Colin S. Gray
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199579662
- eISBN:
- 9780191594458
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579662.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, International Relations and Politics
Strategy is the art of the possible, as Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) insisted, and what is possible is revealed by net tactical performance. And the whole military (and other) endeavour must serve ...
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Strategy is the art of the possible, as Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) insisted, and what is possible is revealed by net tactical performance. And the whole military (and other) endeavour must serve not itself, but political purposes which typically will evolve under the pressure of events. Although strategy is possible, it is always difficult. Among the major sources of difficulty, which tend to manifest themselves synergistically, one must recognize the challenge that is strategy itself, the problem many people have understanding its nature and demands; that lies in the inconvenient, but for strategy essential, fact of an enemy with an independent will; of converting military effect into strategic effect, and then into political effect—which is the whole point of the project; of devising and running a strategy‐making process that is fit for purpose; of peopling the process with competent players; of sheer complexity; of friction, of the things, typically unforeseeable in detail, that go wrong; of productive civil–military relations. Remarkably, strategy is feasible, despite its myriad difficulties. Complexity of subject can translate as alternative options, while the self‐willed enemy must face a generically like large basket of challenges to his strategic effectiveness.Less
Strategy is the art of the possible, as Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) insisted, and what is possible is revealed by net tactical performance. And the whole military (and other) endeavour must serve not itself, but political purposes which typically will evolve under the pressure of events. Although strategy is possible, it is always difficult. Among the major sources of difficulty, which tend to manifest themselves synergistically, one must recognize the challenge that is strategy itself, the problem many people have understanding its nature and demands; that lies in the inconvenient, but for strategy essential, fact of an enemy with an independent will; of converting military effect into strategic effect, and then into political effect—which is the whole point of the project; of devising and running a strategy‐making process that is fit for purpose; of peopling the process with competent players; of sheer complexity; of friction, of the things, typically unforeseeable in detail, that go wrong; of productive civil–military relations. Remarkably, strategy is feasible, despite its myriad difficulties. Complexity of subject can translate as alternative options, while the self‐willed enemy must face a generically like large basket of challenges to his strategic effectiveness.
Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780520220096
- eISBN:
- 9780520924499
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of California Press
- DOI:
- 10.1525/california/9780520220096.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Asian History
This chapter discusses the opium trade's political and economic effects. It employs the term regime to signify a system in which an authority declares its right to control certain practices and ...
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This chapter discusses the opium trade's political and economic effects. It employs the term regime to signify a system in which an authority declares its right to control certain practices and develops policies and mechanisms to exercise that right within its presumed domain. The chapter notes that such a regime has the ability to impose conformity to policies which are profitable to it in the public realm. It explains that the opium regimes considered in this book include formal state governments, both Chinese and foreign; state agencies; and businesses and civic organizations which acted in the public sphere to induce political outcomes. The chapter narrates the origins of the opium trade in East Asia, and how it flourished in China and Japan. It also examines the events that led to the illegalization of opium.Less
This chapter discusses the opium trade's political and economic effects. It employs the term regime to signify a system in which an authority declares its right to control certain practices and develops policies and mechanisms to exercise that right within its presumed domain. The chapter notes that such a regime has the ability to impose conformity to policies which are profitable to it in the public realm. It explains that the opium regimes considered in this book include formal state governments, both Chinese and foreign; state agencies; and businesses and civic organizations which acted in the public sphere to induce political outcomes. The chapter narrates the origins of the opium trade in East Asia, and how it flourished in China and Japan. It also examines the events that led to the illegalization of opium.
