Mark S. Morrisson
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- May 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195306965
- eISBN:
- 9780199785414
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306965.003.0003
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology
This chapter discusses how the close relationship between Theosophical theories of matter and the new atomic science led Theosophists to launch a decades-long research program of “clairvoyant ...
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This chapter discusses how the close relationship between Theosophical theories of matter and the new atomic science led Theosophists to launch a decades-long research program of “clairvoyant chemistry” in 1895. This research continued in the 20th century and has even occupied contemporary scientists in chemistry and physics.Less
This chapter discusses how the close relationship between Theosophical theories of matter and the new atomic science led Theosophists to launch a decades-long research program of “clairvoyant chemistry” in 1895. This research continued in the 20th century and has even occupied contemporary scientists in chemistry and physics.
J. R. LUCAS
- Published in print:
- 1970
- Published Online:
- October 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780198243434
- eISBN:
- 9780191680687
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243434.003.0016
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Moral Philosophy
Physical determinism is easily the most important type of determinism today. It is the only one that poses a credible threat to freedom. None of the other sorts of determinism are convincing, even ...
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Physical determinism is easily the most important type of determinism today. It is the only one that poses a credible threat to freedom. None of the other sorts of determinism are convincing, even though it may be a little tricky to put one's finger precisely on the mistake. But physical determinism is frightening. The arguments for it are forceful. The world-view suggested by physics is strongly supported by the success of the physical sciences in explaining phenomena, and even if it has to be amended in some detail, it remains both well supported and incompatible with freedom.Less
Physical determinism is easily the most important type of determinism today. It is the only one that poses a credible threat to freedom. None of the other sorts of determinism are convincing, even though it may be a little tricky to put one's finger precisely on the mistake. But physical determinism is frightening. The arguments for it are forceful. The world-view suggested by physics is strongly supported by the success of the physical sciences in explaining phenomena, and even if it has to be amended in some detail, it remains both well supported and incompatible with freedom.
E. J. Lowe
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199217144
- eISBN:
- 9780191712418
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217144.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This chapter develops more detailed models of mental causation of the kinds adumbrated, and explains why, if such models are correct, it should nonetheless appear to be the case, from the perspective ...
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This chapter develops more detailed models of mental causation of the kinds adumbrated, and explains why, if such models are correct, it should nonetheless appear to be the case, from the perspective of physical scientists, that all of the causation involved in human behaviour is purely physical in character. In other words, it is explained why mental causation, thus conceived, should be invisible from such a perspective — the implication being, of course, that its invisibility should not be regarded as compelling evidence of its non-existence. In this manner, it is hoped to take some of the wind out the sails of those physicalists who presume uncritically that ‘science is on their side’.Less
This chapter develops more detailed models of mental causation of the kinds adumbrated, and explains why, if such models are correct, it should nonetheless appear to be the case, from the perspective of physical scientists, that all of the causation involved in human behaviour is purely physical in character. In other words, it is explained why mental causation, thus conceived, should be invisible from such a perspective — the implication being, of course, that its invisibility should not be regarded as compelling evidence of its non-existence. In this manner, it is hoped to take some of the wind out the sails of those physicalists who presume uncritically that ‘science is on their side’.
Alice Jenkins
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199209927
- eISBN:
- 9780191706431
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199209927.003.0004
- Subject:
- Literature, 19th-century Literature and Romanticism, 19th-century and Victorian Literature
This chapter focuses on debates about the construction of boundaries between scientific disciplines in the period. Even as the physical sciences were rapidly separating into disciplines, each with ...
