Wesley A. Kort
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195143423
- eISBN:
- 9780199834389
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195143426.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Literature
The argument of this book is that a primary goal in the work of C. S. Lewis is to articulate a Christian worldview. Lewis based this project on his positive view of culture, nature, and human ...
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The argument of this book is that a primary goal in the work of C. S. Lewis is to articulate a Christian worldview. Lewis based this project on his positive view of culture, nature, and human relations. He addresses deficiencies in modern culture and the largely distorted relations of modernity to nature in order to restore culture as a supportive base for a Christian worldview. The book offers discussions of seven interests in Lewis's work: retrieval, reenchantment, houses, culture, character, pleasure, and celebration. The topics provide not only an analysis of Lewis's work but also a basis upon which readers who want to construct a worldview here and now can draw inspiration and direction from him.Less
The argument of this book is that a primary goal in the work of C. S. Lewis is to articulate a Christian worldview. Lewis based this project on his positive view of culture, nature, and human relations. He addresses deficiencies in modern culture and the largely distorted relations of modernity to nature in order to restore culture as a supportive base for a Christian worldview. The book offers discussions of seven interests in Lewis's work: retrieval, reenchantment, houses, culture, character, pleasure, and celebration. The topics provide not only an analysis of Lewis's work but also a basis upon which readers who want to construct a worldview here and now can draw inspiration and direction from him.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- August 2004
- ISBN:
- 9780199265169
- eISBN:
- 9780191601385
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/019926516X.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible ...
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Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.Less
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort ...
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This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.Less
This book is a philosophical study of the nature and value of happiness. Part I is devoted to critical discussion of the most important theories about the nature of happiness, understood as some sort of psychological state. Views discussed include sensory hedonism, local preferentism, Kahneman's theory, and Whole Life Satisfactionism. Part II of the book contains the exposition and defense of a novel theory about the nature and value of happiness. It is a form of attitudinal hedonism. The idea that a person's welfare, or well‐being, depends essentially on happiness is explained and (with reservations) defended, provided that happiness is understood according to the theory presented here. Part III of the book extends the discussion into some areas that bear on interactions between empirical research concerning happiness and philosophical inquiry into the same phenomenon. Current methods of measuring happiness are criticized and a new method is proposed. Philosophical implications of empirical research concerning happiness are evaluated.
Angela Leighton
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780197263037
- eISBN:
- 9780191734007
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197263037.003.0010
- Subject:
- History, Cultural History
This lecture discusses form, which is a term that has multiform meanings and is contradictory. It looks at the sense of form found in the works of Sylvia Plath, Elizabeth Bishop, and Anne Stevenson. ...
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This lecture discusses form, which is a term that has multiform meanings and is contradictory. It looks at the sense of form found in the works of Sylvia Plath, Elizabeth Bishop, and Anne Stevenson. Form is not simply as a matter of formal technique, but as an object in a tradition that goes back to Victorian aestheticism's playful commodifications of its own formal pleasures. It states that the sense of elegy may be greater or lesser, depending on the poem.Less
This lecture discusses form, which is a term that has multiform meanings and is contradictory. It looks at the sense of form found in the works of Sylvia Plath, Elizabeth Bishop, and Anne Stevenson. Form is not simply as a matter of formal technique, but as an object in a tradition that goes back to Victorian aestheticism's playful commodifications of its own formal pleasures. It states that the sense of elegy may be greater or lesser, depending on the poem.
Edmund T. Rolls
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780198570035
- eISBN:
- 9780191693793
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198570035.001.0001
- Subject:
- Neuroscience, Behavioral Neuroscience
The book links the analysis of the brain mechanisms of emotion and motivation to the wider context of what emotions are, what their functions are, how emotions evolved, and the larger issue of why ...
