Isaiah Berlin
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199249893
- eISBN:
- 9780191598807
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924989X.003.0013
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
This briefest of notes, written to help a friend speaking to a popular audience, gives an informal statement of Berlin’s views on liberty, nationalism and the plurality of human goals. It excoriates ...
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This briefest of notes, written to help a friend speaking to a popular audience, gives an informal statement of Berlin’s views on liberty, nationalism and the plurality of human goals. It excoriates ‘the belief that there is one and only one true answer to the central questions which have agonized mankind’ as ‘responsible for … oceans of blood.’Less
This briefest of notes, written to help a friend speaking to a popular audience, gives an informal statement of Berlin’s views on liberty, nationalism and the plurality of human goals. It excoriates ‘the belief that there is one and only one true answer to the central questions which have agonized mankind’ as ‘responsible for … oceans of blood.’
Rein Taagepera
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199287741
- eISBN:
- 9780191713408
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287741.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
The micro-mega rule says that for representation of small parties, it helps to have large assembly sizes, large district magnitudes, and large quotas or large gaps between divisors in seat allocation ...
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The micro-mega rule says that for representation of small parties, it helps to have large assembly sizes, large district magnitudes, and large quotas or large gaps between divisors in seat allocation formulas. Conversely, large parties would prefer small assemblies, magnitudes and quotas — but only if they are absolutely certain to stay large. Worldwide tendency has been to play it safe and move toward more inclusive representation. The number of parties increases with increasing ‘seat product’ — the number of seats in the assembly times the number of seats in the average district — unless the seats are allocated by plurality in multi-seat districts.Less
The micro-mega rule says that for representation of small parties, it helps to have large assembly sizes, large district magnitudes, and large quotas or large gaps between divisors in seat allocation formulas. Conversely, large parties would prefer small assemblies, magnitudes and quotas — but only if they are absolutely certain to stay large. Worldwide tendency has been to play it safe and move toward more inclusive representation. The number of parties increases with increasing ‘seat product’ — the number of seats in the assembly times the number of seats in the average district — unless the seats are allocated by plurality in multi-seat districts.
Louis Massicotte
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Canada has employed the single-member plurality electoral system at all elections to the national parliament and for most elections to provincial legislatures. In recent years, criticism of this ...
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Canada has employed the single-member plurality electoral system at all elections to the national parliament and for most elections to provincial legislatures. In recent years, criticism of this system and its consequences (especially the high degree of disproportionality) has become greater, and there has been much discussion of introducing proportional representation, particularly at provincial level. The strong position of particular parties in specific provinces has a distinctive impact on the party system effects of single-member plurality in the Canadian context.Less
Canada has employed the single-member plurality electoral system at all elections to the national parliament and for most elections to provincial legislatures. In recent years, criticism of this system and its consequences (especially the high degree of disproportionality) has become greater, and there has been much discussion of introducing proportional representation, particularly at provincial level. The strong position of particular parties in specific provinces has a distinctive impact on the party system effects of single-member plurality in the Canadian context.
Anthony Heath, Siana Glouharova, and Oliver Heath
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0007
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has ...
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India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has a Westminster type parliamentary system with single member plurality elections. In a seemingly major challenge to Duverger’s laws, India has developed a large multiparty system despite its SMP electoral system. Part of the answer is that the extreme multi-party system in the all-India parliament masks the nature of party competition in the electoral districts. Electoral competition can be thought of as a series of different regional level two-party contests.Less
India is the world’s biggest, and in many respects, most remarkable democracy. Despite vast social and linguistic diversity, its political system has been surprisingly stable and effective. India has a Westminster type parliamentary system with single member plurality elections. In a seemingly major challenge to Duverger’s laws, India has developed a large multiparty system despite its SMP electoral system. Part of the answer is that the extreme multi-party system in the all-India parliament masks the nature of party competition in the electoral districts. Electoral competition can be thought of as a series of different regional level two-party contests.
Paul Mitchell
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
‘Times they are a-changing . . .’ is at the source of the Westminster model. Or are they? Electoral reformers are still trying to replace Britain’s single-member plurality electoral system with some ...