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This chapter focuses on debates about the construction of boundaries between scientific disciplines in the period. Even as the physical sciences were rapidly separating into disciplines, each with its own dialect and infrastructure, voices were being raised against the process. One powerful objection to specialization was the early 19th-century sense that nature constituted a single uniform field, governed by a very small number of universal laws. Carving science up into artificial disciplinary areas ran counter to the way nature itself worked. A further objection to disciplinization was that specialisms meant exclusivity and yet it was vital to keep the educated general reader abreast of the new scientific knowledge and alive to the growing confidence of scientific claims to cultural authority. The chapter shows how geographical imagery was used in this argument, with rhetoric based on borders, battlefields, nations, and kingdoms widely deployed to increase the emotional pressure on both sides.Less
This chapter focuses on debates about the construction of boundaries between scientific disciplines in the period. Even as the physical sciences were rapidly separating into disciplines, each with its own dialect and infrastructure, voices were being raised against the process. One powerful objection to specialization was the early 19th-century sense that nature constituted a single uniform field, governed by a very small number of universal laws. Carving science up into artificial disciplinary areas ran counter to the way nature itself worked. A further objection to disciplinization was that specialisms meant exclusivity and yet it was vital to keep the educated general reader abreast of the new scientific knowledge and alive to the growing confidence of scientific claims to cultural authority. The chapter shows how geographical imagery was used in this argument, with rhetoric based on borders, battlefields, nations, and kingdoms widely deployed to increase the emotional pressure on both sides.
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199841103
- eISBN:
- 9780199919529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841103.003.0009
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
The natural taxonomy of the empirical sciences would break the sciences down into three basic groups: the physical sciences (physics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, metallurgy), the biological ...
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The natural taxonomy of the empirical sciences would break the sciences down into three basic groups: the physical sciences (physics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, metallurgy), the biological sciences (zoology, botany, genetics, paleontology, molecular biology, physiology), and the psychological sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology, maybe economics). Physics is interested in, for instance, electrical and magnetic force; biology will inquire into the function (and functioning) of, for exdample, as the heart; and psychology will deal with such things as visual perception. These more specific concepts—electromagnetic force, the heart, and vision—illustrate the region of empirical reality the science in question is concerned to understand. They are the kinds of concept that the relevant science is organized around. This chapter focuses on the nature of these concepts as cognitive entities, and what their cognitive nature tells us about the sciences that employ them. Specifically, it is interested in what kind of knowledge is possessed when these concepts are deployed. The chapter proposes that two very different kinds of knowledge are possessed—one kind in the physical sciences (remote knowledge), another in the biological and psychological sciences (intimate knowledge).Less
The natural taxonomy of the empirical sciences would break the sciences down into three basic groups: the physical sciences (physics, astronomy, chemistry, geology, metallurgy), the biological sciences (zoology, botany, genetics, paleontology, molecular biology, physiology), and the psychological sciences (psychology, sociology, anthropology, maybe economics). Physics is interested in, for instance, electrical and magnetic force; biology will inquire into the function (and functioning) of, for exdample, as the heart; and psychology will deal with such things as visual perception. These more specific concepts—electromagnetic force, the heart, and vision—illustrate the region of empirical reality the science in question is concerned to understand. They are the kinds of concept that the relevant science is organized around. This chapter focuses on the nature of these concepts as cognitive entities, and what their cognitive nature tells us about the sciences that employ them. Specifically, it is interested in what kind of knowledge is possessed when these concepts are deployed. The chapter proposes that two very different kinds of knowledge are possessed—one kind in the physical sciences (remote knowledge), another in the biological and psychological sciences (intimate knowledge).
Robert Rosenthal
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195385540
- eISBN:
- 9780199869824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385540.003.0011
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter focuses on intentional error. Intentional error production on the part of the experimenter is probably as relatively rare an event in the psychological experiment as it is in the ...
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This chapter focuses on intentional error. Intentional error production on the part of the experimenter is probably as relatively rare an event in the psychological experiment as it is in the sciences generally. Nevertheless, any serious attempt at understanding the social psychology of psychological research must consider the occurrence, nature, and control of this type of experimenter effect. The control of intentional error is discussed.Less
This chapter focuses on intentional error. Intentional error production on the part of the experimenter is probably as relatively rare an event in the psychological experiment as it is in the sciences generally. Nevertheless, any serious attempt at understanding the social psychology of psychological research must consider the occurrence, nature, and control of this type of experimenter effect. The control of intentional error is discussed.
Robert Rosenthal
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195385540
- eISBN:
- 9780199869824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385540.003.0009
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
This chapter discusses some of the disciplines that have shown a self-conscious awareness of the problem of observer effects. These include the physical sciences, biological sciences, behavioral ...
