Bennett W. Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567898
- eISBN:
- 9780191722387
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
This chapter offers a positive account of friendship in which at least certain kinds of friends are understood to be ‘other selves’, such that they, to a certain extent, share a capacity for ...
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This chapter offers a positive account of friendship in which at least certain kinds of friends are understood to be ‘other selves’, such that they, to a certain extent, share a capacity for autonomy. Section 8.1 examines a variety of alternative accounts of friendship and, in particular, their understanding of the kind of intimacy characteristic of friendship. The tentative, suggestive conclusion is that the intimacy of friendship crucially involves the friends being uniquely able to shape each other's thoughts, feelings, and lives, at least within particular domains defined within their friendship. They do this by ‘sharing’, in a stronger sense than that required by reciprocal love, not only their evaluative perspectives but also their activity and so their lives (within that domain). To start to make sense of such ‘sharing’, Section 2 examines standard accounts of shared activity, arguing that these accounts fail to do justice to the kind of shared activity characteristic of friendship. Section 8.3 provides an alternative account of this sort of shared activity, which gets expanded, in Section 8.4, into a general account of friendship.Less
This chapter offers a positive account of friendship in which at least certain kinds of friends are understood to be ‘other selves’, such that they, to a certain extent, share a capacity for autonomy. Section 8.1 examines a variety of alternative accounts of friendship and, in particular, their understanding of the kind of intimacy characteristic of friendship. The tentative, suggestive conclusion is that the intimacy of friendship crucially involves the friends being uniquely able to shape each other's thoughts, feelings, and lives, at least within particular domains defined within their friendship. They do this by ‘sharing’, in a stronger sense than that required by reciprocal love, not only their evaluative perspectives but also their activity and so their lives (within that domain). To start to make sense of such ‘sharing’, Section 2 examines standard accounts of shared activity, arguing that these accounts fail to do justice to the kind of shared activity characteristic of friendship. Section 8.3 provides an alternative account of this sort of shared activity, which gets expanded, in Section 8.4, into a general account of friendship.
Bennett W. Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567898
- eISBN:
- 9780191722387
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are ...
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Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.Less
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.
Sarah Stroud
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199579952
- eISBN:
- 9780191595233
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579952.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This chapter considers whether our moral entitlement to manifest certain kinds of partiality stems from a morally basic permission to be partial, or whether it can be accounted for in some other way. ...
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This chapter considers whether our moral entitlement to manifest certain kinds of partiality stems from a morally basic permission to be partial, or whether it can be accounted for in some other way. In particular, it explores the possibility of justifying partial conduct via a general moral prerogative to pursue our own projects. On this approach, in contexts of plural agency, where two or more people together pursue a joint project, we would have permission to favour our co-agents — but only in ways that relate to our joint project. While this approach might limit the scope of morally permissible partiality, it seems more faithful to the concerns that animate the partiality debates than the alternative of claiming an unrestricted basic right to be partial to whomsoever we wish.Less
This chapter considers whether our moral entitlement to manifest certain kinds of partiality stems from a morally basic permission to be partial, or whether it can be accounted for in some other way. In particular, it explores the possibility of justifying partial conduct via a general moral prerogative to pursue our own projects. On this approach, in contexts of plural agency, where two or more people together pursue a joint project, we would have permission to favour our co-agents — but only in ways that relate to our joint project. While this approach might limit the scope of morally permissible partiality, it seems more faithful to the concerns that animate the partiality debates than the alternative of claiming an unrestricted basic right to be partial to whomsoever we wish.
Kirk Ludwig
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- October 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780198755623
- eISBN:
- 9780191816765
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198755623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
This book develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the ...
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This book develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action. Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and it requires no group agents per se. Shared intention is a matter of agents in a group each intending that they bring about some end in accordance with a shared plan. Thus their participatory intentions (their we-intentions) differ from individual intentions not in their mode but in their content. Joint intentional action then is a matter of a group of individuals successfully executing a shared intention. The account does not reduce shared intention to aggregates of individual intentions. However, it argues that the content of we-intentions can be analyzed wholly in terms of concepts already at play in our understanding of individual intentional action. The account thus vindicates methodological individualism for plural agency. The account is contrasted with other major positions on shared intention and joint action, and defended against objections. A second volume extends the account to sentences about mob and institutional agency.Less
This book develops a novel reductive account of plural discourse about collective action and shared intention. Part I develops the event analysis of action sentences, provides an account of the content of individual intentions, and on that basis an analysis of individual intentional action. Part II shows how to extend the account to collective action, intentional and unintentional, and shared intention expressed in sentences with plural subjects. On the account developed, collective action is a matter of there being multiple agents of an event and it requires no group agents per se. Shared intention is a matter of agents in a group each intending that they bring about some end in accordance with a shared plan. Thus their participatory intentions (their we-intentions) differ from individual intentions not in their mode but in their content. Joint intentional action then is a matter of a group of individuals successfully executing a shared intention. The account does not reduce shared intention to aggregates of individual intentions. However, it argues that the content of we-intentions can be analyzed wholly in terms of concepts already at play in our understanding of individual intentional action. The account thus vindicates methodological individualism for plural agency. The account is contrasted with other major positions on shared intention and joint action, and defended against objections. A second volume extends the account to sentences about mob and institutional agency.
