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In charting European Union democracy promotion policy in the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership as it evolved during the 1990s, this chapter finds evidence of a genuinely new approach towards political change in the Mediterranean. The chapter analyses European approaches towards political Islam and security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The analysis uncovers important ways in which EU measures were less than fully developed and argues that the EU failed fully to follow through the logic of its own change of approach.

This chapter addresses the growth of Political Islam and transnational religious NGOs in Western Europe. While the European receiving states were granting a de facto monopoly of religious representation to the diplomatic envoys of immigrants' sending states, competing networks of well-organized activists with a more conservative, politicized view of Islam also flourished on the margins of religious community life. Political-Islam federations also provided prayer spaces, imams, lecturers, and social activities and established what may best be described as an Islamist subculture. Although such organizations may represent a relatively small membership base in terms of the local Muslim population, they often control a sizable proportion of the registered Muslim religious associations and prayer spaces where mosque-going Muslims congregate to socialize and pray.

This chapter deals with a critical assessment of Islamic juridical tradition—a formidable obstacle to a number of articles of great consequence for the protection of individual rights that are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. My aim is to explore the ethical doctrines that undergird the legal tradition in Islam, because, as I argue in this chapter, it is the ethical dimension of Islamic legal methodology that holds the potential for an inclusive universal language that can engage the universal morality of the declaration. What is critically needed in the Islamic context is to demonstrate to traditionalist scholars that Islamic ethics shares common moral terrain with the declaration on several levels, and to disregard its sources as antireligious would be to foreclose any opportunity to dialogue with liberal secularists on the need to protect human dignity and to advance peace with justice in the world.

This chapter addresses the failures of the “outsourcing” phase described briefly in Chapter 2, and other events and issues that prompted European interior ministries to wrest control of state–mosque relations from their foreign-ministry counterparts and undertake efforts to bring Islam to the table. First, there is a discussion of socioeconomic indicators of integration, followed by the growing problem of foreign government control over Muslims' religious life, an increasingly felt inadequacy of prayer space and imams, and finally, the rise of Political-Islam activism and Islamist terrorism. Then, the chapter delves into the first of two phases of these efforts that culminated in the establishment of Islamic Councils in the ten European states with sizable Muslim populations.

Since the independence of Morocco in 1956, youth have been represented as the “dangerous class.” This chapter examines to what degree young Moroccans maintain a homogeneous relationship with political Islam, and investigates whether they are really different from the older generation. Data are used from several qualitative surveys conducted in Morocco during the past 20 years on religious aspects of urban youth to understand intergenerational relations. It is argued that youth do not constitute a coherent, uniform, or isolated unit, but that they position and reposition themselves as they react to internal and external dynamics. Although they feel victimized in different ways, their perceptions of injustice are not sufficient to provoke a passage to collective action. The comparison of today’s youth in Morocco with the older generation shows that they are subject to the same cleavages that run throughout the global society and are part of the process of globalization.

This introductory chapter provides some historical and political context underlining the volume's writings. It first discusses the importance of Rached Ghannouchi's works and their relevancy during a politically charged period of “Islamophobia.” The chapter then explains the meaning of “political Islam” and sets it apart from other terms, such as “Islamism.” It also discusses the eminent French scholar of political Islam, François Burgat. The chapter explores Burgat's work; his relationship with the author, Rached Ghannouchi; and how his works appear throughout Ghannouchi's writings in this volume. Finally, this chapter reviews some recent scholarly literature which shed further light on political Islam, before providing some additional remarks on the translation of this volume.

This book explores political theologies and contemporary religion in the public domain or “public religions in a post-secular world”. More specifically, it examines religion's engagement with politics (that is, in its juridical, administrative or policy-oriented, national, and international aspects) and the political (that is, with its very concept and its conceptual analogues, such as sovereignty, democracy, etc.). It draws on contributions from distinguished scholars from various disciplines such as philosophy, political theory, anthropology, classics, and religious studies. The discussion begins with the gods of politics in early Greek cities, then moves to the legal separation and accommodation between church and state, the freedom of religion, and the professed confessional-ideological neutrality of government and the public sphere, as well as the permanence of the theologico-political, pluralism, faith, political Islam, and liberal democracy. The views of such thinkers as Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, Baruch Spinoza, Emmanuel Levinas, Franz Rosenzweig, and Saint Augustine are also examined.