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‘Times they are a-changing . . .’ is at the source of the Westminster model. Or are they? Electoral reformers are still trying to replace Britain’s single-member plurality electoral system with some form of PR, as they have been for 150 years. The system has maintained the parliamentary dominance of two parties, but elections have become increasingly multi-party and disproportional since 1974. However, at sub-state, local, and European elections, Britain has become a very active laboratory for electoral system design and implementation.Less
‘Times they are a-changing . . .’ is at the source of the Westminster model. Or are they? Electoral reformers are still trying to replace Britain’s single-member plurality electoral system with some form of PR, as they have been for 150 years. The system has maintained the parliamentary dominance of two parties, but elections have become increasingly multi-party and disproportional since 1974. However, at sub-state, local, and European elections, Britain has become a very active laboratory for electoral system design and implementation.
Roberto D'Alimonte
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199257560
- eISBN:
- 9780191603280
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199257566.003.0012
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems ...
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Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems are relatively new (dating only to 1993) and are very complex, reflecting compromises between parties with different interests. Lijphart’s prescription that an electoral system should emphasize ‘proportionality and simplicity’ is certainly violated. Italy has changed from list PR (before 1993) to variations of mixed-member majoritarian systems. Both the Chamber and the Senate are composed of 75 per cent of members elected from SMDs, and 25 per cent from lists. Beyond this, the electoral systems vary in a range of important ways. One of the important effects is the ‘proportionalisation of the plurality tier’. Italy is a leading example of the manner in which major electoral reform can have some expected and some very unexpected consequences. There is widespread discontent with the ‘new’ systems, such that electoral reform is very much on the agenda.Less
Given that Italy has had one of the few perfectly bicameral parliamentary systems (in which each house has equal powers), there are two different electoral systems to analyse. These electoral systems are relatively new (dating only to 1993) and are very complex, reflecting compromises between parties with different interests. Lijphart’s prescription that an electoral system should emphasize ‘proportionality and simplicity’ is certainly violated. Italy has changed from list PR (before 1993) to variations of mixed-member majoritarian systems. Both the Chamber and the Senate are composed of 75 per cent of members elected from SMDs, and 25 per cent from lists. Beyond this, the electoral systems vary in a range of important ways. One of the important effects is the ‘proportionalisation of the plurality tier’. Italy is a leading example of the manner in which major electoral reform can have some expected and some very unexpected consequences. There is widespread discontent with the ‘new’ systems, such that electoral reform is very much on the agenda.
JC Beall
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199288403
- eISBN:
- 9780191700491
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This book presents and defends what it calls logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, and that this plurality arises not merely because there ...
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This book presents and defends what it calls logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, and that this plurality arises not merely because there are different languages, but rather arises even within the kinds of claims expressed in any one language. First, it sets logical consequence in its historical context, explains why it is important, and clarifies what is assumed to be the settled core of this notion. It defines logical pluralism and indicates the type of arguments that it takes to support the position. Concrete examples of the various consequence relations endorsed by qua pluralists are given.Less
This book presents and defends what it calls logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, and that this plurality arises not merely because there are different languages, but rather arises even within the kinds of claims expressed in any one language. First, it sets logical consequence in its historical context, explains why it is important, and clarifies what is assumed to be the settled core of this notion. It defines logical pluralism and indicates the type of arguments that it takes to support the position. Concrete examples of the various consequence relations endorsed by qua pluralists are given.
Matthew Søberg Shugart
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539390
- eISBN:
- 9780191715761
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539390.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
Electoral reform may be explained through a model that incorporates both inherent and contingent factors. An electoral system has an inherent tendency towards “systemic failure,” understood as ...
