Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, ...
More
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, especially when associated with collective predication, the assumption takes the form of the thought that this is reference to collective entities, plural objects, or sets. Perhaps the most suggestive and profound, albeit notorious idea of this genre is Russell’s doctrine of the ‘class as many’. George Boolos’ explicitly ‘no-class’ approach to the logic of plurality is then compared favourably with ‘reductive’ approaches.Less
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, especially when associated with collective predication, the assumption takes the form of the thought that this is reference to collective entities, plural objects, or sets. Perhaps the most suggestive and profound, albeit notorious idea of this genre is Russell’s doctrine of the ‘class as many’. George Boolos’ explicitly ‘no-class’ approach to the logic of plurality is then compared favourably with ‘reductive’ approaches.
PETER SIMONS
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199241460
- eISBN:
- 9780191696930
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
This chapter discusses the mereology of three kinds of object for which it is reasonable to suppose the extensionality principle PPP holds: occurrents, classes, and masses. Classes and masses provide ...
More
This chapter discusses the mereology of three kinds of object for which it is reasonable to suppose the extensionality principle PPP holds: occurrents, classes, and masses. Classes and masses provide the most plausible concrete interpretations of classical extensional meteology. The ontological categories of class and mass have been relatively neglected by comparison with that of individuals, and they are introduced in the present chapter. The concept of class is not that found in contemporary set theory, but what is argued to be the old-fashioned notion of a plurality of individuals; this view is also explained in this chapter. Activities and performances are also discussed, along with plural reference, pluralities, analogies between ontology and mereology, mass reference and masses, parts of groups, and further possible applications of extensional mereology.Less
This chapter discusses the mereology of three kinds of object for which it is reasonable to suppose the extensionality principle PPP holds: occurrents, classes, and masses. Classes and masses provide the most plausible concrete interpretations of classical extensional meteology. The ontological categories of class and mass have been relatively neglected by comparison with that of individuals, and they are introduced in the present chapter. The concept of class is not that found in contemporary set theory, but what is argued to be the old-fashioned notion of a plurality of individuals; this view is also explained in this chapter. Activities and performances are also discussed, along with plural reference, pluralities, analogies between ontology and mereology, mass reference and masses, parts of groups, and further possible applications of extensional mereology.
Friederike Moltmann
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- May 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199608744
- eISBN:
- 9780191747700
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608744.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter deals with (apparent) reference to universals. A common view is that terms like wisdom and the property of being wise both refer to abstract objects. There is a range of linguistic ...
More
This chapter deals with (apparent) reference to universals. A common view is that terms like wisdom and the property of being wise both refer to abstract objects. There is a range of linguistic evidence, however, that this view is mistaken. Bare adjective nominalizations like wisdom have the status of kind terms and as such are best considered terms plurally referring to the various instances. Only the property of being wise is a term referring to an abstract property, but as such it is best viewed as a term that introduces a property on the basis of a corresponding predicate. This chapter also gives an introduction to plural reference and discusses parallels between plural terms and kind terms.Less
This chapter deals with (apparent) reference to universals. A common view is that terms like wisdom and the property of being wise both refer to abstract objects. There is a range of linguistic evidence, however, that this view is mistaken. Bare adjective nominalizations like wisdom have the status of kind terms and as such are best considered terms plurally referring to the various instances. Only the property of being wise is a term referring to an abstract property, but as such it is best viewed as a term that introduces a property on the basis of a corresponding predicate. This chapter also gives an introduction to plural reference and discusses parallels between plural terms and kind terms.
Friederike Moltmann
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716327
- eISBN:
- 9780191785030
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716327.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter discusses two approaches to the semantics of (definite) plurals: Reference to a Plurality and Plural Reference. Reference to a Plurality takes a definite plural noun phrase like “the ...