The history of postcolonial Indonesia can therefore be divided into three periods, dominated by different regimes with its own characteristics, during which Islamisation process has continued to evolve. The Sukarno presidency (1945-1965) marks the first period, during which Mayumi established itself as the main Islamic political party. It began with decade of continuing nation building when the young republic was first engaged in armed conflict with the Dutch; experimented with liberal democracy; but then shifted toward ‘Guided Democracy’ and the disbanding of Masyumi. During the same twenty-year period, the unity of Indonesia was also challenged by the Islamist Darul Islam movement. A military coup in 1965 heralded the beginning of the military New Order Regime of General Suharto (1965-1998). Political Islam was kept control and occasionally manipulating it for its own purposes. From the 1970s onward, New Order did make some allowances for Muslim participation in governance, initiating further use of Islam for political purposes between 1983—1993. After the dramatic regime change in 1998, the democratisation process that started in 1999 saw an unprecedented opening-up of the public sphere. This change in Indonesia’s political climate offered new opportunities for socio-political activism across the Islamic spectrum, but also presented a new set of challenges for the world’s largest Muslim nation state. Islamic mass organisations, newly formed political parties, NGOs, think tanks and other platforms began presenting a range of competing Islamic discourses.

In the analysis of the attitudes toward and actual participation in the political process in the country, the most interesting group from among Lithuania’s Muslims are its citizens who have converted to Islam. This is so because their attitudes toward participation in politics could be presumed to have been shaped and influenced by numerous experiences and factors of both an internal and an external nature, major among which are different levels of personal and group socialisation and access to and influence of ‘Islamic’ texts and other material on one’s worldview. As converts are usually very keen on painstakingly observing rules and regulations of their newly adopted religion, as they see them, it is to be expected that the ‘Islamic factor’ should have a profound influence on how they perceive democracy as a political system per se, its compatibility with Islam, and finally their personal decision to take or not to take part in the democratic political process.

This chapter discusses how many Egyptian intellectuals and journalists explain the rise of activist Islam. It first considers beliefs and commitments as expressions of either psychopathology or of structural contradictions, and the historical materialist dialectic that urges cognitive frameworks from the struggles between social classes. The chapter next studies the importance of intellectual goods, the standard theory of social action, and the concept of “Political Islam.” It also argues that the ideas held by the indigenous and foreign elites about Islam and education in modern society have been core elements in modern public policy formation, as well as in the state's ineffective and halting strategies for counteracting its Islamic political opposition.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of how Sufism promotes pluralism and tolerance. It specifically analyses the African Muslim nation of Senegal, which is known for its prevalence of Sufi Muslim brotherhoods. With its openness, Sufism somehow serves as a counter to “Political Islam” which supports the entrance of the religion into the secular domain. In the case of Senegal, it is important to understand the political and religious dynamics as well as the meshing of and exchanges between the Western-educated elite and the various traditional leaders. The Senegalese case study is a historical construction in which a social contract has brought religious and political authorities together since colonial times. This contract, referred to as “Good Islam,” acts as a formal and informal system of exchange—established between the Sufi clericals and the state—it has been credited for the political stability of Senegal.

This chapter continues the book’s analysis of religious freedom in Muslim-majority states by looking at the third of three categories of regimes that are each defined by their political theology. This category is religiously repressive states. It defines the basic features of religiously repressive states, portraying them through the concept of Islamism, a form of political ideology. It identifies Saudi Arabia and Iran as the standard-bearers of this category and focuses on other countries in this category around the world, which total 21. This chapter makes the case for “Islamoskepticism,” though it also argues that this view does not explain everything about this type of regime.

This chapter discusses Iran and Turkey from a comparative perspective. Iran and Turkey are interesting comparisons in the political and economic arenas. In the political arena, while democratic and authoritarian impulses as well as secular and religious elements exist in both countries, they are however present to different degrees. Similarly, in the economic arena, while both countries possess statist and liberal impulses, these however are again present in different combinations and to different degrees. The operation of the variable referred to as political Islam, in both contexts, makes the comparisons and contrasts between Iran and Turkey even more interesting, especially for scholars and analysts engaged in unravelling the relationship between Islam on the one hand, and democracy and development on the other. The two cases clearly demonstrate that Islam does not prescribe a single political or economic model. Where Islam does seem to have some influence in shaping political systems or economic trajectories of predominantly Muslim states, this influence is mediated through a number of contextual variables that render generalisation about this relationship all but impossible. As the Iranian and Turkish cases clearly demonstrate, context matters hugely in the interaction between democracy, development, and political Islam.

Critics of Islamic finance focus on the political mischief of Islamic banks on domestic and international terrain. The suspicion surrounding Islamic banks rests on the syllogism: political Islam at the domestic and international level requires financial resources, Islamic banks are committed to Islam and have vast financial resources; therefore, Islamic banks are likely to advance the political goals of potentially subversive Islamic groups. Do Islamic banks have a domestic or international political agenda? Do they play a role in promoting radical Islam and international terrorism? The answer is that they usually do not. Banks, by virtue of being part of the existing power structure, have a strong status quo orientation. However, there are exceptions to that general rule. As will become evident in the succeeding discussions, the benign view is not widely shared among authoritarian leaders, who often see financial Islam as a destabilising force. This chapter discusses the connection between Islamic finance and politics in domestic and international contexts, comparing the evolution of financial Islam in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Sudan and Indonesia. It also discusses the role of Islamic finance in the New World Order and in the post-September 11 world, where Islamic financial institutions have often been considered ‘guilty by association’.