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Electoral reform may be explained through a model that incorporates both inherent and contingent factors. An electoral system has an inherent tendency towards “systemic failure,” understood as outcomes that are inconsistent with the normative model of democracy with which it is associated. In the case of first past the post, anomalies such as plurality reversals (the largest party in votes does not win the most seats) and lopsided majorities (when the opposition wins few seats) may generate interest in replacing the system. However, processes that might lead to a change in the electoral system also require contingent factors: the coming to power of a previously disadvantaged party (“outcome contingency”) and a pro-reform vote to be cultivated (“act contingency”). This model of electoral reform is analyzed based on 191 elections in nineteen jurisdictions using first past the post.Less
Electoral reform may be explained through a model that incorporates both inherent and contingent factors. An electoral system has an inherent tendency towards “systemic failure,” understood as outcomes that are inconsistent with the normative model of democracy with which it is associated. In the case of first past the post, anomalies such as plurality reversals (the largest party in votes does not win the most seats) and lopsided majorities (when the opposition wins few seats) may generate interest in replacing the system. However, processes that might lead to a change in the electoral system also require contingent factors: the coming to power of a previously disadvantaged party (“outcome contingency”) and a pro-reform vote to be cultivated (“act contingency”). This model of electoral reform is analyzed based on 191 elections in nineteen jurisdictions using first past the post.
Adrian Blau
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- September 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199539390
- eISBN:
- 9780191715761
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539390.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Political Economy
This chapter uses veto-player theory to explore the prospects for electoral reform in the UK. The chapter introduces the idea of ‘path-setting’ to show how the government can help or hinder reform ...
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This chapter uses veto-player theory to explore the prospects for electoral reform in the UK. The chapter introduces the idea of ‘path-setting’ to show how the government can help or hinder reform depending on the particular legislative path that it chooses. It explains that reform is probably not in either the Labour or Conservative parties' interests, and shows how minor-party pressure for reform can be averted. Even if a hung parliament arises, electoral reform may not be initiated; even if electoral reform is initiated, it may not be implemented; even if electoral reform is implemented, it may not be a radical change.Less
This chapter uses veto-player theory to explore the prospects for electoral reform in the UK. The chapter introduces the idea of ‘path-setting’ to show how the government can help or hinder reform depending on the particular legislative path that it chooses. It explains that reform is probably not in either the Labour or Conservative parties' interests, and shows how minor-party pressure for reform can be averted. Even if a hung parliament arises, electoral reform may not be initiated; even if electoral reform is initiated, it may not be implemented; even if electoral reform is implemented, it may not be a radical change.
René Antonio Mayorga
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257683
- eISBN:
- 9780191600241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925768X.003.0010
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
In 1994, Bolivia undertook a major constitutional and electoral reform, in which a closed‐list proportional representation (PR) system for the Lower House of the Congress was replaced by a ...
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In 1994, Bolivia undertook a major constitutional and electoral reform, in which a closed‐list proportional representation (PR) system for the Lower House of the Congress was replaced by a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system. Article 60 of the reformed constitution establishes that 68 deputies out of a constitutionally fixed number of 130 will be chosen by plurality rule in single‐seat districts, while the remaining 62 will be chosen by party‐list voting according to proportional representation in nine regional multi‐seat districts. This new electoral system establishes seats linkage between the two tiers such that the overall allocation of seats is determined proportionally according to list votes at the level of each multi‐seat district. In analyzing the underlying causes of the electoral reform in 1994, Mayorga first deals with the widely perceived fundamental problems and flaws of the traditional PR system and, second, addresses the main causes leading to the adoption of an MMP system, focusing on the context in which the politics of electoral reform was carried out.Less
In 1994, Bolivia undertook a major constitutional and electoral reform, in which a closed‐list proportional representation (PR) system for the Lower House of the Congress was replaced by a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system. Article 60 of the reformed constitution establishes that 68 deputies out of a constitutionally fixed number of 130 will be chosen by plurality rule in single‐seat districts, while the remaining 62 will be chosen by party‐list voting according to proportional representation in nine regional multi‐seat districts. This new electoral system establishes seats linkage between the two tiers such that the overall allocation of seats is determined proportionally according to list votes at the level of each multi‐seat district. In analyzing the underlying causes of the electoral reform in 1994, Mayorga first deals with the widely perceived fundamental problems and flaws of the traditional PR system and, second, addresses the main causes leading to the adoption of an MMP system, focusing on the context in which the politics of electoral reform was carried out.
