Steven Horst
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195317114
- eISBN:
- 9780199871520
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195317114.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind
Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness ...
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Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness and intentionality are uniquely irreducible. The “explanatory gap” between mind and body seems to be an urgent and fascinating problem if one assumes that intertheoretic reductions are the rule in the special sciences, with the mind as the lone exception. While this debate was going on in philosophy of mind, however, philosophers of science were rejecting this very sort of reductionism: intertheoretic reductions are not ubiquitous but rare. This book argues that post‐reductionist philosophy of science poses problems for all the familiar positions in philosophy of mind and calls for a deep rethinking of the problematic. To this end, a new perspective, Cognitive Pluralism, is urged.Less
Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness and intentionality are uniquely irreducible. The “explanatory gap” between mind and body seems to be an urgent and fascinating problem if one assumes that intertheoretic reductions are the rule in the special sciences, with the mind as the lone exception. While this debate was going on in philosophy of mind, however, philosophers of science were rejecting this very sort of reductionism: intertheoretic reductions are not ubiquitous but rare. This book argues that post‐reductionist philosophy of science poses problems for all the familiar positions in philosophy of mind and calls for a deep rethinking of the problematic. To this end, a new perspective, Cognitive Pluralism, is urged.
Daniel Stoljar
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- September 2006
- ISBN:
- 9780195306583
- eISBN:
- 9780199786619
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195306589.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The ...
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This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as having its origin in our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. This change of orientation is shown to be well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and to have none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.Less
This book advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, it is argued, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as having its origin in our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. This change of orientation is shown to be well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and to have none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2013
- Published Online:
- January 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780197265499
- eISBN:
- 9780191760310
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- British Academy
- DOI:
- 10.5871/bacad/9780197265499.003.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This introductory chapter explains how medieval philosophy has hardly made an appearance before in this series of philosophy lectures, and why the author decided on a theme that brings together ...
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This introductory chapter explains how medieval philosophy has hardly made an appearance before in this series of philosophy lectures, and why the author decided on a theme that brings together thinkers from the Middle Ages and the early modern period. It then briefly summarizes the arguments of the three main chapters and of the responses to them.Less
This introductory chapter explains how medieval philosophy has hardly made an appearance before in this series of philosophy lectures, and why the author decided on a theme that brings together thinkers from the Middle Ages and the early modern period. It then briefly summarizes the arguments of the three main chapters and of the responses to them.
Stephen Gaukroger
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199296446
- eISBN:
- 9780191711985
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296446.003.0008
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
This chapter builds on the previous two to offer a more integrated account of the intersections between questions of truth, justification, objectivity, and legitimacy. The origins of philosophy in ...
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This chapter builds on the previous two to offer a more integrated account of the intersections between questions of truth, justification, objectivity, and legitimacy. The origins of philosophy in Plato's Socratic dialogues are represented as a struggle between sophism and philosopher, where the difference lies in a commitment to uncovering the truth. This concern can be traced through to the early modern period, but the 17th century witnessed a shift from notions of truth to notions of objectivity and impartiality as a guide for natural philosophical enquiry.Less
This chapter builds on the previous two to offer a more integrated account of the intersections between questions of truth, justification, objectivity, and legitimacy. The origins of philosophy in Plato's Socratic dialogues are represented as a struggle between sophism and philosopher, where the difference lies in a commitment to uncovering the truth. This concern can be traced through to the early modern period, but the 17th century witnessed a shift from notions of truth to notions of objectivity and impartiality as a guide for natural philosophical enquiry.
Janet A. Kourany
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- January 2011
- ISBN:
- 9780199732623
- eISBN:
- 9780199866403
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199732623.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
The goal of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is not only a (descriptively and normatively) more adequate philosophy of science than what we have now, but also a more socially engaged and socially ...