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This chapter discusses some of the disciplines that have shown a self-conscious awareness of the problem of observer effects. These include the physical sciences, biological sciences, behavioral sciences.Less
This chapter discusses some of the disciplines that have shown a self-conscious awareness of the problem of observer effects. These include the physical sciences, biological sciences, behavioral sciences.
Robert Rosenthal
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- September 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780195385540
- eISBN:
- 9780199869824
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195385540.003.0010
- Subject:
- Psychology, Social Psychology
Identical observations are often interpreted differently by different scientists, and that fact and its implications are the subject of this chapter. Interpretation effects are most simply defined as ...
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Identical observations are often interpreted differently by different scientists, and that fact and its implications are the subject of this chapter. Interpretation effects are most simply defined as any difference in interpretations. The difference may be between two or more interpreters, or an interpreter and such a generalized interpreter as an established theory or an “accepted” interpretation of a cumulative series of studies. As in the observer effect, the interpreter effect, or difference, does not necessarily imply a unidirectional phenomenon. When observations are nonrandomly distributed around a true value, these are referred to as “biased observations.” Similarly, when interpretations do not vary randomly—and usually they do not—these are referred to as “biased”.Less
Identical observations are often interpreted differently by different scientists, and that fact and its implications are the subject of this chapter. Interpretation effects are most simply defined as any difference in interpretations. The difference may be between two or more interpreters, or an interpreter and such a generalized interpreter as an established theory or an “accepted” interpretation of a cumulative series of studies. As in the observer effect, the interpreter effect, or difference, does not necessarily imply a unidirectional phenomenon. When observations are nonrandomly distributed around a true value, these are referred to as “biased observations.” Similarly, when interpretations do not vary randomly—and usually they do not—these are referred to as “biased”.
Christian Pfeiffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198779728
- eISBN:
- 9780191824753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198779728.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
The chapter concerns the relation between physical science and mathematics. There is no contradiction involved in the assumption that both the physicist and the mathematician study body and ...
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The chapter concerns the relation between physical science and mathematics. There is no contradiction involved in the assumption that both the physicist and the mathematician study body and magnitudes, but are nonetheless engaged in two distinct sciences. A physicist studies quantities insofar as they are the bodies and magnitudes of physical substances. A mathematician studies bodies, lines, and surfaces as if they were separate. Quantities are logically separable from physical substances and mathematics studies the quantitative aspect of physical substances in isolation. Since both the physicist and the mathematician are concerned with the same underlying reality, the physicist can draw on mathematical theorems. What holds of an object insofar as it is a body also holds of the object insofar as it is a movable body which belongs to a substance.Less
The chapter concerns the relation between physical science and mathematics. There is no contradiction involved in the assumption that both the physicist and the mathematician study body and magnitudes, but are nonetheless engaged in two distinct sciences. A physicist studies quantities insofar as they are the bodies and magnitudes of physical substances. A mathematician studies bodies, lines, and surfaces as if they were separate. Quantities are logically separable from physical substances and mathematics studies the quantitative aspect of physical substances in isolation. Since both the physicist and the mathematician are concerned with the same underlying reality, the physicist can draw on mathematical theorems. What holds of an object insofar as it is a body also holds of the object insofar as it is a movable body which belongs to a substance.
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- March 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780226767338
- eISBN:
- 9780226767352
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- University of Chicago Press
- DOI:
- 10.7208/chicago/9780226767352.003.0004
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter discusses the reforms Mill proposed in science to counter the view of Whewell. It shows that his overriding desire was to expel the intuitionist philosophy from its “stronghold” in ...
