Joseph Mendola
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199534999
- eISBN:
- 9780191715969
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534999.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book ...
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Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book propounds a plausible physicalist internalism, called qualia empiricism. Qualia empiricism is the conjunction of a modal structuralist account of perceptual experience, an account of the content contributed to thought by referring terms that deploys rigidified description clusters, and an account of non-epistemic internal resources that can bridge those first two elements. It also argues that externalism is supported by no reasons that withstand close scrutiny. These include case-based arguments and arguments entwined with externalist accounts of perceptual states and language. The book critically considers externalist arguments rooted in work by Putnam, Kripke, Burge, Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Prinz, Fodor, Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, Tye, Kant, Williamson, disjunctivists, Wittgenstein, Wright, Davidson, and Brandom, among others.Less
Externalism about mental content is the view that things outside of the skin or in the past are constitutive parts of present mental states. Internalism is the denial of externalism. This book propounds a plausible physicalist internalism, called qualia empiricism. Qualia empiricism is the conjunction of a modal structuralist account of perceptual experience, an account of the content contributed to thought by referring terms that deploys rigidified description clusters, and an account of non-epistemic internal resources that can bridge those first two elements. It also argues that externalism is supported by no reasons that withstand close scrutiny. These include case-based arguments and arguments entwined with externalist accounts of perceptual states and language. The book critically considers externalist arguments rooted in work by Putnam, Kripke, Burge, Millikan, Dretske, Papineau, Prinz, Fodor, Harman, Stampe, Stalnaker, Tye, Kant, Williamson, disjunctivists, Wittgenstein, Wright, Davidson, and Brandom, among others.
Gregg H. Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168143
- eISBN:
- 9780199850075
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there even be a credible alternative? In this book, the author addresses the causal role of consciousness in ...
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What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there even be a credible alternative? In this book, the author addresses the causal role of consciousness in the world from an anti-physicalist perspective. Introducing a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism, he offers a profound framework that proposes a deep link between consciousness and causation. Using this framework, he undercuts the logic of the historical debate and deflates the question of causality that physicalists have long been posing to anti-physicalists. Ultimately, he gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical.Less
What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there even be a credible alternative? In this book, the author addresses the causal role of consciousness in the world from an anti-physicalist perspective. Introducing a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism, he offers a profound framework that proposes a deep link between consciousness and causation. Using this framework, he undercuts the logic of the historical debate and deflates the question of causality that physicalists have long been posing to anti-physicalists. Ultimately, he gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
Physicalism is a programme for building a unified system of knowledge based on the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. This book presents an exploration of ...
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Physicalism is a programme for building a unified system of knowledge based on the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. This book presents an exploration of the philosophical foundations of this programme. It investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; and the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist principles. The book reviews and evaluates major objections to the programme, and considers its significance for philosophy, science, society, and individual persons. An important theme of the book is that recent attempts to formulate a ‘non-reductive’ version of physicalism are inadequate and that the role of supervenience relations in expressions of physicalist thought is significantly limited. The book also examines the relations between physicalism and other philosophical positions, such as realism, empiricism, and relativism, and suggests that physicalism is compatible with a tolerant pluralism in the philosophical, cultural, and personal domains.Less
Physicalism is a programme for building a unified system of knowledge based on the view that everything is a manifestation of the physical aspects of existence. This book presents an exploration of the philosophical foundations of this programme. It investigates the core ideas, motivating values, and presuppositions of physicalism; the constraints upon an adequate formulation of physicalist doctrine; and the epistemological and modal status, the scope, and the methodological roles of physicalist principles. The book reviews and evaluates major objections to the programme, and considers its significance for philosophy, science, society, and individual persons. An important theme of the book is that recent attempts to formulate a ‘non-reductive’ version of physicalism are inadequate and that the role of supervenience relations in expressions of physicalist thought is significantly limited. The book also examines the relations between physicalism and other philosophical positions, such as realism, empiricism, and relativism, and suggests that physicalism is compatible with a tolerant pluralism in the philosophical, cultural, and personal domains.