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The book links the analysis of the brain mechanisms of emotion and motivation to the wider context of what emotions are, what their functions are, how emotions evolved, and the larger issue of why emotional and motivational feelings and consciousness might arise in a system organized like the brain. The topics in motivation covered are hunger, thirst, sexual behaviour, brain-stimulation reward, and addiction. The book proposes a theory of what emotions are, and an evolutionary, Darwinian, theory of the adaptive value of emotion, and then describes the brain mechanisms of emotion. The book examines how cognitive states can influence emotions, and in turn, how emotions can influence cognitive states. The book also examines emotion and decision-making, with links to the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics. The book describes the brain mechanisms that underlie both emotion and motivation in a scientific form that can be used by both students and scientists in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, biology, physiology, psychiatry, and medicine.Less
The book links the analysis of the brain mechanisms of emotion and motivation to the wider context of what emotions are, what their functions are, how emotions evolved, and the larger issue of why emotional and motivational feelings and consciousness might arise in a system organized like the brain. The topics in motivation covered are hunger, thirst, sexual behaviour, brain-stimulation reward, and addiction. The book proposes a theory of what emotions are, and an evolutionary, Darwinian, theory of the adaptive value of emotion, and then describes the brain mechanisms of emotion. The book examines how cognitive states can influence emotions, and in turn, how emotions can influence cognitive states. The book also examines emotion and decision-making, with links to the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics. The book describes the brain mechanisms that underlie both emotion and motivation in a scientific form that can be used by both students and scientists in the fields of neuroscience, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, biology, physiology, psychiatry, and medicine.
Talbot Brewer
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- May 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199557882
- eISBN:
- 9780191720918
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557882.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to ...
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The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.Less
The virtue ethics movement in recent philosophical ethics can usefully be divided into two quite separate streams of thought. Some have turned to the texts of Plato and Aristotle for new answers to established questions in philosophical ethics, while others have sought a vantage point from which the basic questions of the field could themselves be put in question. The aim of this book is to elaborate and defend a version of the second, more radical sort of virtue ethics. The book begins with a fundamental reconsideration of the way in which thought makes itself practical in temporally extended activities and lives. This reconsideration yields an alternative picture of the self — a picture with recognizably Aristotelian and Platonic elements — and puts that picture to work in retrieving an unfamiliar conception of the proper task of philosophical ethics, one that provides a suitable home for retrieving the virtue concepts. The critical bite of the book is directed in the first instance at ideas that are prevalent among philosophers. Yet there is reason to think that these philosophical ideas express a conception of the self that shapes contemporary Western culture, and that hinders our capacity to make full sense of our activities, passions, and lives, or to attain full articulacy about the values to which we might hope to answer. The book argues that the rise of the fact/value distinction and of the characteristically modern distinction between person‐relative and impersonal goods are best understood as a story of encroaching confusion and not as the story of progressive discovery that they are often taken to be. The book culminates in an attempt to show that the ethical and epistemic virtues conduce to a single, monistic sort of goodness that fosters intimate relationships as well as healthy political community, and that overcomes the putative opposition between self‐interest and morality.
G. E. Moore
William H. Shaw (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- February 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780199272013
- eISBN:
- 9780191603181
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199272018.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results ...
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This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results are the test of right and wrong while rejecting utilitarianism’s hedonistic value theory. The book argues at length against attitudinal accounts of right and wrong, which threaten to undermine the objectivity or moral judgements. It also has important things to say about intrinsic value, free will, the motives of actions, and many other topics. Although Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica has overshadowed it, Ethics is a rich text that displays great philosophical skill and intellectual candour, and merits careful study in its own right. Moore himself always regarded the book favourably. Thirty years after its publication, he wrote, ‘I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments’. This edition of Ethics includes Moore’s essay, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’. It also contains an introduction by the editor, notes on the text, a brief chronology of Moore’s life, an index, and suggestions for further reading.Less
This book is a new edition of G.E. Moore’s Ethics, originally published in 1912. In it, Moore analyzes the utilitarian account of right and wrong in great detail, defending the doctrine that results are the test of right and wrong while rejecting utilitarianism’s hedonistic value theory. The book argues at length against attitudinal accounts of right and wrong, which threaten to undermine the objectivity or moral judgements. It also has important things to say about intrinsic value, free will, the motives of actions, and many other topics. Although Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica has overshadowed it, Ethics is a rich text that displays great philosophical skill and intellectual candour, and merits careful study in its own right. Moore himself always regarded the book favourably. Thirty years after its publication, he wrote, ‘I myself like [it] better than Principia Ethica, because it seems to me to be much clearer and far less full of confusions and invalid arguments’. This edition of Ethics includes Moore’s essay, ‘The Nature of Moral Philosophy’. It also contains an introduction by the editor, notes on the text, a brief chronology of Moore’s life, an index, and suggestions for further reading.
Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199798322
- eISBN:
- 9780199950393
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199798322.001.0001
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This book calls into question a number of influential modern notions regarding aesthetics by going back to the very beginnings of aesthetic thought in Greece and raising critical issues about Greek ...
