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This develops an argument applicable primarily to reform in established democracies, but potentially offering insight into choices in new democracies as well: that there are certain electoral systems that may be seen as extreme on one (or both) of two dimensions—interparty and intraparty. The interparty dimension refers to the degree to which, on the one hand, a single party forms a majority government on well under a majority of votes, or, on the other hand, coalitions are formed among several parties; the intraparty dimension refers to a continuum of electoral systems from those in which legislators depend exclusively on their own personal votes to those in which votes are given exclusively to parties such that legislators have no direct ties to voters. Suggests that electoral systems that are extreme on one or both of these dimensions are inherently prone to reformist pressures, and also shows that much of the appeal of mixed‐member systems derives from how they appear to balance the extremes on each of these dimensions: the trade‐off on the interparty dimension, which is between majoritarian and proportional forms of representation; and the trade‐off on the intraparty dimension, which is between ‘strong candidates’ and ‘strong parties’. Brief studies are presented of five cases of reform from extreme electoral systems to mixed‐member systems: New Zealand (formerly a pluralitarian system); Italy and Israel (formerly hyper‐representative systems); Japan (formerly a hyper‐personalistic system); and Venezuela (formerly a hyper‐centralized system). The ideas presented in the chapter form the basis for the set of key questions presented to the authors of the country chapters in Part II of the book.

Explores several of the factors that significantly affected the transition of New Zealand's political system from a pluralitarian (extreme majoritarian) system famous for its tranquil efficacy to an MMP (mixed‐member proportional) system renowned for its vengeful reformism. These factors include: (1) dealignment; (2) minor party under‐representation; (3) the under‐representation of minority groups in an era of increasing multiculturalism; (4) radical, unpopular economic reform by successive Labour and National party governments; and (5) the parliamentary ‘other side’ of the calculus—the provision of both a Royal Commission, which highlighted representational failings of the Westminster system while legitimating MMP specifically as an alternative electoral system, and indicative and binding referendums, which gave New Zealand's voters the final say in determining the fate of the country's electoral system. The extent to which these issues were important in vote choices of electors in the 1993 referendum is also considered. A last section considers the overall explanations for New Zealand's turn to MMP, and the chapter includes a table that shows a timeline of electoral change in New Zealand since 1985 (the period immediately preceding the reform of 1993) and an appendix giving a sketch of the MMP system in New Zealand.