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The goal of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is not only a (descriptively and normatively) more adequate philosophy of science than what we have now, but also a more socially engaged and socially responsible philosophy of science, one that can help to promote a more socially engaged and socially responsible science. Its main message is that philosophy of science needs to locate science within its wider societal context, ceasing to analyze science as if it existed in a social/political/economic vacuum; and correlatively, that philosophy of science needs to aim for a more comprehensive understanding of scientific rationality, one that integrates the ethical with the epistemic. Since feminists—feminist scientists and historians of science as well as feminist philosophers of science—have been pursuing this kind of philosophy of science in gender-related areas for three decades now, two chapters reflect on their contributions and derive from these reflections an “ideal of socially responsible science” that is further developed and defended in other chapters. The articulation of this ideal, it is made clear, is a central project of socially responsible philosophy of science. Other projects are also spelled out.Less
The goal of Philosophy of Science after Feminism is not only a (descriptively and normatively) more adequate philosophy of science than what we have now, but also a more socially engaged and socially responsible philosophy of science, one that can help to promote a more socially engaged and socially responsible science. Its main message is that philosophy of science needs to locate science within its wider societal context, ceasing to analyze science as if it existed in a social/political/economic vacuum; and correlatively, that philosophy of science needs to aim for a more comprehensive understanding of scientific rationality, one that integrates the ethical with the epistemic. Since feminists—feminist scientists and historians of science as well as feminist philosophers of science—have been pursuing this kind of philosophy of science in gender-related areas for three decades now, two chapters reflect on their contributions and derive from these reflections an “ideal of socially responsible science” that is further developed and defended in other chapters. The articulation of this ideal, it is made clear, is a central project of socially responsible philosophy of science. Other projects are also spelled out.
Toshimasa Yasukata
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195144949
- eISBN:
- 9780199834891
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195144945.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually ...
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Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually mature state of being, the hallmark of which is independent and responsible use of one's own reason. He also stands as a key figure in German intellectual history, a bridge joining Luther, Leibniz, and German idealism. Yet despite his well‐recognized importance in the history of thought, and despite a substantial body of in‐depth studies, Lessing as theologian or philosopher of religion remains an enigmatic figure. Even today, his theology or philosophy of religion is a subject of dispute. With regard to the genuine core of his theological or religious‐philosophical thought, researchers hold diametrically opposed interpretations. It is not without reason that scholars refer to the “riddle” or “mystery” of Lessing, a mystery that has proved intractable because of his reticence on the subject of the final conclusions of his intellectual project. Confronted with this perplexity in Lessing studies, this book seeks to resolve the enigma. On the basis of intensive study of the entire corpus of Lessing's philosophical and theological writings as well as the extensive secondary literature, it leads the reader into the systematic core of Lessing's highly elusive religious thought. From a detailed and thoroughgoing analysis of Lessing's developing position on Christianity and reason, there emerges a fresh image of Lessing as a creative modern mind, both shaped by and giving shape to the Christian heritage.Less
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually mature state of being, the hallmark of which is independent and responsible use of one's own reason. He also stands as a key figure in German intellectual history, a bridge joining Luther, Leibniz, and German idealism. Yet despite his well‐recognized importance in the history of thought, and despite a substantial body of in‐depth studies, Lessing as theologian or philosopher of religion remains an enigmatic figure. Even today, his theology or philosophy of religion is a subject of dispute. With regard to the genuine core of his theological or religious‐philosophical thought, researchers hold diametrically opposed interpretations. It is not without reason that scholars refer to the “riddle” or “mystery” of Lessing, a mystery that has proved intractable because of his reticence on the subject of the final conclusions of his intellectual project. Confronted with this perplexity in Lessing studies, this book seeks to resolve the enigma. On the basis of intensive study of the entire corpus of Lessing's philosophical and theological writings as well as the extensive secondary literature, it leads the reader into the systematic core of Lessing's highly elusive religious thought. From a detailed and thoroughgoing analysis of Lessing's developing position on Christianity and reason, there emerges a fresh image of Lessing as a creative modern mind, both shaped by and giving shape to the Christian heritage.
Holger Zaborowski
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- May 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780199576777
- eISBN:
- 9780191722295
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199576777.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Theology, Philosophy of Religion
This chapter further analyzes Spaemann's philosophy of religion and his understanding of Christianity. It focuses on the question of how Spaemann's philosophy provides a model for relating ...