Gregg Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168143
- eISBN:
- 9780199850075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.003.0015
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter revisits the sliding tile puzzle metaphor that the author presented in the first part of this book. Through the challenges and regressive moves he made, the author was able to defend a ...
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This chapter revisits the sliding tile puzzle metaphor that the author presented in the first part of this book. Through the challenges and regressive moves he made, the author was able to defend a group of ideas that are at odds with the physicalist orthodoxy within science and the philosophy of mind. He was also able to link consciousness and causation through various presentations on the need to treat them together. Also, through the Theory of Natural Individuals, he was able to provide a new perspective from which to understand nature and open questions on the possibility for an actual empirical and philosophical research program.Less
This chapter revisits the sliding tile puzzle metaphor that the author presented in the first part of this book. Through the challenges and regressive moves he made, the author was able to defend a group of ideas that are at odds with the physicalist orthodoxy within science and the philosophy of mind. He was also able to link consciousness and causation through various presentations on the need to treat them together. Also, through the Theory of Natural Individuals, he was able to provide a new perspective from which to understand nature and open questions on the possibility for an actual empirical and philosophical research program.
Torin Alter
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195171655
- eISBN:
- 9780199871339
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness ...
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The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) — the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.Less
The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism — the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) — the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.
Ian Carter
- Published in print:
- 1999
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780198294535
- eISBN:
- 9780191598951
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0198294530.003.0008
- Subject:
- Political Science, Political Theory
Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems ...
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Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems encountered here include the fact that actions can have an indefinite number of descriptions, that they can be subjected to indefinite spatio-temporal division, and that they give rise to indefinitely long causal chains of events. Solutions to these problems can be found through an application of Donald Davidson’s notion of actions as particulars, and by thinking of act-tokens as located in particular units within a space-time grid. Once possible actions have been adequately individuated, a formula for the measurement of freedom can be constructed, adapting a formula originally proposed by Hillel Steiner and taking into account the compossibility of particular actions and the probability of their being unconstrained. Careful attention to the structure of sets of available actions helps to mitigate some of the supposed counterintuitive implications of this analysis. Furthermore, subscribing to this empirical approach to the measurement of overall freedom does not necessarily imply subscribing to an empiricist or physicalist conception of action.Less
Defending a non-value-based and therefore purely empirical conception of overall freedom must involve showing how available actions can, at least in theory, be individuated and counted. The problems encountered here include the fact that actions can have an indefinite number of descriptions, that they can be subjected to indefinite spatio-temporal division, and that they give rise to indefinitely long causal chains of events. Solutions to these problems can be found through an application of Donald Davidson’s notion of actions as particulars, and by thinking of act-tokens as located in particular units within a space-time grid. Once possible actions have been adequately individuated, a formula for the measurement of freedom can be constructed, adapting a formula originally proposed by Hillel Steiner and taking into account the compossibility of particular actions and the probability of their being unconstrained. Careful attention to the structure of sets of available actions helps to mitigate some of the supposed counterintuitive implications of this analysis. Furthermore, subscribing to this empirical approach to the measurement of overall freedom does not necessarily imply subscribing to an empiricist or physicalist conception of action.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter is devoted to the identification of the physical bases of the physicalist system. It critically reviews a number of past, failed, strategies for characterizing the bases, and suggests a ...
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This chapter is devoted to the identification of the physical bases of the physicalist system. It critically reviews a number of past, failed, strategies for characterizing the bases, and suggests a set of constraints upon any viable approach to this problem. Hence, the way is paved for the development of a more effective strategy. It also identifies and assesses a set of presuppositions of any significant formulation of physicalist theses. Such presuppositions exist because the content of physicalist claims depends upon there being a principled and determinate set of physical bases of the right sort to warrant privileged status in a physicalist system and the existence of such bases depends upon the truth of the presuppositions.Less
This chapter is devoted to the identification of the physical bases of the physicalist system. It critically reviews a number of past, failed, strategies for characterizing the bases, and suggests a set of constraints upon any viable approach to this problem. Hence, the way is paved for the development of a more effective strategy. It also identifies and assesses a set of presuppositions of any significant formulation of physicalist theses. Such presuppositions exist because the content of physicalist claims depends upon there being a principled and determinate set of physical bases of the right sort to warrant privileged status in a physicalist system and the existence of such bases depends upon the truth of the presuppositions.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter formulates a number of metatheses concerning the physicalist principles just developed. The importance of framing metatheses lies in the clarification they provide concerning the kind of ...