Juan Molinar Horcasitas and Jeffrey A. Weldon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257683
- eISBN:
- 9780191600241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925768X.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Mexico has a long experience with highly majoritarian variants of mixed‐member systems, but has recently been made more proportional in a process of democratization. Electoral reform has developed ...
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Mexico has a long experience with highly majoritarian variants of mixed‐member systems, but has recently been made more proportional in a process of democratization. Electoral reform has developed along two major axes: the degree of proportionality, and the composition of the electoral authority, with the parties often trading openness on one axis for closure on the other. Sometimes trade‐offs in reform negotiations followed a third dimension—the registration requirements for new parties. This chapter first describes the evolution of the Mexican electoral formulae from 1963 to today, explaining the rationale of each phase of reform either as a majority party decision or as a trade‐off between government and opposition; the phases described are the plurality party deputy system (1963–1976), the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) minority representation system (1979–1985), the governability clause of the 1988 law, the governability clause with ‘moving escalator’ of the 1991 law, and the abandonment of the governability clause in the 1994 law. The last part of the chapter focuses on the last round of electoral reforms (the 1997 law), in which the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system reintroduced in 1994 (after the earlier brief interludes of systems that combined MMM with mixed‐member proportional (MMP) arrangements under the 1988 and 1991 laws), was further reformed to result in a more proportional allocation of seats, with the dominant principle depending on the vote distribution.Less
Mexico has a long experience with highly majoritarian variants of mixed‐member systems, but has recently been made more proportional in a process of democratization. Electoral reform has developed along two major axes: the degree of proportionality, and the composition of the electoral authority, with the parties often trading openness on one axis for closure on the other. Sometimes trade‐offs in reform negotiations followed a third dimension—the registration requirements for new parties. This chapter first describes the evolution of the Mexican electoral formulae from 1963 to today, explaining the rationale of each phase of reform either as a majority party decision or as a trade‐off between government and opposition; the phases described are the plurality party deputy system (1963–1976), the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) minority representation system (1979–1985), the governability clause of the 1988 law, the governability clause with ‘moving escalator’ of the 1991 law, and the abandonment of the governability clause in the 1994 law. The last part of the chapter focuses on the last round of electoral reforms (the 1997 law), in which the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system reintroduced in 1994 (after the earlier brief interludes of systems that combined MMM with mixed‐member proportional (MMP) arrangements under the 1988 and 1991 laws), was further reformed to result in a more proportional allocation of seats, with the dominant principle depending on the vote distribution.
Jeffrey A. Weldon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257683
- eISBN:
- 9780191600241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925768X.003.0021
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Mexico has experimented with mixed‐member electoral systems for many years, is probably the second oldest mixed‐member system after Germany, and has modified its mixed system more than any other ...
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Mexico has experimented with mixed‐member electoral systems for many years, is probably the second oldest mixed‐member system after Germany, and has modified its mixed system more than any other country. The purpose behind the electoral reforms has always been the same: to open up the system enough to satisfy political demands, but not so much that the hegemonic party loses control. Although the latter could to a large extent be controlled by electoral fraud, the former objective still had to be addressed, and over the last 35 years Mexico has seen a gradual but consistent expansion of proportional representation, so that by 1997, the electoral laws, together with electoral preferences and the general democratization of the country, had led to the end of majority control by the official party in the Chamber of Deputies, and Mexico now has a strong two‐ or three‐party system. However, there have been seven fundamentally different electoral systems in Mexico this century, with a different electoral system for each of the last five elections, which makes it impossible to distinguish the effects of electoral rules from those of voter preference; furthermore, most of the reforms are highly endogenous with the party system. Discusses reforms from 1964 onwards, and is arranged as follows: it first describes the party (minority) deputy system that operated under single‐seat district plurality rules in the period 1964–1976, and then the minority representation system of 1979–1985 (mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) rules were introduced for the 1979 election); next it gives accounts of the 1988, 1991, 1994 and 1997 mixed‐member electoral laws, and details of the senate formulas for the period 1994–2000; it then discusses the consequences of the four mixed‐member electoral laws (effects on party competition and Duvergerian effects), the effects of the change to an MMM system on legislative behavior, and the prospects for future electoral reform.Less