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This book calls into question a number of influential modern notions regarding aesthetics by going back to the very beginnings of aesthetic thought in Greece and raising critical issues about Greek conceptions of how one responds to the beautiful. The analysis centers on a dominant aspect of beauty—the aural—associated with a highly influential sector of culture that comprised both poetry and instrumental music, the “activity of the Muses” named mousikê. The main argument relies on a series of close-grained readings of literary and philosophical texts, from Homer and Plato to Kant, Joyce, and Proust. Through detailed attention to such scenes as Odysseus’s encounter with the Sirens and Hermes’s playing of his newly invented lyre for his brother Apollo, the book demonstrates that the most telling moments in the conceptualization of the aesthetic are found in the Greeks’ debates and struggles over intense models of auditory pleasure. Despite a recent rebirth of interest in aesthetics, extensive discussion of this key cluster of topics has been lacking. Unlike current tendencies to treat poetry as an early, imperfect mode of meditating upon such issues, the author claims that Greek poetry and philosophy employed equally complex, albeit different, ways of articulating notions of aesthetic response. As a whole, the book discusses alternative modes of understanding aesthetics in its entirety.Less
This book calls into question a number of influential modern notions regarding aesthetics by going back to the very beginnings of aesthetic thought in Greece and raising critical issues about Greek conceptions of how one responds to the beautiful. The analysis centers on a dominant aspect of beauty—the aural—associated with a highly influential sector of culture that comprised both poetry and instrumental music, the “activity of the Muses” named mousikê. The main argument relies on a series of close-grained readings of literary and philosophical texts, from Homer and Plato to Kant, Joyce, and Proust. Through detailed attention to such scenes as Odysseus’s encounter with the Sirens and Hermes’s playing of his newly invented lyre for his brother Apollo, the book demonstrates that the most telling moments in the conceptualization of the aesthetic are found in the Greeks’ debates and struggles over intense models of auditory pleasure. Despite a recent rebirth of interest in aesthetics, extensive discussion of this key cluster of topics has been lacking. Unlike current tendencies to treat poetry as an early, imperfect mode of meditating upon such issues, the author claims that Greek poetry and philosophy employed equally complex, albeit different, ways of articulating notions of aesthetic response. As a whole, the book discusses alternative modes of understanding aesthetics in its entirety.
Timothy Schroeder
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195172379
- eISBN:
- 9780199849987
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195172379.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. Informed ...
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Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. Informed by contemporary science as much as by the philosophical tradition, this book reveals this common foundation and builds a new philosophical theory of desire that puts desire's neglected face — reward — at its core. This book delves into the way that actions and feelings are produced in the brain, arguing that a distinctive system is responsible for promoting action, on the one hand, and causing feelings of pleasure and displeasure, on the other. This system, the brain's reward system, is the causal origin of both action and feeling, and is the key to understanding the nature of desire.Less
Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. Informed by contemporary science as much as by the philosophical tradition, this book reveals this common foundation and builds a new philosophical theory of desire that puts desire's neglected face — reward — at its core. This book delves into the way that actions and feelings are produced in the brain, arguing that a distinctive system is responsible for promoting action, on the one hand, and causing feelings of pleasure and displeasure, on the other. This system, the brain's reward system, is the causal origin of both action and feeling, and is the key to understanding the nature of desire.
A. D. Nuttall
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198187660
- eISBN:
- 9780191674747
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198187660.001.0001
- Subject:
- Literature, Drama
Why does tragedy give pleasure? Why do people who are neither wicked nor depraved enjoy watching plays about suffering or death? Is it because we see horrific matter controlled by majestic art? Or ...