More
This chapter discusses two approaches to the semantics of (definite) plurals: Reference to a Plurality and Plural Reference. Reference to a Plurality takes a definite plural noun phrase like “the children” to stand for a single entity that is a plurality of some sort (a sum, set, or class). Plural Reference takes “the children” to refer to each child at once. The chapter will defend Plural Reference, rejecting both the extensional-mereological version of Reference to a Plurality and the information-based version in my earlier work, especially “Parts and Wholes in Semantics” (OUP 1997). In the semantics of natural language, pluralities are never treated as “single” entities or as particular types of entities. In a given context, though, pluralities may be structured and divided into lower-level pluralities. This requires carrying over some of the insights of the information-based theory for a full account of plurals within the Plural Reference approach.Less
This chapter discusses two approaches to the semantics of (definite) plurals: Reference to a Plurality and Plural Reference. Reference to a Plurality takes a definite plural noun phrase like “the children” to stand for a single entity that is a plurality of some sort (a sum, set, or class). Plural Reference takes “the children” to refer to each child at once. The chapter will defend Plural Reference, rejecting both the extensional-mereological version of Reference to a Plurality and the information-based version in my earlier work, especially “Parts and Wholes in Semantics” (OUP 1997). In the semantics of natural language, pluralities are never treated as “single” entities or as particular types of entities. In a given context, though, pluralities may be structured and divided into lower-level pluralities. This requires carrying over some of the insights of the information-based theory for a full account of plurals within the Plural Reference approach.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2000
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199241811
- eISBN:
- 9780191598029
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199241813.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
The extensional view that predicates are general terms that refer severally to the members of a set of objects that satisfy them is rejected. Instead, it is argued that predicates refer to ...
More
The extensional view that predicates are general terms that refer severally to the members of a set of objects that satisfy them is rejected. Instead, it is argued that predicates refer to properties, and are thus singular terms like names. The distinction between names and predicates is upheld, but it is argued that what accounts for it is not the spurious distinction between singularity and plurality of reference, but rather grammatical position, and the ontological type of the reference.Less
The extensional view that predicates are general terms that refer severally to the members of a set of objects that satisfy them is rejected. Instead, it is argued that predicates refer to properties, and are thus singular terms like names. The distinction between names and predicates is upheld, but it is argued that what accounts for it is not the spurious distinction between singularity and plurality of reference, but rather grammatical position, and the ontological type of the reference.
Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198791522
- eISBN:
- 9780191915468
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. Both assumptions are problematic, as is shown by providing a Henkin-style semantics for plural ...
More
Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. Both assumptions are problematic, as is shown by providing a Henkin-style semantics for plural logic that does not resort to sets but takes a plural term to have plural reference. This semantics gives rise to a generalized notion of ontological commitment, which is used to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic.Less
Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. Both assumptions are problematic, as is shown by providing a Henkin-style semantics for plural logic that does not resort to sets but takes a plural term to have plural reference. This semantics gives rise to a generalized notion of ontological commitment, which is used to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic.
Salvatore Florio and Øystein Linnebo
- Published in print:
- 2021
- Published Online:
- September 2021
- ISBN:
- 9780198791522
- eISBN:
- 9780191915468
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198791522.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Language
Plural logic provides an appealing framework for the regimentation of natural language plurals. However, the choice of a regimenting language leaves wide open the semantic question of how this ...
More
Plural logic provides an appealing framework for the regimentation of natural language plurals. However, the choice of a regimenting language leaves wide open the semantic question of how this language should be interpreted. One option is to interpret a plural term as denoting a non-empty set. Another is to embrace plurals in the metalanguage and take a plural term to have plural reference. A detailed comparison of the options reveals that there is no simple solution to the problem of choosing among them.Less
Plural logic provides an appealing framework for the regimentation of natural language plurals. However, the choice of a regimenting language leaves wide open the semantic question of how this language should be interpreted. One option is to interpret a plural term as denoting a non-empty set. Another is to embrace plurals in the metalanguage and take a plural term to have plural reference. A detailed comparison of the options reveals that there is no simple solution to the problem of choosing among them.
Mark Textor
- Published in print:
- 2017
- Published Online:
- September 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199685479
- eISBN:
- 9780191765636
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The chapter clarifies the conclusion of Brentano’s Duplication Argument. On Brentano’s view, a conscious mental act is directed on two objects, one of them being the act itself, but its plural ...