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This chapter further analyzes Spaemann's philosophy of religion and his understanding of Christianity. It focuses on the question of how Spaemann's philosophy provides a model for relating Christianity and philosophy in a ‘post-modern’ yet not anti-modern way. It shows that Spaemann's philosophy not only does not compete with or question the truth claims of Christianity and the theological nature of theology, but even provides Christian theology with the means for a better self-understanding and a better appreciation of reality vis-á-vis modern criticisms, transformations, and distortions of Christianity. The chapter also examines what alternative to modernity Spaemann's philosophy offers. In comparison to many late modern writers, Spaemann provides a substantial alternative to a cast of mind that seems if not wholly flawed then at least fundamentally problematic, because it ultimately does not take seriously the gift of Being as a creation and the reality of human fallenness.Less
This chapter further analyzes Spaemann's philosophy of religion and his understanding of Christianity. It focuses on the question of how Spaemann's philosophy provides a model for relating Christianity and philosophy in a ‘post-modern’ yet not anti-modern way. It shows that Spaemann's philosophy not only does not compete with or question the truth claims of Christianity and the theological nature of theology, but even provides Christian theology with the means for a better self-understanding and a better appreciation of reality vis-á-vis modern criticisms, transformations, and distortions of Christianity. The chapter also examines what alternative to modernity Spaemann's philosophy offers. In comparison to many late modern writers, Spaemann provides a substantial alternative to a cast of mind that seems if not wholly flawed then at least fundamentally problematic, because it ultimately does not take seriously the gift of Being as a creation and the reality of human fallenness.
Jon McGinnis
- Published in print:
- 2010
- Published Online:
- September 2010
- ISBN:
- 9780195331479
- eISBN:
- 9780199868032
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331479.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Islam
The aim of the present work is threefold. One, it intends to place the thought of Avicenna within its proper historical context, whether the philosophical-scientific tradition inherited from the ...
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The aim of the present work is threefold. One, it intends to place the thought of Avicenna within its proper historical context, whether the philosophical-scientific tradition inherited from the Greeks or the indigenous influences coming from the medieval Islamic world. Thus, in addition to a substantive introductory chapter on the Greek and Arabic sources and influences to which Avicenna was heir, the historical and philosophical context central to Avicenna’s own thought is provided in order to assess and appreciate his achievement in the specific fields treated in that chapter. Two, the present volume aims to offer a philosophical survey of Avicenna’s entire system of thought ranging from his understanding of the interrelation of logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, and medicine. The emphasis here is on how, using a relatively small handful of novel insights, Avicenna was not only able to address a whole series of issues that had troubled earlier philosophers working in both the ancient Hellenistic and medieval Islamic world, but also how those insights fundamentally changed the direction philosophy took, certainly in the Islamic East, but even in the Jewish and Christian milieus. Three, the present volume will provide philosophers, historians of science, and students of medieval thought with a starting point from which to assess the place, significance, and influence of Avicenna and his philosophy within the history of ideas.Less
The aim of the present work is threefold. One, it intends to place the thought of Avicenna within its proper historical context, whether the philosophical-scientific tradition inherited from the Greeks or the indigenous influences coming from the medieval Islamic world. Thus, in addition to a substantive introductory chapter on the Greek and Arabic sources and influences to which Avicenna was heir, the historical and philosophical context central to Avicenna’s own thought is provided in order to assess and appreciate his achievement in the specific fields treated in that chapter. Two, the present volume aims to offer a philosophical survey of Avicenna’s entire system of thought ranging from his understanding of the interrelation of logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, ethics, politics, and medicine. The emphasis here is on how, using a relatively small handful of novel insights, Avicenna was not only able to address a whole series of issues that had troubled earlier philosophers working in both the ancient Hellenistic and medieval Islamic world, but also how those insights fundamentally changed the direction philosophy took, certainly in the Islamic East, but even in the Jewish and Christian milieus. Three, the present volume will provide philosophers, historians of science, and students of medieval thought with a starting point from which to assess the place, significance, and influence of Avicenna and his philosophy within the history of ideas.
Anandi Hattiangadi
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199219025
- eISBN:
- 9780191711879
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219025.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means ...
