Bruno Amable
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- July 2005
- ISBN:
- 9780199261130
- eISBN:
- 9780191602474
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926113X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, Economic Systems
This chapter provides the theoretical background for the book. It proposes a theory of institutions as political equilibriums, and presents the concepts of institutional complementarity and ...
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This chapter provides the theoretical background for the book. It proposes a theory of institutions as political equilibriums, and presents the concepts of institutional complementarity and hierarchy. It shows how institutions influence the economic equilibrium, and that these are political-economy choices. An economy is characterized by a set of complementary institutional forms resting on specific political equilibria defining the hierarchy among institutions.Less
This chapter provides the theoretical background for the book. It proposes a theory of institutions as political equilibriums, and presents the concepts of institutional complementarity and hierarchy. It shows how institutions influence the economic equilibrium, and that these are political-economy choices. An economy is characterized by a set of complementary institutional forms resting on specific political equilibria defining the hierarchy among institutions.
Michael D. McDonald and Ian Budge
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199286720
- eISBN:
- 9780191603327
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199286728.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter clinches the previous analysis by linking equilibria on both sides, (politics and policy) showing that they correspond closely. Broadly speaking, political preferences are transmitted ...
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This chapter clinches the previous analysis by linking equilibria on both sides, (politics and policy) showing that they correspond closely. Broadly speaking, political preferences are transmitted from median voter to median parliamentary party, from that to government, and then to ministries in the sequence postulated by the median mandate. This implies that under the froth and change of politics, certain stable processes continue, and these are in conformity with a median mandate interpretation of democratic processes.Less
This chapter clinches the previous analysis by linking equilibria on both sides, (politics and policy) showing that they correspond closely. Broadly speaking, political preferences are transmitted from median voter to median parliamentary party, from that to government, and then to ministries in the sequence postulated by the median mandate. This implies that under the froth and change of politics, certain stable processes continue, and these are in conformity with a median mandate interpretation of democratic processes.
Josep M. Colomer
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241835
- eISBN:
- 9780191598975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924183X.003.0001
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Social choice theory helps to design a research strategy. Three institutional variables producing different degrees of stability and different amounts of social utility are: (1) the dispersion of ...
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Social choice theory helps to design a research strategy. Three institutional variables producing different degrees of stability and different amounts of social utility are: (1) the dispersion of voters’ preferences, corresponding to simple and complex electorates; (2) the inclusiveness of different voting and electoral rules; and (3) the number of issue dimensions in single and separate elections, corresponding to schemes of unity and division of powers.Less
Social choice theory helps to design a research strategy. Three institutional variables producing different degrees of stability and different amounts of social utility are: (1) the dispersion of voters’ preferences, corresponding to simple and complex electorates; (2) the inclusiveness of different voting and electoral rules; and (3) the number of issue dimensions in single and separate elections, corresponding to schemes of unity and division of powers.