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This chapter formulates a number of metatheses concerning the physicalist principles just developed. The importance of framing metatheses lies in the clarification they provide concerning the kind of theses that physicalism involves (for example, a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent), the kinds of considerations that are relevant to acceptance or rejection of the theses, the domains to which the theses are supposed to apply, and the ways in which the theses can be used in the conduct of inquiry. They play an important part in gaining an understanding of the significance of the physicalist programme.Less
This chapter formulates a number of metatheses concerning the physicalist principles just developed. The importance of framing metatheses lies in the clarification they provide concerning the kind of theses that physicalism involves (for example, a priori or a posteriori, necessary or contingent), the kinds of considerations that are relevant to acceptance or rejection of the theses, the domains to which the theses are supposed to apply, and the ways in which the theses can be used in the conduct of inquiry. They play an important part in gaining an understanding of the significance of the physicalist programme.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter applies the criteria of assessment developed in Chapter 1 to the physicalist doctrine as developed in Chapters 3 to 5. It argues that the theses constitute adequate expressions of ...
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This chapter applies the criteria of assessment developed in Chapter 1 to the physicalist doctrine as developed in Chapters 3 to 5. It argues that the theses constitute adequate expressions of physicalist thought, and defends them against a wide range of objections, many of which are premised upon dated or improper formulations of physicalism. Of special importance is the identification of numerous unnecessary monopolistic overtones characteristic of many past formulations of the doctrine. The chapter discusses evidence bearing upon acceptance or rejection of the theses and identifies the principal obstacles to the success of the physicalist programme. What then emerges is a version of physicalism that is stronger than most extant versions, that is arguably defensible in the light of objections, and that does not fly in the face of obviously insurmountable obstacles. It is argued that the physicalist programme is alive and well, though, like any programme concerned with building, rather than decreeing, significant systems of knowledge, it faces many difficult obstacles to its successful completion.Less
This chapter applies the criteria of assessment developed in Chapter 1 to the physicalist doctrine as developed in Chapters 3 to 5. It argues that the theses constitute adequate expressions of physicalist thought, and defends them against a wide range of objections, many of which are premised upon dated or improper formulations of physicalism. Of special importance is the identification of numerous unnecessary monopolistic overtones characteristic of many past formulations of the doctrine. The chapter discusses evidence bearing upon acceptance or rejection of the theses and identifies the principal obstacles to the success of the physicalist programme. What then emerges is a version of physicalism that is stronger than most extant versions, that is arguably defensible in the light of objections, and that does not fly in the face of obviously insurmountable obstacles. It is argued that the physicalist programme is alive and well, though, like any programme concerned with building, rather than decreeing, significant systems of knowledge, it faces many difficult obstacles to its successful completion.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter surveys aspects of the significance of the physicalist programme for philosophy, science, culture, and the individual. This is a less systematic and less comprehensive discussion than ...
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This chapter surveys aspects of the significance of the physicalist programme for philosophy, science, culture, and the individual. This is a less systematic and less comprehensive discussion than that which preceded it, but it is, none the less, important for gaining some insight into why physicalism matters and for setting the stage for future work. The overall perspective is that physicalism provides a significant framework for effectively integrating facts and values in the pursuit of our deepest and most important cognitive and non-cognitive objectives. It underwrites much activity in philosophy, science, and society. It provides a framework for integrating the many ways in which we understand ourselves and our world, a framework that has significant potential for promoting human well-being.Less
This chapter surveys aspects of the significance of the physicalist programme for philosophy, science, culture, and the individual. This is a less systematic and less comprehensive discussion than that which preceded it, but it is, none the less, important for gaining some insight into why physicalism matters and for setting the stage for future work. The overall perspective is that physicalism provides a significant framework for effectively integrating facts and values in the pursuit of our deepest and most important cognitive and non-cognitive objectives. It underwrites much activity in philosophy, science, and society. It provides a framework for integrating the many ways in which we understand ourselves and our world, a framework that has significant potential for promoting human well-being.
