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This introductory chapter begins with a discussion on the challenges of democratic accountability in Latin America. It then presents the three main themes that run throughout the book. These are the controversies about the definition of accountability, the relationship between electoral accountability and mechanisms of control and oversight of public agencies, and the shortcomings and advances of non-electoral forms of accountability in contemporary Latin America.

Introduces the distinction between a politics of ideas and a politics of presence. In the conventional understandings of liberal democracy, difference has been regarded primarily as a matter of ideas, and representation has been considered more or less adequate depending on how well it reflects voters’ opinions, preferences, or beliefs. This has been challenged by an alternative understanding of political representation that stresses proportionate representation according to characteristics such as gender or ethnicity. The chapter addresses three objections. The first is that this alternative model of representation over‐politicizes group difference, thereby disrupting social cohesion or stability. The second is that making representation even partially dependent on personal or group characteristics can undermine the basis for political accountability. The third is that reinforcing the role of group interest in politics can undermine a politics based on general interest of shared concerns.

This chapter considers political agency models, which explore the consequences of limited information in politics. It develops a canonical model which is then used to discuss an array of issues that arise in such models. As well as providing an introduction to the literature, the chapter throws up a variety of issues that have not been fully understood to date and merit further work. It also emphasises the empirical potential of these models in explaining real world policy choices. At the heart of the models is the notion of political accountability — a frequently used concept that often lacks precise usage. The political agency model is an ideal vehicle for thinking about this idea and exploring how accountability works in practice.

Determining political accountability of the government is measured by the capacity of external bodies, be they voters, legislatures, or superior levels of the government, to impose sanctions on government officials in the event of unsatisfactory performance. Based on this criterion of political accountability, Hong Kong's government is accountable to the government of the People's Republic of China and Principal Officials are answerable to the Chief Executive. The Chief Executive and Principal Officials meanwhile are weakly accountable to the Legislative Council and the voting public. Political accountability rests not solely on the provisions of the constitution but also on the way in which power is exercised. The government can provide conventions that introduce accountability into the government's actions, or it may act in ways that violate the constitution. It can provide measures within the framework of the constitution that may alter the power exercised by the government. This chapter examines the effects of the measures undertaken by the government on broader issues of representation and accountability in Hong Kong.

Theories concerning the roles of courts and legislatures entail certain assumptions about or explicit views concerning accountability. A traditional political constitutionalist might prioritise accountability of the United Kingdom government to the Westminster Parliament over judicial review, whereas a legal constitutionalist might focus on the role of the courts. In reality, of course, there is a range of accountability relationships relating to the legislature, and the priority one accords to each will tie directly to one's background approach. This chapter favours a ‘dialogue’ perspective, and tries to explain debate about accountability-related devices associated with the Westminster Parliament – ministerial responsibility and/or accountability, for example, or Parliamentary privilege – by reference to it. Scrutiny of anti-terrorism measures also offers a key illustration of the role played by a combination of judicial and political methods, with ‘dialogue’ between them, in promoting accountability in a sensitive and central area of the constitution.

This chapter deals with concepts like rule of law, political accountability, and ministerial responsibility showing how they also emerge in European Union (EU) law with a similar but not identical content. It relates some political scandals and the way in which they were dealt with in the jurisdictions concerned, not just to draw attention, but to display the differences between institutional mentalities and constitutional traditions in the EU member states. The chapter does this in a comparative way in honour of Lord Bingham's outstanding contribution to comparative law in his judgments and other writings.

This chapter examines accountability as a sub-practice of EU governance. It first distinguishes between political and other forms of accountability, then tries to spell out the basic rationale behind political accountability and examine what we do—and do not do—when we hold someone to account. Next, it is shown that in order for accountability to be effective, the institutional structure in a system of governance must meet two requirements: what we will call ‘check’ and ‘forum’. The second part of the chapter examines the extent to which the requirements of accountability are being met in the EU, taking into account recent developments in the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.

In introducing the book, this chapter discusses whether it is meaningful to study the question of ‘accountability’ of international organizations in general, and of the United Nations Security Council in particular. It argues that the term ‘accountability’ is too open-ended, and that too many different forms of accountability exist (political, legal, reputational, financial, etc.) for the term to be used without further clarification. The chapter then seeks to determine whether any of the forms of accountability presented can effectively be implemented with respect to Security Council action. It concludes that the focus needs to be on responsibility, i.e., on the legal form of accountability, and sets the scene for the discussion of the international responsibility of the United Nations for Security Council action that will follow.

This chapter links reforms in the legal and political framework of the EU Commission to a transformation that has turned the college of commissioners into a genuinely political rather than a technocratic body. It first explores how new formal powers for the EP and an increase in parliamentary activism have provided a new context for the EU executive. It then describes how this has changed the recruiting of commissioners, and how the commissioner’s role has been redefined. The college of commissioners has turned into a genuinely political rather than a technocratic body, something that is reflected in its composition and its role expectations. Presidentialism and political professionalism are increasingly shaping the executive role of the Commission.The chapter concludes that a top–down process of politicization has increasingly shaped the executive role of the Commission.

