Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate ...
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The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.Less
The book seeks to resolve the so-called ‘problem of mass nouns’ — a problem which cannot be resolved on the basis of a conventional system of logic. It is not, for instance, possible to explicate assertions of the existence of air, oil, or water through the use of quantifiers and variables which take objectual values. The difficulty is attributable to the semantically distinctive status of non-count nouns — nouns which, although not plural, are nonetheless akin to plural nouns in being semantically non-singular. Such are the semantics of a non-singular noun, that there can be no such single thing or object as the thing of which the noun is true. However, standard approaches to understanding non-singular nouns tend to be reductive, construing them as singular expressions — expressions which, in the case of non-count nouns, are true of ‘parcels’ or ‘quantities’ of stuff, and in the case of plural nouns, are true of ‘plural entities’ or ‘sets’. It is argued that both approaches are equally misguided, that there are no distinctive objects in the extensions of non-singular nouns. With plural nouns, their extensions are identical with those of the corresponding singular expressions. With non-count nouns, because they are not plural, there can be no corresponding singular expressions. In consequence, there are no objects in the extensions of non-count nouns at all. In short, there are no such things as instances of stuff: the world of space and time contains not merely large numbers of discrete concrete things or individuals of diverse kinds, but also large amounts of sheer undifferentiated concrete stuff. Metaphysically, non-singular reference in general is an arbitrary modality of reference, ungrounded in the realities to which it is non-ideally or intransparently correlated.
Bennett W. Helm
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199567898
- eISBN:
- 9780191722387
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are ...
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Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.Less
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter presents some preliminary considerations in favour of taking non-distributive predication seriously, introduces key concepts, and indicates some of the issues that need to be worked out ...
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This chapter presents some preliminary considerations in favour of taking non-distributive predication seriously, introduces key concepts, and indicates some of the issues that need to be worked out in order to have a successful treatment of non-distributive predication, plural quantification with a full range of quantifiers, and compound plural terms. It argues that although plural language is widely used and understood in ordinary discourse, further exploration of the notation and the semantics for such a language leads to some interesting insights and surprises.Less
This chapter presents some preliminary considerations in favour of taking non-distributive predication seriously, introduces key concepts, and indicates some of the issues that need to be worked out in order to have a successful treatment of non-distributive predication, plural quantification with a full range of quantifiers, and compound plural terms. It argues that although plural language is widely used and understood in ordinary discourse, further exploration of the notation and the semantics for such a language leads to some interesting insights and surprises.
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0002
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
A summary of the stages through which the modern state has passed historically. It began as authoritarian and patrimonial in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: it was the absolutist state. In ...
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A summary of the stages through which the modern state has passed historically. It began as authoritarian and patrimonial in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: it was the absolutist state. In the nineteenth century, it turned liberal and bureaucratic: the liberal state imposed the rule of law and assured civil rights. In the first part of the twentieth century, the transition to democracy was completed: it was the time of the liberal state, of elitist or liberal democracy, and, still, of bureaucratic administration. In the second part of that century, the state becomes social-democratic, and assumes a developmental character; democracy now is social or plural rather than just liberal. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the state is aiming to become social-liberal and republican; democracy is aiming to become participatory or republican; and administration is aiming to become managerial, or inspired by the principles of new public management.Less
A summary of the stages through which the modern state has passed historically. It began as authoritarian and patrimonial in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: it was the absolutist state. In the nineteenth century, it turned liberal and bureaucratic: the liberal state imposed the rule of law and assured civil rights. In the first part of the twentieth century, the transition to democracy was completed: it was the time of the liberal state, of elitist or liberal democracy, and, still, of bureaucratic administration. In the second part of that century, the state becomes social-democratic, and assumes a developmental character; democracy now is social or plural rather than just liberal. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the state is aiming to become social-liberal and republican; democracy is aiming to become participatory or republican; and administration is aiming to become managerial, or inspired by the principles of new public management.