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This chapter discusses the reforms Mill proposed in science to counter the view of Whewell. It shows that his overriding desire was to expel the intuitionist philosophy from its “stronghold” in physical science and mathematics, because he saw this as being the crucial precondition for reforming moral and political philosophy. The intuitionist epistemology led to political and social conservatism, Mill believed, by reassuring people that what they believed deeply must be true and necessary. Indeed, intuitionism allowed “every inveterate belief and every intense feeling” to be “its own all-sufficient voucher and justification.” If he could demonstrate that knowledge of physical science and even mathematics did not require any a priori axioms, Mill hoped, then he would have proved the superfluity of a priori elements in morality and political philosophy. It is because of this that Mill developed an ultra-empiricist, phenomenalist epistemology, and rejected necessity in mathematics and causal relations. He thus “radicalized” induction. The chapter also discusses Mill's “final and most elaborate protest against the Intuitionist school,” his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865).Less
This chapter discusses the reforms Mill proposed in science to counter the view of Whewell. It shows that his overriding desire was to expel the intuitionist philosophy from its “stronghold” in physical science and mathematics, because he saw this as being the crucial precondition for reforming moral and political philosophy. The intuitionist epistemology led to political and social conservatism, Mill believed, by reassuring people that what they believed deeply must be true and necessary. Indeed, intuitionism allowed “every inveterate belief and every intense feeling” to be “its own all-sufficient voucher and justification.” If he could demonstrate that knowledge of physical science and even mathematics did not require any a priori axioms, Mill hoped, then he would have proved the superfluity of a priori elements in morality and political philosophy. It is because of this that Mill developed an ultra-empiricist, phenomenalist epistemology, and rejected necessity in mathematics and causal relations. He thus “radicalized” induction. The chapter also discusses Mill's “final and most elaborate protest against the Intuitionist school,” his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865).
Colin McGinn
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- January 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199841103
- eISBN:
- 9780199919529
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841103.003.0005
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
In his article on motion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the distinguished historian and philosopher of physics Max Jammer writes: “The predominant role of the concept of motion in physical ...
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In his article on motion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the distinguished historian and philosopher of physics Max Jammer writes: “The predominant role of the concept of motion in physical science poses a problem of great importance to philosophy. Why is it that all processes, laws, and formulas of physics—and modern physics is no exception—ultimately refer to motion, and why is it that even problems in statics, the science of equilibrium and absence of motion, are solved in terms of fictitious motions and virtual velocities?”. This chapter proposes an answer to this question.Less
In his article on motion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the distinguished historian and philosopher of physics Max Jammer writes: “The predominant role of the concept of motion in physical science poses a problem of great importance to philosophy. Why is it that all processes, laws, and formulas of physics—and modern physics is no exception—ultimately refer to motion, and why is it that even problems in statics, the science of equilibrium and absence of motion, are solved in terms of fictitious motions and virtual velocities?”. This chapter proposes an answer to this question.
Christian Pfeiffer
- Published in print:
- 2018
- Published Online:
- September 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780198779728
- eISBN:
- 9780191824753
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/oso/9780198779728.003.0003
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
Motion, the infinite, place, and time are part of the conceptual underpinnings of physical science. The chapter argues that in the same way the study of body should be seen as indispensable for the ...
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Motion, the infinite, place, and time are part of the conceptual underpinnings of physical science. The chapter argues that in the same way the study of body should be seen as indispensable for the physicist and part of the conceptual underpinnings of physical science. It is a study of body and magnitudes insofar as they are the bodies and magnitudes of physical substances. Since it is concerned with the physical nature of the substances to which body and magnitudes belong, it must be distinguished from a mathematical investigation. A physical substance has a body and it is the task of the physicist to consider the nature of body insofar as it belongs to a physical substance.Less
Motion, the infinite, place, and time are part of the conceptual underpinnings of physical science. The chapter argues that in the same way the study of body should be seen as indispensable for the physicist and part of the conceptual underpinnings of physical science. It is a study of body and magnitudes insofar as they are the bodies and magnitudes of physical substances. Since it is concerned with the physical nature of the substances to which body and magnitudes belong, it must be distinguished from a mathematical investigation. A physical substance has a body and it is the task of the physicist to consider the nature of body insofar as it belongs to a physical substance.
Andrew P. Beckerman and Owen L. Petchey
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- December 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780199601615
- eISBN:
- 9780191774539
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601615.001.0001
- Subject:
- Biology, Biomathematics / Statistics and Data Analysis / Complexity Studies
Learning how to get answers from data is an integral part of modern training in the natural, physical, social, and engineering sciences. One of the most exciting changes in data management and ...
