Frank Fischer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199282838
- eISBN:
- 9780191712487
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199282838.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
This chapter demonstrates the ways in which policy is more fundamentally a sociopolitical construct than technical/instrumental tool, as it is approached in much of policy science. Employing a ...
More
This chapter demonstrates the ways in which policy is more fundamentally a sociopolitical construct than technical/instrumental tool, as it is approached in much of policy science. Employing a constructivist sociology of knowledge, the discussion illustrates the ways in which a policy is a product of multiple realities and, as such, is as much a matter for interpretive analysis as it is techno-empirical assessment. To clarify the theoretical position, the second half of the chapter demonstrates the point through the political struggle over sustainable development in environmental policy. Beyond technical knowledge, the case points to how policies are socially experienced — in particular, how they supply citizens with the social sense of collective participation in mutual ventures with fellow members of their own communities.Less
This chapter demonstrates the ways in which policy is more fundamentally a sociopolitical construct than technical/instrumental tool, as it is approached in much of policy science. Employing a constructivist sociology of knowledge, the discussion illustrates the ways in which a policy is a product of multiple realities and, as such, is as much a matter for interpretive analysis as it is techno-empirical assessment. To clarify the theoretical position, the second half of the chapter demonstrates the point through the political struggle over sustainable development in environmental policy. Beyond technical knowledge, the case points to how policies are socially experienced — in particular, how they supply citizens with the social sense of collective participation in mutual ventures with fellow members of their own communities.
Robert M. Uriu
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280568
- eISBN:
- 9780191712814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280568.003.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
The Framework negotiations of 1993–95 represented a turning point in U.S.‐Japan trade negotiations. The U.S. for the first time made “results‐oriented” trade demands, in which the Japanese government ...
More
The Framework negotiations of 1993–95 represented a turning point in U.S.‐Japan trade negotiations. The U.S. for the first time made “results‐oriented” trade demands, in which the Japanese government would be held responsible for increasing imports in certain markets, the centerpiece of its negotiating approach. And for the first time the Japanese stuck to their guns and resisted American trade pressures. In this chapter the author defines revisionism in terms of three core arguments: that Japan's economy was so inherently closed that efforts to remove protectionist barriers would fail; that the Japanese system was so fundamentally different that it represented a unique brand of capitalism; and that the Japanese system represented a genuine threat to the U.S. economy and especially its high-tech industries. The revisionist school called clearly for a policy of managed trade, or forcing the Japanese government to set aside a share of the market for foreign producers.Less
The Framework negotiations of 1993–95 represented a turning point in U.S.‐Japan trade negotiations. The U.S. for the first time made “results‐oriented” trade demands, in which the Japanese government would be held responsible for increasing imports in certain markets, the centerpiece of its negotiating approach. And for the first time the Japanese stuck to their guns and resisted American trade pressures. In this chapter the author defines revisionism in terms of three core arguments: that Japan's economy was so inherently closed that efforts to remove protectionist barriers would fail; that the Japanese system was so fundamentally different that it represented a unique brand of capitalism; and that the Japanese system represented a genuine threat to the U.S. economy and especially its high-tech industries. The revisionist school called clearly for a policy of managed trade, or forcing the Japanese government to set aside a share of the market for foreign producers.
Robert M. Uriu
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280568
- eISBN:
- 9780191712814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280568.003.0004
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
Revisionist assumptions reached their peak just as the Clinton administration was taking office. In this chapter the author demonstrates how the new policy team quickly rejected traditionalist ...
More
Revisionist assumptions reached their peak just as the Clinton administration was taking office. In this chapter the author demonstrates how the new policy team quickly rejected traditionalist thinking and clearly adopted revisionist assumptions about Japan. This chapter first analyzes Japan‐related thinking inside the Clinton campaign and then traces the attitudes toward Japan of the administration's new political appointees. The core of the chapter focuses on the main policymaking body in the White House, the Deputies Committee. Based on extensive interviews with participants in this group, the author is able to demonstrate how the administration came to adopt revisionist assumptions. This then led to a dramatically different trade policy of pursuing “results‐oriented” agreements with Japan that were to include numerical indicators to measure import penetration, and clear penalties if imports did not rise. Here is a case where one can almost see one set of policy assumptions being replaced by another.Less
Revisionist assumptions reached their peak just as the Clinton administration was taking office. In this chapter the author demonstrates how the new policy team quickly rejected traditionalist thinking and clearly adopted revisionist assumptions about Japan. This chapter first analyzes Japan‐related thinking inside the Clinton campaign and then traces the attitudes toward Japan of the administration's new political appointees. The core of the chapter focuses on the main policymaking body in the White House, the Deputies Committee. Based on extensive interviews with participants in this group, the author is able to demonstrate how the administration came to adopt revisionist assumptions. This then led to a dramatically different trade policy of pursuing “results‐oriented” agreements with Japan that were to include numerical indicators to measure import penetration, and clear penalties if imports did not rise. Here is a case where one can almost see one set of policy assumptions being replaced by another.
Robert M. Uriu
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280568
- eISBN:
- 9780191712814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280568.003.0009
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
In this chapter the author argues that the U.S. was forced to back down at every turn during the Framework talks. It also turns out that revisionism was damaged not only by the attacks by the ...