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This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.Less
This book provides a response to the argument for meaning scepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke asks what makes it the case that anybody ever means anything by any word, and argues that there are no facts of the matter as to what anybody ever means. Kripke's argument has inspired a lively and extended debate in the philosophy of language, as it raises some of the most fundamental issues in the field: namely, the reality, privacy, and normativity of meaning. The book argues that in order to achieve the radical conclusion that there are no facts as to what a person means by a word, the sceptic must rely on the thesis that meaning is normative, and that this thesis fails. Since any ‘sceptical solution’ to the sceptical problem is irremediably incoherent, the book concludes that there must be a fact of the matter about what we mean. In addition to providing an overview of the debate on meaning and content scepticism, this book presents a detailed discussion of the contributions made by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Robert Brandom, Fred Dretske, John McDowell, and Crispin Wright, among others, to the controversy surrounding Kripke's argument. The issues considered include the normativity of meaning and its relation to the normativity of moral judgments, reductive and non-reductive theories of meaning, deflationism about truth and meaning, and the privacy of meaning.
Philip Burton
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- September 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780199266227
- eISBN:
- 9780191709098
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199266227.001.0001
- Subject:
- Religion, Early Christian Studies
This book argues that Augustine's Confessions may fruitfully be read as a series of encounters with language and signs: as a baby learning to speak, as a schoolboy orator, student, professor of ...
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This book argues that Augustine's Confessions may fruitfully be read as a series of encounters with language and signs: as a baby learning to speak, as a schoolboy orator, student, professor of rhetoric, and Christian exegete. While language is a universal human characteristic, the fact of languages tends to divide humans into arbitrary and uncomprehending communities; and even in individual communities, language can be manipulated or simply misunderstood. On the theological level, Augustine faces question of how to describe (and invoke) an absolute and immutable God in language that is necessary arbitrary and mutable. This book seeks to explore these questions through a close analysis of specific linguistic features of the work, such as his use of the language of Roman comedy, his attitudes towards Greek, or his use of biblical Latin. Consideration is given also to such ‘paralinguistic’ activities as singing or laughing, and to the relationship between the spoken and the written word.Less
This book argues that Augustine's Confessions may fruitfully be read as a series of encounters with language and signs: as a baby learning to speak, as a schoolboy orator, student, professor of rhetoric, and Christian exegete. While language is a universal human characteristic, the fact of languages tends to divide humans into arbitrary and uncomprehending communities; and even in individual communities, language can be manipulated or simply misunderstood. On the theological level, Augustine faces question of how to describe (and invoke) an absolute and immutable God in language that is necessary arbitrary and mutable. This book seeks to explore these questions through a close analysis of specific linguistic features of the work, such as his use of the language of Roman comedy, his attitudes towards Greek, or his use of biblical Latin. Consideration is given also to such ‘paralinguistic’ activities as singing or laughing, and to the relationship between the spoken and the written word.
José Luis Bermúdez (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2005
- Published Online:
- January 2009
- ISBN:
- 9780199248964
- eISBN:
- 9780191719387
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is ...
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This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The chapters, all newly written for this book, explore different aspects of Evans's philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The book includes an introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans's thought and places the chapters in context.Less
This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The chapters, all newly written for this book, explore different aspects of Evans's philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The book includes an introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans's thought and places the chapters in context.
Genia Schönbaumsfeld
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199229826
- eISBN:
- 9780191710766
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199229826.003.0006
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This final chapter sums up the main arguments of the book. It's aims have been to trace the parallels in Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and examine the affinities in their ...
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This final chapter sums up the main arguments of the book. It's aims have been to trace the parallels in Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and examine the affinities in their thought about religious belief. The book has attempted to undermine some of the more tenacious myths surrounding Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's religious thought and to show that the two authors — especially when read in the light of each other — still present the greatest challenge to the received orthodoxies in the philosophy of religion as well as to the subject's (philosophy's) own conception of itself.Less
This final chapter sums up the main arguments of the book. It's aims have been to trace the parallels in Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and examine the affinities in their thought about religious belief. The book has attempted to undermine some of the more tenacious myths surrounding Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's religious thought and to show that the two authors — especially when read in the light of each other — still present the greatest challenge to the received orthodoxies in the philosophy of religion as well as to the subject's (philosophy's) own conception of itself.