A constitution is defined as the definitive and legally-binding rules and principles governing a state or a country. Constitution is significant as it describes the power and functions of government bodies and outlines the relationship existing between these government bodies. In addition, constitution provides the authority for the decisions of the government and assures the government of the legitimacy of its rule. Constitution also specifies the limitations and the accountability of the government as well as reflecting the aspirations and values of the people. Constitution also serves as a staunch guard of civil liberties when the country and its freedom are threatened by encroachments. This chapter is mainly concerned with the degree to which the Basic Law establishes a framework of political accountability. In this chapter, the extent of accountability of the government for its actions and issues regarding the legitimacy of its exercised power are discussed and analysed. The chapter also discusses whether the Basic Law precisely describes the manner with which the political and administrative system actually operates. Discussed herein are issues regarding the accurate description of the relationship and powers of various governmental institutions. The chapter also tackles the capacity of the Basic Law to safeguard and uphold civil liberties as well as controversies and problems on the interpretation and implementation of the Basic Law.

Courts play a prominent and significant role in holding public bodies to account in the UK, most obviously through the exercise of powers of judicial review. However, the accountability ‘system’ extends far beyond the courts, encompassing (among other institutions) tribunals, ombudsmen and inquiries into matters of public concern. This chapter argues that accountability is a protean concept, and that the accountability system must therefore exhibit appropriate diversity if accountability in all its relevant senses is to be secured. This raises questions about the balance and relationship between legal and political mechanisms for supplying accountability. It is argued that an increasing tendency to view the legal-judicial model as a paradigm places other accountability institutions at risk of inappropriate judicialization. That trend, it is contended, must not continue unchecked if the accountability system is to remain suitably diverse.

The Constitution includes a large number of non-legal conventional rules with most of them dealing with responsibilities of the major organs and officers of government and with the relations between them. Within the United Kingdom, the conventions provide a framework of political accountability. In this chapter, the author stipulates that within the United Kingdom, recent changes in the machinery of government, and developments in party and electoral politics have raised questions about the working of particular conventions. This in turn, has led to political controversies and disputes amongst lawyers and political scientists.

This chapter takes a look at political accountability for EU peacebuilding activities carried out under the CSDP. It starts with some reflections on parliamentary scrutiny in the domaine réservé, a policy field where parliamentary activity has traditionally been low, but becomes increasingly salient given the growing scope and impact of international policy-making. The chapter then develops a discussion of the fairly limited oversight role of national parliaments regarding EU security and defence. General patterns of parliamentary involvement and particular features of scrutiny related to EU peacebuilding activities are assessed. Afterwards, a thorough analysis of law and practice highlights the enhanced significance of the European Parliament as political forum in the CFSP/CSDP context through a range of formal and informal vehicles which, however, only marginally contribute to parliamentary scrutiny of civilian missions. Lastly, this chapter ascertains the hurdles to interparliamentary cooperation and, in its final section, underscores the significance of effective supranational parliamentary scrutiny of peacebuilding activities in the edifice of Europeanized intergovernmentalism.

This chapter explores attempts to hold sovereign actors accountable in the legal sense. At the same time, the chapter shows that legal accountability is precisely what the classic theory of sovereignty rules out—and precisely what people have struggled for, in episode after episode. It also explores startling cases where mere criticism is reviled as an outrageous affront to sovereignty. These two matters are tied: legal accountability turns out to be another kind of affront. The chapter also addresses accountability in terms of international law and politics. It considers the actions of diplomats in the face of sovereign authority, and also discusses the United Nations under this context.

The age of governance challenges traditional understandings and methods for holding political decision-makers to account. A hitherto-hegemonic party government approach to political accountability is losing ground to new theoretical perceptions of political accountability, and forty years of government reforms have brought with them a variety of new methods for holding public authorities to account. What unites these theoretical and empirical developments is a redefinition of what political accountability means and how it is to be obtained in a multi-actor governance context where not only governments but also a wide variety of political and social actors play an active and influential role in the policy-making process. Chapter 5 proposes a concept of political learning accountability, and argues that interactive political leadership offers itself as a suitable strategy for promoting the throughput legitimacy of representative democracy by involving citizens and stakeholders in concrete policy-making.

Although one of the main concerns with PMCs today is that they constitute a threat to the state's monopoly of violence, the involvement of PMC Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and Angola in the mid-1990s tells a different story. The firm is credited with supporting governments challenged by powerful rebel groups and reconfirming the state's control by temporarily questioning it. This use of PMCs points to a shift in the role of private military forces in Africa, though their support came at a hefty price. Contrary to the frequent assumption that the African experience of mercenaries and PMCs are aberrations of the past, this chapter demonstrates that the problems arising out of private military involvement in African conflicts continue to have implications for the discussion of regulation. It concludes that shifts in political and commercial accountability, rather than legislative action, have been instrumental in the transition from mercenaries to PMCs in Africa.