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Activists and scholars are proposing the idea of platform cooperativism as a way to democratize the governance of extractive platforms of digital capitalism. Platform Cooperativism reworks the idea of the cooperative model, adapting it to the new challenges of digital technology with a participatory governance model based on a multistakeholder approach with the aim of redistributing part of the value generated to the community. The chapter aims to compare capitalist platforms with cooperative platforms in two foundational sectors (transport and welfare). Platform co-ops are characterized not only by localism, but also by their desire to scale differently from the capitalist model (scale deep instead of scale up), through partnerships with other operators and through alternative financial tools (impact investing and patient capital). While the transport sector was a forerunner in trialling digital platforms, the welfare sector only recently began the process, with all the consequences in terms of the advantages and disadvantages for early adopters compared with late followers. However, important differences also exist between platforms that begin as green-field start-ups and brown-field platforms; the former are more prevalent in transport, the latter in the welfare sector, due in part to greater barriers to entry for people lacking sector-specific skills and experience.

Chapter 6 analyzes a new form of economy, enabled by ICTs, digital platforms, and smart devices to connect transactors (sharers or buyers and sellers) who may not have been able to cooperate otherwise. It provides an overview of the phenomenon of “the platform revolution” (from classic value chain logic to platform business logic). It goes on to explain different types of platform (innovation platform, transaction platform, integration platform), the principles of platform business (network effects, the distribution power law, asymmetric growth and competition) and the tacit cooperative strategies of suppliers, platform providers, and customers. Cooperation is tacit—providers do not interact and customers do not interact, except through ratings. The platform system is set up to maintain this condition. The chapter concludes with an overview of platform governance.

This chapter explores how the gig economy works. It looks at some of the most important platforms and illustrates their central role in shaping transactions between consumers and workers. Digital work intermediation, in particular, is key to understanding the gig economy: here, platforms’ sophisticated algorithms connect workers and customers, and exercise ongoing control over the ensuing relationships. The chapter then charts the astonishing variety and global growth of the gig economy, with a particular emphasis on how platforms make money, from improved matchmaking to regulatory arbitrage. Finally, this chapter turns to the broader impacts of digital work intermediation, considering how platforms go beyond mere matchmaking to shape the experiences of workers and consumers.

This chapter charts which rules concerning contracts and consumer protection have until now emerged in public and private regulation. These contain a mix of public regulation, co-regulation, codes of conduct, soft law projects to develop model rules, and reputational feedback systems. Also, online dispute resolution can in practice be a source of norms, as norms developed in this context are often through a feedback loop used to improve the quality of services offered by platform operators. Here, the chapter places the focus on the platform economy. Platforms themselves are actively working to provide mechanisms that can, at least partly, overcome the problems of enforcing consumer rights. They have an interest in securing trust between users who, even more than consumers in the offline world, are at a disadvantage in establishing the quality of goods and services and the reliability of their counterparty. Platforms therefore use mechanisms that can fill in a ‘regulatory void’.

This chapter analyses the relations between the various sources of norms introduced in the previous chapter to assess the space for deliberation between lawmaking actors. To that end, the substance of norms developed in private regulation by platforms and through contracting is tested against the objectives and values of existing rules of EU and national contract and consumer laws to establish whether these are adhered to, or not. In terms of substance, the case study focuses in particular on transparency in contracting, that is, the question whether terms and conditions are clear and comprehensible to parties entering into contracts. Practically, two platforms are selected for the case study. One is aimed at connecting users for the exchange of services (Airbnb) and the other for the exchange of goods (Amazon).

This introductory chapter presents the major themes of study and narrows the scope of research to the European Union (EU). It briefly examines developing trends in the market for consumer goods and services as well as the legal systems which changed to accommodate these trends. In particular, the chapter focuses on the platform economy. It discusses issues arising from these developments, especially as they apply to private law. Private law concerns the contractual rights that suppliers and customers have vis-à-vis each other and their potential liability. However, whereas the rights and duties of these parties would normally be governed by rules of national contract and consumer law, or perhaps also by rules of European origin if the parties are in the EU, the platform economy has created a private sphere that operates largely through other mechanisms. From here, the chapter introduces research questions as well as a new approach to lawmaking in European law.

New York Tech Meetup emerged in the early 2000s as a formative organization in the city’s innovation ecosystem. Every month, hundreds of mostly young people and a few potential investors come to see computer coders and startup founders “demo” new apps and platforms they have created. In the 2010s, the tech meetup was joined by other organizations that also claimed to mobilize and speak for New York’s tech “community,” notably, the nonprofit organization Civic Hall, specializing in “civic tech,” and Tech:NYC, a nonprofit industry association. The chapter uses ethnographic observations and interviews with leaders of these organizations to document their efforts to “leverage” the membership for a role in tech policymaking in the city.

With the publication of its White Paper on Artificial Intelligence—A European Approach to Excellence and Trust, the European Commission has set the stage for regulatory measures to ensure that the diffusion of artificial intelligence (AI) will remain acceptable to market participants, data subjects, and citizens. While recognizing the immense promise that AI holds for economic development, it also points to serious concerns over privacy, accuracy, and equity of automated decision systems, and economic dominance and abuse by platform providers. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have, from the perspective of competition law and policy, always raised questions about the justification of their exercise in light of economic dominance. The use of AI in traditional business models involving sales and online services, but also new applications such as Internet of Things (IoT), digital twinning and AI of Things (AIoT), otherwise known as Edge Computing, is set to create new forms of dominance that is reinforced by intellectual property in relation to data, software, and trade secrecy. This chapter deals with the intellectual property system and how it may have to be adapted for its continued acceptance as instrument to engender trust in the sustainable development of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) platform technologies, and AI in particular. It is argued that competition policy that recognizes and safeguards consumer interests in AI-dominated markets is key to the smooth functioning of such a platform economy.