John Marenbon
- Published in print:
- 2003
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780195134070
- eISBN:
- 9780199868094
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0195134079.003.0006
- Subject:
- Religion, Philosophy of Religion
Addresses the argument of Boethius's masterpiece, the Consolation of Philosophy. It shows that Boethius, the author, juxtaposes a complex view of happiness in which it is vulnerable to fortune, with ...
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Addresses the argument of Boethius's masterpiece, the Consolation of Philosophy. It shows that Boethius, the author, juxtaposes a complex view of happiness in which it is vulnerable to fortune, with a monolithic view in which it is identified with the highest good – God. It also considers the treatment of divine providence and how it can be reconciled with the existence of chance and with human freedom.Less
Addresses the argument of Boethius's masterpiece, the Consolation of Philosophy. It shows that Boethius, the author, juxtaposes a complex view of happiness in which it is vulnerable to fortune, with a monolithic view in which it is identified with the highest good – God. It also considers the treatment of divine providence and how it can be reconciled with the existence of chance and with human freedom.
Gary Scott Smith
- Published in print:
- 2006
- Published Online:
- January 2007
- ISBN:
- 9780195300604
- eISBN:
- 9780199785285
- Item type:
- chapter
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300604.003.0002
- Subject:
- Religion, Religion and Society
While many of George Washington’s contemporaries portrayed him as a devout Christian, Thomas Jefferson’s foes depicted him as an infidel and an atheist. Given how similar their religious views and ...
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While many of George Washington’s contemporaries portrayed him as a devout Christian, Thomas Jefferson’s foes depicted him as an infidel and an atheist. Given how similar their religious views and practices were, these radically different appraisals of Washington and Jefferson are ironic. Religion mesmerized, tantalized, alarmed, and sometimes inspired Jefferson, and he discussed religious issues, movements, and leaders often in his conversation and correspondence and occasionally in his addresses and published writings. Religious issues played a major role in Jefferson’s life and presidency. He wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1786) that disestablished the Episcopal Church, enshrined the principle of freedom of conscience, and helped prepare the way for the First Amendment. Since 1947 his metaphor of a “wall of separation” between church and state has dominated constitutional debate over the proper place of religion in public life and policy. Although he repudiated much of orthodox Christianity, the Virginian was a deeply religious man. Jefferson’s alleged lack of faith was a major issue in the hotly contested election of 1800. In an effort to discover the historical Jesus, he devised two different editions of the Gospels for his own use that eliminated all miraculous elements and focused on Christ’s ethical teachings. Although his supporters, his opponents, and academicians have, for the past two centuries, debated the nature of his faith and whether he should be labeled an Episcopalian, a deist, or a Unitarian, many scholars do not recognize how important Jefferson’s religious convictions were to his philosophy of government and career. Jefferson’s character and views of slavery are also examined.Less
While many of George Washington’s contemporaries portrayed him as a devout Christian, Thomas Jefferson’s foes depicted him as an infidel and an atheist. Given how similar their religious views and practices were, these radically different appraisals of Washington and Jefferson are ironic. Religion mesmerized, tantalized, alarmed, and sometimes inspired Jefferson, and he discussed religious issues, movements, and leaders often in his conversation and correspondence and occasionally in his addresses and published writings. Religious issues played a major role in Jefferson’s life and presidency. He wrote the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1786) that disestablished the Episcopal Church, enshrined the principle of freedom of conscience, and helped prepare the way for the First Amendment. Since 1947 his metaphor of a “wall of separation” between church and state has dominated constitutional debate over the proper place of religion in public life and policy. Although he repudiated much of orthodox Christianity, the Virginian was a deeply religious man. Jefferson’s alleged lack of faith was a major issue in the hotly contested election of 1800. In an effort to discover the historical Jesus, he devised two different editions of the Gospels for his own use that eliminated all miraculous elements and focused on Christ’s ethical teachings. Although his supporters, his opponents, and academicians have, for the past two centuries, debated the nature of his faith and whether he should be labeled an Episcopalian, a deist, or a Unitarian, many scholars do not recognize how important Jefferson’s religious convictions were to his philosophy of government and career. Jefferson’s character and views of slavery are also examined.