Mexico has experimented with mixed‐member electoral systems for many years, is probably the second oldest mixed‐member system after Germany, and has modified its mixed system more than any other country. The purpose behind the electoral reforms has always been the same: to open up the system enough to satisfy political demands, but not so much that the hegemonic party loses control. Although the latter could to a large extent be controlled by electoral fraud, the former objective still had to be addressed, and over the last 35 years Mexico has seen a gradual but consistent expansion of proportional representation, so that by 1997, the electoral laws, together with electoral preferences and the general democratization of the country, had led to the end of majority control by the official party in the Chamber of Deputies, and Mexico now has a strong two‐ or three‐party system. However, there have been seven fundamentally different electoral systems in Mexico this century, with a different electoral system for each of the last five elections, which makes it impossible to distinguish the effects of electoral rules from those of voter preference; furthermore, most of the reforms are highly endogenous with the party system. Discusses reforms from 1964 onwards, and is arranged as follows: it first describes the party (minority) deputy system that operated under single‐seat district plurality rules in the period 1964–1976, and then the minority representation system of 1979–1985 (mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) rules were introduced for the 1979 election); next it gives accounts of the 1988, 1991, 1994 and 1997 mixed‐member electoral laws, and details of the senate formulas for the period 1994–2000; it then discusses the consequences of the four mixed‐member electoral laws (effects on party competition and Duvergerian effects), the effects of the change to an MMM system on legislative behavior, and the prospects for future electoral reform.
R. Kent Weaver
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257683
- eISBN:
- 9780191600241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925768X.003.0025
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The puzzle addressed by this chapter is why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely made it to the agenda, let alone to adoption, despite the existence of widely recognized ...
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The puzzle addressed by this chapter is why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely made it to the agenda, let alone to adoption, despite the existence of widely recognized problems with the current electoral system, the experience of several rounds of constitutional reform in which the issue could have been raised, and relatively weak constitutional barriers to reform. The first section, ‘Electoral Rules and the Party System’, provides background on how the Canadian party system has evolved under the current set of single‐seat district (SSD) plurality electoral rules. The second section, ‘Explaining the Limited Electoral Reform Agenda in Canada’, examines why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely been on the political agenda. The final section, ‘Prospects for Electoral Reform in the Future’,discusses conditions under which electoral reform might come onto the agenda in the near future, and whether it is likely to do so.Less
The puzzle addressed by this chapter is why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely made it to the agenda, let alone to adoption, despite the existence of widely recognized problems with the current electoral system, the experience of several rounds of constitutional reform in which the issue could have been raised, and relatively weak constitutional barriers to reform. The first section, ‘Electoral Rules and the Party System’, provides background on how the Canadian party system has evolved under the current set of single‐seat district (SSD) plurality electoral rules. The second section, ‘Explaining the Limited Electoral Reform Agenda in Canada’, examines why electoral reform for the Canadian House of Commons has so rarely been on the political agenda. The final section, ‘Prospects for Electoral Reform in the Future’,discusses conditions under which electoral reform might come onto the agenda in the near future, and whether it is likely to do so.
Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199257683
- eISBN:
- 9780191600241
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019925768X.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Mixed‐member electoral systems are described as a mixture of two principles of electoral system design: majoritarian systems, which usually have single‐seat districts with plurality rule and tend to ...