More
The chapter clarifies the conclusion of Brentano’s Duplication Argument. On Brentano’s view, a conscious mental act is directed on two objects, one of them being the act itself, but its plural reference is primitive, not due to the fact that the mental act has parts which each have reference on their own. Because of the plural reference the act can be brought under different partial concepts that are arrived at by abstraction. Brentano’s view is compared with contemporary versions of self-representationalism and shown not to admit of higher orders, double presentations, or indirect presentation of complexes. Brentano’s Duplication Argument makes plausible that awareness of perceiving can’t be such a complex that integrates independently existing mental acts; instead one simple act can have multiple objects.Less
The chapter clarifies the conclusion of Brentano’s Duplication Argument. On Brentano’s view, a conscious mental act is directed on two objects, one of them being the act itself, but its plural reference is primitive, not due to the fact that the mental act has parts which each have reference on their own. Because of the plural reference the act can be brought under different partial concepts that are arrived at by abstraction. Brentano’s view is compared with contemporary versions of self-representationalism and shown not to admit of higher orders, double presentations, or indirect presentation of complexes. Brentano’s Duplication Argument makes plausible that awareness of perceiving can’t be such a complex that integrates independently existing mental acts; instead one simple act can have multiple objects.
Massimiliano Carrara, Alexandra Arapinis, and Friederike Moltmann (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- June 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198716327
- eISBN:
- 9780191785030
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716327.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The aim of this volume is to present novel ways of thinking about plurality while casting new light on the interconnections among the logical, philosophical, and linguistic aspects of plurals. The ...
More
The aim of this volume is to present novel ways of thinking about plurality while casting new light on the interconnections among the logical, philosophical, and linguistic aspects of plurals. The volume brings together new work on the logic and ontology of plurality, and on the semantics of plurals in natural language. Plural reference—the view that definite plurals such as “the students” refer to several entities at once (the individual students)—is an approach favored by logicians and philosophers, who take sentences with plurals (“the students gathered”) not to be committed to entities beyond individuals, entities such as classes, sums, or sets. By contrast, linguistic semantics has been dominated by a singularist approach to plurals, taking the semantic value of a definite plural such as “the students” to be a mereological sum or set. Moreover, semantics has been dominated by a particular ontological view of plurality, that of extensional mereology. The volume aims to build a bridge between the two traditions and to show the fruitfulness of nonstandard mereological approaches. Thus, a good part of the contributions in this volume investigate new perspectives that arise from plural logic and non-standard mereology, and explore novel applications to natural language phenomena.Less
The aim of this volume is to present novel ways of thinking about plurality while casting new light on the interconnections among the logical, philosophical, and linguistic aspects of plurals. The volume brings together new work on the logic and ontology of plurality, and on the semantics of plurals in natural language. Plural reference—the view that definite plurals such as “the students” refer to several entities at once (the individual students)—is an approach favored by logicians and philosophers, who take sentences with plurals (“the students gathered”) not to be committed to entities beyond individuals, entities such as classes, sums, or sets. By contrast, linguistic semantics has been dominated by a singularist approach to plurals, taking the semantic value of a definite plural such as “the students” to be a mereological sum or set. Moreover, semantics has been dominated by a particular ontological view of plurality, that of extensional mereology. The volume aims to build a bridge between the two traditions and to show the fruitfulness of nonstandard mereological approaches. Thus, a good part of the contributions in this volume investigate new perspectives that arise from plural logic and non-standard mereology, and explore novel applications to natural language phenomena.
Daniel Z. Korman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732532
- eISBN:
- 9780191796760
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Arbitrariness arguments turn on the claim that there is no ontologically significant difference between certain of the objects that conservatives do believe in and certain of the ones they don’t. ...