Eli Hirsch
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199556182
- eISBN:
- 9780191721014
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter defends Saul Kripke's argument. The basic principle underlying the argument is that if a sentence contains only terms that pick out their referents essentially then, if the sentence ...
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This chapter defends Saul Kripke's argument. The basic principle underlying the argument is that if a sentence contains only terms that pick out their referents essentially then, if the sentence expresses a necessary truth, it is impossible for people in our epistemic situation to be mistaken in asserting the sentence. It seems clear that people in our epistemic situation might be mistaken in asserting the sentences that materialists assert as necessary truths. The option available to materialists is to claim that physicalist terms do not pick out their referents essentially. But that leads to an implausible view of physical reality akin to idealism.Less
This chapter defends Saul Kripke's argument. The basic principle underlying the argument is that if a sentence contains only terms that pick out their referents essentially then, if the sentence expresses a necessary truth, it is impossible for people in our epistemic situation to be mistaken in asserting the sentence. It seems clear that people in our epistemic situation might be mistaken in asserting the sentences that materialists assert as necessary truths. The option available to materialists is to claim that physicalist terms do not pick out their referents essentially. But that leads to an implausible view of physical reality akin to idealism.
Gregg Rosenberg
- Published in print:
- 2004
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195168143
- eISBN:
- 9780199850075
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
The argument against physicalism is an argument against the claim that the physical facts entail the facts about phenomenal consciousness. To be able to explain why orthodox physicalist's approaches ...
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The argument against physicalism is an argument against the claim that the physical facts entail the facts about phenomenal consciousness. To be able to explain why orthodox physicalist's approaches are unsatisfying, the author first presents the kinds of responses a physicalist may claim and categorizes them into three: appeals to a posteriori necessity, appeals to holism, and warnings about a greater absurdity. In this chapter, each of these strategies for responding to the anti-physicalist arguments is examined. Subsequently, the author outlines various reasons why he considers these responses inadequate.Less
The argument against physicalism is an argument against the claim that the physical facts entail the facts about phenomenal consciousness. To be able to explain why orthodox physicalist's approaches are unsatisfying, the author first presents the kinds of responses a physicalist may claim and categorizes them into three: appeals to a posteriori necessity, appeals to holism, and warnings about a greater absurdity. In this chapter, each of these strategies for responding to the anti-physicalist arguments is examined. Subsequently, the author outlines various reasons why he considers these responses inadequate.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter begins by setting out the primary objectives of the book, which are to clarify what it means to be a physicalist and to come to an understanding of the issues bearing upon whether ...
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This chapter begins by setting out the primary objectives of the book, which are to clarify what it means to be a physicalist and to come to an understanding of the issues bearing upon whether physicalism is indeed a worthy programme. It identifies the questions that must be addressed in order to establish the foundations of physicalism. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.Less
This chapter begins by setting out the primary objectives of the book, which are to clarify what it means to be a physicalist and to come to an understanding of the issues bearing upon whether physicalism is indeed a worthy programme. It identifies the questions that must be addressed in order to establish the foundations of physicalism. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter identifies the fundamental ideas and motivations that fuel the physicalist's thinking and that guides subsequent efforts at properly formulating physicalist theses. It begins by stating ...