The collapse of Communism and the weakening of Social Democracy in the face of post-industrial capitalism seemed to nullify all systemic challenges to liberal capitalism. The Neo-conservatives celebrated the triumph of free-market democracy, but worried that bourgeois civil society lacked the moral sinews to see off interstitial challenges from political Islam. The 9.11 atrocity and the subsequent War on Terror allowed for a ‘forward strategy’ in the Middle east, and Iraq was the set-piece for an export of bourgeois revolution on the points of bayonets. The liberation of Iraq was a bloody mess, however, and from the 2008 Great Recession deep-rooted economic problems in the model of financialized capitalism became evident. Nonetheless, bourgeois liberalism was not exhausted: rather, the markets demanded and the politicians agreed that marketization of social life was the appropriate response to multiple social and economic dysfunctions.

This chapter aims to address whether political Islam is compatible, as far as its socio-political ends are concerned, with the requirements of just and democratic institutions. The emphasis in this chapter is on the term ‘just’, as certain understandings of democratic institutions make no conceptual connection between justice and democracy. In theory, a state may be democratic but not just. It is argued in this chapter that democracy without justice, though logically conceivable, is democracy only in form but not in substance. This argument fans the desire of this chapter to explore not merely whether the aims of political Islam are reconcilable with the requirements of democratic institutions, but more importantly, whether they are reconcilable with just, democratic institutions. To begin, the chapter provides some preliminary remarks about the meaning and criteria of just, democratic institutions. It focuses on pluralism, however it is limited to the discussion of classical pluralism, radical pluralism, and liberal pluralism. The chapter then discusses political Islam and demonstrates why its aims, if implemented, would exclude the possibility of any of the five conditions required for the establishment of just, democratic institutions being satisfied.

This chapter presents an anthropological account of the key ideas of Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami. It first de-reifies the hegemonic portrayals of Maududi as a “fundamentalist” to see him instead as a political thinker. Central to his exposition on Islam were the use of reason, critique, and ijtihād as opposed to taqlīd. It dwells on Maududi’s educational thoughts and evaluation of past scholars—‘Omar bin Abdul Aziz, Imam Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyyah, Shayḳh Ahmad Sirhindi, and Shah Valiullah and his successors. The final section outlines Maududi’s thoughts about cosmology, human nature, and civilization to locate the objective behind the formation of Jamaat. It addresses issues such as the meanings of Allah, the message of the Qurʾān, monotheism, prophecy, jāhiliyat (ignorance), and so on. It also discusses Maududi’s citations from the New Testament and references to Christ’s life to argue how Muhammad’s message and his life resembled earlier prophets, including Jesus. Maududi held that his call for a polity resting on divine sovereignty echoed the teachings of prophets preceding Muhammad. Maududi’s invoking of God’s sovereignty was similar to that of the Protestant politician-thinker Abraham Kuyper in Holland, Catholics in Australia, as well as Bellah’s notion of civil religion.

Islamism now dates back a hundred years. Concern over members of this political and religious movement relates to their putative and potential radical - or even violent – behavior when confronted with cultural otherness. Such behavior takes root in their assumed wish to redesign the world in their image. From its inception in the 1920s to its more recent manifestations, the Islamist movement strove to lift Muslim societies out of their alleged civilizational lethargy. In so-doing, it has paid substantial attention to the state of international affairs, as well as to potential ways to act on it. If the State remains undeniably Islamist movements’ privileged arena for action, considerations for Muslim countries’ environment; devising strategies aiming at the completion of a “motherland of believers” (al-oumma); thoughts on an interstate order within an Islamic frame of reference - remain prominent concerns to them. From its outset, Islamism has always insisted on the duty to serve religion as a whole - and thus everyone identifying with it. Its end goal therefore overrides geographical, historical and political borders – those being perceived as divisive and weakening the face of Islam. In addition, Islamists consider the current international order as one consciously designed by non-Muslims. In such views, the latter nurse an ontological enmity towards Islam because of its revisionist potential. The Arab revolutions initiated in 2010 have been experimental fields of the oppositional – even revolutionary – dimensions of Islamist ideology. These enable interrogations to be raised on Islamism’s practice and possible evolutions. In other words, how do Islamist movements translate fundamental diplomatic and relational principles into practice with other actors of the international system? If Islamist forces are indeed maintaining special relationships with the outside world mainly driven by the wish to shower the planet with Islam-serving behavior, is it however analytically relevant to identify a specific Islamist practice of international affairs? There are two objectives tied to this presentation. First, it will attempt to shed light on how Islamist activists, leaders and theorists view the world. In so-doing, Islamist speeches and intellectual output will be scrutinized. Then, answers will be provided to the following question: when Islamist officials have had the chance to approach national decision-making arenas - this is the case in some countries that have experienced the Arab Spring – how did they manage to put up a foreign policy agenda centered around an Islamic framework? This question is central for through it one can attempt to measure the empirical outreach of the Islamist ideology.