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- November 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199261185
- eISBN:
- 9780191601507
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199261180.003.0006
- Subject:
- Political Science, Democratization
The social democratic state rises from the Great Depression and Second Word War. And up to the 1970s, the capitalist economies grow enormously, at the same time that social rights were recognized and ...
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The social democratic state rises from the Great Depression and Second Word War. And up to the 1970s, the capitalist economies grow enormously, at the same time that social rights were recognized and the welfare state implemented. The tax burden and the state apparatus grow to face the new social and developmental activities taken on by the state. With the social state emerges plural or public opinion democracy. Political elites diversify, including increasing representatives of the professional middle class. Capitalism also diversifies, and we can detect four models of capitalism: the Anglo-Saxon market model, the European social model, the Asian developmental model, and the Latin American mixed model of capitalism. Particularly in the later two models, a developmental bureaucracy rises.Less
The social democratic state rises from the Great Depression and Second Word War. And up to the 1970s, the capitalist economies grow enormously, at the same time that social rights were recognized and the welfare state implemented. The tax burden and the state apparatus grow to face the new social and developmental activities taken on by the state. With the social state emerges plural or public opinion democracy. Political elites diversify, including increasing representatives of the professional middle class. Capitalism also diversifies, and we can detect four models of capitalism: the Anglo-Saxon market model, the European social model, the Asian developmental model, and the Latin American mixed model of capitalism. Particularly in the later two models, a developmental bureaucracy rises.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements ...
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The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements are possible and obligate the parties. The obligation in question is not a moral requirement deriving from a general moral principle, it is an obligation of joint commitment as discussed in Chapter 7. Actual contract theory can thus be defended against the no-obligation objection construed in terms of obligation simply; the no-agreement objection remains. Plural subject theory avoids both objections and is therefore to be preferred.Less
The actual contract theory of political obligation is reconsidered in light of a plural subject account of agreements. Given the proposed account of agreements, both immoral and coerced agreements are possible and obligate the parties. The obligation in question is not a moral requirement deriving from a general moral principle, it is an obligation of joint commitment as discussed in Chapter 7. Actual contract theory can thus be defended against the no-obligation objection construed in terms of obligation simply; the no-agreement objection remains. Plural subject theory avoids both objections and is therefore to be preferred.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke ...
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The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke subjective identification and fair play. Some questions relating to political authority are also discussed, including the question of the standing to punish. Several objections that might or have been raised to plural subject theory, including some from A. John Simmons are noted, and responses are offered. The practical importance of political obligations according to the theory is discussed, and some substantive moral questions relating to them are noted.Less
The plural subject theory of political obligation is brought up against the tests proposed in Chapter 3, and compared and contrasted with several other theories, including those that invoke subjective identification and fair play. Some questions relating to political authority are also discussed, including the question of the standing to punish. Several objections that might or have been raised to plural subject theory, including some from A. John Simmons are noted, and responses are offered. The practical importance of political obligations according to the theory is discussed, and some substantive moral questions relating to them are noted.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0012
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ...
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The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.Less
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.
Henry Laycock
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- May 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199281718
- eISBN:
- 9780191603594
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199281718.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, ...
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The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, especially when associated with collective predication, the assumption takes the form of the thought that this is reference to collective entities, plural objects, or sets. Perhaps the most suggestive and profound, albeit notorious idea of this genre is Russell’s doctrine of the ‘class as many’. George Boolos’ explicitly ‘no-class’ approach to the logic of plurality is then compared favourably with ‘reductive’ approaches.Less
The curiously sweeping assumption that all reference is ‘ultimately’ singular — even in the case of plural or non-count reference — is presented and examined. In the case of plural reference, especially when associated with collective predication, the assumption takes the form of the thought that this is reference to collective entities, plural objects, or sets. Perhaps the most suggestive and profound, albeit notorious idea of this genre is Russell’s doctrine of the ‘class as many’. George Boolos’ explicitly ‘no-class’ approach to the logic of plurality is then compared favourably with ‘reductive’ approaches.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social ...