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Why does tragedy give pleasure? Why do people who are neither wicked nor depraved enjoy watching plays about suffering or death? Is it because we see horrific matter controlled by majestic art? Or because tragedy actually reaches out to the dark side of human nature? This wide-ranging, lively and engaging book offers a new answer to this perennial question. The ‘classical’ answer to the question is rooted in Aristotle and rests on the unreality of the tragic presentation: no one really dies; we are free to enjoy watching potentially horrible events controlled and disposed in majestic sequence by art. In the nineteenth century, Nietzsche dared to suggest that Greek tragedy is involved with darkness and unreason and Freud asserted that we are all, at the unconscious level, quite wicked enough to rejoice in death. But the problem persists: how can the conscious mind assent to such enjoyment? Strenuous bodily exercise is pleasurable. Could we, when we respond to a tragedy, be exercising our emotions, preparing for real grief and fear? King Lear actually destroys an expected majestic sequence. Might the pleasure of tragedy have more to do with possible truth than with ‘splendid evasion’?Less
Why does tragedy give pleasure? Why do people who are neither wicked nor depraved enjoy watching plays about suffering or death? Is it because we see horrific matter controlled by majestic art? Or because tragedy actually reaches out to the dark side of human nature? This wide-ranging, lively and engaging book offers a new answer to this perennial question. The ‘classical’ answer to the question is rooted in Aristotle and rests on the unreality of the tragic presentation: no one really dies; we are free to enjoy watching potentially horrible events controlled and disposed in majestic sequence by art. In the nineteenth century, Nietzsche dared to suggest that Greek tragedy is involved with darkness and unreason and Freud asserted that we are all, at the unconscious level, quite wicked enough to rejoice in death. But the problem persists: how can the conscious mind assent to such enjoyment? Strenuous bodily exercise is pleasurable. Could we, when we respond to a tragedy, be exercising our emotions, preparing for real grief and fear? King Lear actually destroys an expected majestic sequence. Might the pleasure of tragedy have more to do with possible truth than with ‘splendid evasion’?
J. C. B. Gosling
- Published in print:
- 1969
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243397
- eISBN:
- 9780191680670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243397.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses and establishes a connection between pleasure and human wanting, which is a more direct connection between ‘pleasure’ and one force of the word ‘want’. This relationship only ...
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This chapter discusses and establishes a connection between pleasure and human wanting, which is a more direct connection between ‘pleasure’ and one force of the word ‘want’. This relationship only holds with one out of many pleasure expectations, and is relied on by arguments for hedonism.Less
This chapter discusses and establishes a connection between pleasure and human wanting, which is a more direct connection between ‘pleasure’ and one force of the word ‘want’. This relationship only holds with one out of many pleasure expectations, and is relied on by arguments for hedonism.
J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246664
- eISBN:
- 9780191681035
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book aims to provide a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories of the nature of pleasure and of its value and role in human life, from the earliest times down to the period of ...
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This book aims to provide a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories of the nature of pleasure and of its value and role in human life, from the earliest times down to the period of Epicurus and the early Stoics. While there have been many valuable studies of particular aspects of the topic, and several surveys of the treatment of pleasure by individual ancient writers (notably the monographs of Tenkku and Voigthinder on Plato, and Lieberg and Rieken on Aristotle), this is the first attempt at a comprehensive review of the contribution of the ancient Greeks to the theoretical understanding of pleasure. In view both of the central position which the major thinkers of the period accorded to the topic and of the inter-connectedness of many of their theories, the authors believe that the lack of such a study was a lacuna in the literature which they should attempt to fill.Less
This book aims to provide a critical and analytical history of ancient Greek theories of the nature of pleasure and of its value and role in human life, from the earliest times down to the period of Epicurus and the early Stoics. While there have been many valuable studies of particular aspects of the topic, and several surveys of the treatment of pleasure by individual ancient writers (notably the monographs of Tenkku and Voigthinder on Plato, and Lieberg and Rieken on Aristotle), this is the first attempt at a comprehensive review of the contribution of the ancient Greeks to the theoretical understanding of pleasure. In view both of the central position which the major thinkers of the period accorded to the topic and of the inter-connectedness of many of their theories, the authors believe that the lack of such a study was a lacuna in the literature which they should attempt to fill.
Philip Burton
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199266227
- eISBN:
- 9780191709098
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266227.003.0007
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This chapter considers the presentation of language acquisition given in the Confessions. It is argued that Augustine presents this as being two-edged; language permits the child to interact with ...
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This chapter considers the presentation of language acquisition given in the Confessions. It is argued that Augustine presents this as being two-edged; language permits the child to interact with other speakers, but at the cost of being constrained within a system of language, ‘the authority of the ancestors’. The wider question of authority in the Confessions is then considered. It is suggested that authority may be seen as a positive, bottom-up recognition of what is useful and pleasurable, and that ultimately, the model for authority in language is the divine Logos.Less
This chapter considers the presentation of language acquisition given in the Confessions. It is argued that Augustine presents this as being two-edged; language permits the child to interact with other speakers, but at the cost of being constrained within a system of language, ‘the authority of the ancestors’. The wider question of authority in the Confessions is then considered. It is suggested that authority may be seen as a positive, bottom-up recognition of what is useful and pleasurable, and that ultimately, the model for authority in language is the divine Logos.