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Mixed‐member electoral systems are described as a mixture of two principles of electoral system design: majoritarian systems, which usually have single‐seat districts with plurality rule and tend to give greater representation to the two parties that receive the most votes; and proportional systems, which have multi‐seat districts, usually with party lists, and typically produce parliamentary representation that largely mirrors the vote shares of multiple parties. In the prototype mixed‐member system, half the seats in a legislative chamber (the nominal tier) are elected in single‐seat districts and the other half (the list tier) are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation; such systems come in a wide variety of options, with the most important choices involved being those of how seats and/or votes are linked between the two tiers. Defines mixed‐member electoral systems as a subset of the broader category of multiple‐tier electoral systems. The typology of systems outlined is arranged in three main sections: Mixed‐Member Systems as Variants of Multiple‐Tier Electoral Systems; Majoritarian or Proportional: Linkage Between Nominal and Tier Lists—mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed‐member proportional (MMP) systems; and How MMM and MMP Systems Work: Simple Systems and Additional Variables—this section includes a table of mixed‐member systems in use around the world in 1999.Less
Mixed‐member electoral systems are described as a mixture of two principles of electoral system design: majoritarian systems, which usually have single‐seat districts with plurality rule and tend to give greater representation to the two parties that receive the most votes; and proportional systems, which have multi‐seat districts, usually with party lists, and typically produce parliamentary representation that largely mirrors the vote shares of multiple parties. In the prototype mixed‐member system, half the seats in a legislative chamber (the nominal tier) are elected in single‐seat districts and the other half (the list tier) are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation; such systems come in a wide variety of options, with the most important choices involved being those of how seats and/or votes are linked between the two tiers. Defines mixed‐member electoral systems as a subset of the broader category of multiple‐tier electoral systems. The typology of systems outlined is arranged in three main sections: Mixed‐Member Systems as Variants of Multiple‐Tier Electoral Systems; Majoritarian or Proportional: Linkage Between Nominal and Tier Lists—mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed‐member proportional (MMP) systems; and How MMM and MMP Systems Work: Simple Systems and Additional Variables—this section includes a table of mixed‐member systems in use around the world in 1999.
Jack Vowles
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240562
- eISBN:
- 9780191600296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240566.003.0014
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
The first introductory section discusses the evolution of the current party system in New Zealand, from a system dominated by the two parties around which it had aligned in the 1930s, to the ...
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The first introductory section discusses the evolution of the current party system in New Zealand, from a system dominated by the two parties around which it had aligned in the 1930s, to the consequences for party composition and representation of the change from the first past the post (FPTP) or single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system, to the new mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system under which the 1996 and 1999 elections were fought. The second introductory section discusses theoretical issues associated with party system dealignment that has resulted. The next three sections cover the same topics as those in the other country case studies in the book, and examine party legitimacy, party organizational strength (party finance, staffing, membership activity, and media), and systemic functionality (governance, interest articulation and aggregation, political recruitment, and political communication and education).Less
The first introductory section discusses the evolution of the current party system in New Zealand, from a system dominated by the two parties around which it had aligned in the 1930s, to the consequences for party composition and representation of the change from the first past the post (FPTP) or single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system, to the new mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system under which the 1996 and 1999 elections were fought. The second introductory section discusses theoretical issues associated with party system dealignment that has resulted. The next three sections cover the same topics as those in the other country case studies in the book, and examine party legitimacy, party organizational strength (party finance, staffing, membership activity, and media), and systemic functionality (governance, interest articulation and aggregation, political recruitment, and political communication and education).
Pippa Norris
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295686
- eISBN:
- 9780191600043
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295685.003.0011
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Substantial cross‐national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries ...
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Substantial cross‐national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries exist. It identifies at least three separate schools of thought seeking to explain this phenomenon: the role of cultural values, government performance, and political institutions. Comparisons are made among a broad range of political systems, drawing on the 1981–4, 1990–1 and 1995–7 World Values Surveys, the Latinobarometer and the Eurobarometer, and various support hypotheses are advanced (support for the party in government; dependence on level of democratization; differences between presidential and parliamentary systems (executive structure); variation with party system; differences between federal and unitary state structures; and variation with electoral system) and tested. The findings indicate that institutional confidence is most likely to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterized by plurality electoral systems, two‐party or moderate multi‐party systems, and unitary states, and that these relationships are confirmed even after controlling for differences in levels of economic development and post‐material values; social background and education are also related to institutional confidence, while the influence of socioeconomic status and gender are very modest. The results replicate one of the main theoretical principles of Anderson and Guillory (1997)—that winners express more confidence in the system than losers, and they also show that majoritarian institutions tend to produce greater institutional confidence than consociational arrangements.Less
Substantial cross‐national variations have been demonstrated in political support/institutional confidence; the aim of this chapter is to investigate why these major differences between countries exist. It identifies at least three separate schools of thought seeking to explain this phenomenon: the role of cultural values, government performance, and political institutions. Comparisons are made among a broad range of political systems, drawing on the 1981–4, 1990–1 and 1995–7 World Values Surveys, the Latinobarometer and the Eurobarometer, and various support hypotheses are advanced (support for the party in government; dependence on level of democratization; differences between presidential and parliamentary systems (executive structure); variation with party system; differences between federal and unitary state structures; and variation with electoral system) and tested. The findings indicate that institutional confidence is most likely to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterized by plurality electoral systems, two‐party or moderate multi‐party systems, and unitary states, and that these relationships are confirmed even after controlling for differences in levels of economic development and post‐material values; social background and education are also related to institutional confidence, while the influence of socioeconomic status and gender are very modest. The results replicate one of the main theoretical principles of Anderson and Guillory (1997)—that winners express more confidence in the system than losers, and they also show that majoritarian institutions tend to produce greater institutional confidence than consociational arrangements.