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Learning how to get answers from data is an integral part of modern training in the natural, physical, social, and engineering sciences. One of the most exciting changes in data management and analysis during the last decade has been the growth of open source software. The open source statistics and programming language R has emerged as a critical component of any researcher's toolbox. Indeed, R is rapidly becoming the standard software for analyses, graphical presentations, and programming in the biological sciences. This book provides a functional introduction to R. While teaching how to import, explore, graph, and analyse data, it keeps readers focused on their ultimate goals — communicating their data in oral presentations, posters, papers, and reports. It also provides a consistent method (workflow) for using R that is simple, efficient, reliable, accurate, and reproducible. The material in the book reproduces the engaging and sometimes humorous nature of the three-day course on which it is based.Less
Learning how to get answers from data is an integral part of modern training in the natural, physical, social, and engineering sciences. One of the most exciting changes in data management and analysis during the last decade has been the growth of open source software. The open source statistics and programming language R has emerged as a critical component of any researcher's toolbox. Indeed, R is rapidly becoming the standard software for analyses, graphical presentations, and programming in the biological sciences. This book provides a functional introduction to R. While teaching how to import, explore, graph, and analyse data, it keeps readers focused on their ultimate goals — communicating their data in oral presentations, posters, papers, and reports. It also provides a consistent method (workflow) for using R that is simple, efficient, reliable, accurate, and reproducible. The material in the book reproduces the engaging and sometimes humorous nature of the three-day course on which it is based.
John J. McDermott (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- May 2019
- ISBN:
- 9780823224845
- eISBN:
- 9780823284894
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Fordham University Press
- DOI:
- 10.5422/fordham/9780823224845.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, American Philosophy
This chapter studies Henri Poincaré's discussion of science and hypotheses. The useful hypotheses of science are of two kinds: the hypotheses which are valuable precisely because they are either ...
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This chapter studies Henri Poincaré's discussion of science and hypotheses. The useful hypotheses of science are of two kinds: the hypotheses which are valuable precisely because they are either verifiable or else refutable through a definite appeal to the tests furnished by experience; and the hypotheses which, despite the fact that experience suggests them, are valuable despite, or even because, of the fact that experience can neither confirm nor refute them. The first type of hypotheses are the ones which the textbooks of inductive logic and those summaries of scientific method which are customary in the course of the elementary treatises upon physical science are already accustomed to recognize and to characterize. However, Poincaré's treatment of the work of science is especially marked by the fact that he explicitly makes prominent both the existence and the scientific importance of hypotheses of the second type.Less
This chapter studies Henri Poincaré's discussion of science and hypotheses. The useful hypotheses of science are of two kinds: the hypotheses which are valuable precisely because they are either verifiable or else refutable through a definite appeal to the tests furnished by experience; and the hypotheses which, despite the fact that experience suggests them, are valuable despite, or even because, of the fact that experience can neither confirm nor refute them. The first type of hypotheses are the ones which the textbooks of inductive logic and those summaries of scientific method which are customary in the course of the elementary treatises upon physical science are already accustomed to recognize and to characterize. However, Poincaré's treatment of the work of science is especially marked by the fact that he explicitly makes prominent both the existence and the scientific importance of hypotheses of the second type.
Steven Horst
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015257
- eISBN:
- 9780262295741
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015257.003.0002
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This chapter is concerned with the putative difference between psychology and the physical sciences. Although this difference has been viewed as problematic for psychology, it is yet to be seen why ...
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This chapter is concerned with the putative difference between psychology and the physical sciences. Although this difference has been viewed as problematic for psychology, it is yet to be seen why this should be so. Also considered here are the Weber-Fechner laws, a paradigm of psychophysical respectability which claims that the intensity of a percept is a logarithmic function of the intensity of the stimulus. Such laws are well established by repeated experiments, are robust across many subjects, and take the form of a mathematical equation. In short, they have many of the hallmarks of respectable scientific results. It is not true, however, that the intensity of the percept is always related to that of the stimulus in the manner which they predict.Less
This chapter is concerned with the putative difference between psychology and the physical sciences. Although this difference has been viewed as problematic for psychology, it is yet to be seen why this should be so. Also considered here are the Weber-Fechner laws, a paradigm of psychophysical respectability which claims that the intensity of a percept is a logarithmic function of the intensity of the stimulus. Such laws are well established by repeated experiments, are robust across many subjects, and take the form of a mathematical equation. In short, they have many of the hallmarks of respectable scientific results. It is not true, however, that the intensity of the percept is always related to that of the stimulus in the manner which they predict.