J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor
- Published in print:
- 1982
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198246664
- eISBN:
- 9780191681035
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246664.003.0010
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter analyzes Plato's views on pleasure in the Laws. It focuses on two main sections — 653–70 and 732–4 — where the following apparent differences from the Philebus are found: first, (660–3), ...
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This chapter analyzes Plato's views on pleasure in the Laws. It focuses on two main sections — 653–70 and 732–4 — where the following apparent differences from the Philebus are found: first, (660–3), we seem to be told that the good life is pleasantest (and cf. 733–4) and (663c) that a good man is a better judge of pleasure than a bad one, but also (667) that it is not pleasure that makes pleasant things good; further (733b–d) we are said all to want pleasure and the pleasantest life, and any other view shows ignorance. All these points sound very like the Republic. So either Plato has gone back on the Philebus and thinks he can, after all, give criteria for maximum pleasure which show the identity of the pleasantest life with the good life, or we have a pre-Philebus section of the Laws, or these remarks can be interpreted to conform with the Philebus.Less
This chapter analyzes Plato's views on pleasure in the Laws. It focuses on two main sections — 653–70 and 732–4 — where the following apparent differences from the Philebus are found: first, (660–3), we seem to be told that the good life is pleasantest (and cf. 733–4) and (663c) that a good man is a better judge of pleasure than a bad one, but also (667) that it is not pleasure that makes pleasant things good; further (733b–d) we are said all to want pleasure and the pleasantest life, and any other view shows ignorance. All these points sound very like the Republic. So either Plato has gone back on the Philebus and thinks he can, after all, give criteria for maximum pleasure which show the identity of the pleasantest life with the good life, or we have a pre-Philebus section of the Laws, or these remarks can be interpreted to conform with the Philebus.
Fred Feldman
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199571178
- eISBN:
- 9780191722547
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571178.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Chapter 2 contained criticism of sensory hedonism. Chapter 6 contains a defense of attitudinal hedonism about happiness. According to this theory, the atoms of happiness are episodes in which a ...
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Chapter 2 contained criticism of sensory hedonism. Chapter 6 contains a defense of attitudinal hedonism about happiness. According to this theory, the atoms of happiness are episodes in which a person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs. Principles about attitudinal pleasure are presented, emphasizing how it differs from sensory pleasure. Attitudinal Hedonism about Happiness is explained and defended. Many writers seem to assume that ‘happy’ in ordinary English is multiply ambiguous. In Appendix C some typical claims of ambiguity are reviewed. In fact, there is not much evidence to support the claim that ‘happy’ is ambiguous. It appears that in its central uses in ordinary English, ‘happy’ is vague, but fundamentally univocal. To say that a person is happy means—roughly—that he takes on balance more attitudinal pleasure than displeasure in things.Less
Chapter 2 contained criticism of sensory hedonism. Chapter 6 contains a defense of attitudinal hedonism about happiness. According to this theory, the atoms of happiness are episodes in which a person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs. Principles about attitudinal pleasure are presented, emphasizing how it differs from sensory pleasure. Attitudinal Hedonism about Happiness is explained and defended. Many writers seem to assume that ‘happy’ in ordinary English is multiply ambiguous. In Appendix C some typical claims of ambiguity are reviewed. In fact, there is not much evidence to support the claim that ‘happy’ is ambiguous. It appears that in its central uses in ordinary English, ‘happy’ is vague, but fundamentally univocal. To say that a person is happy means—roughly—that he takes on balance more attitudinal pleasure than displeasure in things.
Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- September 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199798322
- eISBN:
- 9780199950393
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199798322.003.0007
- Subject:
- Classical Studies, Literary Studies: Classical, Early, and Medieval
This short, concluding chapter sheds light on the differences between modern and ancient Greek aesthetics regarding, in particular, the conceptualization of aesthetic response. According to the ...
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This short, concluding chapter sheds light on the differences between modern and ancient Greek aesthetics regarding, in particular, the conceptualization of aesthetic response. According to the author, these differences point the way for contemporary thought to further explore and redefine the aesthetic.Less
This short, concluding chapter sheds light on the differences between modern and ancient Greek aesthetics regarding, in particular, the conceptualization of aesthetic response. According to the author, these differences point the way for contemporary thought to further explore and redefine the aesthetic.