More
Arbitrariness arguments turn on the claim that there is no ontologically significant difference between certain of the objects that conservatives do believe in and certain of the ones they don’t. This chapter shows how conservatives can identify ontologically significant differences in a wide range of cases. It argues that certain arbitrariness arguments can be defused by treating grammatically singular terms like ‘the Supreme Court’ as referentially plural, referring not to a single scattered object, but to nine objects (the nine justices), and shows that others can be defused by holding that the presence of creative intentions can make a difference to which objects exist.Less
Arbitrariness arguments turn on the claim that there is no ontologically significant difference between certain of the objects that conservatives do believe in and certain of the ones they don’t. This chapter shows how conservatives can identify ontologically significant differences in a wide range of cases. It argues that certain arbitrariness arguments can be defused by treating grammatically singular terms like ‘the Supreme Court’ as referentially plural, referring not to a single scattered object, but to nine objects (the nine justices), and shows that others can be defused by holding that the presence of creative intentions can make a difference to which objects exist.
Friederike Moltmann
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780199645268
- eISBN:
- 9780191755330
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
The common view, at least since Frege, is that terms like ‘the number of planets’ refer to numbers as abstract objects. On the basis of a range of linguistic evidence, I will argue that this view is ...
More
The common view, at least since Frege, is that terms like ‘the number of planets’ refer to numbers as abstract objects. On the basis of a range of linguistic evidence, I will argue that this view is mistaken. Instead I will argue that ‘the number of planets’ refers to a number trope, the instantiation of the property of being eight in the plurality of the planets.Less
The common view, at least since Frege, is that terms like ‘the number of planets’ refer to numbers as abstract objects. On the basis of a range of linguistic evidence, I will argue that this view is mistaken. Instead I will argue that ‘the number of planets’ refers to a number trope, the instantiation of the property of being eight in the plurality of the planets.
Graham Priest
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780199688258
- eISBN:
- 9780191767586
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688258.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter starts with a discussion of Parmenides’ view that there is just one object with no parts. Parmenides’ arguments are rejected. It then moves to Plato’s critique of Parmenides’ view in the ...
More
This chapter starts with a discussion of Parmenides’ view that there is just one object with no parts. Parmenides’ arguments are rejected. It then moves to Plato’s critique of Parmenides’ view in the Sophist. Plato draws a crucial distinction between a true unity and a sum of parts. This raises the question of how to understand mereological wholes, and the matter is examined in the rest of the chapter. It is argued that we may take an object to be identical with the sum of its parts, but not the plurality of its parts. Various objections are considered and rejected. It is also argued that nothingness may be seen as the mereological sum of the empty set. The idea is spelled out in technical detail in a formal appendix to the chapter.Less
This chapter starts with a discussion of Parmenides’ view that there is just one object with no parts. Parmenides’ arguments are rejected. It then moves to Plato’s critique of Parmenides’ view in the Sophist. Plato draws a crucial distinction between a true unity and a sum of parts. This raises the question of how to understand mereological wholes, and the matter is examined in the rest of the chapter. It is argued that we may take an object to be identical with the sum of its parts, but not the plurality of its parts. Various objections are considered and rejected. It is also argued that nothingness may be seen as the mereological sum of the empty set. The idea is spelled out in technical detail in a formal appendix to the chapter.
Daniel Z. Korman
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- January 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198732532
- eISBN:
- 9780191796760
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter gives a detailed presentation of the permissivist, eliminativist, and conservative theses under discussion. It distinguishes among a variety of different permissive and eliminative ...
More
This chapter gives a detailed presentation of the permissivist, eliminativist, and conservative theses under discussion. It distinguishes among a variety of different permissive and eliminative theses (e.g., universalism, plenitude, nihilism, and organicism) and explains how the arguments from the previous chapter are meant to motivate the different revisionary theses. It address a variety of attempts to show that there is a trivial answer to whether universalism and/or eliminativism is true. Finally, it includes some remarks about methodology and other background assumptions.Less
This chapter gives a detailed presentation of the permissivist, eliminativist, and conservative theses under discussion. It distinguishes among a variety of different permissive and eliminative theses (e.g., universalism, plenitude, nihilism, and organicism) and explains how the arguments from the previous chapter are meant to motivate the different revisionary theses. It address a variety of attempts to show that there is a trivial answer to whether universalism and/or eliminativism is true. Finally, it includes some remarks about methodology and other background assumptions.