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The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke subjective identification and fair play. Some questions relating to political authority are also discussed, including the question of the standing to punish. Several objections that might or have been raised to plural subject theory, including some from A. John Simmons are noted, and responses are offered. The practical importance of political obligations according to the theory is discussed, and some substantive moral questions relating to them are noted.

Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social groups in general, and societies in particular. Defining a plural subject as a set of persons who are jointly committed in some way, it argues for an account of social groups as plural subjects. It argues that plural subjects can be large and possess the features of anonymity, hierarchy, impersonality, and inclusiveness. These features are typically associated with a society as a special type of social group.

A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.

The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements are possible and obligate the parties. The obligation in question is not a moral requirement deriving from a general moral principle, it is an obligation of joint commitment as discussed in Chapter 7. Actual contract theory can thus be defended against the no-obligation objection construed in terms of obligation simply; the no-agreement objection remains. Plural subject theory avoids both objections and is therefore to be preferred.

The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.

Building on the arguments about the need to maintain integrity in order to reason from Chapter 7, this chapter develops a variety of bases for reasonably responding to the invitations that others offer us as we reason. Integrity allows someone to bring considerations that stem from certain relationships to bear on reasoning within other relationships. This strategy is further worked out through a discussion of different approaches to the evaluation of reasons, one that derives from Hobbes and one from Hegel. The need to maintain integrity also generates grounds for responses that point to threats to one’s integrity. Finally, since direct harm to the self and the arbitrary frustration of its ends can threaten integrity, there are grounds for rejecting proposals that would interfere with the pursuit of one’s ends.

Plato was the first philosopher, to my awareness, to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g., you and I are two, but neither you nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that his account of plural-partaking can be employed to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relational Forms, which can explain their absence from Plato’s Theory of Forms. My contention is that a conception of plural-partaking in relative Forms—pairs of Opposites—can rest on the account Plato gives of plural-partaking in a Form. I hope that an account of related individuals through plural-predication will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on the subject.

Group jazz improvisation at the highest levels can achieve a kind of cooperative creativity that rises above the sum total of the contributions of the individuals. This phenomenon is widely recognized, but has resisted description beyond metaphors that refer to ‘special chemistry’ and the like. Some recent work in the philosophy of social action, on collective intention and group cognition, and on what has been helpfully called a ‘plural subject’, is brought together in this chapter with a close listening to the Stan Getz Quartet’s performance of the classic standard ‘On Green Dolphin Street’. As with discussions of group action in recent philosophical writings, here it emerges that qualities of the improvised performance are not reducible to individuated intentional content, and the notion of the plural subject provides both an analysis of it and the language for it.

Action in solidarity is in the first instance a case of acting together with others. Yet deference is essential to it. So solidarity can be roughly defined as political action on others’ terms. Unfortunately, contemporary theories of shared agency do not fully account for solidarity’s essentially deferential character or the relations among individuals and groups in solidarity. The chapter discusses Sangiovanni’s recent account of solidarity as joint action, challenging his analysis of solidarity in terms of shared goals, which cannot accommodate the limitations on knowledge and agreement typical of solidarity. The chapter then proposes a more satisfactory sufficient condition grounded in consummated deference, showing that this condition can be met not only when formal groups act in concert, but when previously disconnected individuals join together. The chapter shows that solidarity, so understood, can fit into both plural-subject and shared-intention theories of shared agency.

This essay probes an idea common to poets, philosophers, and psychologists that long-term marital relationships tend to involve a desirable kind of “fusion” or “merging” of the parties. After rejecting some possible accounts of such fusion it argues that one should focus on the fact that in a relationship of the kind in question the parties will come jointly to accept many opinions, values, principles of action and aims. Such jointly accepted opinions and so do not preclude the contrary personal views of the parties. They do entail obligations to help each other promote the common “cause”. Their proliferation is likely to encourage a strong sense of unity, which will be deepened when untrammelled by contrary personal views, and so on.