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This chapter applies the criteria of assessment developed in Chapter 1 to the physicalist doctrine as developed in Chapters 3 to 5. It argues that the theses constitute adequate expressions of physicalist thought, and defends them against a wide range of objections, many of which are premised upon dated or improper formulations of physicalism. Of special importance is the identification of numerous unnecessary monopolistic overtones characteristic of many past formulations of the doctrine. The chapter discusses evidence bearing upon acceptance or rejection of the theses and identifies the principal obstacles to the success of the physicalist programme. What then emerges is a version of physicalism that is stronger than most extant versions, that is arguably defensible in the light of objections, and that does not fly in the face of obviously insurmountable obstacles. It is argued that the physicalist programme is alive and well, though, like any programme concerned with building, rather than decreeing, significant systems of knowledge, it faces many difficult obstacles to its successful completion.

This chapter formulates a number of metatheses concerning the physicalist principles just developed. The importance of framing metatheses lies in the clarification they provide concerning the kind of theses that physicalism involves (for example, a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent), the kinds of considerations that are relevant to acceptance or rejection of the theses, the domains to which the theses are supposed to apply, and the ways in which the theses can be used in the conduct of inquiry. They play an important part in gaining an understanding of the significance of the physicalist programme.

This chapter surveys aspects of the significance of the physicalist programme for philosophy, science, culture, and the individual. This is a less systematic and less comprehensive discussion than that which preceded it, but it is, none the less, important for gaining some insight into why physicalism matters and for setting the stage for future work. The overall perspective is that physicalism provides a significant framework for effectively integrating facts and values in the pursuit of our deepest and most important cognitive and non-cognitive objectives. It underwrites much activity in philosophy, science, and society. It provides a framework for integrating the many ways in which we understand ourselves and our world, a framework that has significant potential for promoting human well-being.