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Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social groups in general, and societies in particular. Defining a plural subject as a set of persons who are jointly committed in some way, it argues for an account of social groups as plural subjects. It argues that plural subjects can be large and possess the features of anonymity, hierarchy, impersonality, and inclusiveness. These features are typically associated with a society as a special type of social group.Less
Having articulated an account of joint activity in terms of joint commitment, and hence of those social groups that arise through the joint activity of certain persons, this chapter returns to social groups in general, and societies in particular. Defining a plural subject as a set of persons who are jointly committed in some way, it argues for an account of social groups as plural subjects. It argues that plural subjects can be large and possess the features of anonymity, hierarchy, impersonality, and inclusiveness. These features are typically associated with a society as a special type of social group.
Margaret Gilbert
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199274956
- eISBN:
- 9780191603976
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199274959.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Political Philosophy
A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all ...
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A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.Less
A political society was defined in Chapter 1 as a society with institutions of governance. These institutions are its institutions. Three kinds of institution of governance are discussed, all involving social rules of one kind or another: governing rules, personal rule, and rules of governance or constitutional rules. The nature of social rules is explored in counterpoint to the classical account of H.L.A. Hart, and an alternative joint commitment account is offered. Given this account, the members of a political society are jointly committed to uphold its institutions of governance. By the argument of the previous chapters, they will then be obligated to uphold the institutions in question. This is the gist of the plural subject theory of political obligation.
David B. Wong
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195305395
- eISBN:
- 9780199786657
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195305396.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out ...
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The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out of reasons that are persuasive to the other, but is also a disagreement in which coming to understand the other side brings along an appreciation of its reasons. The root of moral ambivalence is the existence of plural and irreducible moral values (e.g., special duties to particular people and groups, rights, utility, perfectionist ends or values, commitment to one’s own projects and undertakings, and attunement to the world) and our coming to understand how others could have made choices different from the ones we make in the face of conflicts among these values. Moral ambivalence poses difficulties for universalism. A case in point is ambivalence in the face of conflict between personal values (special duties, commitment to one’s own projects) and impersonal values (rights possessed by everyone, utility).Less
The case for pluralistic relativism begins with discussing a discomforting kind of moral disagreement that gives rise to moral ambivalence: this is not simply disagreement in which both sides run out of reasons that are persuasive to the other, but is also a disagreement in which coming to understand the other side brings along an appreciation of its reasons. The root of moral ambivalence is the existence of plural and irreducible moral values (e.g., special duties to particular people and groups, rights, utility, perfectionist ends or values, commitment to one’s own projects and undertakings, and attunement to the world) and our coming to understand how others could have made choices different from the ones we make in the face of conflicts among these values. Moral ambivalence poses difficulties for universalism. A case in point is ambivalence in the face of conflict between personal values (special duties, commitment to one’s own projects) and impersonal values (rights possessed by everyone, utility).
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
Because of the power and significance of first-order logic in its traditional form, restricted to distributive predication, it has been natural to try to express non-distributive plurals within that ...
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Because of the power and significance of first-order logic in its traditional form, restricted to distributive predication, it has been natural to try to express non-distributive plurals within that framework. Two approaches leap quickly to the mind of the student of standard first-order logic who is trying to come to terms with non-distributive plurals. The first is ‘the multiple relations idea’. The second is the adoption of some variety of singularism, representing plurals by a single object that encompasses many. This chapter presents some initial considerations for the case that it will ultimately be better to reconsider the underlying logic.Less
Because of the power and significance of first-order logic in its traditional form, restricted to distributive predication, it has been natural to try to express non-distributive plurals within that framework. Two approaches leap quickly to the mind of the student of standard first-order logic who is trying to come to terms with non-distributive plurals. The first is ‘the multiple relations idea’. The second is the adoption of some variety of singularism, representing plurals by a single object that encompasses many. This chapter presents some initial considerations for the case that it will ultimately be better to reconsider the underlying logic.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter develops a systematic semantics for non-distributive predication with plural quantification that does not employ the resources of set theory or any other ‘singularization’ of plural ...