Gary Kemp
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199695621
- eISBN:
- 9780191738524
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695621.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics/Epistemology
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most ...
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So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.Less
So far as language and meaning are concerned, Donald Davidson and Willard Van Orman Quine are typically regarded as birds of a feather. This book urges first of all that they cannot be. Quine’s most basic and general philosophical commitment is to his methodological naturalism, which is incompatible with Davidson’s main commitments. In particular, it is not possible to endorse, from Quine’s perspective, the roles played by the concepts truth and reference in Davidson’s philosophy of language; Davidson’s employment of the concept of truth is from Quine’s point of view needlessly ambitious; and his use of the concept of reference cannot be divorced from unscientific ‘intuition’. Second, the book puts the case positively in favour of Quine’s naturalism and its corollary, naturalized epistemology. It is possible to give a consistent account of language without problematic uses of the concepts truth and reference, which in turn makes a strident naturalism much more plausible.
Gillian Russell
- Published in print:
- 2008
- Published Online:
- May 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199232192
- eISBN:
- 9780191715907
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232192.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because ...
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The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.Less
The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence: synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean, whereas analytic sentences — like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides — are different; they are true in virtue of meaning and so, no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true. The distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way; one can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many 20th-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments. But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language — semantic externalism — on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate. This book argues that it hasn't. It uses the tools of contemporary philosophy of language to outline a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism, and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. It then goes on to draw out some surprising epistemological consequences.
Norman Kretzmann
- Published in print:
- 2001
- Published Online:
- November 2003
- ISBN:
- 9780199246540
- eISBN:
- 9780191597879
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/0199246548.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, History of Philosophy
The Metaphysics of Creation is a continuation of the project begun in The Metaphysics of Theism, moving the focus to the second book of Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Building upon his ...
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The Metaphysics of Creation is a continuation of the project begun in The Metaphysics of Theism, moving the focus to the second book of Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Building upon his account of God's existence and nature, Aquinas argues that the existence of things other than God must be explained by divine creation out of nothing. Arguments follow to identify God's motivation for creating, to defend the possibility of a beginningless universe, and to explain the origin of species. Aquinas focuses exclusively on creatures with intellects, with the result that more than half of his natural theology of creation constitutes a philosophy of mind.Less
The Metaphysics of Creation is a continuation of the project begun in The Metaphysics of Theism, moving the focus to the second book of Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Building upon his account of God's existence and nature, Aquinas argues that the existence of things other than God must be explained by divine creation out of nothing. Arguments follow to identify God's motivation for creating, to defend the possibility of a beginningless universe, and to explain the origin of species. Aquinas focuses exclusively on creatures with intellects, with the result that more than half of his natural theology of creation constitutes a philosophy of mind.
Sharon L. Crasnow and Anita M. Superson (eds)
- Published in print:
- 2012
- Published Online:
- May 2012
- ISBN:
- 9780199855469
- eISBN:
- 9780199932788
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy
Philosophy is by its very nature a critical discipline. Due to its critical nature, all philosophy is progressive, building on the lessons of the past, offering new ways of thinking about the present ...