Robert E. Goodin
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199256174
- eISBN:
- 9780191599354
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199256179.003.0005
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
It is a long‐standing debate within political philosophy generally whether we want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair; while democratic theory has traditionally ...
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It is a long‐standing debate within political philosophy generally whether we want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair; while democratic theory has traditionally taken the latter focus, democracy can be defended in the former way as well; how that can be done is the subject of this chapter and the next. For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth’, while for procedural democrats, the aim is to embody certain procedural virtues. When voters are choosing between only two options, both epistemic and procedural standards point in the same direction, and in that case, Condorcet's jury theorem reassures both epistemic and procedural democrats that the correct outcome is most likely to win a majority of votes; however, where there are three or more options on the table, recommendations of the different strands of democratic theory diverge. In these cases, plurality voting is arguably the simplest and possibly the most frequently used voting rule, and this chapter demonstrates that the Condorcet jury theorem can indeed be generalized from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over many options; other decision rules, Condorcet pairwise criteria, Borda count procedures, and the Hare and Coombs systems have also been shown to have considerable truth‐seeking powers. This chapter addresses the question of which of these alternative possible democratic decision rules are the most reliable truth‐tracker in the more general ‘many‐option’ case.Less
It is a long‐standing debate within political philosophy generally whether we want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair; while democratic theory has traditionally taken the latter focus, democracy can be defended in the former way as well; how that can be done is the subject of this chapter and the next. For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth’, while for procedural democrats, the aim is to embody certain procedural virtues. When voters are choosing between only two options, both epistemic and procedural standards point in the same direction, and in that case, Condorcet's jury theorem reassures both epistemic and procedural democrats that the correct outcome is most likely to win a majority of votes; however, where there are three or more options on the table, recommendations of the different strands of democratic theory diverge. In these cases, plurality voting is arguably the simplest and possibly the most frequently used voting rule, and this chapter demonstrates that the Condorcet jury theorem can indeed be generalized from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over many options; other decision rules, Condorcet pairwise criteria, Borda count procedures, and the Hare and Coombs systems have also been shown to have considerable truth‐seeking powers. This chapter addresses the question of which of these alternative possible democratic decision rules are the most reliable truth‐tracker in the more general ‘many‐option’ case.
Paul Webb
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199240562
- eISBN:
- 9780191600296
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199240566.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
For thirty years following the end of the Second World War, it was orthodox to regard Britain as having one of the most stable and party‐oriented political systems in the Western world—parties ...