Sue V. Rosser
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- March 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780814776452
- eISBN:
- 9780814771525
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- NYU Press
- DOI:
- 10.18574/nyu/9780814776452.001.0001
- Subject:
- Sociology, Gender and Sexuality
Why are there so few women in science? This book uses the experiences of successful women scientists and engineers to answer the question of why elite institutions have so few women scientists and ...
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Why are there so few women in science? This book uses the experiences of successful women scientists and engineers to answer the question of why elite institutions have so few women scientists and engineers tenured on their faculties. Women are highly qualified, motivated students, and yet they have drastically higher rates of attrition, and they are shying away from the fields with the greatest demand for workers and the biggest economic payoffs, such as engineering, computer sciences, and the physical sciences. The book shows that these continuing trends are not only disappointing, they are urgent: the U.S. can no longer afford to lose the talents of the women scientists and engineers, because it is quickly losing its lead in science and technology. Ultimately, these biases and barriers may lock women out of the new scientific frontiers of innovation and technology transfer, resulting in loss of useful inventions and products to society.Less
Why are there so few women in science? This book uses the experiences of successful women scientists and engineers to answer the question of why elite institutions have so few women scientists and engineers tenured on their faculties. Women are highly qualified, motivated students, and yet they have drastically higher rates of attrition, and they are shying away from the fields with the greatest demand for workers and the biggest economic payoffs, such as engineering, computer sciences, and the physical sciences. The book shows that these continuing trends are not only disappointing, they are urgent: the U.S. can no longer afford to lose the talents of the women scientists and engineers, because it is quickly losing its lead in science and technology. Ultimately, these biases and barriers may lock women out of the new scientific frontiers of innovation and technology transfer, resulting in loss of useful inventions and products to society.
Steven Horst
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262015257
- eISBN:
- 9780262295741
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015257.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
This book addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the ...
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This book addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. The author argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy—the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of “strict” laws in the sciences of the mind—are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: That laws make claims about how objects actually behave. The author argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws—one rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. The author argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between “strict” laws and generalizations about the mind (ceteris paribus laws, laws hedged by the caveat “other things being equal”), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. This alternative account, which the author calls “cognitive Pluralism,” vindicates the truth of psychological laws, and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences.Less
This book addresses the apparent dissonance between the picture of the natural world that arises from the sciences and our understanding of ourselves as agents who think and act. If the mind and the world are entirely governed by natural laws, there seems to be no room left for free will to operate. Moreover, although the laws of physical science are clear and verifiable, the sciences of the mind seem to yield only rough generalizations rather than universal laws of nature. The author argues that these two familiar problems in philosophy—the apparent tension between free will and natural law and the absence of “strict” laws in the sciences of the mind—are artifacts of a particular philosophical thesis about the nature of laws: That laws make claims about how objects actually behave. The author argues against this Empiricist orthodoxy and proposes an alternative account of laws—one rooted in a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science. The author argues that once we abandon the Empiricist misunderstandings of the nature of laws there is no contrast between “strict” laws and generalizations about the mind (ceteris paribus laws, laws hedged by the caveat “other things being equal”), and that a commitment to laws is compatible with a commitment to the existence of free will. This alternative account, which the author calls “cognitive Pluralism,” vindicates the truth of psychological laws, and resolves the tension between human freedom and the sciences.
Robert J. Howell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262232661
- eISBN:
- 9780262286497
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0007
- Subject:
- Philosophy, General
This chapter presents four theses with which most philosophers agree, namely, that the world is a world of physical things, that the physical sciences tell the complete causal story about the world, ...