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This chapter develops a systematic semantics for non-distributive predication with plural quantification that does not employ the resources of set theory or any other ‘singularization’ of plural reference. This methodological constraint has some value for philosophy (especially metaphysics), but it also has value for linguistics and for the foundations of mathematics.Less
This chapter develops a systematic semantics for non-distributive predication with plural quantification that does not employ the resources of set theory or any other ‘singularization’ of plural reference. This methodological constraint has some value for philosophy (especially metaphysics), but it also has value for linguistics and for the foundations of mathematics.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter develops some axioms that express the fundamental features of the among relationship. It shows that although among is interdefinable with one of on one understanding of the one of ...
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This chapter develops some axioms that express the fundamental features of the among relationship. It shows that although among is interdefinable with one of on one understanding of the one of relation, there is reason to think that that is not the only understanding available for one of, and that will help to clarify some issues in the semantics of plurals, especially concerning the status of the plurally plural (the perplural). The relationships among theory to set theory and to second-order logic are considered, and the reasons to think of among as a logical relationship are discussed. The first-order plural theory of among may provide a base for a first-order way of talking about everything, contrary to Tim Williamson's claim that second-order logic is needed for such ‘generality absolutism’.Less
This chapter develops some axioms that express the fundamental features of the among relationship. It shows that although among is interdefinable with one of on one understanding of the one of relation, there is reason to think that that is not the only understanding available for one of, and that will help to clarify some issues in the semantics of plurals, especially concerning the status of the plurally plural (the perplural). The relationships among theory to set theory and to second-order logic are considered, and the reasons to think of among as a logical relationship are discussed. The first-order plural theory of among may provide a base for a first-order way of talking about everything, contrary to Tim Williamson's claim that second-order logic is needed for such ‘generality absolutism’.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter develops a formal treatment of definite descriptions indicating how the singular and plural descriptions are related and exactly how they differ from (and are analogous to) mass ...
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This chapter develops a formal treatment of definite descriptions indicating how the singular and plural descriptions are related and exactly how they differ from (and are analogous to) mass descriptions. The formal theory is applied to produce a natural solution to a puzzle about plurals connected with Philip Bricker.Less
This chapter develops a formal treatment of definite descriptions indicating how the singular and plural descriptions are related and exactly how they differ from (and are analogous to) mass descriptions. The formal theory is applied to produce a natural solution to a puzzle about plurals connected with Philip Bricker.
Hagit Borer
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199263905
- eISBN:
- 9780191718182
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199263905.003.0004
- Subject:
- Linguistics, Semantics and Pragmatics
This chapter turns to the motivation for one more functional open value within the nominal domain: Classifier Phrase (CLmax), headed by the open value DIV (div. meaning ‘division’). It is argued that ...
