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The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation of China’s high performance despite several factors that would indicate otherwise according to conventional wisdom. The authors argue that conventional wisdom is problematic in regards to China. First, it provides too narrow a definition of political reform. Second, although it asks the right question about political discretion, the inappropriate definition of political reform leads it to the wrong conclusion. Third, though much is wrong with the system of property rights in China, looking for a system of such rights as exists in the West has confused many analysts. Rights are not as secure in China as they could be, and the absence of a law of property and contracts along with a judicial system to enforce it remains a significant lacuna in the reform process. And yet, property rights are not completely insecure and without political foundations. Indeed, political reform in China has provided considerable limits on the discretion of the central government. These limits, in turn, provide the beginnings of a strong and credible political foundation for many market-oriented enterprises throughout the successful regions of China. China has a new political system that we characterize as federalism, Chinese style. This system, in turn, provides considerable political protection for China’s reforms, including limits on the central government. Viewed from the perspective of the individual, this system differs considerably from federalisms in the developed West.

This chapter examines the evolution of risk regulation in the European Union since the Single European Act, with particular emphasis on how the legal and institutional context of the internal market has shaped the EU approach to risk. It first traces the emergence of supranational risk regulation in the EU with the ‘1992 project’ before discussing treaty reforms in the 1990s which strengthened the function of risk regulation as a justification of EU internal market regulation. It then considers the legitimacy dilemma faced by the EU with regard to risk regulation, focusing on the debate over the scope of political discretion that the precautionary principle should provide. It also analyses the application of the principles of risk and cost-benefit analysis to control discretion through science and economics, respectively. Finally, it explores risk regulation challenges arising from the legal-institutional, socio-economic, and cultural diversity in the Member States.

By retaining the political discretion to determine to whom, and when, protection will be granted, States have in fact complicated the protection regime. Diverging statuses, different eligibility thresholds, and variations from State to State have created incentives for asylum seekers to forum-shop and appeal decisions granting subsidiary status. It is arguably in States' own interests to grant a single legal status based on the Convention to all persons in need of international protection, with the exception of persons whom the Refugee Convention expressly excludes.

This chapter examines two distinct methodological approaches inspired by economics and sociology in the study of policy reforms in India, particularly educational reforms. In the analysis done using the concepts of formal political economy and rational choice, a series of dilemmas mark the working of existing policies—teacher accountability cannot be enforced due to teacher-politician linkages, patronage opportunities, and political power of unions. Educational decentralization and appointing para-teachers on contract is seen as one way of breaking the centralized power of teachers. It argues that this is a technical view to policy reforms—more grounded approaches are needed to understand the contested process of policy change, especially as they are implemented at the local level. It outlines the methodology by which schools, decentralization, teachers and their unions can be examined at the local level, and a ‘bottom-up’ view of policy implementation obtained. The research design enables viewing educational reform as a complex chain of policy decisions and its implementation, including both central and more local variables within the Indian federal system. Viewed in this manner the picture of change that emerges is that of an interactive and contested process.