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This chapter identifies the fundamental ideas and motivations that fuel the physicalist's thinking and that guides subsequent efforts at properly formulating physicalist theses. It begins by stating what are the core ideas and values of physicalism. It then explicitly identifies a number of ‘gratuitous associations’ to the physicalist programme: that is, ideas and values which are not essential aspects of the programme even if they might have been, at some time or another, associated with it. Finally, the chapter codifies much of the discussion in the form of criteria of assessment which are employed in later chapters for assessing the book's own and other formulations of physicalist doctrine.Less
This chapter identifies the fundamental ideas and motivations that fuel the physicalist's thinking and that guides subsequent efforts at properly formulating physicalist theses. It begins by stating what are the core ideas and values of physicalism. It then explicitly identifies a number of ‘gratuitous associations’ to the physicalist programme: that is, ideas and values which are not essential aspects of the programme even if they might have been, at some time or another, associated with it. Finally, the chapter codifies much of the discussion in the form of criteria of assessment which are employed in later chapters for assessing the book's own and other formulations of physicalist doctrine.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter reviews the most prominent recent formulations of physicalist doctrine to determine how well they fare relative to the criteria of adequacy set out in Chapter 1. It argues that every ...
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This chapter reviews the most prominent recent formulations of physicalist doctrine to determine how well they fare relative to the criteria of adequacy set out in Chapter 1. It argues that every such formulation fails in one or another crucial respect. In particular, most recent formulations fail to properly address physicalist concerns about emergence and explanation. The purpose of the chapter, however, is ultimately constructive. It aims to clarify further the various constraints and obstacles to which any adequate and acceptable formulation of physicalism must be responsive.Less
This chapter reviews the most prominent recent formulations of physicalist doctrine to determine how well they fare relative to the criteria of adequacy set out in Chapter 1. It argues that every such formulation fails in one or another crucial respect. In particular, most recent formulations fail to properly address physicalist concerns about emergence and explanation. The purpose of the chapter, however, is ultimately constructive. It aims to clarify further the various constraints and obstacles to which any adequate and acceptable formulation of physicalism must be responsive.
Jeffrey Poland
- Published in print:
- 1994
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198249801
- eISBN:
- 9780191681202
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198249801.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter formulates a set of theses that ultimately aim to satisfy the criteria of assessment set up in Chapter 1. Thus, they must be theses that are sufficient for expressing the core ideas of ...
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This chapter formulates a set of theses that ultimately aim to satisfy the criteria of assessment set up in Chapter 1. Thus, they must be theses that are sufficient for expressing the core ideas of the physicalist programme while avoiding the pitfalls encountered by other formulations. They must be capable of withstanding the numerous objections launched against the programme by its opponents. And they must fare well in the face of relevant evidence. Consistent with the negative assessment of the formulations considered in Chapter 2, the theses formulated are responsive to physicalist concerns about emergence and explanation.Less
This chapter formulates a set of theses that ultimately aim to satisfy the criteria of assessment set up in Chapter 1. Thus, they must be theses that are sufficient for expressing the core ideas of the physicalist programme while avoiding the pitfalls encountered by other formulations. They must be capable of withstanding the numerous objections launched against the programme by its opponents. And they must fare well in the face of relevant evidence. Consistent with the negative assessment of the formulations considered in Chapter 2, the theses formulated are responsive to physicalist concerns about emergence and explanation.
Jerry A. Fodor
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199548774
- eISBN:
- 9780191721106
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
Only matter has causal powers. The underlying metaphysical intuition is perhaps clear enough to be getting on with: whatever enters into causal interactions is constituted of the sort of stuff that ...
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Only matter has causal powers. The underlying metaphysical intuition is perhaps clear enough to be getting on with: whatever enters into causal interactions is constituted of the sort of stuff that basic physics is about. Call that the ‘physicalist’ thesis (PT). This chapter argues that PT functions as an a priori methodological constraint on scientific practice; ‘a priori’ in the sense that any theory that fails to conform to PT to that extent counts as disconfirmed. This applies to intentional psychology inter alia: only matter can think. It also discusses what philosophers call the ‘naturalization’ of intentional psychology.Less
Only matter has causal powers. The underlying metaphysical intuition is perhaps clear enough to be getting on with: whatever enters into causal interactions is constituted of the sort of stuff that basic physics is about. Call that the ‘physicalist’ thesis (PT). This chapter argues that PT functions as an a priori methodological constraint on scientific practice; ‘a priori’ in the sense that any theory that fails to conform to PT to that extent counts as disconfirmed. This applies to intentional psychology inter alia: only matter can think. It also discusses what philosophers call the ‘naturalization’ of intentional psychology.