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This chapter turns to the motivation for one more functional open value within the nominal domain: Classifier Phrase (CLmax), headed by the open value DIV (div. meaning ‘division’). It is argued that CLmax is responsible for the generation of mass vs. count structures and is assigned range, in English, both by plural inflection and by the indefinite article a. #P, on the other hand, is the merger location of all other determiners, including strong determiners, weak determiners, cardinals, and the definite article as well. The chapter looks at the mass-count distinction and the singular-plural distinction in a number of languages, particularly English and Chinese. It also discusses the affinity between bare mass nouns and bare plurals when contrasted with singulars, and provides for a typology of determiners across languages. As in the case of proper vs. common names, it is argued that no lexical listing is required to distinguish mass nouns from count nouns, and that, as in the case of proper/common names, the distinction is fundamentally structural, rather than lexico-semantic.Less
This chapter turns to the motivation for one more functional open value within the nominal domain: Classifier Phrase (CLmax), headed by the open value DIV (div. meaning ‘division’). It is argued that CLmax is responsible for the generation of mass vs. count structures and is assigned range, in English, both by plural inflection and by the indefinite article a. #P, on the other hand, is the merger location of all other determiners, including strong determiners, weak determiners, cardinals, and the definite article as well. The chapter looks at the mass-count distinction and the singular-plural distinction in a number of languages, particularly English and Chinese. It also discusses the affinity between bare mass nouns and bare plurals when contrasted with singulars, and provides for a typology of determiners across languages. As in the case of proper vs. common names, it is argued that no lexical listing is required to distinguish mass nouns from count nouns, and that, as in the case of proper/common names, the distinction is fundamentally structural, rather than lexico-semantic.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter focuses on the significance of the account of descriptions for the development of a theory of English pronouns, especially E-type pronouns. The uses of pronouns, pronouns as bound ...
More
This chapter focuses on the significance of the account of descriptions for the development of a theory of English pronouns, especially E-type pronouns. The uses of pronouns, pronouns as bound variables, and referential pronouns, and donkey sentences are discussed.Less
This chapter focuses on the significance of the account of descriptions for the development of a theory of English pronouns, especially E-type pronouns. The uses of pronouns, pronouns as bound variables, and referential pronouns, and donkey sentences are discussed.
Thomas J. McKay
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199278145
- eISBN:
- 9780191707971
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278145.003.0011
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This chapter shows how to use the material developed in the book to deal with some of the principal puzzles that have led people to the conclusion that the introduction of events into the semantics ...
More
This chapter shows how to use the material developed in the book to deal with some of the principal puzzles that have led people to the conclusion that the introduction of events into the semantics of English is important to understanding plurals. While events may be important to the semantics of English for other reasons, core issues involving plurals can be dealt with without giving a central role to events.Less
This chapter shows how to use the material developed in the book to deal with some of the principal puzzles that have led people to the conclusion that the introduction of events into the semantics of English is important to understanding plurals. While events may be important to the semantics of English for other reasons, core issues involving plurals can be dealt with without giving a central role to events.
Stephen Macedo
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- October 2017
- ISBN:
- 9780691166483
- eISBN:
- 9781400865857
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- DOI:
- 10.23943/princeton/9780691166483.003.0008
- Subject:
- Law, Family Law
This chapter examines the different forms of plural marriage and provides some historical background and context, focusing on the long-running conflict around polygamy in the Mormon Church in North ...
More
This chapter examines the different forms of plural marriage and provides some historical background and context, focusing on the long-running conflict around polygamy in the Mormon Church in North America. It asks whether we can justify prohibiting or denying recognition to polygamous marriages, whether we ought to drop restrictions based on numbers and focus on the quality of people's relationships, and on what grounds nonrecognition and discouragement of polygamy can be justified. It also considers the so-called “polyamory” and argues that same-sex marriage and polygamy have little in common, aside from being deviations from “traditional” monogamy. Finally, it explores plural marriage as a doctrinal tenet of the Mormons and the 1947 Supreme Court case Reynolds v. United States.Less
This chapter examines the different forms of plural marriage and provides some historical background and context, focusing on the long-running conflict around polygamy in the Mormon Church in North America. It asks whether we can justify prohibiting or denying recognition to polygamous marriages, whether we ought to drop restrictions based on numbers and focus on the quality of people's relationships, and on what grounds nonrecognition and discouragement of polygamy can be justified. It also considers the so-called “polyamory” and argues that same-sex marriage and polygamy have little in common, aside from being deviations from “traditional” monogamy. Finally, it explores plural marriage as a doctrinal tenet of the Mormons and the 1947 Supreme Court case Reynolds v. United States.