More
In this chapter the author argues that the U.S. was forced to back down at every turn during the Framework talks. It also turns out that revisionism was damaged not only by the attacks by the Japanese government, but also because Japan's economic downturn, which began in the early 1990s, undermined the contention that it represented an economic threat. Furthermore, the traditionalist emphasis on the military relationship was restored in the mid‐1990s, as the U.S. came to realize that it needed Japan's cooperation against threats such as North Korea. And a horrible incident in which U.S. Marines on Okinawa raped a young Japanese schoolgirl led to strong anti-American feelings in Japan. By 1996, traditionalists had regained control of Japan policy. The period in which revisionist assumptions were the core of U.S. policy was thus relatively brief, limited to the first Clinton administration. Yet in this short time, these new policy assumptions had a definite and visible impact on how the U.S. approached one of its most important bilateral relationships.Less
In this chapter the author argues that the U.S. was forced to back down at every turn during the Framework talks. It also turns out that revisionism was damaged not only by the attacks by the Japanese government, but also because Japan's economic downturn, which began in the early 1990s, undermined the contention that it represented an economic threat. Furthermore, the traditionalist emphasis on the military relationship was restored in the mid‐1990s, as the U.S. came to realize that it needed Japan's cooperation against threats such as North Korea. And a horrible incident in which U.S. Marines on Okinawa raped a young Japanese schoolgirl led to strong anti-American feelings in Japan. By 1996, traditionalists had regained control of Japan policy. The period in which revisionist assumptions were the core of U.S. policy was thus relatively brief, limited to the first Clinton administration. Yet in this short time, these new policy assumptions had a definite and visible impact on how the U.S. approached one of its most important bilateral relationships.
Robert M. Uriu
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280568
- eISBN:
- 9780191712814
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280568.003.0003
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
The revisionist drumbeat reached a peak in the early 1990s, in the context of the continuing “Japan Problem” compounded by America's growing economic crisis. In this chapter the author traces the ...
More
The revisionist drumbeat reached a peak in the early 1990s, in the context of the continuing “Japan Problem” compounded by America's growing economic crisis. In this chapter the author traces the development of revisionist thought, focusing on the “Gang of Four” (academic Chalmers Johnson, government official Clyde Prestowitz, and journalists James Fallows and Karel van Wolferen), who were the most visible proponents of revisionism. This chapter also demonstrates how revisionism gained in resonance among academics and in the popular media. Despite its overall popularity, revisionism was not adopted as the working policy assumptions of the administration of George H.W. Bush, and thus had only a limited impact on U.S. policy. Most of the top officials in the administration still clung to traditionalist views of Japan, and were thus not supportive of the revisionist call for a managed trade solution.Less
The revisionist drumbeat reached a peak in the early 1990s, in the context of the continuing “Japan Problem” compounded by America's growing economic crisis. In this chapter the author traces the development of revisionist thought, focusing on the “Gang of Four” (academic Chalmers Johnson, government official Clyde Prestowitz, and journalists James Fallows and Karel van Wolferen), who were the most visible proponents of revisionism. This chapter also demonstrates how revisionism gained in resonance among academics and in the popular media. Despite its overall popularity, revisionism was not adopted as the working policy assumptions of the administration of George H.W. Bush, and thus had only a limited impact on U.S. policy. Most of the top officials in the administration still clung to traditionalist views of Japan, and were thus not supportive of the revisionist call for a managed trade solution.
Robert M. Uriu
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199280568
- eISBN:
- 9780191712814
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280568.001.0001
- Subject:
- Economics and Finance, South and East Asia
This book chronicles how a controversial set of policy assumptions about the Japanese economy, known as revisionism, rose to become the basis of the trade policy approach of the Clinton ...
More
This book chronicles how a controversial set of policy assumptions about the Japanese economy, known as revisionism, rose to become the basis of the trade policy approach of the Clinton administration. In the context of deep-rooted fears over Japan's increasing economic strength, revisionists argued that Japan represented a distinctive form of capitalism that was inherently closed to imports and that posed a threat to U.S. high-tech industries. Revisionists advocated a “managed trade” solution in which the Japanese government would be forced to set aside a share of the market for foreign goods. The author describes the role that various American academics, government officials, and business leaders played in developing revisionist thought. The revisionist drumbeat grew loudest just as the Clinton administration came into office. The author uses extensive interviews with policy makers to trace the internal discussions inside the Clinton White House, which culminated in the adoption of revisionist assumptions and then to demands for “results-oriented” trade agreements during the Framework negotiations. Japan, however, refused to accept these managed trade solutions, and fought to discredit revisionism and to rally global support against American unilateralism. Despite a history of caving in to U.S. pressures, this time the Japanese held firm even in the face of an historic failure of a bilateral summit in 1994 and the threat of sanctions against Japanese autos in 1995. In the end, it was the U.S. that folded; for the first time ever, Japan said “no,” and in the process beat back America's demands for managed trade once and for all.Less
This book chronicles how a controversial set of policy assumptions about the Japanese economy, known as revisionism, rose to become the basis of the trade policy approach of the Clinton administration. In the context of deep-rooted fears over Japan's increasing economic strength, revisionists argued that Japan represented a distinctive form of capitalism that was inherently closed to imports and that posed a threat to U.S. high-tech industries. Revisionists advocated a “managed trade” solution in which the Japanese government would be forced to set aside a share of the market for foreign goods. The author describes the role that various American academics, government officials, and business leaders played in developing revisionist thought. The revisionist drumbeat grew loudest just as the Clinton administration came into office. The author uses extensive interviews with policy makers to trace the internal discussions inside the Clinton White House, which culminated in the adoption of revisionist assumptions and then to demands for “results-oriented” trade agreements during the Framework negotiations. Japan, however, refused to accept these managed trade solutions, and fought to discredit revisionism and to rally global support against American unilateralism. Despite a history of caving in to U.S. pressures, this time the Japanese held firm even in the face of an historic failure of a bilateral summit in 1994 and the threat of sanctions against Japanese autos in 1995. In the end, it was the U.S. that folded; for the first time ever, Japan said “no,” and in the process beat back America's demands for managed trade once and for all.