Derk Pereboom
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- February 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199542680
- eISBN:
- 9780191715396
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542680.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter contends that a Kantian perspective on the nature of introspective representation inspires a defense of a physicalist understanding of phenomenal states in the face of the most prominent ...
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This chapter contends that a Kantian perspective on the nature of introspective representation inspires a defense of a physicalist understanding of phenomenal states in the face of the most prominent arguments against it. Immanuel Kant claims that introspective representations (those of inner sense) are entities caused by the states they represent and are distinct from them, and that they mediate the representational relationship between the subject and the introspected psychological states. As a result, the subject may not represent these states as they are in themselves. It is argued that Kant's position yields a significant challenge to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, and that it provides a response to those — like Joseph Levine and Robert Adams — who maintain that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal that the physicalist will have difficulty closing.Less
This chapter contends that a Kantian perspective on the nature of introspective representation inspires a defense of a physicalist understanding of phenomenal states in the face of the most prominent arguments against it. Immanuel Kant claims that introspective representations (those of inner sense) are entities caused by the states they represent and are distinct from them, and that they mediate the representational relationship between the subject and the introspected psychological states. As a result, the subject may not represent these states as they are in themselves. It is argued that Kant's position yields a significant challenge to Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, and that it provides a response to those — like Joseph Levine and Robert Adams — who maintain that there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal that the physicalist will have difficulty closing.
David Papineau
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199233151
- eISBN:
- 9780191696596
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233151.003.0002
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter discusses a set of ideas associated with the phrase ‘the explanatory gap’ and their methodological implications. The ‘explanatory gap’ refers to the lack of any conceptual tie between ...
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This chapter discusses a set of ideas associated with the phrase ‘the explanatory gap’ and their methodological implications. The ‘explanatory gap’ refers to the lack of any conceptual tie between physical descriptions and claims about consciousness. It is understood by most people as expressing the dualist intuition that the conscious mind is separate from the brain. Given this terminology, type-A and type-B physicalists can be distinguished by their differing attitudes to this ‘explanatory gap’. Type-A physicalists will insist that there is no ‘explanatory gap’ and that, despite appearances to the contrary, claims about consciousness can after all be shown to follow a priori from the physical facts. Type-B physicalists, by contrast, accept the ‘explanatory gap’, but maintain that no ontological conclusions about the immateriality of consciousness follow.Less
This chapter discusses a set of ideas associated with the phrase ‘the explanatory gap’ and their methodological implications. The ‘explanatory gap’ refers to the lack of any conceptual tie between physical descriptions and claims about consciousness. It is understood by most people as expressing the dualist intuition that the conscious mind is separate from the brain. Given this terminology, type-A and type-B physicalists can be distinguished by their differing attitudes to this ‘explanatory gap’. Type-A physicalists will insist that there is no ‘explanatory gap’ and that, despite appearances to the contrary, claims about consciousness can after all be shown to follow a priori from the physical facts. Type-B physicalists, by contrast, accept the ‘explanatory gap’, but maintain that no ontological conclusions about the immateriality of consciousness follow.
Philip Pettit
- Published in print:
- 1996
- Published Online:
- March 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780198524021
- eISBN:
- 9780191689093
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.003.0013
- Subject:
- Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
This chapter analyses various types of causal relationships and argues for the legitimacy of causal claims at higher levels. First, it formulates the physicalist doctrine and discusses the ...
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This chapter analyses various types of causal relationships and argues for the legitimacy of causal claims at higher levels. First, it formulates the physicalist doctrine and discusses the architecture of instrumental control at different levels which this physicalism allows. It also examines how far this architecture of control is mirrored in the architecture of causality: how far causality, like control, can be found at higher levels.Less
This chapter analyses various types of causal relationships and argues for the legitimacy of causal claims at higher levels. First, it formulates the physicalist doctrine and discusses the architecture of instrumental control at different levels which this physicalism allows. It also examines how far this architecture of control is mirrored in the architecture of causality: how far causality, like control, can be found at higher levels.
