's Basic Income would work for households and individuals once it was implemented); political feasibility (whether the idea would cohere with existing political ideologies); and policy process feasibility (whether the political process would be able to process the idea through to implementation). After explaining each of these feasibilities in detail, the chapter asks whether they are additive, conjunctive, or disjunctive.

This chapter discusses issues concerning the awarding of new legal rights to nonhuman animals. It argues that animals should, in an important sense, be allowed to own themselves, and explains what this would mean in practice. The chapter suggests that one of the main problem of the animal rights movement is the tendency of their leaders to support only the purest philosophical position, regardless of political feasibility. It also considers the present possibility of moving towards the recognition of new rights for animals by awarding them the status of equitable self-ownership.

Global egalitarian principles call for a political distribution of responsibilities which are in turn dependent on relevant political and institutional reforms. For this kind of reform to be both politically feasible and motivationally sustainable, the chapter argues, existing associative relations are crucial. Cosmopolitanism becomes politically effective by taking advantage of political mechanisms that allow citizens to transform collective institutions by putting constraints on each other’s action. It may hope to be stably maintained by appealing to familiar learning processes, a particular sense of justice, and cultural resources that motivate existing moral agents. To clarify both points, the chapter invokes the concepts of popular sovereignty and civic education mentioned when exploring the tensions between cosmopolitanism and patriotism during the Enlightenment, and examines their application to the global justice debate.

Proponents of International Paretianism (IP)—the principle that international agreements should not make any state worse off and should make some at least better off—argue that it is the only feasible approach to reducing the harms of climate change. They draw on some key assumptions regarding the meaning of ‘feasibility’ and the nature of the Pareto improvements associated with coordinated action on climate change. This chapter challenges these assumptions, in effect weakening the case for IP and allowing for broader thinking about what counts as a ‘feasible’ climate solution.

This chapter studies a variety of political ideologies: the New Right, Socialism, One Nation Conservatism, Liberalism, Social Democracy, and the Third Way. For each ideology it asks what arguments can be made for a Citizen's Income on the basis of the ideology, what arguments have in fact been made, what arguments might be made against a Citizen's Income on the basis of the ideology, and what arguments against a Citizen's Income have in fact been made. Green perspectives are also discussed in terms of a Citizen's Income's possible impacts on consumption of natural resources and on care for the planet. All of the ideologies studied are found to generate arguments for a Citizen's Income, and arguments against are found to be more generic, to be answerable, and to have little to do with any of the ideologies. The chapter then studies today's shorter term policy directions: the encouragement of enterprise in a free market context, the extension of choice, equality between women and men, active and equal citizenship, and ‘we’re in it together’. A Citizen's Income coheres with all of them. The chapter concludes that a Citizen's Income is politically feasible, particularly if implemented one demographic group at a time.

This chapter defends the idea that ethical norms, and especially those of justice, are relevant to the assessment of global climate policy even given the theoretical storm. It begins by describing how approaches that aim to avoid climate justice, and especially those focusing on narrow economic self-interest, are at risk of endorsing climate extortion, a clear violation of ethical norms. The chapter goes on to argue that norms of global, corrective and intergenerational justice are not rendered irrelevant by the objections of economic realists. Instead, they would need to be incorporated in any reasonable and feasible climate policy that does not suffer from intelligibility blinders.

Why would any president, having spent a career achieving the pinnacle of power, willingly hand it over to others he cannot control? This is the black hole at the heart of the decentralization debate that has never been satisfyingly answered. This chapter provides a response to this questionby considering the radical case of Bolivia, through an extended interview with the man who decentralized it. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was a principal actor in some of the most important events in Bolivia’s—and indeed Latin America’s—modern history. A highly improbable politician and statesman, he rose to prominence as the minister who designed the stabilization plan that defeated hyperinflation in a period of near-national collapse. He was elected president in 1993 and again in 2002. His first term saw a burst of reforms that decentralized political power and resources to municipalities, capitalized the largest state enterprises, reformed education, created a new public pension system, reformed the executive branch of government, and reformed the constitution. His second term saw rising unrest that culminated in huge demonstrations, shocking violence, and Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation and exile to the USA, where he lives today. This chapter focuses on his formative experiences in government, how he came to believe in the necessity of reform, and how he carried his party and government in a startling push that decentralized Bolivia.