Peter Unger
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780195155617
- eISBN:
- 9780199850563
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195155617.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical ...
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The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical individuals. Accordingly, the physical need not be so opaque to us as it sometimes seemed to many philosophers. When we speak of a certain quality exemplified in an individual, the matter is related more perspicuously by saying that the particular is qualified in a certain way. Whatever its deficiencies, the restrictive empiricism epitomized by David Hume should not be completely abandoned. Our power to experience cannot be our only resource for understanding concrete reality. This chapter examines the hypothesis that: in your fully conceiving a physical entity as being Monochromatic Spatially Extensible Blue, you will be (spatially Non-extensible) experiential blue. It also discusses the notion of spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, insensate bodies as pervaded with tactile qualities, extensible qualities, experiential qualities, and metaphysics.Less
The idea of physical things as extensible qualified is so aptly related to our power to think experientially that it may serve us humans fairly well when it comes to our clearly conceiving physical individuals. Accordingly, the physical need not be so opaque to us as it sometimes seemed to many philosophers. When we speak of a certain quality exemplified in an individual, the matter is related more perspicuously by saying that the particular is qualified in a certain way. Whatever its deficiencies, the restrictive empiricism epitomized by David Hume should not be completely abandoned. Our power to experience cannot be our only resource for understanding concrete reality. This chapter examines the hypothesis that: in your fully conceiving a physical entity as being Monochromatic Spatially Extensible Blue, you will be (spatially Non-extensible) experiential blue. It also discusses the notion of spatially extensible colors, spatial bodies, insensate bodies as pervaded with tactile qualities, extensible qualities, experiential qualities, and metaphysics.
Peter J. Steinberger
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- November 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780231163545
- eISBN:
- 9780231535205
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Columbia University Press
- DOI:
- 10.7312/columbia/9780231163545.003.0004
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter examines the notion of God-as-spirit, first proposed by the Reverend Samuel Clarke, and its flaws. Clarke, an important English thinker of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth ...
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This chapter examines the notion of God-as-spirit, first proposed by the Reverend Samuel Clarke, and its flaws. Clarke, an important English thinker of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, goes for the idea of God-as-spirit because he agrees that physical things are governed by the logic of cause and effect. According to Clarke, the Unmoved Mover—God—exists and must have existed, since something must have started everything. The logic of cause and effect requires a beginning. But if God exists—if God is the beginning—then God must be spirit and not matter. God is immaterial. Clarke argues that the logic of cause and effect is a logic of material things causing other material things. But if God is spirit—not a material thing—then we solve the problem. This chapter also considers George Berkeley's arguments based on his belief that God must be entirely spirit. Berkeley said we should give up on the existence of material things because matter simply does not exist; the only things that exist are ideas.Less
This chapter examines the notion of God-as-spirit, first proposed by the Reverend Samuel Clarke, and its flaws. Clarke, an important English thinker of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, goes for the idea of God-as-spirit because he agrees that physical things are governed by the logic of cause and effect. According to Clarke, the Unmoved Mover—God—exists and must have existed, since something must have started everything. The logic of cause and effect requires a beginning. But if God exists—if God is the beginning—then God must be spirit and not matter. God is immaterial. Clarke argues that the logic of cause and effect is a logic of material things causing other material things. But if God is spirit—not a material thing—then we solve the problem. This chapter also considers George Berkeley's arguments based on his belief that God must be entirely spirit. Berkeley said we should give up on the existence of material things because matter simply does not exist; the only things that exist are ideas.
Robert J. Howell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262232661
- eISBN:
- 9780262286497
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents four theses with which most philosophers agree, namely, that the world is a world of physical things, that the physical sciences tell the complete causal story about the world, ...
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This chapter presents four theses with which most philosophers agree, namely, that the world is a world of physical things, that the physical sciences tell the complete causal story about the world, that there is such a thing as conscious experience, and that the nature of consciousness is not fully captured by descriptions in the physical sciences. Ironically, the debates regarding qualia and consciousness are puzzling in part because the majority of philosophers agree about the majority of facts. After the four theses presented above, one might think that the only remaining issue regarding the truth or falsity of physicalism is merely terminological. The real question is whether the four theses can be acknowledged by a monistic metaphysics. A closer look at this notion reveals several places that could engender disagreement over the consistency of qualia with physicalism.Less
This chapter presents four theses with which most philosophers agree, namely, that the world is a world of physical things, that the physical sciences tell the complete causal story about the world, that there is such a thing as conscious experience, and that the nature of consciousness is not fully captured by descriptions in the physical sciences. Ironically, the debates regarding qualia and consciousness are puzzling in part because the majority of philosophers agree about the majority of facts. After the four theses presented above, one might think that the only remaining issue regarding the truth or falsity of physicalism is merely terminological. The real question is whether the four theses can be acknowledged by a monistic metaphysics. A closer look at this notion reveals several places that could engender disagreement over the consistency of qualia with physicalism.