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This chapter presents four theses with which most philosophers agree, namely, that the world is a world of physical things, that the physical sciences tell the complete causal story about the world, that there is such a thing as conscious experience, and that the nature of consciousness is not fully captured by descriptions in the physical sciences. Ironically, the debates regarding qualia and consciousness are puzzling in part because the majority of philosophers agree about the majority of facts. After the four theses presented above, one might think that the only remaining issue regarding the truth or falsity of physicalism is merely terminological. The real question is whether the four theses can be acknowledged by a monistic metaphysics. A closer look at this notion reveals several places that could engender disagreement over the consistency of qualia with physicalism.Less
This chapter presents four theses with which most philosophers agree, namely, that the world is a world of physical things, that the physical sciences tell the complete causal story about the world, that there is such a thing as conscious experience, and that the nature of consciousness is not fully captured by descriptions in the physical sciences. Ironically, the debates regarding qualia and consciousness are puzzling in part because the majority of philosophers agree about the majority of facts. After the four theses presented above, one might think that the only remaining issue regarding the truth or falsity of physicalism is merely terminological. The real question is whether the four theses can be acknowledged by a monistic metaphysics. A closer look at this notion reveals several places that could engender disagreement over the consistency of qualia with physicalism.
Alice Boardman Smuts
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- October 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780300108972
- eISBN:
- 9780300128475
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Yale University Press
- DOI:
- 10.12987/yale/9780300108972.003.0003
- Subject:
- History, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine
This chapter discusses a new scientific psychology, modeled on the physical sciences, which emerged in Europe in the 1860s. It first flourished in Germany, and reached America in the 1870s. It was ...
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This chapter discusses a new scientific psychology, modeled on the physical sciences, which emerged in Europe in the 1860s. It first flourished in Germany, and reached America in the 1870s. It was the product of evolutionary biology, the empirical tradition in philosophy, and experimental studies of the physiology of perception and sensation. Now called early experimental psychology, it was based in the laboratory, where researchers studied conscious reactions to touch, sights, and sounds. Since subjects had to be aware of and able to articulate their inner experience, animals, illiterate or abnormal persons, and children were excluded. Wilhelm Wundt, who founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, warned that the results of experiments on very young children were “wholly untrustworthy.” The belief that the mental life of adults can be understood only through the analysis of children's minds, Wundt declared, is an “error,” the exact opposite of the “true position.”Less
This chapter discusses a new scientific psychology, modeled on the physical sciences, which emerged in Europe in the 1860s. It first flourished in Germany, and reached America in the 1870s. It was the product of evolutionary biology, the empirical tradition in philosophy, and experimental studies of the physiology of perception and sensation. Now called early experimental psychology, it was based in the laboratory, where researchers studied conscious reactions to touch, sights, and sounds. Since subjects had to be aware of and able to articulate their inner experience, animals, illiterate or abnormal persons, and children were excluded. Wilhelm Wundt, who founded the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, warned that the results of experiments on very young children were “wholly untrustworthy.” The belief that the mental life of adults can be understood only through the analysis of children's minds, Wundt declared, is an “error,” the exact opposite of the “true position.”
R. Alexander Bentley
- Published in print:
- 2009
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262013338
- eISBN:
- 9780262259101
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013338.003.0008
- Subject:
- Biology, Evolutionary Biology / Genetics
This chapter is concerned with the characterization of innovation using the random-copying (neutral) model. It explores databases to test differences between genres over the short, modern, and long ...
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This chapter is concerned with the characterization of innovation using the random-copying (neutral) model. It explores databases to test differences between genres over the short, modern, and long prehistoric timescales and within several different niches of knowledge production. This chapter shows that social science examples displayed more indications of drift, consistent with the neutral model. It suggests that it is difficult to distinguish purposeful selection from random drift. It highlights an alternative, objective approach which is the revitalized efforts at social modeling within the physical sciences, particularly in network science.Less
This chapter is concerned with the characterization of innovation using the random-copying (neutral) model. It explores databases to test differences between genres over the short, modern, and long prehistoric timescales and within several different niches of knowledge production. This chapter shows that social science examples displayed more indications of drift, consistent with the neutral model. It suggests that it is difficult to distinguish purposeful selection from random drift. It highlights an alternative, objective approach which is the revitalized efforts at social modeling within the physical sciences, particularly in network science.