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For thirty years following the end of the Second World War, it was orthodox to regard Britain as having one of the most stable and party‐oriented political systems in the Western world—parties penetrated state and society so significantly that it was virtually impossible to conceive of political life in the country without thinking first and foremost of party political life. However, since the middle of the 1970s, old certainties have been challenged by a continuing and multi‐dimensional debate about the transformation of British party politics. This challenge is predicated on a number of interconnected developments, which include: the apparent growth of electoral volatility; the spread of partisan and class dealignment; the emergence of nationalist cleavages in Scotland and Wales, which have threatened to fragment the national political culture; the erosion of two‐party electoral domination; and the growing chorus of criticism levelled at the damaging iniquities of the electoral system and the adversarial ‘winner‐takes‐all’ political mentality that is closely associated with it. Despite this, the single‐member plurality (SMP) (first‐past‐the‐post) electoral system continues to ensure that single‐party majority governments remain the norm. This chapter looks at what such changes imply for the general status of parties in the country, and is arranged in the same three sections as the other country case studies in the book; these examine the popular legitimacy of British political parties, their organizational strength, and their systemic functionalities (in governance and political recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation, political communication, and political participation).Less
For thirty years following the end of the Second World War, it was orthodox to regard Britain as having one of the most stable and party‐oriented political systems in the Western world—parties penetrated state and society so significantly that it was virtually impossible to conceive of political life in the country without thinking first and foremost of party political life. However, since the middle of the 1970s, old certainties have been challenged by a continuing and multi‐dimensional debate about the transformation of British party politics. This challenge is predicated on a number of interconnected developments, which include: the apparent growth of electoral volatility; the spread of partisan and class dealignment; the emergence of nationalist cleavages in Scotland and Wales, which have threatened to fragment the national political culture; the erosion of two‐party electoral domination; and the growing chorus of criticism levelled at the damaging iniquities of the electoral system and the adversarial ‘winner‐takes‐all’ political mentality that is closely associated with it. Despite this, the single‐member plurality (SMP) (first‐past‐the‐post) electoral system continues to ensure that single‐party majority governments remain the norm. This chapter looks at what such changes imply for the general status of parties in the country, and is arranged in the same three sections as the other country case studies in the book; these examine the popular legitimacy of British political parties, their organizational strength, and their systemic functionalities (in governance and political recruitment, interest articulation and aggregation, political communication, and political participation).
Josep M. Colomer
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241835
- eISBN:
- 9780191598975
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019924183X.003.0003
- Subject:
- Political Science, Comparative Politics
Voting rules producing a single absolute winner include unanimity, majority, and plurality rules. Multiple winners are created, in contrast, by electoral systems of proportional representation and ...
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Voting rules producing a single absolute winner include unanimity, majority, and plurality rules. Multiple winners are created, in contrast, by electoral systems of proportional representation and further multi‐party coalition formation. Different electoral rules are evaluated for the frequency with which they produce winners, corresponding to the median voter's preference.Less
Voting rules producing a single absolute winner include unanimity, majority, and plurality rules. Multiple winners are created, in contrast, by electoral systems of proportional representation and further multi‐party coalition formation. Different electoral rules are evaluated for the frequency with which they produce winners, corresponding to the median voter's preference.
Andrew Reynolds
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198295105
- eISBN:
- 9780191600128
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198295103.003.0004
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
This is the third of four chapters that discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research on democratization in southern Africa that is described in the book, and deals with the theoretical ...
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This is the third of four chapters that discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research on democratization in southern Africa that is described in the book, and deals with the theoretical debate underlying the choice of electoral system in divided societies. The five sections of the chapter are: The Importance of Electoral Systems; The Range of Electoral Systems; What Criteria Should Electoral Systems Aim to Fulfil?; The Debate over Electoral Systems and Conflict Management in Africa (single-member district plurality, proportional representation, the alternative vote in multi-member districts (the Horowitz proposal for South Africa); and Conclusion. The overall discussion includes reference not only to four of the country case studies presented in the rest of the book (Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) but also to numerous other countries worldwide.Less
This is the third of four chapters that discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the research on democratization in southern Africa that is described in the book, and deals with the theoretical debate underlying the choice of electoral system in divided societies. The five sections of the chapter are: The Importance of Electoral Systems; The Range of Electoral Systems; What Criteria Should Electoral Systems Aim to Fulfil?; The Debate over Electoral Systems and Conflict Management in Africa (single-member district plurality, proportional representation, the alternative vote in multi-member districts (the Horowitz proposal for South Africa); and Conclusion. The overall discussion includes reference not only to four of the country case studies presented in the rest of the book (Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) but also to numerous other countries worldwide.