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Philosophy is by its very nature a critical discipline. Due to its critical nature, all philosophy is progressive, building on the lessons of the past, offering new ways of thinking about the present and the future. Recent debates within analytical philosophy have become very rigorous and fine-tuned, with great attention to detail, resulting in much progress. But social progress, the progress that feminists and other critical philosophers have made or are trying to make toward the goal of “better” knowledge, knowledge that is not only true but relevant for improving our lives, has been for the most part left out of traditional analytical philosophy. The effects of social progress can be tradition-changing at various levels, bringing traditional philosophy “out from the shadows.” The 18 papers (all but two previously unpublished) in this volume, spanning most areas of philosophy, address the social progress being made by analytical feminism in its attempt to bring traditional issues out from the shadows into the light of feminist critique. The volume represents current discussions on topics that have not been previously addressed by feminists, and further discussions on topics that feminists have already addressed but are here themselves critiqued.Less
Philosophy is by its very nature a critical discipline. Due to its critical nature, all philosophy is progressive, building on the lessons of the past, offering new ways of thinking about the present and the future. Recent debates within analytical philosophy have become very rigorous and fine-tuned, with great attention to detail, resulting in much progress. But social progress, the progress that feminists and other critical philosophers have made or are trying to make toward the goal of “better” knowledge, knowledge that is not only true but relevant for improving our lives, has been for the most part left out of traditional analytical philosophy. The effects of social progress can be tradition-changing at various levels, bringing traditional philosophy “out from the shadows.” The 18 papers (all but two previously unpublished) in this volume, spanning most areas of philosophy, address the social progress being made by analytical feminism in its attempt to bring traditional issues out from the shadows into the light of feminist critique. The volume represents current discussions on topics that have not been previously addressed by feminists, and further discussions on topics that feminists have already addressed but are here themselves critiqued.
Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199231195
- eISBN:
- 9780191710810
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231195.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book examines what happens when language becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are habitual users of various ...
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This book examines what happens when language becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are habitual users of various meta-linguistic devices, but reliance on these devices begins early — kids are told, “That's called a rabbit”. It's not implausible that a primitive capacity for the meta-linguistic kicks in at the beginning stages of language acquisition. But no matter when or how frequently these devices are invoked, one thing is clear: they present theorists of language with a complex data pattern. This book shows that the study of these devices and patterns not only represents an interesting and neglected project in the philosophy of language, but also carries important consequences for other parts of philosophy. Part I is devoted to presenting data about various aspects of our meta-linguistic practices. In Part II, the book examines and rejects the four leading meta-linguistic theories, and offers a new account of our use of quotation in a variety of different contexts. But the primary goal of this book is not to promote one theory over another. Rather, it is to present a deeply puzzling set of problems and explain their significance.Less
This book examines what happens when language becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are habitual users of various meta-linguistic devices, but reliance on these devices begins early — kids are told, “That's called a rabbit”. It's not implausible that a primitive capacity for the meta-linguistic kicks in at the beginning stages of language acquisition. But no matter when or how frequently these devices are invoked, one thing is clear: they present theorists of language with a complex data pattern. This book shows that the study of these devices and patterns not only represents an interesting and neglected project in the philosophy of language, but also carries important consequences for other parts of philosophy. Part I is devoted to presenting data about various aspects of our meta-linguistic practices. In Part II, the book examines and rejects the four leading meta-linguistic theories, and offers a new account of our use of quotation in a variety of different contexts. But the primary goal of this book is not to promote one theory over another. Rather, it is to present a deeply puzzling set of problems and explain their significance.
Keith Hossack
- Published in print:
- 2007
- Published Online:
- January 2008
- ISBN:
- 9780199206728
- eISBN:
- 9780191709777
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
- DOI:
- 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206728.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. ...
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This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.Less
This book presents the thesis that knowledge is an absolutely fundamental relation, with an indispensable role to play in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and philosophy of mind and language. Knowledge has been generally assumed to be a propositional attitude like belief. But this book argues that knowledge is not a relation to a content; rather, it's a relation to a fact. This point of view allows us to explain many of the concepts of philosophical logic in terms of knowledge. The book provides a theory of facts as structured combinations of particulars and universals, and presents a theory of content as the property of a mental act that determines its value for getting knowledge. It also defends a theory of representation in which the conceptual structure of content is taken to picture the fact it represents. This permits definitions to be given of reference, truth, and necessity in terms of knowledge. Turning to the metaphysics of mind and language, the book argues that a conscious state is one that is identical with knowledge of its own occurrence. This allows us to characterize subjectivity, and, by illuminating the ‘I’-concept, allows us to gain a better understanding of the concept of a person. Language is then explained in terms of knowledge, as a device used by a community of persons for exchanging knowledge by testimony. The book concludes that knowledge is too fundamental to be constituted by something else, such as one's functional or physical state; other things may cause knowledge, but do not constitute it.