George Rudebusch
- Published in print:
- 2002
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195159615
- eISBN:
- 9780199869367
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195159616.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy
This book argues that the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic 1 can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure and virtue as the good for human beings by ...
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This book argues that the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic 1 can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure and virtue as the good for human beings by identifying pleasant with virtuous activity for a human being (ch. 10). The argument is as follows: Socrates (in the Protagoras and Gorgias) can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure as the good for human beings (chs. 3–5). Socrates’ hedonism can be interpreted to be a compelling theory of modal, not sensate pleasure (chs. 6 and 7). Socrates (in the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Republic 1) can consistently and compellingly speak of virtue as the good for human beings (chs. 8 and 9). Chapter 2 defends the method of interpretation used throughout the book.Less
This book argues that the Socrates of the Apology, Crito, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic 1 can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure and virtue as the good for human beings by identifying pleasant with virtuous activity for a human being (ch. 10). The argument is as follows: Socrates (in the Protagoras and Gorgias) can consistently and compellingly speak of pleasure as the good for human beings (chs. 3–5). Socrates’ hedonism can be interpreted to be a compelling theory of modal, not sensate pleasure (chs. 6 and 7). Socrates (in the Apology, Crito, Gorgias, and Republic 1) can consistently and compellingly speak of virtue as the good for human beings (chs. 8 and 9). Chapter 2 defends the method of interpretation used throughout the book.
Jerrold Levinson
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199206179
- eISBN:
- 9780191709982
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206179.003.0013
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Aesthetics
This essay focuses on a particular musical phenomenon, namely, the distinctive and usually pleasurable chills, shivers, or frissons that listening to certain passages of music produce in many ...
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This essay focuses on a particular musical phenomenon, namely, the distinctive and usually pleasurable chills, shivers, or frissons that listening to certain passages of music produce in many listeners. This phenomenon is described and then situated in the field of musical pleasures as a whole, and the explanations of the phenomenon and its value that have been offered by cognitive psychologists are considered. A more satisfactory explanation is offered, one illustrated most fully in connection with a piano piece of Scriabin, his Etude in C# minor, op. 42, no. 5.Less
This essay focuses on a particular musical phenomenon, namely, the distinctive and usually pleasurable chills, shivers, or frissons that listening to certain passages of music produce in many listeners. This phenomenon is described and then situated in the field of musical pleasures as a whole, and the explanations of the phenomenon and its value that have been offered by cognitive psychologists are considered. A more satisfactory explanation is offered, one illustrated most fully in connection with a piano piece of Scriabin, his Etude in C# minor, op. 42, no. 5.
J. C. B. Gosling
- Published in print:
- 1969
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243397
- eISBN:
- 9780191680670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243397.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the different arguments regarding hedonism that are presented in the book. Most of the chapter is focused on providing a summary of the next eleven chapters, although a ...
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This chapter discusses the different arguments regarding hedonism that are presented in the book. Most of the chapter is focused on providing a summary of the next eleven chapters, although a conclusion is provided at the end of the chapter. It states that the hedonists are right in supporting that pleasure has a central importance in morality. While pleasure may not operate as the overall goal that hedonists have often wished it to be, it still has a more basic moral importance than most critics of hedonism have been prepared to allow.Less
This chapter discusses the different arguments regarding hedonism that are presented in the book. Most of the chapter is focused on providing a summary of the next eleven chapters, although a conclusion is provided at the end of the chapter. It states that the hedonists are right in supporting that pleasure has a central importance in morality. While pleasure may not operate as the overall goal that hedonists have often wished it to be, it still has a more basic moral importance than most critics of hedonism have been prepared to allow.
J. C. B. Gosling
- Published in print:
- 1969
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243397
- eISBN:
- 9780191680670
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243397.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This chapter discusses the different variations that are to be found among the views that are roughly classed together as hedonist. These come from two sources: the matter of what the philosopher in ...
More
This chapter discusses the different variations that are to be found among the views that are roughly classed together as hedonist. These come from two sources: the matter of what the philosopher in question is out to do, and the matter of what sort of thing he thinks pleasure is.Less
This chapter discusses the different variations that are to be found among the views that are roughly classed together as hedonist. These come from two sources: the matter of what the philosopher in question is out to do, and the matter of what sort of thing he thinks pleasure is.
